Darrell Tipton, Et Al. v. William J. Wolfenbarger, Et Al.
E2022-01407-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Michael Sharp

This case stems from a dispute over a parcel of real property located in Monroe County,
Tennessee. Following a partition action and sale of the property, the trial court entered an
order dividing the sale proceeds between several parties that the trial court determined had an interest in the property at the time of the sale. One of those parties appeals, arguing that it is entitled to a bigger portion of the sale proceeds. Discerning no error, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed;
Case Remanded

Hartwell D. Price v. State of Tennessee
M2022-01556-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Christopher V. Sockwell

The Appellant, Hartwell D. Price, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

Lee Ann Polster v. Russell Joseph Polster
M2022-01432-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ted A. Crozier

In the prior appeal of this case, a husband’s argument regarding the division of assets/unconscionability of the marital dissolution agreement was deemed waived because it was not raised in the trial court. The case was remanded for a determination of attorney’s fees. The husband attempted to bring the issue up again on remand, and the trial court refused to consider them. We affirm based on waiver and the narrow scope of the remand.

State of Tennessee v. Hamid Houbbadi
M2022-01751-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Bateman

The Defendant, Hamid Houbbadi, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of first degree premediated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus twelve years. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting orders of protection the victim obtained against the Defendant; and (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing a twelve-year sentence for his especially aggravated burglary conviction and ordering that it be served consecutively to his life sentence. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Deirdre Marie Rich
M2022-00435-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry J. Wallace

Defendant, Deirdre Marie Rich, appeals from her conviction for first degree premediated murder, for which she received a sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting entries from the victim’s ex-wife’s journal in violation of Defendant’s right to confrontation. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State Of Tennessee on behalf of Bledsoe County, Tennessee Et Al v. Whoriskey, Inc.
E2023-00505-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Melissa Thomas Willis

This appeal arises from an action to recover delinquent ad valorem real property taxes.
Whoriskey, Inc., which currently owns the property, raises numerous challenges to the
proposed delinquent tax sale. In principal part, it asserts that the property at issue was not
subject to taxation during the relevant tax period, 2017 and 2018, because it claims that,
during that time, the property was owned by the United States Government through a
federal forfeiture. Further, Whoriskey contends that Bledsoe County and the City of
Pikeville are barred from recovering back taxes because they failed to assert a claim in
federal court. The trial court found no factual or legal basis to support Whoriskey’s
contentions and determined that the County and City could proceed with the delinquent tax sale to recover ad valorem real property taxes on the subject real property for the tax years 2017 and 2018. This appeal followed. We affirm.

In Re Aubria H. et al.
M2023-00329-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Haylee Bradley-Maples

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two minor children. The trial court concluded that several grounds for termination existed and that the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Although we vacate two grounds for termination, we affirm the trial court’s reliance on the remaining grounds for termination and its best interests determination. The trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights is accordingly affirmed.

Corey Andrew Tate v. Andrea Nicole Jones
E2022-01524-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy E. Irwin

This is an appeal by Father of a judgment rendered against him for child support. Because
the final judgment does not provide adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law for
this Court to conduct a proper review, we are unable to adequately address Father’s issues
on appeal. Therefore, we remand the case back to the trial court for the entry of a judgment
compliant with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Elvin Pearson v. State of Tennessee
M2021-01560-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Elvin Pearson, of one count of felony murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. He filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, pro se, he contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied him relief because: (1) the trial court committed plain error when it failed to give correct and complete jury instructions, denied his judgment of acquittal, and merged the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter into felony murder; (2) he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to move to dismiss the indictment; and (3) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), by failing to disclose a witness prior to trial. He further contends that: (4) his post-conviction counsel deprived him of a full and fair post-conviction hearing by not presenting the mother of his children, Diane Reid, as a witness, not asking trial counsel questions relevant to his issues, and failing to investigate the subject matter of his questions; and (5) the post-conviction court erred when it did not allow post-conviction counsel to withdraw from the case and denied the Petitioner the opportunity to address the court. Upon review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Elvin Pearson v. State of Tennessee (dissenting)
M2021-01560-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

An attorney’s failure to fulfill a promise made in opening statements “may be justified when ‘unexpected developments warrant changes in previously announced trial strategies.’” United States ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 257 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)). Otherwise, “little is more damaging than to fail to produce important evidence that had been promised in an opening [statement].” Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 408 Mass. 803, 563 N.E.2d 1353 (1990). The reason being that the jury may infer that the testimony would have been adverse to the defendant and may also question the attorney’s credibility. Hampton, 347 F.3d at 259. Because the record in this case clearly shows that no unexpected developments occurred which justified trial counsel’s decision not to call Reid, the only alibi witness, as promised in the opening statement, I must part ways with the majority and respectfully dissent.

Antoine Hinton v. State of Tennessee
W2022-01135-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

The Petitioner, Antoine Hinton, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial
of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree felony murder,
especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, employing a firearm during the
commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless aggravated assault. The Petitioner is
serving an effective life sentence. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction
court erred when it denied the State’s motion to dismiss the petition. The Petitioner
contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied relief for the Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim against: (1) pretrial counsel for advising the
Petitioner to give a statement to law enforcement when counsel had a conflict of interests;
(2) trial counsel for failing to raise marital privilege, and (3) trial and appellate counsel for
failing to secure at trial a jury instruction pursuant to State v. White or to raise on appeal
the lack of the instruction. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Susan Davis Malone v. Thomas Franklin Malone
W2023-00843-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Townsend

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B,
filed by the appellants seeking to recuse the trial judge, Judge Joe Townsend (the "trial
judge") in the underlying post-divorce contempt action. Having reviewed the petition for
recusal appeal filed by the appellants and the answer thereto, and finding that the appellants
have failed to dernonstrate that a person of ordinary prudence in Judge Townsend's
position, possessing the same knowledge as Judge Townsend, would find a reasonable
basis to question Judge Townsend's impartiality, we affirm the trial judge's denial of the
recusal petition.

Susan Davis Malone v. Thomas Franklin Malone - DISSENT
W2023-00843-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Townsend

I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that recusal of the trial judge is
not warranted in this case. The majority discusses each of Appellants' allegations
concerning the trial court's bias. However, the majority fails to consider the cumulative
effects of the trial court's actions, and wholly fails to consider the fact that the ultimate
result of these actions is usurpation of the autonomous decisions Ms. Malone made for her
own care when she was cornpetent to do so. Although the trial court negated Ms. Malone's
well-established attorney-client relationship with Mr. Autry, Ms. Bleavins [together with
Mr. Autry, "Attorneys"], and the Williams McDaniel firm, my dissent does not focus on
Judge Townsend's rulings. Rather, in the context of recusal, I focus my dissent on the
disparate treatment the trial judge showed to the Attorneys and the Williams McDaniel
firm in reaching those decisions.

In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
W2023-00841-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Townsend

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B,
filed by the appellants seeking to recuse the trial judge, Judge Joe Townsend (the "trial
judge") in the underlying conservatorship action. Having reviewed the petition for recusal
appeal filed by the appellants and the answer thereto, and finding that the appellants have
failed to demonstrate that a person of ordinary prudence in Judge Townsend's position,
possessing the same knowledge as Judge Townsend, would find a reasonable basis to
question Judge Townsend's impartiality, we affirm the trial judge's denial of the recusal
petition.

Courtney Logan v. Lisa Helton, et al.
W2023-00063-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kasey Culbreath

Appellant, Courtney Logan, appealed a December 7, 2022 order of the Hardeman County
Chancery Court. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The appeal is dismissed.

In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone - DISSENT
W2023-00841-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Townsend

I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that recusal of the trial judge is
not warranted in this case. The majority discusses each of Appellants' allegations
concerning the trial court's bias. However, the majority fails to consider the cumulative
effects of the trial court's actions, and wholly fails to consider the fact that the ultimate
result of these actions is usurpation of the autonomous decisions Ms. Malone made for her
own care when she was competent to do so. Although the trial court negated Ms. Malone's
well-established attorney-client relationship with Mr. Autry, Ms. Bleavins [together with
Mr. Autry, "Attorneys"], and the Williams McDaniel firm, my dissent does not focus on
Judge Townsend's rulings. Rather, in the context of recusal, I focus my dissent on the
disparate treatment the trial judge showed to the Attorneys and the Williams McDaniel
firm in reaching those decisions.

Erick Gordon v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security
E2022-01175-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

The petitioner’s employment as a Tennessee highway patrolman was terminated for cause
after he attended a training course on breathalyzer machines and, as part of the training,
submitted two breath samples that returned positive numbers for alcohol content in his
blood. The petitioner appealed, but his termination was upheld in the first two steps of the
internal appeals process by the respondent, the Tennessee Department of Safety and
Homeland Security (“the Department”). The petitioner appealed to the Tennessee Board
of Appeals, which conducted a hearing on the matter. Prior to the hearing, Mr. Gordon
filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude the two breathalyzer test results on grounds
that the tests were not conducted in compliance with the evidentiary requirements for
breathalyzer test results. The Board declined to exclude the breathalyzer test results and
upheld the petitioner’s termination, ending the Department’s internal appeals process. The
petitioner sought judicial review with the trial court. The trial court reversed and modified
the Board’s decision, determining that the Board improperly considered the numeric
breathalyzer test results and that without them there was no substantial and material
evidence remaining to support the Board’s decision to terminate Mr. Gordon’s
employment. Nonetheless, the trial court determined that some discipline was warranted
and accordingly ordered the Department to reinstate the petitioner with back pay and
benefits to one year following his dismissal, in effect sanctioning petitioner with a oneyear
suspension without pay. The Department timely appealed. Discerning no reversible
error, we affirm.

Janice Deloach v. Sahara Daycare Center, Inc., ET AL
W2022-01695-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary L. Wagner

This is a breach of contract case involving a business partnership. Due to deficiencies in
Appellants’ brief, we do not reach the substantive issues and dismiss the appeal. We grant
Appellee’s motion to declare Appellant’s appeal frivolous and award her damages.

State of Tennessee v. David Elias Hernandez Sanchez
M2023-00180-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Bateman

The defendant, David Elias Hernandez Sanchez, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his bid for judicial diversion of the four-year sentence imposed for his guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In Re Jonah B.
E2022-01701-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge John D. McAfee

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, who was nearly three years old at the time of trial. On appeal, Father disputes that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s determinations as to both the ground for termination and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Penny Lawson, et al. v. Hawkins County, TN et al.
E2020-01529-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

This appeal concerns governmental immunity. Steven W. Lawson (“Decedent”), by and through his widow, Penny Lawson, and on behalf of Corey Lawson, Decedent’s child (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued the Hawkins County Emergency Communications District Board (“ECD-911”), Hawkins County, Tennessee, and Hawkins County Emergency Management Agency (“the EMA”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for
Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) alleging negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness in Defendants’ response to a road washout that led to Decedent’s death. Defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, which the Trial Court granted partly on grounds that claims of recklessness could not proceed against the Defendant entities under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). Plaintiffs appealed. We reversed. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed this Court, holding that when the GTLA removes immunity for negligence, it does so for ordinary negligence only. The matter was remanded to this Court for further proceedings. We hold, inter alia, that while Defendants’ immunity is removed under the GTLA by Plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence claims, the public duty doctrine bars those claims. However, ECD-911’s immunity also is removed by Plaintiffs’ claim of gross negligence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-108, and the third special duty exception to the public duty doctrine allows that claim to proceed against ECD-911. We reverse the Trial Court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings to ECD-911 and remand for Plaintiffs’ case to proceed against that entity. Otherwise, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Lori Anne Pierce
E2023-00163-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sandra Donaghy

A Bradley County jury found Defendant, Lori Anne Pierce, guilty of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony (Count 1); possession of alprazolam with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony (Count 2); possession of clonazepam with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony (Count 3); and attempted unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to deliver, a Class A misdemeanor (Count 4). On appeal, Defendant challenges whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that she constructively possessed the contraband on all four counts. Defendant also challenges whether the evidence was sufficient to prove intent to sell or deliver on all counts. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of the judgment forms to indicate Defendant’s proper offender status and release eligibility.

State of Tennessee v. George Wells
M2022-01561-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Defendant, George Wells, pleaded guilty to reckless homicide with an agreed-upon sentencing range of two to five years. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for diversion or any other form of alternative sentencing and imposed a five-year incarcerative sentence. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s sentencing decision, challenging the length, manner of service, and denial of judicial diversion. After review, we determine that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider and weigh all of the relevant judicial diversion factors and by utilizing an improper factor. Based upon our de novo review of the judicial diversion factors, the trial court’s judgment is reversed, and the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion is granted. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of a term and the conditions of judicial diversion.

Gerrish & McCreary, PC v. Carri Chandler Lane
W2022-01441-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Yolanda Kight Brown

Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02
motion. In 2003, the trial court entered judgment against Appellant and in favor of
Appellee/law firm. In her role as Appellee’s bookkeeper, Appellant committed fraud,
misrepresentation, conversion, and negligence in stealing funds from the Appellee’s
operating account. The 2003 order of judgment also contains a separate judgment for
conversion against Appellant’s then-husband, who is not a party to this appeal. However,
there is no finding of joint-and-several liability in the 2003 order, and Appellant did not
appeal the order. After receiving an extension of its judgment, in July 2021, Appellee filed
a garnishment against Appellant, claiming that the outstanding balance on the judgment,
with interest, was in excess of $1,000,000.00. After the garnishment was filed, Appellant
sought a finding that she should receive a credit against the judgment based on the payment
made by her then-husband in satisfaction of the 2003 judgment entered against him.
Appellant also sought credit for monies paid by Appellee’s bank under a private settlement.
The bank was never sued. The trial court denied the credits on its finding that the bank and
Appellant’s then-husband were neither joint tortfeasors, nor jointly and severally liable.
The trial court noted that any relief from the 2003 judgment for mistake in the omission of
joint-and-several language was time-barred as Appellant failed to bring her Rule 60.02
motion, under subsection (1) for mistake, within the one-year time period contemplated in
the rule. Having determined that there was no joint-and-several liability, the trial court
determined that Appellant was not entitled to credits for either her then-husband’s payment
or the bank’s payment and denied relief under Rule 60.02(4) for satisfaction of the
judgment. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In Re: Glenn B. et al
M2023-00096-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Branden Bellar

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. The trial court found six grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found termination of Mother’s parental rights to be in the best interests of the children. Mother raises procedural and substantive challenges to the trial court’s decision. We affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights.