Bradley County School System By And Through The Bradley County Board Of Education Et Al. v. The City Of Cleveland, Tennessee
This is one of four separate actions currently before this Court with the common issue of whether the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to the July 2014 amendment of that statute required a municipality governed by its own liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school system to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county in which the municipality was located when the county had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. The county commenced the instant action by filing a complaint requesting declaratory judgment of its asserted right to a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue collected within the municipality. Upon subsequent competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality, finding that the municipality was entitled to keep all liquor-by-the-drink tax monies distributed to it by the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue (“the Commissioner”). Upon the county’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court reserved judgment on the issue of whether the municipality was entitled to the local political subdivision’s portion of the liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue for sales that took place at private clubs within the municipal limits of the municipality prior to the municipality’s 2002 passage of its referendum authorizing liquor-by-the-drink sales. Following consideration of a motion for summary judgment on this remaining issue filed by the municipality and a response filed by the county, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality, dismissing the county’s complaint in its entirety. The county has appealed. Determining that the municipality was not required under the applicable version of the statute to share its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenues with the county, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Sullivan County, Tennessee Et Al. v. The City Of Bristol, Tennessee Et Al.
This is one of four separate actions currently before this Court with the common issue of whether the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to the July 2014 amendment of that statute required a municipality governed by its own liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school system to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county in which the municipality was located when the county had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. The county initially filed separate complaints against the two municipalities involved in this appeal, requesting declaratory judgment as to the county’s asserted right to a portion of liquorby- the-drink tax revenue collected within each municipality. The municipalities each respectively filed answers denying the county’s claims, as well as counterclaims asserting that the county owed them a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue collected from private clubs located within the county but outside the incorporated limits of the municipalities. By agreement, the trial court subsequently consolidated the actions. Upon competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the municipalities and dismissed the county’s claims, finding that the municipalities were entitled, respectively, to keep all liquor-by-the-drink tax monies distributed to them by the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue (“the Commissioner”). The county filed a motion to alter or amend this judgment, and the municipalities filed a motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims. In a subsequent order, the trial court denied the county’s motion to alter or amend and granted summary judgment in favor of the municipalities on their counterclaims, awarding money judgments against the county in favor of each municipality. The county has appealed solely the judgment dismissing its claims against the municipalities. Determining that the municipalities were not required under the applicable version of the statute to share their liquor-by-the-drink tax revenues with the county, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Blount County Board Of Education Et Al. v. City Of Maryville, Tennessee Et Al.
This is one of four separate actions currently before this Court with the common issue of whether the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to the July 2014 amendment of that statute required a municipality governed by its own liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school system to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county in which the municipality was located when the county had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. The county commenced the instant action by filing a complaint requesting declaratory judgment of its asserted right to a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue collected within the two municipalities involved in this appeal. Following the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss filed by the municipalities, the municipalities filed a motion for summary judgment. The county subsequently amended its complaint to, in the alternative, request reimbursement of the portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue it had previously distributed to the municipalities’ respective school systems from liquor-by-the-drink gross receipts collected at private clubs located within the county but outside the incorporated limits of the municipalities. The county then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the original issue of the cities’ purported liability to share a portion of their liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipalities, finding that the municipalities were entitled, respectively, to keep all liquor-by-the-drink tax monies distributed to them by the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue (“the Commissioner”). The county filed a motion to alter or amend, which the trial court granted insofar as it found that the county’s claims for alternative relief had not been properly before the court when the judgment was entered. Upon subsequent competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipalities on the alternative claims as well. The county has appealed. Determining that the municipalities were not required under the applicable version of the statute to share their liquor-by-the-drink tax revenues with the county but that the county was required to share tax revenue from liquor-by-the-drink sales within unincorporated areas of the county with all school systems in the county, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Washington County School System By And Through The Washington County Board Of Education Et Al. v. The City Of Johnson City, Tennessee
This is one of four separate actions currently before this Court with the common issue of whether the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to the July 2014 amendment of that statute required a municipality governed by its own liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school system to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county in which the municipality was located when the county had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. The county commenced the instant action by filing a complaint requesting declaratory judgment of its asserted right to a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue collected within the municipality. The city filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the municipality’s motion for summary judgment and granted declaratory judgment to the county, declaring that the municipality was required to share with the county its liquor-by-the-drink tax monies distributed to it by the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue (“the Commissioner”) in the manner that county property tax was expended and distributed. The trial court reserved issues of prejudgment interest and the amount of unremitted tax revenue for an evidentiary hearing. The municipality subsequently filed an unopposed motion for interlocutory appeal, which was granted, respectively, by the trial court and this Court. Determining that the municipality was not required under the applicable version of the statute to share its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county, we reverse the trial court’s grant of declaratory judgment and grant summary judgment in favor of the municipality, dismissing the county’s complaint. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re M.E.N.J.Et AL.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of M.L.D.N. (mother) with respect to her firstborn child, M.E.N.J. While that petition was pending, mother had a second child. The guardian ad litem for the two children later filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of mother with respect to her second-born child, M.A.L.D.1 The trial court found clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of mother’s rights with respect to both children based on three grounds. The court found (1) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (2) persistence of conditions that led to removal of the children; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the children. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Brianna T. Et Al.
Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her four children. Mother, who did not attend the final hearing, stipulated through counsel that a statutory ground existed for termination of her parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on her stipulation and the proof offered by DCS. Despite the stipulation, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination but not for the finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. Thus, we reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights and remand for entry of a judgment dismissing the petition. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Brianna T. Et Al.
Father appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his four children. Father, who did not attend the final hearing, stipulated through counsel that a statutory ground existed for termination of his parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights based on his stipulation and the proof offered by DCS. Despite the stipulation, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination but not for the finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. Thus, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights and remand for entry of a judgment dismissing the petition. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Colton B.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the trial court failed to provide a rationale for its decision and the final order entered by the trial court is nearly a verbatim recitation of the termination petition, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order that reflects that it is the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brooke E. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving an almost nine-year-old child, who was removed from his parents’ custody after allegations of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and a violation of the prior visitation order. On June 26, 2015, the Stewart County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered an order, finding the child dependent and neglected as to both parents. The father filed a notice of appeal from the adjudicatory hearing order, which appeal was still pending during trial in this matter. On September 1, 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the father. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights to the child upon the grounds that (1) prior to incarceration, the father had abandoned the child by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare, (2) the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the parents’ custody persisted, and (3) he had committed severe abuse against a half-sibling of the child. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The trial court declined to terminate the mother’s parental rights after finding that said termination was not in the best interest of the child. The father has appealed. Having determined that there was not a final adjudicatory hearing order for purposes of res judicata due to a pending appeal, we reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding the statutory ground of persistence of conditions. We conclude that the trial court erred by including in its decision portions of evidence from the adjudicatory hearing order, which was pending on appeal, but we determine this error to be harmless. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights to the child. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky L. Boren, et al. v. Hill Boren, PC, et al.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ava B.
The parents in this action challenge inter alia, the juvenile court’s decisions regarding calculation of the parents’ income for child support purposes and the modification of the final co-parenting order. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Roy D. Cox v. Carolyn Ellen Cox
This appeal arises from a combined judgment of divorce and an award of damages in tort. After awarding the husband a divorce, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital property. The court also granted the husband a judgment for compensatory and punitive damages arising from an intentional tort committed by the wife. The wife raises numerous issues on appeal, including the classification of marital property, the equitable division of the marital estate, and the amount of the damages award. Because the court’s order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its division of the marital estate or the amount of punitive damages awarded, we vacate those portions of the court’s judgment and remand for entry of an order in compliance with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In all other respects, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Blake Bookstaff v. David Gerregano, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
In this action, the Tennessee Department of Revenue (“the Department”) sought to collect unpaid franchise and excise taxes owed by a dissolved corporation from its former shareholder. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the shareholder, determining that the Department could not collect on the assessments originally issued in 2008 and 2009 due to the six-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-1-1429. The trial court also determined that the shareholder was not a “person” or “taxpayer” subject to franchise and excise taxes because those taxes are assessed solely against entities such as corporations. Finally, the trial court determined that the shareholder had no personal liability for the taxes owed by the dissolved corporation absent proof of a fraudulent conveyance. The Department timely appealed. Determining that the trial court erred in its construction and application of the applicable tax statutes, we reverse the judgment in favor of the shareholder. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Cobble, Et Al. v. Greene County, Tennessee, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a dispute over the grant of a zoning variance. Earl Scott Moore and Joetta Moore (“the Moores,” collectively) applied for a variance in order to build a carport at their home. The Moores’ neighbors, Michael Cobble and Lora Cobble (“the Cobbles,” collectively) opposed the requested variance. The Greene County Board of Zoning Appeals (“the BZA”) rejected the Moores’ application. The Moores submitted a second application, this time reducing their request by seven feet so as not to protrude into a public right-of-way. The BZA granted the Moores’ application for a variance. The Cobbles filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court concluded that material evidence supported the BZA’s decision to grant the variance and dismissed the Cobbles’ petition. The Cobbles appealed to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court in its declining to hold that res judicata barred the Moores’ second application for a variance. We hold further that, because the Moore property is not distinguishable in any meaningful way, the BZA’s decision to grant a variance was not supported by material evidence. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine J. Hollahan v. Tennessee Department of Health
An advanced practice nurse worked at three different testosterone clinics in the Memphis area and was charged with violating portions of the Nursing Practice Act and the rules and regulations governing nurses. The Tennessee Board of Nursing (the “Board”) held a hearing and determined that the evidence supported many of the alleged offenses. The Board revoked the nurse’s certificate to practice as an advanced practice nurse, revoked the nurse’s license to practice as a registered nurse in Tennessee and the multistate privilege to practice in any other party state, and assessed civil penalties against her that totaled $7,200. The nurse sought judicial review of the Board’s decision, and the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The nurse then appealed the Board’s decision to this court. Concluding that substantial and material facts support the Board’s findings, we affirm the Board’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Lacy v. MeHarry General Hospital, Et Al.
Plaintiff sued a physician, alleging that the physician’s handshake caused her injuries and that the physician failed to properly document her medical records. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Health Care Liability Act. We conclude that the claim of failure to properly document plaintiff’s medical records relates to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of that claim for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act’s procedural requirements. But we conclude the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claim for injuries allegedly caused by the physician’s handshake. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Autumn B. - CORRECTED
This is a child custody case. Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that Father should be designated as the child’s primary residential parent. Father requests attorney’s fees for defending this appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. This Court deems the appeal frivolous and remands this matter to the juvenile court to determine attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to Father. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Danny E. Gilliam v. Frances A. Blankenbecler
This case involves the dismissal, on the basis of res judicata, of the plaintiff Danny Gilliam’s breach of contract case against the defendant Frances Blankenbecler. In an earlier case involving the same parties, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint based upon his failure to comply with the court’s order to provide discovery responses. The order of dismissal in that first case did not state whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. After the plaintiff refiled the same case, the trial court dismissed the case on the basis of res judicata. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Dermon-Warner Properties, LLC v. Steve H. Warner
