In Re Estate of JD Bush
Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we conclude that he waived consideration of all issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL. ANGELA HOCKETT v. TRACY JOY
The trial court entered an order awarding a mother retroactive child support and calculating the amount of support the father owed. The father filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Several months later, he amended his motion to assert that he was entitled to relief from the judgment because his attorney sustained an injury and died, which prevented the father from timely receiving a copy of the judgment so he could appeal it. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the father failed to raise the issue within a reasonable time, and then awarded the mother one-half of her attorney fees. The father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion, but we vacate the award of attorney fees because the trial court failed to consider their reasonableness. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Vivian Khah v. Jonathan Capley
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a personal injury action in which the alleged tortfeasor died before suit was filed. Upon a motion to dismiss, the trial court determined that the suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Because no personal representative was appointed for the deceased tortfeasor and more than a year had elapsed following the accrual of the plaintiff’s cause of action, we affirm the dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shauneille Sharifa (Morton) v. Wells Fargo/ASC
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse and award of summary judgment. Plaintiff-homeowner took out a loan secured by a deed of trust on a parcel of real property. After defaulting on the loan, plaintiff and defendant-bank entered into a loan modification agreement. Plaintiff, however, again defaulted on the loan, and, after she failed to make the required acceleration payments, defendant initiated foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the deed of trust. The real property ultimately was sold at foreclosure for less than the balance owed on the loan. Plaintiff then sued defendant for breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure. Defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff never responded to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Three days prior to the hearing on the summary judgment, plaintiff filed a motion for a change of venue, which the trial judge treated as a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B and which, following a hearing, he denied. The trial court subsequently granted defendant’s summary judgment motion and dismissed plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals both the trial court’s denial of the motion to recuse and its granting of the motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel., Amanda C. Sensing v. Bradley K. Sensing
The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify child support. Because Father failed to establish his current gross monthly income, as necessary to prove a significant variance, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Adrian M.-M., et al.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Obion County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Emily M. M.-A. (“Mother”) to her minor children Adrian, Maribel, Alisiana, and Elena (“the Children”). The Children had been exposed to methamphetamine in Mother’s care. After trial, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; abandonment by failure to visit; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; severe child abuse; and, being sentenced to more than two years’ imprisonment for child abuse. The Trial Court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. On appeal, Mother argues that she has made improvements such that termination of her parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest. First, apart from the grounds of failure to visit and failure to provide a suitable home, which we reverse, we affirm the grounds for termination found by the Trial Court. Regarding best interest, we find that Mother has no meaningful relationship with the Children and that her purported improvements are insufficient. The evidence is clear and convincing that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanie Morgan Beltz Et Al v. Brett Anthony Heffner
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition based on Tennessee’s Grandparent Visitation Statute. The parents of the deceased mother of a new-born child filed a petition to obtain visitation with their three-month-old granddaughter. The child’s father opposed the petition. Following discovery, the father filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the ground that there was no danger of substantial harm to the child if visitation was denied because there was no evidence that the grandparents had a significant relationship with the child. The petitioners opposed the motion relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(b)(4), which established a rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child if visitation was denied because their daughter, the child’s mother, was deceased. The trial court found there was no significant existing relationship between the grandparents and the child. After analyzing the child’s best interests under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-307, the court granted summary judgment to the father, finding the petitioners did not meet the requirements of the Grandparent Visitation Statute. We have determined that the trial court misconstrued the statutory scheme. The trial court failed to recognize that because the petitioners are the parents of the child’s deceased mother, they were entitled to the rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child if visitation was denied without having to establish that a “significant” relationship with their grandchild existed. Moreover, we have determined that more than one conclusion or inference can reasonably be drawn from the facts, thereby precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Diane Kikue-Yasutake Winne v. Scott Anderson Winne
Husband petitioned the court to modify his alimony obligation after Wife moved in with her boyfriend. Wife maintained that her new living arrangement did not affect her need for alimony because she and her partner shared expenses equally and her living expenses after the move were unchanged. The trial court disagreed and suspended a portion of Husband’s alimony obligation. Both sides raise issues with the trial court’s decision. Contrary to Wife’s assertion, we conclude that the alimony provision in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement did not preclude modification of the alimony award as authorized by statute. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in basing its modification decision on the evidence of Wife’s financial circumstances at the time of trial. We affirm the alimony modification, but we modify the judgment so that the modification applies retroactively to the date of Husband’s petition. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
City of Franklin, Tennessee v. W. L. Hailey & Co., Inc. Et Al.
Appellant city appeals from the dismissal of its negligent misrepresentation claim on the basis of the economic loss doctrine, arguing that Tennessee law recognizes an exception to the economic loss doctrine for negligent misrepresentations. Because we conclude that Tennessee law does not recognize a negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss doctrine, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
E Solutions For Buildings, LLC v. Knestrick Contractor, Inc., Et Al.
