Darren Dwayne Bracey v. Kimberly Ann Roberts Bracey
In this divorce action, Wife contends the trial court erred in the division of marital property and by declining to award her alimony. Wife also contends the trial court erred by permitting her counsel of record to withdraw, denying her recusal motion, and denying her requests for disability modifications. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find Wife’s appeal frivolous and remand for the trial court to award Husband his reasonable and necessary fees and expenses incurred on appeal. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
West Warren-Viola Utility District v. Jarrell Enterprises, Inc.
Utility district brought action to condemn a parcel of real property which was located outside the district’s boundaries in order to construct a water storage tank, associated piping, and an access road. The trial court denied the petition, and the district appeals. Finding that the district is given the power in the Utility District Law to construct and maintain its system, and that the unrebutted evidence shows that the district was not attempting to expand the boundaries of its service area, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing on the damages due the property owner. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Cooper Singletary, et al. v. Gatlinburlier, Inc. et al.
This is a premises liability action. A visitor fainted and fell into an antique, glass display case located in a retail store in Gatlinburg, Tennessee. The glass in the case shattered, piercing her chest and causing her death. Her husband sued the retail store and the mall in which it operated for negligence. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that the injuries were not reasonably foreseeable. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Paul B. Schodowski, D.P.M. et al v. Tellico Village Property Owners Association, Inc. et al.
This case originated with the filing of a declaratory judgment action by the plaintiffs, Paul B. Schodowski, D.P.M., and Sharon Ann Ziegler (“Plaintiffs”), against the Tellico Village Property Owners' Association and its individual board members, Alan Hart, Ginny Ranck, Tom Lee, Claire Frazer, Joe Marlette, Cap Purvis, and Bob Coates (collectively, “TVPOA”). Plaintiffs alleged that the restrictive covenant regarding payment of annual assessments applicable to their lot in the Tellico Village development should not be enforced. TVPOA filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), determining that the restrictions were enforceable as written and that Plaintiffs had notice of the restrictions when they purchased their lot. Plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In re Izzabella B.
This is an appeal from an order designating a primary residential parent, setting visitation and child support, and changing the child’s last name to that of Father. The juvenile court found that naming Father as primary residential parent was in the child’s best interest and determined that the child’s last name should be changed. Mother appealed both the designation of primary residential parent and the changing of the child’s last name. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney Bibbs v. Tennessee Board of Parole
Appellant is an inmate in the Tennessee prison system; he is serving a life sentence, with the possibility of parole, for first degree murder. Appellee, the Tennessee Board of Parole, declined to recommend the Appellant for parole, citing as its reason the seriousness of his offense. Appellant filed a common law writ of certiorari in the Davidson County Chancery Court challenging the Board’s decision to deny him parole. The chancery court dismissed the petition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodger Lee Moon v. Carolyn O'Day Moon
Husband and Wife were married for approximately three years when Husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce. Wife filed a counter-complaint seeking a divorce as well. The trial court awarded Wife a divorce, classified the parties‟ assets as separate or marital, and divided the marital estate. The trial court also awarded Wife transitional alimony for a period of two years. Husband appealed, arguing the trial court erred in (1) classifying a boat he purchased before the marriage as marital property; (2) dividing the marital estate in an inequitable manner; and (3) awarding Wife transitional alimony. On appeal, we affirm the trial court‟s judgment in all respects and grant Wife‟s request for the attorney‟s fees she incurred in defending Husband‟s appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Robin Ann Longstreth v. Phillip Andrew Longstreth
The issues on appeal arise from a final decree of divorce following a 27-year marriage in which Wife is clearly the economically disadvantaged spouse. The trial court awarded Wife the divorce, divided the property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro and approximately one-third of the attorney’s fees she requested. Both spouses appeal. Husband contends the trial court erred by awarding Wife alimony in futuro, insisting she could be rehabilitated. Husband also contends Wife had sufficient resources to pay all of her attorney’s fees. Wife challenges the division of property and seeks to recover all of the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial and in this appeal. Both parties challenge the trial court’s decision to include, sua sponte, a mathematical formula pursuant to which alimony will be modified in the future based solely on the parties’ future income thresholds. We agree with the parties that the trial court erred by incorporating an automatic modification of alimony that is based solely on future income thresholds. We affirm the award of alimony in futuro to Wife; however, we vacate that portion of the alimony award that purports to automatically modify alimony based on future income thresholds. We affirm the division of property. We find that Wife should be awarded $18,105.75 of the $29,141 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses she claims she incurred at trial. Therefore, we modify the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees Wife incurred at trial. As for Wife’s fees incurred on appeal, we find that she is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Matthew T.
The parents of a son born in May 2013 appeal the termination of their parental rights. In December 2013, the son was removed from his parents’ custody after law enforcement discovered that he was living in a home with two methamphetamine labs. After a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order finding that the son was dependent and neglected and that the parents had committed severe abuse as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(21). Parents did not appeal this order. Three permanency plans were created, all of which required the parents to maintain contact with the Department of Children’s Services, notify the Department of changes in their address or phone number, submit to and test negative on unannounced drug screens, and pay child support. In August 2014, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The trial court conducted a hearing, which the parents did not attend even though they knew of the date. An employee of the Department was the only witness to testify. She testified that the parents had not updated their contact information, maintained contact with the Department, or engaged in much visitation with their son. In addition, the father did not complete a drug treatment plan, admitted to using illegal drugs, and tested positive for drugs. After the hearing, the court found that the following grounds for termination had been established by clear and convincing evidence: abandonment, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and severe abuse. The court also found that termination of parental rights was in the son’s best interest. Parents appealed. In accordance with In re Carrington H., --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2014-00453-SC-R11-PT, 2016 WL 819593, at *12-13 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016), we have reviewed the trial court’s findings related to all of the grounds for termination and the best interest of the child and conclude that termination is appropriate based on abandonment, substantial noncompliance, severe abuse, and persistence of conditions. We also hold that termination is in the son’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Mesmer Cocke v. Thomas Lawrence Hunt Cocke
This is an appeal of an order granting a reduction in child support. Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that she is voluntarily underemployed and alleges that the trial court improperly modified the parties’ parenting plan sua sponte. We conclude that the trial court did not modify the parenting plan in this case and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mitchell L. Bowers v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by dismissing this action for failure to prosecute. The trial court dismissed the action because the case had been pending for more than one year but no summons had been issued. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William W. York v. Tennessee Board Of Parole
This appeal arises from the denial of parole. The Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole found that the inmate’s release from custody would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which he was convicted. The inmate filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari, alleging violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the inmate alleges the same state and federal constitutional violations. He also argues that the trial court erred in not letting him conduct discovery and in relying on an affidavit filed in support the Board’s decision. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth R. Vaught v. Green Bankshares, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises from an effort by a former bank employee to collect certain deferred compensation payments. Kenneth R. Vaught ("Vaught") filed a complaint against his former employer, Green Bankshares, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, Greenbank ("Greenbank"), in the Chancery Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court"). Both sides agree Vaught is entitled to certain deferred compensation. The issue is the amount. According to Greenbank, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") regulations prevent payment of the total amount requested by Vaught as it would constitute a prohibited "golden parachute." After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Vaught, awarding him the full amount. Greenbank appeals. On appeal, FDIC, amicus curiae, argues that the additional deferred compensation payment to Vaught constitutes a prohibited golden parachute. We hold that the Trial Court‘s judgment places Greenbank in the untenable position of having to either disobey the Trial Court‘s judgment or flout federal regulations and FDIC. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court, remand this case to the Trial Court, and order a 60 day stay, during which time Vaught may pursue, should he elect to do so, other avenues of relief, including via the Administrative Procedure Act ("the APA") to challenge FDIC‘s determination. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lindsay Meghan Crutchfield v. State of Tennessee
A hearing-impaired student attending a state university was required to live in a dormitory on campus. The university installed a bed shaker and strobe light in the student’s room that would be triggered by the presence of smoke or by a doorbell installed outside the room. The student’s room also had a speaker above the door that was wired into the building’s fire alarm system that sounded an alarm if the dormitory’s fire alarm was activated. On a morning in September 2011, the speaker in the student’s room that was located above the door was activated in response to a false alarm in the dormitory. Believing the sound caused her to suffer further hearing loss, the student sued the State, arguing the State was negligent by subjecting her to the loud alarm. The case was tried by the Tennessee Claims Commission, which found the State liable for the student’s further hearing impairment. The State appealed, and we reverse, holding the student failed to prove proximate cause. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jana Hill v. Michael Gannon, et al.
This is a wrongful termination case. Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on her claims of intentional interference with at-will employment and civil conspiracy on the part of Appellees. Because Appellant has not averred facts sufficient to make out a claim for intentional interference with at-will employment, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim. In the absence of an underlying tort, we also affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claim for civil conspiracy. Affirmed and remanded. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Jeronimus v. Zoila Maria Jeronimus
Divorce proceeding in which Husband contends that the trial court erred in dividing the marital assets and debts, in setting parenting time, and determining that Wife is the economically disadvantaged spouse. Wife contends that the court erred in not ordering Husband to formulate and sign the letter of instruction transferring assets from his IRA account; in not awarding a higher amount in transitional alimony; in failing to designate a party to be responsible for processing the qualified domestic relation orders for two retirement accounts; and in granting the divorce based on Husband’s Amended Complaint for divorce. Wife asks this court to impose restrictions on Husband’s ability to initiate future litigation. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah C. Russell v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., et al
A homeowner alleges that a mortgage company promised her favorable terms to induce her to refinance her mortgage but the actual loan did not contain the terms discussed. She further alleges that company representatives led her to believe, after she received copies of some of the loan documents, that the discrepancy in the loan terms was a “mistake” that would be corrected. The homeowner filed this case against several entities, including the mortgage company. In the order at issue in this appeal, the trial court granted the defendants summary judgment on all of the homeowner’s causes of action and on their counterclaim. We have concluded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the claim for violation of the Truth in Lending Act. With regard to the homeowner’s claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, we find that there remain genuine issues of material fact and that the trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Covenant Health v. Tennessee Health Services And Development Agency, et al.
This appeal arises out of the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency’s decision to grant a certificate of need to a company to acquire and operate a linear accelerator; the decision was opposed by another company that operated a linear accelerator. After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge issued an initial order holding that the certificate of need should not have been granted. On the applicant’s appeal, the agency reviewed the initial order and reversed it. The company which contested the application filed a petition for review in chancery court, where the Chancellor reversed the agency’s decision, finding that it was not based on substantial and material evidence. On appeal to this court, we conclude that substantial and material evidence existed to support the agency’s decision to issue the certificate of need. We therefore reverse the order of the chancery court and remand the case for entry of an order affirming the agency’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Department of Correction v. David Pressley
Employee of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed an administrative appeal challenging the termination of his employment. The board of appeals reduced the termination to a fourteen-day suspension. On appeal to the trial court, the chancery court ruled that the burden of proof was improperly allocated to the Tennessee Department of Correction in the hearing before the board of appeals. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and conclude that the board of appeals properly allocated the burden to the Tennessee Department of Correction. We further conclude that no substantial and material evidence in the record exists to support the board of appeals’ finding that the employee committed negligence in the performance of his duties. We also reverse the board of appeals’ decision denying the employee’s request for attorney’s fees in the prosecution of his appeal to the board of appeals and remand to the board of appeals for a determination of those fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dustin Scott Roberts v. William R. Ray
This is a legal malpractice action in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant attorney failed to conform to the applicable standard of care in drafting a prenuptial agreement. The trial court granted the defendant attorney's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Damien C. Darden v. Tennessee Department of Correction
This appeal involves an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari, in which he challenged a decision of the prison disciplinary board finding him guilty of drug possession. After reviewing the record of the disciplinary hearing, the trial court dismissed the inmate's petition. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: F.N.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case. F.N.M. (the child) was born out of wedlock while her biological father, W.C.G. (father), was incarcerated. Shortly after the child’s birth, A.M.M. (mother) gave the child’s physical custody to individuals, who would later choose to be the prospective adoptive parents. Soon thereafter, mother surrendered her parental rights to the child. The prospective adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption and termination of father’s parental rights. Father opposed the adoption and filed a petition to establish paternity. After a hearing, the trial court found father to be the child’s biological parent; but it also found that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of his parental rights. Furthermore, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest. Father appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment. As modified, the judgment terminating father’s rights is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: F.N.M.- Dissenting
I agree with the majority that the prospective adoptive parents, S.L.D. and B.W.D., failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that W.C.G. (“Father”) acted with wanton disregard for the child’s welfare within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2015). I also agree with the majority’s interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (2015). However, in my view, our Supreme Court has interpreted Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) differently, and therefore, I am constrained by that interpretation to respectfully dissent. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Dayton R., et al.
Appellants petitioned for grandparent visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306. After a trial, Appellants were awarded visitation consisting of one weekday per month, the entire day of December 26, and four hours on each of the two children's birthdays. Appellants appeal from the trial court's order, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding them more visitation. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Felix Luis Torres, et al. v. Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC., et al.
Mexican car crash victims filed this lawsuit in Tennessee against the manufacturer of the subject vehicle and the manufacturer of its tires. The original lawsuit was dismissed by this Court in 2003 under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. A separate lawsuit was filed in Mexico but ultimately dismissed. The plaintiffs then filed this action in Tennessee. As the case progressed, the parties disputed whether Tennessee law or Mexican law applies to the substantive issues in this case. The trial court ruled that Mexican law applies. The plaintiffs were granted an interlocutory appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that Tennessee law should apply to the substantive issues in this case because it has the most significant relationship to the litigation. The defendants argue that the choice-of-law issue was resolved in our 2003 opinion and should not be reconsidered due to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Alternatively, they argue that Mexico has the most significant relationship to the litigation, and therefore, its law should apply. For the following reasons, we conclude that this Court’s determination in our 2003 decision regarding the applicable choice-of-law is entitled to preclusive effect. Accordingly, as we concluded in 2003, Mexican law will govern the substantive issues in this case. The trial court’s order is affirmed as modified and remanded for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
