SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Melissa Combs Cranston v. Edward Scott Combs
M2000-02101-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol A. Catalano

We granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the appellant (father) in this post-divorce case failed to present evidence of a material change of circumstances justifying a change of custody of the parties’ two minor children. The Chancellor granted a change in custody from the appellee (mother) after finding that there was a material change in circumstances that presented a substantial risk of harm to the children. A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no material change of circumstances that presented a threat of substantial harm to the children. After reviewing the record and applying our recent decision in Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. 2002), we conclude that a material change of circumstances occurred after the initial custody determination and that the modification of custody was in the best interest of the children. Although the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of Kendrick in this case, and therefore applied an incorrect legal standard, we affirm the result reached by the Chancery Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the Chancery Court is reinstated.d.

State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia
M2000-01760-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier

State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia
M2000-01760-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier

State v. Keena Mathes
E2001-00753-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Cupp
In this appeal, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred in ordering that she legitimate her youngest child as a condition of probation. Having carefully reviewed the issues raised by the parties, we hold that the trial court erred in requiring the appellant to legitimate her child as a condition of probation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the legitimation condition and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State v. Jerry Graves
E2001-00123-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner

State v. Jerry Graves
E2001-00123-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner

State v. Maurice Nash
W2001-01703-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
Maurice Lashaun Nash was tried before a Tipton County jury for possession of marijuana, a schedule VI controlled substance, with intent to deliver. The jury convicted Nash of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support an instruction to the jury and conviction on the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession with the intent to deliver. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Nash's conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on the charge of simple possession. Both Nash and the State sought permission to appeal the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We granted both petitions and after conducting a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for facilitation of possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of its judgment of conviction.

Robert Davidson v. Charles Lindsey
W2000-02891-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
In this personal injury case, we address whether the trial judge properly performed his duties as thirteenth juror in denying the appellees' motion for new trial. The Court of Appeals found that based on statements made by the trial judge during the trial, at the hearing for the motion for new trial, and at the hearing to set bond and stay execution of the judgment, there was "an appearance of bias" against two of the defendants due to their failure to reach a settlement with the plaintiffs. As a result, the Court of Appeals found that the trial judge could not have properly discharged his duty as thirteenth juror. We reverse. There is no indication that the trial judge was biased against the defendants; instead, it is clear that the trial judge believed that the ultimate outcome was obvious from the outset, and that the bad facts and poor testimony of one of the defendants should have prompted a substantial settlement offer from the defendants. The record indicates that the trial judge considered the issues in the case and explicitly approved the jury's apportionment of fault and the amount of damages awarded. Additionally, acting in our discretion under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(b), we address the other issues raised on appeal by the appellees, and find that they are without merit. As such, we reinstate the judgment of the trial judge approving the jury's verdict.

Victoria Henry v. Timothy Goins
M2000-02663-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
The trial court entered an Order of Dismissal for failure to prosecute. The order was entered with prejudice and without notice to the parties. After the trial court reinstated Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 60.02"), Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in setting aside the Order of Dismissal and vacated the judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. We granted permission to appeal. Because Plaintiffs presented adequate grounds for relief under Rule 60.02, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reinstating their claims. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the trial court erred in setting aside the Order of Dismissal. Accordingly, we reinstate the jury verdict, and we remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

John Doe, et al. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, et al.
M2002-02076-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julia Smith Gibbons

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, we accepted certification of questions of law from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. We are asked by the federal district court to construe Rule 9, section 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Specifically, we are asked to determine whether Richard Roe, a layperson (i.e., a non-attorney), may be charged with contempt for disclosing that he filed a complaint with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility against an attorney in violation of the confidentiality provision embodied in Rule 9, section 25, and if so, by whom and before what tribunal? For the reasons given herein, we answer that the confidentiality requirement of Rule 9, section 25 applies to non-lawyers and lawyers alike. The appropriate sanction for a violation of Rule 9, section 25 is an action of contempt. Contempt proceedings may be initiated by the attorney against whom the complaint has been filed, the complainant, the Board of Professional Responsibility, or this Court. Finally, we hold that such a petition for contempt should be filed in this Court, whereupon assignment shall issue to a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The record and findings of fact of the special master shall then be sent to this Court whereupon a determination of guilt and punishment, if any, will follow.

Rutherford County v. Martha Jordan Wilson, et al.
M2000-01382-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

This appeal arises out of a condemnation proceeding brought by Rutherford County against the appellees. The appellant, claiming an interest through her deceased husband in the property to be condemned, filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding. The trial court denied the appellant's motion to intervene and dismissed her cross-claim for declaratory judgment, finding that she held no interest in the property under the provisions of the granting instrument. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the granting instrument conveyed a contingent remainder to each member of the class. As such, the conveyance to the appellant's husband lapsed when he predeceased the life tenant, leaving appellant without an interest in the property. We granted review, and we now hold that each class member held a vested, transmissible interest in the property prior to the death of the life tenant and that the appellant holds no interest in the property. We remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Dee Ann Gallaher v. Curtis J. Elam
E2000-02719-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carey E. Garrett

In this appeal, the appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Guidelines ("the Guidelines"). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that chapter 1240-2-4-.03(4) of the Guidelines violates the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions. We granted permission to appeal. After careful consideration, we conclude that: (1) chapter 1240-2-4-.03(4) of the Guidelines, which prohibits consideration of non-court-ordered child support in calculating child support, and chapter 1240-2-4-.03(2) of the Guidelines, which requires consideration only of the obligor's income in calculating child support, do not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of either the United States or Tennessee Constitutions; and (2) the promulgation of the Guidelines does not constitute an impermissible delegation of rulemaking authority by the General Assembly to the Department of Human Services. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Linda J. Corum v. Holston Health & Rehabilitation Center, et al.
E2001-02074-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Sharon J. Bell

We granted the employer's motion for full court review in this case in order to decide whether the failure to file the statistical data ("SD1") form contemporaneously with the order of final judgment, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-244(b) (1999), affects the finality of that judgment. After a thorough review of the record and careful consideration of relevant authorities, we have determined that the failure to file the SD1 form contemporaneously with the order of final judgment does not affect the finality of the judgment. Accordingly, we agree with the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in its dismissal of the appeal as untimely because as it was not filed within the time prescribed by Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Rodney R. Hardin v. Royal & Sunalliance Insurance
E2001-02622-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler

We granted the plaintiff's motion for review as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e) (1999 & Supp. 2002) to determine whether a trial court may reconsider an award pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) (1999) when an employee resigns and, if so, under what circumstances may the prior award be increased. After receiving a workers' compensation award and returning to his pre-injury employment, Rodney R. Hardin voluntarily resigned. Thereafter, he filed a motion requesting that the trial court reconsider his award. The trial court granted this motion and increased the plaintiff's award by 15%. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel held that, while a trial court may reconsider a previous workers' compensation award when the employee resigns, it may increase the award only if the resignation was reasonably related to the injury. The Panel found that Hardin's resignation was not reasonably related to his injury and, therefore, reversed the trial court's increase of the award. We agree with the Panel's reasoning and its conclusion.

State of Tennessee v. Harold L. Green
E2000-00616-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

We granted Harold L. Green's application pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine the duration of the trial court's authority to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. On October 8, 1999, Green pleaded guilty to driving while under the influence of an intoxicant and was, thereafter, sentenced by the Criminal Court of Anderson County. On November 5, 1999, Green filed a motion to withdraw the previously entered guilty plea; the trial court granted the motion. The State appealed pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. After granting the State's request for appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. We find that the trial court's jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion to withdraw the guilty plea continued for thirty days after the plea was entered. Accordingly, we reinstate the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for any further proceedings that may be appropriate.

Susan Green v. Leon Moore
M2002-00889-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Lee Davies
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the thirty (30)-day notice of appeal period, articulated in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) ("Rule 4(a)"), began to run when the appellees filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the final claim between all parties in this action, or when the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all parties in this action had been adjudicated. The Court of Appeals held that the thirty-day period commenced on the date the appellees filed the notice of voluntary dismissal and concluded that the appellant's notice of appeal was untimely filed. We granted permission to appeal and hold that the thirty-day notice of appeal period commenced on the date that the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all the parties had been adjudicated. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the intermediate court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Darryl Lee Elkins
E2001-01245-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

State of Tennessee v. Darryl Lee Elkins
E2001-01245-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

State of Tennessee v. Darryl Lee Elkins
E2001-01245-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Ricky Harris v. State
E1999-02771-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Ricky Harris v. State
E1999-02771-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Ricky Harris v. State
E1999-02771-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Maylene E. Ledbetter v. Bryan K. Ledbetter
E2004-00239-SC-S09-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
In this interlocutory appeal, we must determine whether the trial court had the authority to enforce a mediated marital dissolution agreement when one of the parties repudiated its terms prior to court approval. Here, the parties, Maylene and Bryan Ledbetter, reached, through mediation, a marital dissolution agreement pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31. Shortly after the mediation, and prior to presentation for court approval, Mr. Ledbetter repudiated the agreement. Mrs. Ledbetter then filed a motion to enforce the terms of the agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court overruled Mrs. Ledbetter's motion, ruling that the oral agreement reached in mediation was not binding and enforceable against the parties. After a thorough review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that because Mr. Ledbetter repudiated the terms of the agreement prior to its presentation to the court, the trial court lacked authority to enter a judgment on the agreement. Further, because the agreement had not been reduced to writing and signed by the parties, it is not an enforceable contract. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State v. Robert Tait
W2001-02157-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
We granted this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether, in a prosecution commenced by an arrest warrant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, the resulting indictment may charge the defendant for offenses that can be inferred from the arrest warrant. The arrest warrant charged the appellant, Robert Tait, with driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and the grand jury indicted him for that offense (count one) and for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more (count two). The trial court dismissed the second count, finding that it described a new and additional charge and was, therefore, barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations because its prosecution had been commenced more than one year after the conduct occurred. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, concluding that the second count merely constituted an alternative theory for conviction and did not charge an offense distinct from that for which the appellant was initially charged. After reviewing the record and controlling legal authority, we hold that the language of the warrant sufficiently tolled the limitations period for count two. Therefore, we affirm the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Judy Burroughs v. Robert W. Magee
W2001-00238-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III