This appeal involves payment disputes arising out of a public construction project. Among other things, the case involves claims made by an equipment supplier against a subcontractor, the project’s general contractor, and the general contractor’s bonding company, and claims made by the same subcontractor against the general contractor. Following a trial, the trial court granted the supplier a judgment against the subcontractor and granted the subcontractor a judgment against the general contractor. The supplier’s claim against the general contractor and its bonding company was denied. The propriety of these rulings and numerous other issues are now before this Court. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm in part, affirm in part as modified, reverse in part, and remand the case for such further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
101 Construction Company v. Lawrence B. Hammet, II Et Al.
Plaintiff client sued Defendant attorney and law firm for damages tied to a breach of an attorney’s fees contract following the completion of an arbitration matter. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appeals the denial of its motion for directed verdict and motion for new trial. Because the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict on interpretation of the written contract at issue, we reverse the verdict entered by the trial court and remand with instructions to enter a directed verdict against the attorney and law firm in the amount of $67,335.69 and to determine whether prejudgment interest is warranted in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brewco, LLC et al. v. Martha R. Scent
The plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking recovery for improvements they had made to real property that had been purchased at a foreclosure sale by the defendant. When the plaintiffs originally purchased the property, the defendant as mortgagee held a deed of trust on it. Due to a fraudulently recorded release of that deed of trust, however, the plaintiffs purchased and improved the property, believing that they had clear title. The defendant did not learn of the various improvements to the property until after the improvements were complete. At approximately the same time, the defendant discovered that a third party had recorded a release of the deed of trust without her consent, with such release containing a forgery of her signature. The defendant filed suit against the third party who purportedly forged the release, the plaintiffs, and others, and she ultimately received a monetary judgment that resulted in a judicial foreclosure to enforce her deed of trust. At the foreclosure sale, the defendant purchased title to the property in question with a credit bid. Shortly before the foreclosure sale, the plaintiffs filed this action, ultimately asserting claims of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, constructive trust, and an equitable lien. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment concerning the plaintiffs’ claims, determining that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated facts supporting their theories of recovery. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Sonya Lee Westbrooks v. Earl Lavon Westbrooks
Appellant/Husband appeals the trial court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to reopen proof in this divorce case. By his motion, Husband sought to introduce allegedly “newly discovered evidence” concerning the premarital value of his retirement account. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence, which consisted of Husband’s previous divorce decree, was a matter of public record and was available to Husband during discovery in the instant divorce matter. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband’s motion. Affirmed and remanded. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Takesha Curtiss Nelvis v. Lafayette Baptist, Jr.
Father appeals the juvenile court’s decision to deny him equal parenting time. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the statutory best interest factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a), we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of a proper order. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Alexis S.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s termination of a mother’s parental rights and denial of the maternal grandmother’s petition for grandparent visitation. The court terminated the mother’s rights on the grounds that she abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit and support the child, and failed to manifest an ability or willingness to assume personal custody of the child. The court also found that termination of the mother’s rights was in the child’s best interest. The court awarded guardianship of the child to her paternal grandparents and denied the maternal grandmother’s intervening petition for visitation, finding that the risk of harm in permitting visitation was greater than the risk of harm in denying it. The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, and the grandmother appeals the denial of her petition for visitation. Because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k), we reverse the trial court’s determination that the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support the child was established and remand the issue for the trial court to make the requisite findings and to enter judgment accordingly. We reverse the court’s determination that the other two grounds for termination were proven because the record fails to establish either ground by clear and convincing evidence. Because no ground for termination has been proven, we also reverse the court’s determination regarding the child’s best interests. Because the court terminated the father’s parental rights, we affirm the court’s appointment of the paternal grandmother and her husband as the child’s guardians, subject to the mother’s rights, which have not been terminated. We also affirm the denial of the maternal grandmother’s petition for visitation. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Dr. Victor W. McLaughlin, M.D. v. Elizabeth King McLaughlin a/k/a Rev. Elizabeth King
The plaintiff filed this action on a sworn account, seeking to recover $20,451.00 that he had allegedly loaned in several money transfers to the defendant, plus prejudgment interest and costs. In her answer to the complaint, the defendant denied all substantive allegations but failed to raise any affirmative defenses. At trial, the defendant stipulated to having received the money transfers. However, she requested that the court allow her to orally swear under oath that the transfers did not constitute a valid debt. The trial court found that the defendant was attempting to assert an affirmative defense that the transfers constituted gifts rather than loans and that she had waived such a defense pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.03 by failing to raise it in her responsive pleading. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the total amount of $33,942.69, including prejudgment interest. The defendant filed a motion to alter or amend, requesting that the judgment be vacated on the ground that under Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-5-107 (2017), she should have been allowed to raise any defense orally at trial. Following a hearing, the trial court found that because the defendant had elected to file a responsive pleading, she was required to raise the affirmative defense in the pleading. The trial court thereby declined to vacate the judgment. The defendant has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Apexworks Restoration v. Derek Scott, Et Al.
This case involves statutory interpretation of the requirements for service by private process servers in the General Sessions Courts and whether or not a party has been properly served. Plaintiff obtained default judgments in General Sessions Court against two individuals, a man and a woman, who were living together. Although the process server stated on the return that both parties had been served, only the man had been served. Three years later, in an effort to aid in the execution on the default judgments, the plaintiff had subpoenas issued against both defendants, but only the woman was served. The defendants then moved to quash the subpoena as against her and, additionally, to void the default judgments, alleging that the plaintiff had failed to properly serve them with the civil warrant and the subpoenas. The General Sessions Court denied the motion, and the defendants thereafter appealed to the trial court. Having found that only the man had been properly served with the civil warrant, the trial court affirmed the default judgment as against him and voided the default judgment as against the woman. Additionally, the trial court found that, while the judgment was void as against the woman, she had been properly served with the subpoena and was thus required to respond to it. Defendants appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
B. Nathan Hunt et al. v. David Lowery, et al.
This is an unlawful detainer action in which the owner permitted the defendants to live in her house rent-free. The owner was later declared incompetent, and her daughters/co-conservators sought to evict the defendants. The general sessions court awarded the co-conservators possession, and the defendants appealed to circuit court. Once the owner died, an administrator was substituted for the co-conservators as the plaintiff. The circuit court awarded the administrator rent for the period between the date the detainer summons was filed and the date the owner died. The defendants appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. Neither the |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Cornerstone Financial Credit Union v. Joshua Mundy
A credit union initiated this action on December 12, 2007, by filing a civil warrant to recover an amount alleged to be due on an account. On June 14, 2011, after several unsuccessful attempts to serve the warrant, a return on service was filed indicating that the defendant had been served with the warrant; a default judgment in the amount of $13,717.79 was entered on July 25, 2011. The credit union levied on the defendant’s bank account on April 25, 2018, following which the defendant moved the general sessions court to set aside the judgment on the ground that service of the warrant was defective and the judgment was void; the court granted the motion and set the case for trial. Before the trial could be held, the credit union appealed to the circuit court, where the defendant moved for summary judgment to affirm the general sessions court’s order setting aside the judgment. The circuit court dismissed the action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12.02(3), holding that service of the warrant was not in compliance with the applicable statutes. The credit union appeals. Upon our de novo review, we have determined that the record does not show that the defendant was duly served with the warrant that led to the default judgment and, as a result, the judgment entered against him is void. Because of the current proceeding, however, trial on the merits has not been held. Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the circuit court that the judgment of the general sessions court is void, modify the judgment of the circuit court to reinstate the credit union’s cause of action, and remand the case to the circuit court with instruction to remand it to the general sessions court for trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Channing M.
This is a termination of parental rights case. After the death of the mother, petitioner— the child’s maternal grandmother—sought to terminate the father’s parental rights on four grounds: abandonment by failure to support the child; abandonment by failure to support the mother; abandonment by failure to visit the child; and failure to manifest ability to take custody of the child. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate father’s parental rights only on the ground of abandonment by failure to support the child. The trial court further found that termination was in the best interests of the child. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dylan S.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit and to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(3); and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee did not meet her burden to show that Mother willfully failed to support the child, and because Appellee did not meet her burden to show proof of an order in which the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, we reverse the trial court’s findings as to these grounds. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility, and on its finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Abdighani K. Hashi v. Parkway Xpress, LLC Et Al.
A forklift operator suffered injuries while operating his forklift within the confines of the trailer of a tractor-trailer. He sued the John Doe operator of the tractor-trailer, a trucking company, and a freight broker. Both the trucking company and the freight broker moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions, dismissing the claims against them. On appeal, the forklift operator claims that some of the evidence filed in support of the motions for summary judgment was inadmissible and that there were disputed issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
SmartBank v. Sandra Stephens
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3) motion for relief from a default judgment. Appellant argues that she was not properly served, thus rendering the default judgment void ab initio. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s order allowing Appellee to execute its judgment on Appellant’s right of survivorship interest in real property held as a tenancy by the entirety. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Mathews Construction, Inc. v. Kennedy Omanwa
A defendant filed a motion to recuse the trial judge one month prior to trial; the trial judge responded to the motion and entered an order denying it two weeks prior to trial. Defendant appeals, asserting that the court erred in denying the motion and in failing to notify him that the court would proceed with the trial as previously set. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
John Mark Porter v. Betsy Hillis Porter
This appeal is from a final decree of divorce. The wife challenges the trial court’s ruling regarding the ground for divorce and division of the marital estate. Because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, we are unable to conduct a meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Warren | Court of Appeals |