A member of a limited-liability company withdrew from the company with a deficit in his capital account. The company filed suit against the withdrawing member on the ground that he had an obligation to repay the deficit amount. The withdrawing member filed a counter-complaint arguing that the company was estopped from collecting the debt because the debt had been forgiven. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the withdrawing member’s motion and granted the company’s motion, finding that the withdrawing member failed to prove that the company forgave the debt. The withdrawing member appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tressie G. Smith v. Michael Lee Smith
This appeal involves an unnecessarily lengthy and convoluted divorce proceeding. The appellant-wife argues that the trial court failed to properly classify and divide the parties’ marital property. Due to the lack of factual findings regarding the basis for the trial court’s marital property distribution, we vacate that portion of the judgment and remand the issue to the trial court for entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Leneal Simpson v. Bradley County, Tennessee
Appellant filed a complaint after he was terminated from his employment with the Bradley County, Tennessee Sheriff’s Department. The complaint alleges a violation of procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, breach of contract, and violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 38-8-304. The County filed a motion for summary judgment on various grounds and a second motion to dismiss on the basis that Appellant’s claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment and by separate order granted the County’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the one year statute of limitations applied. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony D. Herron, Jr. v. Tennessee Department of Human Services, Division of Rehabilitation Services
Anthony D. Herron, Jr., a disabled army veteran, applied and was approved for vocational rehabilitation services through the Tennessee Department of Human Services, Division of Rehabilitation Services. During the course of developing a self-employment plan, the Division of Rehabilitation Services determined it had received insufficient information from Mr. Herron to merit further consideration of his self-employment plan. Mr. Herron administratively appealed, but after a hearing, the Department affirmed the decision of the Division of Rehabilitation Services. Mr. Herron then petitioned for judicial review in chancery court, which also affirmed the decision of the Division of Rehabilitation Services. Mr. Herron appeals. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Josh Holland Et Al. v. Edward M. Forester Et Al.
This case involves an alleged intentional or negligent misrepresentation made in connection with the sale of a residence. Shortly after purchasing their home from sellers Edward M. Forester and Alisa S. Forester, buyers Josh Holland and Angie Holland discovered that the subfloor of the house was saturated and ruined by pet urine. The buyers sued the sellers in general sessions court. That court found that the sellers intentionally misrepresented the condition of the subfloor on the property disclosure form. The sellers appealed to the trial court. The buyers alleged that the sellers violated the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act (TRPDA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5- 201, et seq. (2015). They sought damages for intentional or negligent misrepresentation; promissory fraud; fraudulent inducement to contract; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 Mr. Forester passed away prior to the second trial. The buyers continued this litigation but only against Ms. Forester in her individual capacity. The trial court held that the buyers failed to prove that Ms. Forester had knowledge of the alleged defect in the subfloor. Specifically crediting her trial testimony, the court held that Ms. Forester did not violate the TRPDA or make an intentional or negligent misrepresentation. The buyers appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in determining that Ms. Forester did not know about the condition of the subfloor and in admitting Ms. Forester’s testimony regarding Mr. Forester’s mental capacity around the time of the general sessions court trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tennison Brothers, Inc., et al. v. William H. Thomas, Jr.
This appeal involves parties with interests in neighboring properties who competed for the issuance of a billboard permit. Rather than waiting for the resolution of the administrative process that would determine which of the two applicants was entitled to a billboard permit, one party illegally constructed his billboard without a permit in the midst of the proceedings. Because of his action, the opposing party was unable to construct a billboard when the litigation ultimately ended in its favor. The party who prevailed in the administrative process and its landlord both obtained default judgments against the party who constructed the billboard based on claims of intentional interference with business relations and inducement to breach a contract. The trial court appointed a special master to calculate damages and adopted the master’s report in its entirety, awarding the landlord approximately $1.1 million and awarding the party who planned to construct the billboard $3.9 million, which included treble damages. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brianna B.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. The father is currently serving an eleven-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to vehicular homicide, with the victim being the child’s mother. The child’s maternal aunt and uncle, who had been granted custody of the child, filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights upon finding by clear-and-convincing evidence that four grounds for termination were proven, and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court as to three of the grounds for termination. However, we affirm the trial court’s decision as to one ground, and that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals |
