State vs. Jimmy Noah
03C01-9710-CC-00436

State vs. Gilbert Smith
03C01-9708-CC-00360
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

State vs. Guillermo Juan
03C01-9708-CR-00318
Trial Court Judge: Rebecca J. Stern

State vs. James Clinton Wolford
03C01-9708-CR-00319
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil

Russell vs. Mid-South Insurance et al
01A01-9803-CV-00135
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Blankenship v. Mars
03S01-9709-CH-00105
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Earl H. Henley, Chancellor

Freeman v. American Motorist
03S01-9803-CH-00023
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordancewith Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. George Edward Freeman (employee), sustained an injury to his left eye while grinding metal at work, when a piece of metal penetrated his safety glasses and lodged in his cornea. The trial court awarded 7 percent permanent partial disability to the left eye, which the employer appeals as excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Employee had worked for Vinylex Corporation (employer), as a machine technician and maintenance fabricator for eleven years when he was involved in the above-described industrial accident on February 18, 1995. He was taken to an emergency room, where examination by Dr. Leslie Cunningham revealed a central corneal laceration, with inflammation, and a triangular metallic foreign body in his left eye. Dr. Cunningham surgically removed the foreign body, cleansed the wound and patched Mr. Freeman's eye. She advised the employee to leave the patch on the eye and to remain off work for six weeks. Mr. Freeman testified that he went back to work three days later owing to family financial responsibilities requiring him to earn his full salary. Dr. Cunningham assessed three to five percent permanent partial impairment to the left eye, but opined that if the employee works in bright sunlight or under bright lights or drives at night, then his medical impairment to the left eye would be 16 to 18%, and that he retains a permanent corneal scar. 2

State vs. Marty Thatcher
03C01-9710-CC-00446
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

State vs. Robert Gillespie
03C01-9710-CC-00455

State vs. Timothy Wayne Reece
03C01-9803-CR-00098
Trial Court Judge: Arden L. Hill

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Trial Court Judge: James F. Russell

State vs. Darryl Kennedy
02C01-9708-CR-00318
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett

State vs. Cedric Dickerson
02C01-9802-CR-00051

Hamilton v. Life Care Center
03S01-9712-CH-00143
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Earl Henley,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Life Care Center, insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the injury to the employee or claimant, Hamilton, is permanent or, alternatively, that the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. It is undisputed that, on September 15, 1993, the claimant slipped on a wet floor and fell backward, hitting the back of her head on a hard floor, while working for the employer. After a trial, the trial judge awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on forty percent to the body as a whole. The extent of an injured worker's disability is an issue of fact. Jaske v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 75 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1988). Thus, appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). The claimant was forty-five years old at the time of her injury, with a high school education. She worked for Life Care Center as a nurse's assistant and had a second job as a greeter for Wal-Mart. Her work for Life Care required some heavy lifting and other strenuous work, whereas her work as a greeter for Wal-Mart was not very strenuous. She has never before made a claim for an injury to her head or neck. On the day of the accident, it had been raining heavily. As the claimant entered the building to attend classes for obtaining certification as a nurse's aide, her feet suddenly went out from under her and she fell, striking the back of her head on the tile floor. According to her testimony, accredited by the findings 2

Mcgaha v. U.S. Marine
03S01-9711-CV-00137
Authoring Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben W. Hooper, Circuit Judge

Hooker vs. Thompson
01A01-9709-CH-00533

William Terry Wyatt
03C01-9802-CC-00057
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham

State vs. Paul Dejongh
03C01-9806-CR-00211
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins

Bradson Mercantile vs. Joseph Crabtree
02A01-9710-CV-00272

Barbara Jordan vs. Sofamor S.N.C.
02A01-9803-CV-00067
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.

02A01-9804-CV-
02A01-9804-CV-
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.

State vs. Leonard Prater
01C01-9710-CC-00499

State vs. Leonard Prater
01C01-9710-CC-00499

Rhea v. Modine
03S01-9710-CV-00124
Authoring Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James B. Scott, Jr.

State vs. Torayo Brown
W2000-00472-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
The defendant, Torayo Olandis Brown, was convicted of possessing with intent to deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine, a class B felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years and nine months, ordering eight months to be served in the local jail and the balance to be served in a community corrections program. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the state to impeach him with a prior conviction; and (3) the state improperly argued that he was impeached by the prior conviction. Because of plain error in the trial court's failure to provide a limiting instruction relating to the impeachment evidence, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.