The City of White House vs. Whitley
01S01-9711-CH-00259

State vs Ricky Bryan
01C01-9704-CC-00136

Willie Gooch v. Mckinnon Bridge Company
01S01-9708-CH-00169
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue on appeal is whether the denial of the employee's motion to set aside the workers' compensation settlement was an abuse of discretion. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the trial court did not err and that the trial court's action should be affirmed. The employee, Mr. Willie Gooch, a manual laborer, injured both hands on March 14, 1995 during the course and within the scope of his employment for McKinnon Bridge Company. Dr. Fred Torstrick had assigned the following impairment ratings: eight percent to the left index finger, twenty-nine percent to the left long finger, twenty-nine percent to the left ring finger, twelve percent to the left small finger, fifteen percent to the right index finger, fifteen percent to the right long finger, and twelve percent to the right ring finger. Mr. Todd Smith, a representative for the insurance adjusting agency, advised Mr. Gooch of the treating physician's disability ratings and offered him a settlement based on those ratings. However, the settlement eliminated any future medical benefits for the injury. Mr. Smith, admittedly, did not read the documents to Mr. Gooch, who cannot read and can barely write his name. The settlement proposed a lump sum payment in the sum of $11,962.19, in addition to medical expenses already paid totaling $2,766.1. Mr. James Tucker, attorney for McKinnon Bridge Company, testified that he personally called Mr. Gooch and explained the settlement, including the omission of any future medical expenses and the settlement's finality. Mr. Tucker and Mr. Gooch met and went over the prepared documents, which Mr. Gooch then signed. Mr. Tucker testified that he did not read the documents to Mr. Gooch verbatim but that he did cover the substance of the material portions in question. On October 31, 1996, McKinnon Bridge Company and the injured employee filed a Petition for Approval of Final Settlement in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. Mr. Gooch was not represented by counsel. A hearing was held that same day. The chancellor repeatedly told Mr. Gooch he would likely receive more money if he took his case to trial. The chancellor further informed Mr. Gooch that he certainly would be awarded future medical benefits if taken to trial. Moreover, the chancellor advised Mr. Gooch that he was entitled to hire an attorney. Despite the information provided by the insurance adjuster, the defendant's attorney, as well as the chancellor, Mr. Gooch still expressed a desire to settle the matter. Thus, the chancellor entered an Order Approving the Settlement, after finding the settlement to be in the employee's best interest. On his drive home from the courthouse, Mr. Gooch concluded he had made a mistake. He hired an attorney, who, on November 8, 1996, filed a timely Motion to Set Aside The Order Approving the Workers' Compensation Settlement, grounded on his lack of sophistication and illiteracy, and that he had changed his mind after considering what he had been told by the judge and 2

Bonnie Doss Knutson v. Dollar General Corporation
01S01-9709-CV-00207
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

William R. Littrell v. Lawrence County Advocate, Inc.
01S01-9710-CV-00233
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This action was filed by the heirs at law and administrators of the estate of Edith Carolyn Littrell ["Decedent"] to recover the statutory benefits available in a non-dependency case. On August 4, 1996, the Decedent was delivering newspapers for the defendant. She was 53 years old, single, and had delivered newspapers twice weekly for four years on a 1-mile route driving her personal automobile, a Ford Bronco. The one-car accident occurred on the tertiary, non-paved Mt. Zion road in a remote section of Lawrence County at about the halfway point on her delivery route. The road was seventeen feet wide, graveled, straight, and the Decedent was west-bound, traveling up-grade. There were no witnesses to the accident, but the witness Richardson testified without objection that the Bronco "flipped over one and a-half times." The precise time of the accident was not established. The witness Richardson testified that he "learned there had been a car wreck" about 9: a.m. and went to the scene. Trooper Paul Moore testified that he received a 911 message about 9: a.m. that an accident had occurred and that he arrived at the scene 2 - 3 minutes later. Mr. Richardson testified that Trooper Moore arrived more than an hour after he - Mr. Richardson - arrived. The EMS people arrived before Trooper Moore, and were attending to the Decedent, who was taken to Crockett Hospital. Trooper Moore testified: " . . . there was a cooler inside the vehicle. There was a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, beer . . . there was also open beer cans in the vehicle. It had a strong, strong smell of it . . . beer." 2

Charles Garrison v. James Stamps
M2001-02900-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Robert P. Hamilton
Charles Garrison and James C. Stamps were involved in an automobile accident on October 10, 1998 wherein Garrison was seriously injured. Stamps was uninsured, and Garrison was beneficiary of uninsured motorists coverage under policies of insurance issued to his parents. With no suit ever filed against Stamps, Garrison and his parents reached an agreement with the uninsured motorists carriers whereby the carriers paid the limits of their uninsured motorists coverage. Charles Garrison being a minor, a Petition for court approval of the settlement was filed naming Stamps as the defendant, and an Order was entered approving the settlement. Garrison then filed suit against Stamps, which suit was met with a Summary Judgment Motion by Stamps claiming that he was released from liability by the settlement Order. Garrison filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 Motion seeking to have the settlement Order revised to reflect the true facts of the settlement. This Motion was granted, and Stamps appeals. We hold that Stamps is without standing to assert any rights under the settlement Order and, on this basis, affirm the judgment.

Mathivathani Mohan vs. Rathnasabapathy Mohan - Concurring/Dissenting
01-A-01-9708-CV-00415
Authoring Judge: Judge Walter W. Bussart
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This is an appeal from the final divorce decree of Rathnasabapathy Mohan ("the Husband") and Mathivathani Mohan ("the Wife") which was entered by  the lower court in December of 1996. The contested divorce action initiated by the Wife involved issues of custody, visitation, child support, alimony,  classification and division of marital property, and apportionment of marital debt. This appeal by the Husband emanates from the fact the Husband was not present when the final hearing took place.

Mathivathani Mohan v. Rathnasabapathy Mohan - Dissenting
01A01-9708-CV-00415
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I do not think the trial judge abused her discretion in denying the appellant’s motion for a new trial. The appellant’s motion does not set out what proof he would offer at a new trial and how that might change the result below. Therefore, I think the trial judge justifiably overruled the motion.

Max Norton and Long Outdoor Advertising, v. John McCaskill D/B/A City Sign Company
02A01-9712-CH-00325
Authoring Judge: Judge David V. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe C. Morris

This appeal involves a dispute over the duration of a lease. Defendant John A. McCaskill (McCaskill), doing business as City Sign Company (City Sign), appeals the Chancellor’s order granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs Max Norton (Norton) and Long Outdoor Advertising (LOA).

ATS, Inc., v. James Curtis Kent and George V. Kenney, and Bill R. McLaughlin, Trustees for Union Planters National Bank, v. Keith M. Canfield, v. Mid-South Title Insurance Corp.
02A01-9802-CH-00038
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This appeal involves the enforcement of a judgment lien where, subsequent to the attachment of the judgment lien, the encumbered real property was sold to a buyer who simultaneously granted a purchase money mortgage to a financial institution.

State of Tennessee vs. Edward Anthony Joslin
01C01-9710-CR-00491
Authoring Judge: Judge John H. Peay
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth Norman

A jury found the defendant guilty of conspiracy to possess with the intent to deliver over seventy pounds of marijuana; two counts of possession with the intent to deliver one-half ounce to ten pounds of marijuana; and delivery of ten pounds, one gram to seventy pounds of marijuana. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirtynine years incarceration, with a total fine of one hundred sixty thousand dollars ($160,000). On appeal, the defendant presents ten issues for review, most of which deal with the sufficiency of the convicting evidence or the propriety of the defendant’s sentence. We affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence.

State of Tennessee vs. Michael Orman
01C01-9710-CR-00498
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl Blackburn

The defendant was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of burglary and theft of property over $1,000. The trial court sentenced defendant to Range II sentences of six years on each count and ordered them served consecutively for an effective twelve-year sentence. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding and weighing the enhancement and mitigating factors and in ordering the sentences served consecutively instead of concurrently. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed.

Terry L. Baker vs. State of Tennessee
01C01-9711-CR-00522
Authoring Judge: Judge John H. Peay
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth Norman

The petitioner pled guilty to six counts of drug charges in Davidson County case number 92-A-647 on May 16, 1995. He was sentenced as a Range I offender to concurrent ten year sentences to be served in the Community Corrections program. On January 19, 1996, the petitioner was found guilty of violating his community corrections sentence and the court increased his sentence from ten years to twenty years to serve. On December 11, 1996, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that it was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations. The petitioner now appeals and argues the postconviction court erred when it dismissed the petition. We agree and reverse the judgment of the court below and remand this cause for a hearing on the merits of the petition.

Billie Joe Linticum vs. State of Tennessee - Concurring
03C01-9710-CR-00458
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stephen M. Bivel

The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree murder in 1975 and sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the conviction, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by executive action. Hamilton v. State, 555 S.W.2d 724 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

Timothy R. Powell vs. State of Tennessee
01C01-9708-CR-00379
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement

The Defendant, Timothy R. Powell, appeals as of right from the order of the trial court summarily dismissing his second petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Glenn M. Berger v. Lear Seating Corporation
03S01-9708-CV-00102
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Kindall Lawson,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, alleging that he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result of back injuries which he suffered during his employment in August 1994 and May 1996. The trial court found that the plaintiff timely notified the defendant of these injuries and determined that these injuries arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 1 percent permanent total disability but did not award him certain discretionary costs. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reduce the judgment by the amount of social security benefits attributable to employer contributions under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27(4)(A). The defendant appeals and raises the following issues: "1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff provided adequate notice of an injury as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 21, 5-6-22? 2. Whether the plaintiff's claim for benefits is barred by the one-year statute of limitations as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-23? 3. Whether the court erred in its award and assessment of benefits in light of the medical and lay testimony at trial? 4. Whether the trial court erred in awarding permanent total disability? 5. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's Motion to Reduce the Judgement [sic] by the amount of social security benefits attributable to employer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27 (4)(A)?" The plaintiff raises this single issue on appeal: 2

State of Tennessee v. Chrysta Gail Pike
03S01-9712-CR-00147
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Lebowitz

In this capital case, the defendant, Christa Gail Pike, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing on the conviction for first degree murder, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;” and (2) “[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) and (6) (1997 Repl.). Finding that the two aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution. With respect to the defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the trial judge imposed a consecutive twenty-five-year sentence.

