Kellye And Reid v. Mitchell Sherman Reid
In this post-divorce proceeding the self-employed father of the parties’ two children sought a reduction in his child support obligation on the ground that his income had substantially decreased. The mother of the children opposed the petition, asserting that Father was attempting to hide income by referring income-producing business to his brother, who was also self- employed in the same trade; Mother also sought an increase in support due to Father’s increase in income and modification of the parenting plan. The trial court held that Father was voluntarily underemployed and that the proof of his income was not credible; concluding that neither party had carried their burden of proof the court denied both petitions insofar as each sought modification of the child support obligation. The court denied Mother’s proposed modification of the parenting plan and both parties’ request for an award of counsel fees for services rendered in the proceeding. Both parties appeal. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the denial of Father’s petition to modify his support obligation and the order denying his counsel fees; we reverse the trial court’s holding that Father was underemployed and remand the case for a determination of whether income should be imputed to Father and, if so, whether there has been a significant variance such as to justify an increase in his support obligation; we vacate the order denying Mother’s petition to modify the parenting plan and remand the case for the court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Rule 52.01 and, in its discretion, for further consideration; we vacate the order denying Mother attorney’s fees. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Marlon McKay v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Marlon McKay, of felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life plus six years. This Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments on appeal. State v. Marlon McKay, No. W2010-01785-CCA-MR3C, 2011 WL 5335285 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 4, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2012). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged, as relevant on appeal, that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) not challenging his forty-eight hour hold when his arrest was not supported by probable cause; and (2) not timely filing a motion for new trial or a notice of appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clinton Austin v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Clinton Austin, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2014 conviction of aggravated sexual battery, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Osteen
The Defendant, Christopher Osteen, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Defendant complains that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences based upon judicially determined facts in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Additionally, he asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object to the aforementioned Blakely violation. Following our review, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Martin Dean "Cub" Meeks v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Martin Dean “Cub” Meeks, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition seeking to overturn his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was deficient in failing to obtain expert evidence, but he did not present any expert testimony at the post-conviction hearing. Because the Petitioner has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Shannon Gresham
Defendant, William Shannon Gresham, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury for one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, two counts of rape of a child, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court dismissed one count of rape of a child upon motion of the State at the close of the State’s proof, and the trial court dismissed one count of aggravated sexual battery at the close of the defense’s proof. The jury found Defendant not guilty of aggravated sexual battery, and Defendant was convicted on one count each of the lesser-included offenses of sexual exploitation of a minor and child abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to four years’ incarceration for sexual exploitation of a minor and two years’ incarceration for child abuse, to be served concurrently. Following a hearing on Defendant’s “Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and/or New Trial,” the trial court granted a judgment of acquittal on Defendant’s sexual exploitation of a minor conviction, concluding that the photographs of the victim did not depict “lascivious exhibition” as defined in State v. Whited, 506 S.W.3d 416 (Tenn. 2016). In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for child abuse and the trial court’s denial of probation. Following a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State v. A.B. Price Jr. and Victor Tyrone Sims
This consolidated appeal comes to us following the passage of the Public Safety Act (“the PSA”), which, as relevant here, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-28-301,-306, changed how non-criminal or “technical” violations of probation are handled in Tennessee. These provisions require the Tennessee Department of Probation and Parole (“the department”) to develop, among other things, a single system of graduated sanctions for technical violations of community supervision and an administrative review process for objections by the probationer to imposition of such sanctions. Prior to accepting the Defendants’ guilty pleas, the trial court expressed concern regarding the implementation of the PSA, as these consolidated cases were the first in its district to which the graduated sanctions of the PSA would apply. The Defendants then objected to the imposition of the PSA as a mandatory condition of their probation and “request[ed] that the Court find certain of the provisions of T.C.A. § 40-28-301 through § 40-28-306, relative to sentences of probation, to be facially unconstitutional, and, therefore, decline to incorporate them within the judgment.” Specifically at issue are the provisions (1) mandating trial courts to include as a condition of probation that the department supervising the individual may impose graduated sanctions for violations of probation; and (2) the extent to which the department’s administrative process to review graduated sanctions contested by supervised individuals complies with principles of due process. After a hearing, the trial court issued an extensive order finding these sections of the PSA violated the separation of powers doctrine and principles of due process and equal protection. It is from this order that the State appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State v. A.B. Price Jr. and Victor Tyrone Sims - Concurring
I fully concur with Judge McMullen’s opinion. I write separately in order to elaborate on some of the details on the Public Safety Act of 2016 (“Public Safety Act”) which this court concludes violates the Tennessee Constitution. I do not take any pleasure when, after a thorough review of the statutes, the Tennessee Constitution, and applicable case law, I am compelled to conclude that statutes passed by the General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor violate provisions of our state’s constitution. I do not doubt the good intentions of the executive and legislative branches of our state government in establishing Section 14 of the Public Safety Act. Only the portion of the Public Safety Act found presently in T.C.A. § 40-28-301-306 pertaining to probation is deemed unconstitutional by this court. The provisions are contained solely in Section 14 of ch. 906 of the 2016 Public Acts. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State v. A.B. Price Jr. and Victor Tyrone Sims - Dissent
The posture of this matter is that, as the Defendant arrived in the trial court to enter his plea of guilty and be placed on probation, the trial court announced to the parties that the court wanted to be “educated” as to the workings of the PSA, to which the Defendant would be subject. As the majority opinion in this matter explains, the practical effect of the PSA is that certain alleged infractions of the probation requirements would not go to the court but, rather, would be handled by a probation officer. Subsequently, a hearing was held in this matter at which a probation officer testified regarding the general workings of the PSA. The Defendant, having not yet pled guilty, was not yet subject to the PSA provisions; and defense counsel had not questioned its constitutionality. One week later, the trial court filed its lengthy and detailed order, finding that the constitutionality of the PSA was ripe for the court’s consideration, and concluding that, were the Defendant subject to its provisions, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law would be violated. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daetrus Pilate v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Daetrus Pilate, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief claiming that his confession was coerced and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in Case No. 11-05220. After appointment of counsel, an amended petition was filed claiming that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in Case No. 11-05220 and in Case No. 12-01054. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Taylor
The defendant, Robert Taylor, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, claiming that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions of second degree murder, and that the sentence imposed was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
C & C North America, Inc. d/b/a Cosentino v. Natural Stone Distributors, LLC, et al.
This is an appeal from an interpleader action filed by a party who owed funds that were claimed by two other parties. The trial court found that interpleader was appropriate pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 22.01 and allowed the disputed funds to be deposited with the court. The two remaining claimants to the funds filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The trial court found that one party was originally owed the funds but that this party owed a debt to the other claimant. As such, the trial court ruled that the funds would be paid to the party who was not originally owed the funds but who had the outstanding claim against the other claimant. We reverse in part, affirm as modified, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Elliott v. Apple Investors Group, LLC, et al.
This is an appeal in a slip and fall case. The plaintiff fell in a restaurant bathroom due to water on the floor. According to the plaintiff, the water was steadily dripping from a utility faucet located beneath the bathroom vanity. The plaintiff argues that the existence of the utility faucet was a dangerous condition such that the restaurant had a duty to either remedy it or warn of its existence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the restaurant, concluding that the existence of the faucet was not a dangerous condition. We agree and affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Board of Professional Responsibility of The Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Larry Edward Parrish
This is a direct appeal of a disciplinary proceeding involving a Memphis attorney who filed motions to recuse containing pejorative statements about three appellate judges. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that the attorney had violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct and that his sanction should be a public censure. The trial court agreed that the attorney was guilty of misconduct but modified the hearing panel’s decision, determining that the appropriate sanction was a six-month suspension, with thirty days served on active suspension and the remainder on probation. We hold that the attorney’s pejorative statements in the motions to recuse were not protected by the First Amendment and there was material and substantial evidence of noncompliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct. In addition, we hold that the hearing panel acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that the attorney should receive a public censure rather than suspension. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Queen City Pastry, LLC v. Bakery Technology Enterprises, LLC
The purchaser of automated cake-line equipment filed this action against the seller alleging breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. On the seller’s motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint as untimely. Because we conclude that the complaint was filed after the applicable limitations periods, either as agreed to by the parties or set by statute, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Bethel University v. Tennessee State Board of Education, Et Al.
The Tennessee Board of Education (“the Board”) denied approval of Bethel University’s (“Bethel”) educator preparation program (“EPP”). After unsuccessfully pursuing remedies under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Bethel sought judicial review of the Board’s action. The trial court found that the Board Policy 5.504, relied upon by the Board in its decision, was invalid and reinstated approval of Bethel’s EPP. The Board appeals, asserting 5.504 is a valid policy within the meaning of the UAPA and that the court erred in reinstating Bethel’s EPP. We affirm the trial court’s holding that 5.504 is a rule within the meaning of the UAPA and, since it was not promulgated as a rule in accordance with the UAPA, it is invalid and could not be used as a basis of denying approval of Bethel’s EPP. Further, we have determined that the court exceeded its authority in ordering reinstatement of Bethel’s EPP; we vacate the decision in that regard and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to remand the case to the Board for further consideration of Bethel’s approval status as an EPP. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Extended Stay America v. Scott Wilson
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on February 20, 2015. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ida Lucille Land
Judy A. Allen (“Allen”) filed suit contesting the Last Will and Testament of Ida Lucille Land dated May 9, 2011 (“the Will”), which was admitted to probate in October of 2015. The case proceeded to trial before a jury, and after trial the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding that there was undue influence arising from a confidential relationship between Kenneth L. Hill (“the Executor”) and his wife, Pauline Hill, and Ida Lucille Land (“Deceased”); that the Executor and Pauline Hill unduly benefitted from the Will; and that the Executor and Pauline Hill failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was fair. The Executor appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the naming of a person as executor is a sufficient benefit to trigger the presumption of undue influence and whether the Trial Court erred in denying the Executor’s motion for directed verdict. We find and hold that there is material evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that the Executor and Pauline Hill exercised undue influence, that they received a benefit under the Will, and that the Executor and Pauline Hill failed to prove that the transaction was fair. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in denying the motion for directed verdict. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s June 8, 2017 Final Decree. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of James W. Smalling, Deceased
This matter involves a will contest. The deceased died testate. His daughter, the proponent, is the executor. She submitted the deceased’s will to the trial court for probate. An order to probate was entered. The will expressly provides that the deceased’s son “is to take nothing” under the will. The son filed a complaint and a notice with the trial court contesting the will due to alleged undue influence. Proponent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that contestant did not have standing to file a contest. Contestant subsequently took a voluntary nonsuit; the trial court entered an order of nonsuit. Nine months after his initial filing, contestant filed a second will contest in the same court. The proponent filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the contestant’s voluntary dismissal of his first will contest bars the filing of his second complaint. The trial court agreed. It entered an order granting proponent’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Sterling Davis v. State of Tennessee
A Monroe County jury convicted the Petitioner, Sterling Davis, of possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of more than half an ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years, and this court affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. Sterling Jerome Davis, No. E2012-01398-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6047558, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 14, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 13, 2014). In a petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner raised multiple issues not relevant to this appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) the State failed to disclose facts that would be classified as Brady material; (2) the State willfully omitted facts which would have invalidated the search warrant in this case; and (3) the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it quashed a subpoena. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William H. Young
The Defendant, William H. Young, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for judicial diversion. The Defendant was convicted following a bench trial of criminally negligent homicide, and he was sentenced to eighteen months of supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by relying solely on the circumstances of the offense in its decision to deny judicial diversion to the exclusion of other supporting factors. According to the Defendant, the trial court’s decision to deny his request for judicial diversion was based on the offense that he was convicted of rather than the applicable factors. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Board of Professional Responsibility Of The Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Michael Gibbs Sheppard
This is a direct appeal of a disciplinary proceeding against a Brentwood attorney arising out of the mismanagement of client funds held in trust. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that the attorney had violated Rules 1.15 (safekeeping property and funds) and 8.4 (misconduct) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearing panel recommended that the attorney be suspended for sixty days, to be followed by two years of probation under the supervision of a practice monitor, and that he complete fifteen hours of continuing legal education on law office management and trust accounting procedures. The chancery court modified the hearing panel’s decision by increasing the periods of suspension and probation and by imposing additional conditions of probation. We hold that the hearing panel’s decision was supported by material and substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The chancery court, therefore, erred in modifying the hearing panel’s decision. We reverse the judgment of the chancery court and affirm the hearing panel’s decision. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Troy Nicholas v. Tennessee Department of Safety And Homeland Security
After police seized a vehicle allegedly used to transport drugs, the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security initiated forfeiture proceedings against the vehicle’s owner. The owner filed a claim contesting the forfeiture proceedings, and the Department dismissed the claim as untimely. The owner petitioned for judicial review, and the trial court reversed the dismissal, reinstated the owner’s claim, and remanded for a hearing. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn Lynn Jones v. Gary Edward Jones
This is the second appeal arising from a divorce action. In this appeal, the wife contends the trial court erred by depriving her of the post-trial increase in her proportionate share of marital investment accounts. On remand, the trial court held that the wife was awarded a sum certain as of the date of divorce; thus, the subsequent increase in the value of the account was the husband’s property. We affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Victory Thayer v. United Parcel Service, ET AL.
Victory Thayer (“Employee”) alleged that he sustained a compensable injury in 1997 in the course and scope of his employment with United Parcel Service (“Employer”). Employer and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Insurer”), filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted their motion on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations barred Employee’s claim. Employee has appealed that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel |