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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Robert E. Lee Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee et al.
In this appeal, we examine the intersection of the rule governing the voluntary dismissal of a civil action, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, and the statutory scheme of the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (2021). Robert E. Lee Flade filed suit against several defendants over what he considered to be disparaging remarks that were made on social media. Two of the defendants, Stephanie Isaacs and the Bedford County Listening Project (“the BCLP”), each filed not only a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, but also a petition to dismiss pursuant to the TPPA. The TPPA petitions sought dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and an award of sanctions. Mr. Flade filed responses, and both the motions and the petitions were set for hearing. However, before the trial court conducted the hearing, Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. As a result, the trial court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice. Ms. Isaacs and the BCLP sought to have the trial court adjudicate their TPPA petitions notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court determined that Mr. Flade’s nonsuit concluded the matter and declined to adjudicate the TPPA petitions. On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Flade v. City of Shelbyville, No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 9, 2023). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that although the right to take a voluntary nonsuit is subject to certain limitations, the mere filing of a TPPA petition is not among them. Thus, we hold that the trial court correctly declined to adjudicate the pending TPPA petitions after Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre JuJuan Lee Green
This appeal presents the issue of how the legalization of hemp affects a probable cause analysis where law enforcement relied, in part, on a positive alert from a drug-sniffing canine incapable of differentiating between the smell of legal hemp and illegal marijuana. After initiating a routine traffic stop, law enforcement conducted an open-air sniff using a drug-sniffing canine. Based on the canine’s positive alert on the vehicle, combined with other facts observed by the officer, law enforcement searched the vehicle without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The search revealed the following items inside a backpack: one ounce of marijuana, a loaded handgun, Ziploc bags, and a scale. The defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, was indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver; possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the canine sweep could not provide probable cause because the canine could not distinguish between the smell of legalized hemp and illegal marijuana. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges against the defendant. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed by holding that the smell of illegal marijuana provides law enforcement with probable cause to search a vehicle. Alternatively, the intermediate court held that law enforcement possessed probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances. The defendant appealed to this Court, and we granted review. First, we clarify that State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762 (Tenn. 2000), does not provide a per se rule of probable cause based on a positive indication from a drug-sniffing dog. Rather, England provides for an examination of the totality of the circumstances. Second, we hold that a positive indication from a drug-sniffing canine may continue to contribute to a finding of probable cause when examining the totality of the circumstances, notwithstanding the legalization of hemp. After examining the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that law enforcement possessed probable cause to search the vehicle. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reinstating the indictments against the defendant and remanding for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Peggy Mathes et al. v. 99 Hermitage, LLC
This appeal raises a thorny question about adverse possession. Under that doctrine, a party may gain legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property by maintaining exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious possession of the property for a certain length of time. At issue here is the adversity requirement. The original plaintiff in this case, Ora Eads, Jr., obtained legal title to a commercial property near downtown Nashville years ago but did not register the deed. About two decades later, the individual who sold the property to Mr. Eads defaulted on a loan, and his creditor obtained a judgment lien against the property, which was eventually sold to enforce the lien. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Eads adversely possessed the property during the intervening years. Defendant, the subsequent purchaser of the property, disagrees and argues that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse. We agree with defendant. Adversity, for purposes of both common-law and statutory adverse possession, requires either a conflict of title or a controversy about the right to possess the property. Because neither existed here for the requisite time period, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and reinstate the chancery court’s judgment in favor of defendant. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Peggy Mathes et al. v. 99 Hermitage, LLC (Dissenting)
I agree with the majority that, to acquire legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property through adverse possession, the Plaintiffs must show Mr. Eads had “exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious” possession of the property for the requisite time. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Eads’s possession of the property was not “adverse.” 1 I would hold Mr. Eads has met the requirements to show a hostile or adverse possession for common-law and statutory adverse possession.2 |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Colleen Ann Hyder v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this case, we review a trial court’s determination that a Montgomery County attorney violated Rule 5.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by practicing law while her license was suspended for failure to pay the professional privilege tax and the accompanying sanction of a public censure. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Family Trust Services LLC et al. v. Green Wise Homes LLC et al.
In this case, plaintiffs alleged defendants committed fraud in connection with their property rights. After a jury trial, plaintiffs moved for a new trial asking the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed upon finding the trial court misconceived its role as thirteenth juror. When a trial court misconceives its role as thirteenth juror or applies an incorrect standard, remand for a new trial historically has been the only remedy available under common law. In this appeal, we consider whether our law should allow the alternative remedy of remand for the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.06. We hold that remand for the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror is an appropriate remedy when a civil trial court misconceives that role or applies an incorrect standard. We further hold that the lower courts erred in finding that a claim for unjust enrichment requires a voluntary conferral of a benefit. Finally, we hold that our law does not recognize a claim for misappropriation or conversion of a right of redemption. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Bill Charles v. Donna McQueen
Ordinarily, a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim must prove that the defendant made a false statement and did so negligently. If the plaintiff is a public figure, however, he must prove that the statement was made with actual malice. This is a steep hill to climb, so determining whether the plaintiff is a public figure is a crucial inquiry in any defamation case. This case is no exception. The plaintiff here, Bill Charles, assisted with the development of the Durham Farms community in Hendersonville, Tennessee, and is president of its homeowners’ association. Charles brought defamation and false light claims against Donna McQueen, a Durham Farms resident who posted a Google review that was critical of him. McQueen sought dismissal of Charles’s claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, arguing that Charles could not establish a prima facie case for his claims because he could not prove actual malice. The trial court agreed with McQueen and dismissed the claims. The Court of Appeals reversed in part. It agreed with McQueen that Charles had to prove actual malice to prevail on his false light claim and had failed to do so. But it held that Charles is not a public figure and therefore need not prove actual malice for his defamation claim. We disagree with the Court of Appeals on that score. We hold that Charles is a limited-purpose public figure given the voluntary and prominent role he played in a controversy concerning changes to the Durham Farms development plan. We further hold that Charles failed to establish a prima facie case of actual malice. Finally, we reject Charles’s argument that McQueen waived her request for appellate attorney’s fees by failing to list it as an issue in her Court of Appeals brief. We reverse the Court of Appeals in part and affirm in part, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Thomas Edward Clardy v. State of Tennessee
The prisoner in this case filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis long after expiration of the one-year limitations period and sought tolling of the statute of limitations. The petition was filed under the tolling exception to the coram nobis statute of limitations adopted by this Court in Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001). The coram nobis court held a hearing on whether to toll the statute of limitations. It accepted the factual allegations in the coram nobis petition as true, but determined that the new evidence did not show that the petitioner was actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted, so he was not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the coram nobis court on the tolling exception, reversed the dismissal for untimeliness, and remanded for a hearing on the allegations in the petition. On appeal, we hold that if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is not timely filed and seeks tolling of the statute of limitations, it must be based on new evidence, discovered after expiration of the limitations period, that clearly and convincingly shows that the petitioner is actually innocent of the underlying crime, i.e., that the petitioner did not commit the crime. To obtain tolling of the coram nobis statute of limitations, the prisoner must file the petition no more than one year after he discovers the new evidence of actual innocence. From our review of the record, we agree with the analysis and conclusion of the coram nobis court and find no error. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirm the decision of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition as untimely. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Thomas Edward Clardy v. State of Tennessee (Concurring)
I agree with the majority that the trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Clardy’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis without conducting a hearing on the merits because the petition was untimely and was not entitled to tolling. I also agree with the majority that the trial court handled and decided this case exactly as it should have. Thus, I concur in the judgment of the Court. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Robert Allen Doll, III v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this case, an attorney appeals the recommended sanction of disbarment after three criminal convictions. The attorney was convicted by a jury of two counts of subornation of aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation, all Class E felony offenses and serious crimes under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22. All three criminal convictions arose out of the attorney’s conduct in representing a client. In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel recommended disbarment. The attorney appealed the hearing panel’s decision to the chancery court, which affirmed. The attorney appealed to this Court. On appeal, the attorney argues the hearing panel should have reviewed similar cases of attorney misconduct where a suspension was imposed, and that he should be suspended based on the sanction imposed in those cases. Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panels and trial courts considering attorney discipline promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by anchoring their decisions on punishment to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Rule 9 does not give either hearing panels or trial courts authority in attorney disciplinary cases to base recommended attorney disciplinary sanctions on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases. The Supreme Court’s more expansive perspective from seeing the broad swath of attorney disciplinary matters in the entirety of the State—whether appealed or not—puts it in the best position to consider comparative cases for the sake of uniformity of punishment throughout Tennessee. In this case, considering the nature of the attorney’s misconduct, no comparable case convinces us that suspension, rather than disbarment, is the appropriate sanction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court and the decision of the hearing panel and impose the sanction of disbarment. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Loring E. Justice v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This is a direct appeal of a disciplinary proceeding involving a Knoxville attorney who filed four motions containing pejorative statements about the trial judge in a child custody case involving the attorney’s minor child. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that the attorney violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct and imposed a three-year suspension as punishment. The attorney appealed to the trial court. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s judgment in all respects with the exception of the attorney’s punishment. The trial court held that the hearing panel erred in imposing a suspension, and it increased the punishment to disbarment. The attorney appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all issues with the exception of the issue regarding the attorney’s punishment. We hold that the trial court erred in increasing the punishment to disbarment, and we reinstate the three-year suspension imposed by the hearing panel but modify it to take effect upon the filing of this Opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Loring E. Justice v. Board of Professional Responsibility (concurring)
I agree with virtually all of the majority’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, with one exception: its determination that ABA Standards 6.21 and 7.1, which identify disbarment as the presumptive sanction, do not apply to this case. As explained below, I would hold that ABA Standards 6.21 and 7.1 apply, and consequently disbarment is the presumptive sanction, because Mr. Justice engaged in the misconduct with intent to obtain personal benefit. I nonetheless concur in the majority’s decision to impose a three-year suspension, based on the comparative cases cited in the majority opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This is the second interlocutory recusal appeal in this conservatorship action, filed by two attorneys in the case. In the first recusal appeal, the Court of Appeals entered an order staying all trial court proceedings. The Court of Appeals then issued an opinion affirming denial of the recusal motion, stating that the stay was lifted, and remanding the case to the trial court. Before the appellate mandate issued, the attorneys filed a second motion for the trial court judge to recuse; this was denied as well. The attorneys then filed this second petition for recusal appeal. They later filed a motion in the Court of Appeals arguing that trial court orders entered after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in the first recusal appeal, but before the mandate issued, are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals agreed and held the orders were void. The counterpetitioners and co-conservators have filed an accelerated application for permission to appeal in this Court, and we ordered the attorneys to file a response. Having reviewed the application for permission to appeal, the answer, all appendices, and the applicable law, we grant the application, and dispense with additional briefing and oral argument. We hold that the stay imposed by the Court of Appeals in the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. We further hold that the attorneys waived any other argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Melissa Binns v. Trader Joe's East, Inc.
This interlocutory appeal involves an alleged slip and fall incident that occurred at the defendant’s grocery store. The plaintiff’s amended complaint included allegations of vicarious liability, premises liability, negligent training, and negligent supervision against the defendant. In an attempt to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligent training and supervision claims, the defendant filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and asserted two alternative arguments, both of which the trial court rejected. First, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that courts must dismiss “negligent activity” claims, such as claims for negligent training and supervision, when asserted concurrently with a premises liability theory of recovery. Second, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s direct negligence claims were no longer legally viable due to the defendant admitting it was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee, commonly referred to as the “preemption rule.” After denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application. The defendant then appealed to this Court, and we granted review. We hold that the preemption rule is incompatible with Tennessee’s system of comparative fault and decline to adopt it. In addition, we decline to adopt the rule proposed by the defendant pertaining to “negligent activity” claims asserted alongside premises liability claims. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Thomas and LaRonda Turner
A jury convicted two defendants, Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, of three counts of |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Thomas and LaRonda Turner (Concur in Part and Dissent in Part)
I agree that Tony Thomas’s murder convictions should be affirmed. The Brady v. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Thomas and LaRonda Turner (Concur in Part, Dissent in Part)
I join in full the majority opinion’s analysis of the Brady issue and its judgment |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
James Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC et al.
Granville Williams, Jr., died while residing at an assisted-living facility. The central question in this appeal is whether his son’s ensuing wrongful-death action against the facility must be arbitrated. To answer that question, we must resolve two subsidiary issues—first, whether the attorney-in-fact who signed the arbitration agreement as Williams’s representative had authority to do so and, second, whether Williams’s son and other wrongful-death beneficiaries who were not parties to the arbitration agreement nevertheless are bound by it. We hold that signing an optional arbitration agreement—that is, one that is not a condition of admission to a health care facility—is not a “health care decision” within the meaning of the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act. The durable power of attorney that gave Williams’s attorney-in-fact authority to act for him in “all claims and litigation matters” thus provided authority to enter the optional arbitration agreement even though it did not specifically grant authority to make health care decisions. We further hold that Williams’s son is bound by the arbitration agreement because his wrongful-death claims are derivative of his father’s claims. Because we conclude that the claims in this action are subject to arbitration, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remand to the trial court. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
James Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC et al. (Dissenting)
To enforce and compel arbitration in this case, the majority rewrites a health care facility admission contract, disregards the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, ignores precedent, and creates confusion in an important area of the law. I respectfully dissent. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
James Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC et al. (Dissenting)
I agree with many of the points made in Justice Lee’s dissenting opinion. I write separately out of concern about the practical implications of the majority’s decision to leave the law so unsettled in an area that touches so many. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Brian Philip Manookian v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this lawyer disciplinary case, the lawyer’s conduct compels disbarment. The lawyer sent a series of intimidating, demeaning, embarrassing, and harassing communications to opposing counsel and others. Some targeted family members of opposing counsel, including one family member who was also a former client, and caused well-founded concern for their well-being and safety. In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that the purpose of the communications was to intimidate opposing counsel in order to gain unfair advantage in pending litigation. It concluded inter alia that the lawyer’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, that he failed to respect the rights of third persons, and that he violated his duty to a former client, in violation of Tennessee’s Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearing panel said the presumptive sanction was disbarment, found four aggravating factors, and found no mitigating circumstances. Without explanation, the hearing panel recommended a two-year suspension instead of disbarment. The attorney appealed to the trial court. The trial court indicated that, had the Board of Professional Responsibility filed a separate petition for review, the trial court would have recommended disbarment, but because the Board did not, the trial court affirmed the sanction of suspension. Both parties appeal. Here, the lawyer’s conduct was egregious. Victimizing the families of opposing counsel and causing concern for their well-being and safety is an especially grave offense and a profound dishonor as a lawyer. The hearing panel’s decision to deviate downward from the presumptive sanction of disbarment was arbitrary and capricious, and the lawyer must be disbarred. Accordingly, we modify the judgment of the hearing panel and impose the sanction of disbarment. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Brian Philip Manookian v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee (Dissenting)
While this Court has inherent jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary matters, attorneys must be afforded fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. For the first time, this Court has increased an attorney’s discipline through the exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction outside of the process outlined in Rule 9 by disbarring Brian Philip Manookian without giving fair notice of its intent. I dissent from the Court’s decision to disbar Mr. Manookian and would affirm the hearing panel’s finding of a twenty-four-month suspension. Neither the hearing panel nor the trial court erred. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Wayne Eady
This appeal presents two issues. First, we consider whether the District Attorney General’s |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Thomas Fleming Mabry v. The Board of Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court
This is an appeal in a lawyer-disciplinary proceeding involving Tennessee attorney Thomas |
Knox | Supreme Court |
