State of Tennessee v. Daryl Bobo
The defendant appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion seeking resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h). Upon our review of the applicable law and the briefs of the parties, we conclude the defendant does not have an appeal as of right and the instant appeal should be dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jonathan Michael Atha v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jonathan Michael Atha, appeals the denial of his motion for a hearing on |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cody Lynn Wyrick, Alias
The defendant, Cody Lynn Wyrick, Alias, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Heather Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee
This appeal concerns a claim of retaliatory discharge. Heather Smith (“Smith”), then an |
Court of Appeals | ||
Adarion C. Morris v. State of Tennessee
In April 2018, Petitioner, Adarion C. Morris, pleaded guilty in three separate cases and received an effective sentence of six years to be served on community corrections. However, after two community corrections violation warrants were filed, one in June 2018 and another in August 2018, the trial court held a hearing, revoked Petitioner’s community corrections sentence, and re-sentenced Petitioner to forty-eight years in the Department of Correction. This court affirmed the trial court’s revocation and sentence imposed on appeal. See State v. Adarion C. Morris, No. M2018-02034-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2019), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when entering his guilty pleas, which rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. He also alleged counsel was ineffective at the revocation hearing and re-sentencing for not challenging the legality of the original community corrections sentence. After a hearing, the post-conviction court concluded Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding the guilty pleas were untimely and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim relative to the revocation and re-sentencing was without merit. Petitioner appeals, arguing that he is entitled to due process tolling of the limitations period for his claims regarding his guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Wayne Woods
The Defendant, Douglas Wayne Woods, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Estate of Willie Harold Hargett et al. v. Charlotte R. Hodges Brown
A decedent’s estate sued his girlfriend for the proceeds of his life insurance policy, items from his home that were missing or damaged, and money withdrawn from his credit union account. The trial court found for the estate on the basis of fraud, conversion, and undue influence. The girlfriend appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Rommell Gray
After a jury trial, the Defendant, Jerry Rommell Gray, was convicted of felony murder, |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Russell Davis
The Defendant, Russell Davis, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy W. Locke
Defendant, Billy W. Locke, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his two |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jasmin Lawan Towles
The Defendant, Jasmin Lawan Towles, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lynne Ingram Bolton v. David Bolton
This is a criminal contempt case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s finding that he is guilty of four counts of criminal contempt for violating the trial court’s orders regarding medical treatment for the minor child. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marcus Johnson v. Kevin Genovese, Warden
Marcus Johnson, Petitioner, sought habeas corpus relief for the third time after his convictions for one count of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. See State v. Marcus Johnson, No. W2002-00987-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22080778, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 26, 2004); Marcus Johnson v. State, No. W2007-02664-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 4866817, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2008), no perm. app. filed. The petition was dismissed without a hearing after the habeas corpus court determined that Petitioner was merely raising issues that had previously been litigated. We determine that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition and affirm the judgment of that court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Infinity Homes, Inc. et al. v. Horizon Land Title, Inc. et al.
Appellants, purchasers of several unimproved lots, filed suit against Appellee title company. Appellants asserted five counts against Appellee based on Appellee’s alleged failure to disclose the existence of a lien lis pendens on the lots. The trial court dismissed all but one of the counts against Appellee and certified its orders of partial dismissal as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its orders as final and dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Summers Cavin
The primary issue presented is whether a criminal restitution order is a final and appealable |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Summers Cavin (Concur)
I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court did not err in ordering Johnny Cavin to pay restitution. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court believed there was more to be done, not because it did everything it was supposed to do. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon
A trial court ordered a defendant to pay a set amount of criminal restitution but did not |
Giles | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon (Concur)
I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Joseph Gevedon’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.1 I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court had any intention of setting the time for payment, not because the trial court did everything it was supposed to do. |
Giles | Supreme Court | |
Maryam Sobhi (Soryana) Mikhail v. George Aziz Mikhail
A wife sought a divorce after a long-term marriage. The trial court granted the wife a default judgment for divorce as a sanction for the husband’s discovery abuses. After a trial, the court also valued and divided the marital estate and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. On appeal, the husband challenges the court’s decisions on multiple grounds. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Rimmel, III
Defendant, William Rimmel, III, was indicted by the Marion County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of false imprisonment, one count of vandalism over $2,500, and one count of burglary of an automobile. The charge of false imprisonment was dismissed prior to trial. A jury found Defendant guilty of attempted aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, attempted reckless endangerment, vandalism under $1,000, and attempted burglary of an automobile. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective sentence of two years on probation following service of 11 months and 29 days in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and in ordering consecutive sentencing, that his convictions should be vacated due to the State’s failure to preserve evidence, and that the trial court gave confusing jury instructions. Based on the record, the briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a judgment in Count 4 and amended judgment in Count 3, reflecting that those counts were dismissed, and for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 5 and 6. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vondell Richmond v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee
This case involves a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the plaintiff, then a member of the Clarksville City Council, was entitled to a declaration of rights concerning alleged communications between the Clarksville City Attorney and the local District Attorney General potentially pertaining to plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that the plaintiff was seeking an impermissible advisory opinion because there was no justiciable controversy. Having reviewed the record, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kristie M. Haun v. Jason B. Haun Et Al.
This is an appeal regarding the final decree of divorce for this couple. The husband’s inlaws |
Court of Appeals | ||
Heidi Pendas v. Christopher J. Irizarry et al.
This case involves an intrafamily dispute over a home and the alleged indebtedness thereon. The trial court found that the son committed promissory fraud with regard to the conveyance of the home and awarded the mother $180,000.00 in damages as the value of the home at the time of the conveyance. The trial court further dismissed a claim against the daughter related to a loan on the property. Both the son and the mother appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William Rolandus Keel v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief from his convictions for two counts of rape of a child, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in not admitting relevant evidence consisting of a recorded phone call (“Phone Call Recording” or “recording”) between the victim and her mother, in limiting the Petitioner’s testimony at the remand evidentiary hearing, in finding that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel, and in denying post-conviction relief when the Petitioner is “one hundred percent innocent and [was] wrongfully convicted.” Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Garen Wright
Defendant, Garen Wright, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his previously ordered probationary sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by not considering alternatives to placing Defendant in custody for the full term. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |