In Re Angelleigh R. - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s determination that Angelleigh R. (“the Child”) had been the victim of severe child abuse while living with her mother, Amanda B. (“Mother”), and Mother’s paramour, J.M. As noted in the majority opinion, both Mother and J.M. were parties to the proceedings in juvenile court as well as the de novo appeal to the Marshall County Circuit Court (“trial court”). However, the trial court’s dependency and neglect determination as to Mother was based solely on educational neglect while the trial court’s determination of severe child abuse was based solely on its finding of sexual abuse perpetrated against the Child by J.M. Mother was not accused of severe child abuse or failing to protect the Child from such abuse. Although Mother has perfected an appeal to this Court, J.M. did not appeal the determination that he had severely abused the Child, and thus the existence of Mother’s standing to appeal that particular determination, which was not rendered with respect to her, is somewhat uncertain. See Clark v. Perry, No. 02A01-9704-CH-00080, 1998 WL 34190562, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1998) (“As a general rule, . . . a party lacks standing to appeal an order entered against a co-party who has elected not to appeal that order.”). Nevertheless, assuming, arguendo, that Mother possesses the proper standing to appeal the trial court’s determination that J.M. severely abused the Child, I believe that the trial court’s determination should be affirmed.