Barbara White as the Administratrix of the Estate of Earl R. White, deceased v. William H. Lawrence, M.D.
02S01-9701-CV-00007
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

The Court has considered the Petition for Rehearing filed by the defendant/appellee, and it is the decision of a majority of this Court that the petition is without merit. The Petition for Rehearing is denied.

Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. John P. Roberts
02S01-9712-CH-00109
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Neal Small

In this legal malpractice action, the defendant, John P. Roberts, appeals from the Court of Appeals’ reversal of summary judgment entered by the trial court in his favor based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. The issue for our determination is whether the present action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104.1 After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we conclude that the instant suit is time-barred. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the decision of the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant is reversed.

John Kohl & Company P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, a Tennessee General Partnership, and Dan E. Huffstutter
01S01-9711-CV-00255
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

In this legal malpractice action, the plaintiffs, John Kohl & Company P.C., John B. Kohl, III and Helen H. Kohl, Individually, and John B. Kohl, III, Trustee, as Trustee of the John Kohl & Company, P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, (collectively referred to as the “plaintiffs”), appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the trial court’s finding that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs’ recovery for negligently provided legal advice pertaining to certain business matters. The plaintiffs have also appealed from the denial of legal fees associated with prosecuting this action against the defendant, Dearborn and Ewing, and one of its associates, Dan Huffstutter. The issues before us are: (1) whether certain of the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104, and (2) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover legal fees associated with prosecuting this action. For the reasons explained hereafter, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

State of Tennessee vs. Cecil Eugene McGuire
03C01-9705-CC-00191
Authoring Judge: Judge Curwood Witt
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

The Sevier County Grand Jury indicted sixteen-year old Cecil Eugene McGuire for aggravated rape, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated burglary. After a trial, the jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary but found him guilty of aggravated sexual battery and aggravated criminal trespass, a lesser grade offense of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to serve eleven years in the custody of the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender for the Class B felony, concurrently with eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the defendant presents the following issues:

1. Whether the indictments are fatally defective and thereby deprive the trial court of jurisdiction in this case.
2. Whether the evidence as a matter of law was insufficient to support the convictions.
3. Whether the trial court improperly credited and weighed the enhancement factors and imposed an excessive sentence.

After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we find no error warranting reversal of the defendant’s convictions. We affirm the convictions, but for reasons explained below, we modify the felony sentence from eleven years to ten years.

Karen Lynn Pilcher, and husband Keith A. Pilcher, v. A.L. Moneymaker, Jr., and wife, Roberta Moneymaker
03A01-9710-CV-00482
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

A. L. Moneymaker, Jr., and his wife Roberta Moneymaker appeal a judgment rendered by the Trial Court against them in the amount of $36,000 as a result of personal injuries sustained by Karen Lynn Pilcher and loss of consortium of her husband, Keith A. Pilcher. The suit arose as a result of a collision occurring on September 3, 1994, about 10:00 a.m., between a female dog named Spec, alleged to be owned by Mr. and Mrs. Moneymaker, and a bicycle being ridden by Mrs. Pilcher on Dutch Valley Road in Anderson County.

Damon Alan Kratochvil a Minor by James L. Coone and Sonja Coone v. Danny Alan Kratochvil
03A01-9712-CH-00536
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor R. Vann Owens

In this adoption case, Danny Alan Kratochvil (respondent) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights regarding his son, Damon Alan Kratochvil. The biological mother's parental rights were terminated by default judgment, and she is not a party to this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Larry G. Relford, v. William DeRochie and Steve LaFon
03A01-9712-CV-00547
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons

Larry G. Relford, an employee of William DeRochie, sued Mr. DeRochie and Steve LaFon, seeking damages for injuries received by him when he fell from a scaffold while framing a personal residence being erected for Mr. LaFon under a contract with Mr. DeRochie, the general contractor. As best we understand the complaint, it is grounded upon two theories-- first, that Mr. LaFon failed to provide a safe place for Mr. Relford to work and, second, that Mr. LaFon was, as contemplated by T.C.A. 50-6-111, a statutory employer and subject to the provisions of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Statute.

Jeremy P. Crye, a Minor by his next friend and Mother, Beverly A. Rogers, and Beverly A. Rogers, Individually v. Lloyd C. Norton and Mary B. Norton
03A01-9804-CV-00142
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

The plaintiff, Jeremy P. Crye, seeks to impose liability on Mary B. Morton for the act of her son, Lloyd C. Norton, in shooting him. The trial judge granted her motion for summary judgment without enlargement. The plaintiff appeals, and presents for review the issue of whether the proof relevant to the motion established a genuine dispute of a material fact, thus requiring a merit trial.