IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE FILED

AT JACKSON

FEBRUARY 1997 SESSION

Feb. 24, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson **Appellate Court Clerk**

ANDREA JONES,

APPELLANT,

No, 02-C-01-9603-CR-00084

Shelby County

W. Fred Axley, Judge

(Post-Conviction Relief)

ν.

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

APPELLEE.

FOR THE APPELLANT:

Andrea Jones, Pro Se Lake County Regional Facility Route 1, Box 330 Tiptonville, TN 38079-9775

FOR THE APPELLEE:

Charles W. Burson Attorney General & Reporter 500 Charlotte Avenue Nashville, TN 37243-0497

Deborah A. Tullis Assistant Attorney General 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37243-0493

John W. Pierotti **District Attorney General** 201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01 Memphis, TN 38103

Alanda Horne Assistant District Attorney General 201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01 Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED:

AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

Joe B. Jones, Presiding Judge

ΟΡΙΝΙΟΝ

The appellant, Andrea Jones, has appealed as of right from a judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing his suit for post-conviction relief. The trial court found the ground alleged in the petition is not cognizable in a post-conviction suit and the suit is barred by the statute of limitations. The appellant contends the sentences imposed by the trial court are illegal. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law which governs the issue presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

This Court affirmed the appellant's convictions and sentences in <u>State v. Herrod</u>, 754 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. Crim. App.), <u>per</u>. <u>app</u>. <u>denied</u> (Tenn. 1988). The supreme court denied the appellant's application for permission to appeal on April 4, 1988. This suit was not filed until October 20, 1995, well beyond the statute of limitations in post-conviction cases. <u>See</u> Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (Supp. 1990).

The appellant's contention that the sentences imposed by the trial court are illegal is totally without merit. He predicates his argument on the ground he should have been sentenced pursuant to the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. The fallacy in this argument is that he committed the crimes in question, was tried, convicted and sentenced, and the appeal final before the effective date of the Act. The appellant was properly sentenced pursuant to the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982.

The appellant cannot seek review of the length and manner of serving sentences in a post-conviction suit. This is true under the 1982 Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-402(a)(1982), as well as the 1989 Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(a)(1989). In other words, a ground predicated upon a sentence imposed by the trial court is not cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding unless the sentence is illegal.

The appellant did not challenge his sentences on direct appeal. Therefore, he waived this issue.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE

CONCUR:

JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE