State of Tennessee v. Myles Wiseman
The Defendant, Myles Wiseman, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape, a Class B felony; two counts of incest, a Class C felony; and two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, a Class C felony. He was sentenced by the trial court to thirty years at 100% as a Range IV, career offender for the Class B felony rape conviction and fifteen years at 45% as a Range III, persistent offender for each of the Class C felony incest and statutory rape convictions. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of ninety years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce the Defendant’s recorded phone calls from the jail; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adam T. Huffstutter v. Metropolitan Historical Zoning Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
The appellant is a property owner who sought review of a decision by the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the Historic Zoning Commission. The appellant property owner appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re A.H. Et Al.
This is a dependency and neglect case predicated on an allegation of severe abuse. The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and found that one of the children had been subject to severe child abuse at the hands of the children’s father. The father appealed to circuit court. After a de novo hearing, the circuit court found the allegations of severe abuse were not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence and declined to find the children dependent and neglected. The Department of Children’s Services, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the children’s mother appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in concluding that the evidence of severe abuse was not clear and convincing. Based on our review of the entire record, we find there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of severe abuse. Therefore, we affirm the trial court. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
David L. Richman, Et Al. v. Joshua Debity, Et Al.
This case began with the filing of a “Civil Warrant Restraining Order” in general sessions |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: James Ralph Hickman, Jr., BPR #020125
In this case, we consider the appropriate discipline for Tennessee attorney James Ralph Hickman, Jr. The Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for discipline against Hickman alleging that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct while representing an estate in probate proceedings. A hearing panel of the Board adjudicated the petition and recommended a one-year suspension, with “at least” ninety days served as an active suspension and the rest on probation. Any violation of the conditions of probation would result in “reversion to active suspension.” The hearing panel also directed Hickman to obtain a practice monitor during the probationary period, complete fifteen additional hours of estate-management continuing legal education (“CLE”) and three additional hours of ethics CLE, and pay the costs of the matter. Neither Hickman nor the Board appealed. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the hearing panel’s judgment. Exercising our authority under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 15.4, we determined that the punishment imposed by the hearing panel appeared too lenient and proposed to increase it. After carefully considering the entire record, “with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case,” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b), we affirm the hearing panel’s one-year suspension but modify the judgment to impose six months of active suspension followed by six months on probation. We also clarify that the period of probation imposed should be fixed rather than indefinite and that violation of a condition of probation does not automatically result in reversion of the probationary period to active suspension. We affirm the decision of the hearing panel in all other respects. |
Sevier | Supreme Court | |
Eric Emory Edwards v. Dallis Leeann Edwards
In this post-divorce action, the trial court modified the permanent parenting plan to provide the father with equal co-parenting time after the father and the mother had, by oral agreement, lived by an alternate plan for approximately sixteen months during the COVID19 pandemic in an effort to adapt to their child’s virtual education from home. The mother has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding a material change in circumstance affecting the child’s best interest and by determining that modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. Both parties have requested attorney’s fees on appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We decline to award attorney’s fees to either party. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kenneth D.
In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child upon a petition filed by the child’s mother and stepfather, the trial court determined that five statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Following the father’s initial appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k). On remand, the trial court entered a judgment confirming its prior determinations with added specific findings and conclusions. The father has again appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Ernest Falls et al. v. Mark Goins et al.
In this appeal, we consider the interplay and applicability of two statutes that relate to suffrage rights of Tennessee residents previously convicted of infamous crimes in other states. Although the Tennessee Constitution recognizes the importance of the right of its residents to vote, the Constitution also allows the General Assembly to restrict the right of a person to vote “upon a conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 5. Ernest Falls, a resident of Tennessee since 2018, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia in 1986, an infamous crime under the laws of Tennessee. In 2020, Mr. Falls was granted clemency in Virginia by then-Governor Ralph Northam. The grant of clemency reinstated Mr. Falls’ rights of citizenship in Virginia, including his right to vote. Subsequently, Mr. Falls attempted to register to vote in Grainger County, Tennessee, in June of 2020. The Grainger County Election Commission denied his restoration of voting rights request and cited “Incomplete/Insufficient Document(s)” as the reasoning for the denial. Mr. Falls and a co-plaintiff, who was left off the voter rolls under similar circumstances, filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise persons convicted of out-of-state infamous crimes as soon as said persons are “pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor or other appropriate authority of such other state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) (2014). Respondents, three public employees sued in their official capacity, countered that Mr. Falls also is required to comply with requirements set forth in another statutory provision, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202, which requires that persons convicted of infamous crimes pay outstanding court costs, restitution, and child support obligations before they can be re-enfranchised. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202 (2018). The Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of the three state officials, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment with Mr. Falls acting as the sole remaining plaintiff. Like the Court of Appeals, we affirm the grant of summary judgment and conclude that, in order to regain the right of suffrage in Tennessee, Mr. Falls and other similarly situated individuals must comply with both section 2-19-143(3) and the additional requirements set forth in section 40-29-202. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Ernest Falls et al. v. Mark Goins et al. (Dissent)
Ernest Falls’ right to vote is guaranteed under the Tennessee Constitution. Tenn. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Bruce Antione Cole
For the second time, the Defendant, Bruce Antione Cole, appeals the trial court’s order of |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dale Anthony Wilbourn
The Defendant, Dale Anthony Wilbourn, was convicted of the offenses of evading arrest |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Courdarrius Perkins
A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Courdarrius Perkins, of first-degree felony |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shatyra Johnson v. Romello Love
The Appellant challenges the circuit court’s grant of an order of protection, asserting that |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall Chism v. Romello Love
The Appellant challenges the circuit court’s grant of an order of protection, asserting that |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ladon Antoine Doak v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ladon Antoine Doak, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Lavelle Lilly
The Appellant, Gregory Lavelle Lilly, appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for a reduction of sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35. Upon review of the motion filed by appointed counsel, and in light of the record on appeal, the Court hereby affirms the order of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Blue Water Bay at Center Hill, LLC Et Al. v. Larry J. Hasty Et Al.
This appeal concerns the enforceability of a promissory note and a coguarantor’s right to seek contribution from another guarantor. The note and guaranties were assigned several times and, at one point, held by the coguarantor. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded on the undisputed facts that the promissory note had been discharged and that there was no right to contribution. We conclude that the promissory note was not discharged but agree that there was no right to contribution. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael E. Odom
Defendant, Michael E. Odom, was convicted by a Houston County jury of assault and elder abuse. The trial court imposed a two-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation after sixty days of incarceration. Defendant appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for a new trial. On appeal, Defendant argues that the jury instruction on elder abuse was incomplete and that the trial court improperly commented on matters of fact during trial testimony. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and oral argument, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charter Communications Operating, LLC v. Madison County, et al.
This appeal involves a bid awarded by a county finance department and upheld by the |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deshawn Eugene Williams
Defendant, Deshawn Eugene Williams, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his previously ordered probationary sentence of ten years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give him credit for time successfully served while on probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kim Brown v. Shelby County Schools
This appeal involves the termination of a tenured teacher for the cause of inefficiency. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Anderson Clark, Jr.
The pro se Petitioner, Charles Anderson Clark, Jr., appeals the denial of his motion to |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kyanedre Oshea-Malik Benson
The Defendant, Kyanedre Oshea-Malik Benson, was convicted in the Haywood County Circuit Court of one count of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class C felony; one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; ten counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sentence of sixty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter and that the trial court erred by refusing to merge one of his convictions of reckless aggravated assault into his conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry W. Phillips v. Martin Frink, Warden
Jerry W. Phillips, Petitioner, appeals from the summary dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he claimed his convictions were void because there was a fatal variance between the proof at trial and the indictment and that the proof at trial, which differed from the proof at the preliminary hearing, constructively amended the indictment. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Leah T.
In this case involving a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her child and to allow the petitioners to adopt the child, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that the petitioners had provided clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed the best interest determination. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s finding as to the statutory grounds of abandonment through failure to support, abandonment through failure to visit, and severe abuse of the child’s sibling. However, having determined that under the facts of this case, the trial court erred in applying the statutory best interest factors applicable to the initial termination petition rather than those applicable to the amended petition, we reverse the trial court’s best interest finding and remand for reconsideration applying the amended best interest factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2022). |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |