William M. Phillips v. State of Tennessee - concurring in part and dissenting in part

I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority pertaining to the Petitioner’s recusal claim. I respectfully part ways with the lead opinion; however, because it fails to address the issue squarely before the court, which is whether the Petitioner was entitled to counsel during his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This issue, as noted in Judge Easter’s dissent, requires us to determine whether a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage of the proceedings. Because a defendant’s substantial rights are affected, I would have concluded that a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage in judicial proceedings. Accordingly, I would have reversed the judgment of the post-conviction court and vacated its order denying relief. I also would have reversed and vacated the trial court’s denial of the Petitioner’s post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw following the appointment of counsel or valid waiver thereof.