Julia Leach Bryan vs. James Leach M1998-00922-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
This case involves post-divorce disputes over alimony and child support and issues of contempt of court. The father commenced this appeal after the trial court declined to modify or terminate his alimony obligation and awarded the mother more than $50,000 in child support arrearages and, later, found the father in contempt of court and ordered him to pay a fine of $100 per day until all judgments were paid to the mother. On appeal, the father argues that his alimony obligation should have terminated or decreased, that a portion of his child support payments should be placed in trust for the benefit of the children, and that the trial court erred by fining him for contempt. We affirm the trial court's orders but modify the fine imposed upon the father.
Maury
Court of Appeals
Julia Leach Bryan vs. James Leach M1998-00922-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
This case involves post-divorce disputes over alimony and child support and issues of contempt of court. The father commenced this appeal after the trial court declined to modify or terminate his alimony obligation and awarded the mother more than $50,000 in child support arrearages and, later, found the father in contempt of court and ordered him to pay a fine of $100 per day until all judgments were paid to the mother. On appeal, the father argues that his alimony obligation should have terminated or decreased, that a portion of his child support payments should be placed in trust for the benefit of the children, and that the trial court erred by fining him for contempt. We affirm the trial court's orders but modify the fine imposed upon the father.
Maury
Court of Appeals
Suzette Marie Elder vs. Sidney Lee Elder M1998-00935-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. Curtis Smith
This appeal involves a post-divorce custody dispute precipitated by the custodial parent's decision to accept a job in Texas. The custodial parent requested the Circuit Court for Franklin County to permit the parties' children to accompany him to Texas and to adjust the visitation arrangements accordingly. The non-custodial parent responded by requesting the trial court to change custody. Following a bench trial, the trial court declined to change the existing custody arrangement and permitted the custodial parent to move to Texas. On this appeal, the non-custodial parent takes issue with both the denial of her petition to change custody and the approval of the custodial parent's move to Texas. We have determined that the record supports both of these decisions and, therefore, affirm the trial court.
Franklin
Court of Appeals
Janice Hillyer vs. Charles Hillyer M1998-00942-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton
The issues in this post-divorce case arise because the former husband's waiver of military retirement pay in order to receive disability benefits cut off the former wife's receipt of her portion of the retirement pay which had been awarded to her in the distribution of marital property. The former wife filed a contempt petition, seeking to reinstate her portion of the benefits. The trial court, relying on Gilliland v. Stanley, an unpublished opinion from this court, denied her motion for contempt. In light of our Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. Johnson, No. W1999-01232-SC-R11-CV, 2001 WL 173502 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2001), we reverse and remand.
Montgomery
Court of Appeals
Janice Hillyer vs. Charles Hillyer M1998-00942-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton
The issues in this post-divorce case arise because the former husband's waiver of military retirement pay in order to receive disability benefits cut off the former wife's receipt of her portion of the retirement pay which had been awarded to her in the distribution of marital property. The former wife filed a contempt petition, seeking to reinstate her portion of the benefits. The trial court, relying on Gilliland v. Stanley, an unpublished opinion from this court, denied her motion for contempt. In light of our Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. Johnson, No. W1999-01232-SC-R11-CV, 2001 WL 173502 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2001), we reverse and remand.
Montgomery
Court of Appeals
Billy Steagall vs. Nancy Steagall M1998-00948-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell
This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute regarding the custody a 15-year-old boy. In August 1997, the boy's father petitioned the Chancery Court for Marshall County to change the minor's custody because of his concern that the mother's attempt to home school the boy had undermined his education and development of social skills. The mother opposed the petition and requested an increase in child support. During the June 1998 trial, the father presented evidence raising serious questions about the progress of the child's education and development of social skills, as well as other aspects of the mother's approach to parenting. The mother presented no evidence of her own. Instead, after the close of the father's proof, she asserted that the trial court could remediate the acknowledged deficiencies without changing custody. Thereafter, the parties and the court discussed at length the provisions of a proposed remedial order, and the hearing was adjourned when the parties and the court believed they had agreed on the contents of the proposed order. Before the trial court entered the proposed order, the wife took issue with a provision requiring her to enroll the child in public school. The trial court informed the parties that it had understood that both parties had agreed to send their child to public school and that it would resume the trial if its understanding was incorrect. Rather than requesting the trial court to resume the hearing, the mother filed this appeal claiming that the trial court had infringed on her constitutionally protected right to raise her child. We have determined, in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a), that the mother is not entitled to appellate relief because she is, in part, responsible for the error and because she failed to pursue the reasonably available steps that would have nullified the harmful effect of the error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
State vs. Michael Elvis Green W2001-00455-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
A Hardeman County jury found the defendant guilty of rape. Four issues are raised on appeal: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant a continuance; (3) whether evidence of the defendant's escape from jail was improperly admitted; and (4) whether the trial court should have charged the jury as to sexual battery, statutory rape, and Class B misdemeanor assault as lesser-included offenses of rape. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In this action Patricia Anne Pehlman essentially seeks a declaration that marital property awarded to her in a divorce is not subject to a lien in favor of the intervenor.
Essie M. Butler v. Emerson Motor Co . 02S01-9805-CH-00045
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George E. Ellis,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court found the plaintiff had failed to show she was entitled to compensation because of an alleged back injury.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The facts in this case are reasonably simple. The plaintiff, age 49, had been working for the defendant for 25 years. Several years prior to 1995 she injured her back at work. This injury is more historical than significant in the case before us. In January 1995, the plaintiff was working at a lathe, putting machine parts on the lathe and turning them. She began to experience pain in her back. She testified this was caused by having to twist her body side to side or back and forth in doing the work. Ultimately, the plaintiff was seen by several doctors and had several diagnostic tests and various treatments done. The most significant treatment was done by Dr. Dan Spengler, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed the plaintiff as having instability of motion at the L4-5 section of her spine with some pinching of the nerve. Dr. Spengler was of the opinion that the cause of this problem was a degenerative process in a person of the plaintiff's age. He was of the opinion the plaintiff's work did not cause the problem. 1 The plaintiff also sued for carpal tunnel syndrome and was found to be entitled to compensation. That matter is not raised in this appeal. 2
