In Re Estate of Calvert Hugh Fletcher
A husband and wife deposited funds in a joint checking account designated with a right of survivorship. Later, the husband withdrew most of the funds from the joint account and placed the funds in a certificate of deposit issued solely in his name. After the husband’s death, a dispute arose between his surviving spouse and his children from a previous marriage regarding ownership of the certificate of deposit. The trial court, relying on Mays v. Brighton Bank, 832 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), held that the certificate of deposit was an asset of the husband’s estate because the funds ceased to be entireties property when withdrawn from the joint account. The Court of Appeals reversed and, relying on In re Estate of Grass, No. M2005-00641-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2343068, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2008), held that the certificate of deposit belonged to the surviving spouse because the funds were impressed with the entireties and could be traced to the joint account. We hold that once funds are withdrawn from a bank account held by a married couple as tenants by the entirety, the funds cease to be entireties property. Accordingly, the certificate of deposit issued to the husband from funds withdrawn from the joint bank account belongs to his estate, not his surviving spouse. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Putnam | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Watkins
The pro se defendant, Calvin Watkins, appeals the revocation of his judicial diversion by the Shelby County Criminal Court. The defendant argues the trial court improperly revoked his diversion based upon an unindicted arrest. After our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Jaiden A.
This is a dependency and neglect case. After adjudication of dependency and neglect, the juvenile court granted custody to the child’s paternal grandparents. Mother/Appellant appealed that decision to the circuit court. Because the circuit court did not conduct a de novo hearing, we vacate its order and remand for further proceedings. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Lamar Gillespie, Jr.
Defendant, Gregory Lamar Gillespie, Jr., pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to the offenses of robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant received an effective six-year sentence to be served on probation (effective February 1, 2016) with GPA monitoring for the first year. On April 22, 2016, a probation violation report was filed. On April 27, 2016, a capias for Defendant’s arrest was issued. An addendum to the report was filed on August 17, 2016. Following a probation violation hearing, the trial court revoked probation and ordered Defendant to serve his six-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court “erred by not considering additional means – more restrictive than the probation Defendant was alleged to have violated, but less restrictive than incarceration – that were available.” He further contends that the trial court “erred by ordering the Defendant’s sentence into execution.” We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Buford Cornell Williams
Defendant, Buford Cornell Williams, was convicted of selling 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. He received a fourteen-year sentence. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Prince J.
The mother of twins seeks to set aside the termination of her parental rights on the ground the judgment is void for lack of personal service. In August 2013, relatives who had legal custody of the children filed a “Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption.” After two failed attempts to locate the mother for service of process, she was served by publication. In December 2013, the trial court entered an Order of Default terminating her parental rights, and the children were adopted shortly thereafter. The mother received actual notice of the termination of her parental rights and the adoption no later than April 2014, but she waited until October 2015 to file a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion to set aside the 2013 judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court ruled that the 2013 judgment was void for lack of personal service but that the mother was not entitled to relief from the judgment based on “exceptional circumstances.” The mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the mother is not entitled to relief based on exceptional circumstances, they being that she had actual notice of the judgment eighteen months prior to seeking relief, which manifested an intention to treat the judgment as valid, and that granting relief would impair the children’s and the adoptive parents’ substantial interests of reliance on the judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brooklyn J.
The mother of twins seeks to set aside the termination of her parental rights on the ground the judgment is void for lack of personal service. In August 2013, relatives who had legal custody of the children filed a “Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption.” After two failed attempts to locate the mother for service of process, she was served by publication. In December 2013, the trial court entered an Order of Default terminating her parental rights, and the children were adopted shortly thereafter. The mother received actual notice of the termination of her parental rights and the adoption no later than April 2014, but she waited until October 2015 to file a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion to set aside the 2013 judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court ruled that the 2013 judgment was void for lack of personal service but that the mother was not entitled to relief from the judgment based on “exceptional circumstances.” The mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the mother is not entitled to relief based on exceptional circumstances, they being that she had actual notice of the judgment eighteen months prior to seeking relief, which manifested an intention to treat the judgment as valid, and that granting relief would impair the children’s and the adoptive parents’ substantial interests of reliance on the judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
in Re Estate of Eunice Katherine Sanders McCollum
This is a probate case, and the parties are Decedent’s children. Appellant son filed a claim against Appellee daughter, alleging that she mishandled the Decedent’s financial affairs, both during Decedent’s life and after her death in 2007. In 2009, the trial court appointed a special master, who conducted two evidentiary hearings and filed two reports, which essentially exonerated Appellee from any wrong-doing. Two years later, the trial court ordered the Administrator of the estate to pay certain fees and file certain applications so that the estate could be closed, and dismissed all pending motions filed by the parties. Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment of the trial court that was denied. Concluding that the Appellant did not have standing to bring a claim against Appellee, we affirm and remand. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Monterious Bell v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Monterious Bell, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition as time-barred. Following our review, we conclude the petition was timely filed. The judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed and the matter remanded for consideration of the postconviction petition in accord with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Coynick Boswell
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Coynick Boswell, was convicted of the first-degree murder of the victim, Kadrian Woods. On appeal the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for premeditated murder and his request for and instruction on self-defense. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and although the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to self-defense. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Curry v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ronald Curry, pled guilty to rape of a child for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years. He filed the instant post-conviction petition, and following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately evaluate the mental health issues of the petitioner and for failing to secure and present evidence of his innocence. The petitioner also claims trial counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricco Williams v. State of Tennessee
Ricco Williams, the Petitioner, was convicted of various charges, and on appeal, this court and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed three convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping of three minor victims accomplished with a deadly weapon, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon, and aggravated assault. The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to: (1) request fingerprint testing on several items of evidence; (2) file a motion to suppress the introduction of these items at trial; (3) request a mistrial when two potential jurors stated during voir dire that they recognized the Petitioner from his prior incarceration; (4) allow the Petitioner to negotiate directly with the State regarding plea offers; and (5) move to dismiss the indictment "because one count contained an inaccurate conviction.” The Petitioner asserts that he was prejudiced by these deficiencies because “[t]he trial evidence circumstantially tied the [Petitioner] to the crime” and “anything trial counsel could do to refute the circumstantial evidence would be crucial for the jury to consider.” The Petitioner additionally asserts that, had he “prevailed in a Motion to Suppress or Motion to Dismiss the Indictment[,] he would have prevailed at trial.” After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Vance
Defendant, Brandon Vance, was convicted of first degree felony murder by a Shelby County jury. He received a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Eunice Katherine Sanders McCollum
This is a probate case, and the parties are Decedent’s children. Appellant son filed a claim against Appellee daughter, alleging that she mishandled the Decedent’s financial affairs, both during Decedent’s life and after her death in 2007. In 2009, the trial court appointed a special master, who conducted two evidentiary hearings and filed two reports, which essentially exonerated Appellee from any wrong-doing. Two years later, the trial court ordered the Administrator of the estate to pay certain fees and file certain applications so that the estate could be closed, and dismissed all pending motions filed by the parties. Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment of the trial court that was denied. Concluding that the Appellant did not have standing to bring a claim against Appellee, we affirm and remand. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua Matthew Cline v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Joshua Matthew Cline, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his April 2013 convictions for two counts of rape of a child. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group, LLC v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., et al.
The tenant of a warehouse and the warehouse owner’s property manager disagree over which party is responsible for the damage caused by a fire that destroyed the tenant’s inventory. We have concluded that the “as is, where is” lease between the warehouse owner and the tenant places the responsibility for the damage on the tenant and that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the property manager. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Christopher J., et al.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that Father was criminally convicted of the intentional and wrongful death of the children’s mother and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support both findings. Thus, we affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carlos Cornwell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Carlos Cornwell, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that he was denied his right to a competent and impartial trial judge, “resulting in structural constitutional error,” due to the presiding trial judge’s out-of-court misconduct during the course of the Petitioner’s trial proceedings; (2) that the trial judge failed to perform his role as the thirteenth juror; (3) that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to inspect the Petitioner’s vehicle in a timely manner and failed to properly challenge evidence that was not properly preserved by the State; and (4) that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because trial counsel failed to “properly investigate, challenge, and counter” the testimony of one of the State’s expert witnesses and failed to properly address that witness’s having questioned trial counsel’s credibility during cross-examination. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Brown
The Defendant, Melvin Brown, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”); DUI with a blood alcohol concentration of .20% or more; violation of the implied consent law; reckless driving; and driving on a revoked, suspended, or cancelled license. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress the results of his blood test on the basis that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406 was unconstitutional1 and that there were no exigent circumstances that prevented the officers from obtaining a warrant. Thereafter, the State sought and was granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal, contending that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406 was constitutional, that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw, and that the warrantless blood draw was permissible pursuant to the implied consent law. Upon review, we reversed the portion of the trial court’s judgment declaring Code section 55-10-406(f)(1) unconstitutional but affirmed the trial court’s suppression of the results of the warrantless blood draw because no exception to the warrant requirement existed. State v. Melvin Brown, No. W2014-00162-CCA-R9-CD, 2015 WL 1951870 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2015), perm. app. granted and remanded, No. W2014-00162-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016) (order). On November 22, 2016, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016).2 State v. Melvin Brown, No. W2014-00162-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016) (order). Upon reconsideration, we conclude that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule adopted in Reynolds applies to this case and that suppression of the Defendant’s test results was not required. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment suppressing the test results of the warrantless blood draw is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Glenn R. Funk v. Scripps Media , Inc. Et Al.
A public figure filed a defamation lawsuit against an investigative reporter and a television station based on two news stories that were aired in February 2016. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that their reports were constitutionally protected speech, were privileged as a fair and accurate report of pleadings and documents filed in two other lawsuits, and did not contain false or defamatory statements. The plaintiff served interrogatories and requests for documents on the defendants in an effort to discover the defendants’ investigative files. The defendants objected on the grounds of relevance and the Tennessee fair report privilege. The plaintiff filed a motion to compel, arguing that he needed the discovery to respond to the defendants’ motion to dismiss by uncovering evidence of actual malice. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to compel. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s decision granting the motion to compel. They argue that (1) actual malice is not an element of the fair report privilege and (2) the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion to compel. We agree with the defendants’ position on both issues and reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gary L. Key v. O.C. Renner Jr. Et Al.
Neighboring property owners disagree over the terms of an oral agreement for construction of a private road across their properties. After the road was completed, one property owner failed to pay his part of the construction costs or grant a permanent easement permitting use of the road. The other property owner filed a complaint for specific performance or, in the alternative, damages for breach of contract. The defendant admitted the parties had an agreement but disputed the terms and raised the defense of the statute of frauds. After a trial, the court ruled that the defendant was equitably estopped from asserting the statute of frauds and awarded specific performance. On appeal, the defendant argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to enforce the agreement because either the statute of frauds bars enforcement of the agreement or the plaintiff was the first party to breach. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment as modified. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cecil Glen Dobbs, Jr.
The Defendant, Cecil G. Dobbs, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and theft of property valued at less than $500 in return for a sentence of seven years of split confinement with two years of incarceration followed by five years of probation. A probation violation warrant was issued based upon subsequently incurred charges and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation sentence, ordering that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation sentence and by “not allowing him to be heard” at the probation revocation hearing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Jefferson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marshall Shawn Nelson
The Defendant, Marshall Shaw Nelson, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with an agreed sentence of six years with the trial court to determine the manner of service. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence and ordered the sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Patterson AKA John O'Keefe Varner AKA John O'Keefe Kitchen
We granted this appeal to determine whether deficiencies in the State’s timely filed notice of intent to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender entitle the defendant to relief via the plain error doctrine. We conclude that, although imperfect, the timely filed notice fairly informed the defendant of the State’s intent to seek enhanced sentencing and triggered the defendant’s duty to inquire into the errors and omissions. Furthermore, the defendant has failed to establish that the deficiencies in the notice adversely affected his substantial rights—a necessary criterion for obtaining relief via the plain error doctrine. Accordingly, we reverse in part the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment, insofar as it set aside the defendant’s sentence of life without parole and remanded to the trial court for resentencing, and we reinstate the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Coffee | Supreme Court | |
Michael Tomlin, Et Al. v. Renal Care Group, Inc. Et Al.
A real estate consultant brought suit against a renal care company and related corporate affiliates alleging breach of contract for failing to pay real estate commissions. The commissions were allegedly owed based upon the consultant’s work in negotiating one original lease for a dialysis clinic, and based upon several alleged renewals of leases that had originally been negotiated by the consultant. The parties’ consulting agreement specified that the consultant was entitled to commissions upon execution of original leases, and at any subsequent renewals or extensions of the original leases. Because the order appealed is not final in that it fails to adjudicate at least six of the former consultant’s claims, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |