

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION PANEL
AT NASHVILLE

FILED

October 21, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk

ALMA JEAN GRAYSON)
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)
 Plaintiff/Appellant)
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 V.)
)
)
)
 HEALTHTRUST, INC.-)
 THE HOSPITAL COMPANY)
)
)
 Defendant/Appellee)

DAVIDSON CHANCERY

Hon. Robert S. Brandt
Chancellor

NO. 01S01-9607-CH-00153

For the Appellant: Ann Buntin Steiner, Steiner & Steiner, 214 Second Avenue North, Suite 203, Nashville, TN 37201-1644
For the Appellee: W. Reese Willis, Willis & Knight, 21 Second Avenue North, Nashville, TN 37201-1644

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Members of Panel:
Chief Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Senior Judge James L. Weatherford
Special Judge Joe C. Loser, Jr.

**REVERSED AND
REMANDED**

WEATHERFORD, Senior Judge

This workers' compensation case between the
Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. Sec.
hearing and reporting to the Supreme
and conclusions of law.

Plaintiff Alma Jean Grayson, has
of the trial court in dismissing her
time by the as required by TENN. CODE
and 50-6-202.

Plaintiff, at the time of the trial, had
education. She completed the seventh
Her grades were poor and she has
Her reading level was about second grade
basically she cannot read.

The plaintiff began working at
Memorial Hospital, in September, 1991, as
duties as a cleaning aide were to clean
such as going in and picking up trash
treatments, pickup of the trash, clean
sinks, commodes, high dusting, clean
dust and mopping throughout the rooms.

required constant repetitive use of

Plaintiff going to work for an elderly man for a
work after she left school in the seventh

married 1959, had three, and during that time she was raising her children. Plaintiff had cancer and she took care of him in the 80's.

Plaintiff worked for Holiday Inn at various hotels, also worked for home.

While working for the defendant, plaintiff had a problem with her hands in 1990. She told Owen, her supervisor, that the work she was doing, dusting and cleaning the sink, was causing her arms to hurt. Mr. Owen denied that he knew that plaintiff had a problem with her hands at that time. Plaintiff stated that when an employee came to him with a problem, it would have been his duty to report even though the employee's condition was work related. Mr. Owen further stated that employees with braces on their hands were given notice that there was a problem and they should have filed notice.

In the fall of 1993, Plaintiff's supervisor, Mrs. Honeycutt, knew what plaintiff's problem was with her hands and knew that she was suffering from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Plaintiff was working on her

for this condition, knew she was having
condition worse near the end of the
did not file a notice of injury stating
injury and that she didn't do anything

Plaintiff saw Dr. Robert Palkin
her hands and arms. Dr. Palkin
who performed tests and diagnosed carpal
tunnel syndrome. Plaintiff then was referred
to Dr. Huber who advised plaintiff to have surgery
because as she stated, "I couldn't
lay out of work because I'd be
coming in." She continued to work on her
discussed with her supervisors about
hand and arms.

The only experience plaintiff had with
during this time was a "needle stick".
one time. The plaintiff thought an
was filed, but she never stated that
compensation claim or this was a work

In July of 1994, plaintiff saw Dr.
was about 14 months after she had seen
period of time, she was found as a cleaner
with the defendant, and her symptoms

On July 14, 1994, Dr. Collins diagnosed
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome including
symptoms in her left arm. Dr. Collins referred

EMG which indicated a high grade ulnar nerve palsy in the left forearm and wrist.

On the 22nd day of 1994, plaintiff underwent an electromyogram with Nurse McKinnon at the Hospital in Nashville. She informed Nurse work that she did not make her arm dusting and stuff.

Dr. Collins performed surgery on Plaintiff worked up until the time of

An injured employee must generally give written notice of injury within thirty days unless a reasonable excuse exists in complying with the TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 50-6-201.

This panel must determine whether or not the evidence preponderates in favor of the plaintiff's claim of work-related injury as required by TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 50-6-202, and if there exists a reasonable excuse in complying with the rule.

The Supreme Court held that the injury was a compensable occupational injury, a condition of employment, and that the injury occurred on the date the employer's negligence prevented the employee from working. *Crescent Corp. v. Reed*, 253 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tenn. 1991). *Shoe Company v. Reed*, 350 S.W.2d 65 (Tenn. 1961).

Defendant argues plaintiff's delay of providing notice was not reasonable and plaintiff was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in November, 1992.

The date of injury in this case was the holding of *Barker v. Home-Crest* (1919). Defendant's argument that plaintiff was not given notice when she was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in November, 1992, would in effect, require plaintiff to give notice of an injury before the injury occurred.

During this time, plaintiff constantly complained to her supervisor about how her hands and arms hurt at the end of a work day. Her supervisor advised her to wear a brace on her arms. Also, the plaintiff advised her supervisor about a month before her surgery that she had carpal tunnel syndrome and that her work made her symptoms worse.

In this case, it can be determined that the employer had actual knowledge of plaintiff's condition and the nature of the injury as discussed during the time Ms. Honeycutt was the plaintiff's supervisor. Plaintiff's condition was discussed with her supervisor.

A condition justifies the delay in awarding compensation is the employee's limited knowledge of her rights and duties under the workers' compensation act. *Livingston v. Shelby* (1991), 511 (Tenn. 1991).

The record in this case reflects that the
reader write or reads at the second grade.
She is functionally illiterate. She
remembering dates and difficulty in

The trial judge was obviously
in the information furnished by the
interrogation, her testimony at trial
misrepresentation to be intentional

From the record in this case, it is
plaintiff totally ignorant of the work.
A glaring example when she was asked why
agree to Dr. Huber to do surgery, stated,
I didn't have - - - - I couldn't lay out
have no other income coming in."

Therefore we find and hold that as a result
from a palpable error, in judgment due to re-
work-removals in her hands and as a
that she never intended to work with the
the accidents involved to have occurred
defendant employer and this injury through
plaintiff's supervisors and nurse.

Therefore, the judgment of the trial
We do not find the record in this
deems the extent of plaintiff's permanent
therefore we refer the case to the trial court for

d e t e r m i n i n g t h e e x t e n t o f p l a i n t i f f '
 f o r a n y f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s n e c e s s a r y .
 t a x e t d o t h e a p p e l l e e , H e a l t h T r C u o s m t p , a n I y n , c
 f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c

J a m e s L . W e a t h e r f o r

CONCUR:

Adolpho A. Birch, Jr. , Chief Justice

Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge

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II III IIIII IIIIIIIIIII,
Appellant,
v.
II IIIIIIIIIII, IIIIIII,
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Appellee,

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Clerk

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This case is before the Court upon a motion for review presented to Court Clerk Crowson, III-4-111(1)(1)(1), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Tribunal for Appellate Panel, and the Panel's Decision. Upon review, the Court finds the findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference;

Therefore, it appears to the Court that the motion for review is not well-taken and should be denied; and

It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is affirmed the judgment of the Court.

Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant.

II III IIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIII this 21st day of October, 1997.

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Filed, C. W. Crowson participating.