COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Charles Blackburn, et al. v. Henry E. McGee
M2013-01676-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

Plaintiff in wrongful death action filed motion to quash Notice of Hospital Lien which had been filed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §29-22-101 et seq. on behalf of medical center which rendered care to the decedent. The trial court held that the medical center had not properly perfected its lien and granted the motion; medical center appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Mary Ann Pereira Brown v. Dwain Allen Brown
M2012-02084-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Laurence M. McMillan

This appeal involves the grant of a Rule 60.02 motion to modify a default divorce decree entered nearly eight years prior. The husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion seeking relief from the parties’ divorce decree; he argued primarily that the provision pertaining to his retirement benefits was inequitable. The trial court initially denied the motion, and the husband filed a timely notice of appeal. Almost two years later, the husband voluntarily dismissed his appeal. The trial court then entered an order setting aside its prior denial of the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion, held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, and eventually entered an order granting the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion. The wife now appeals. We hold that the effect of the dismissal of the earlier appeal was to affirm the trial court’s denial of the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion, so the trial court was precluded under the law of the case doctrine from reconsidering its earlier denial of the Rule 60.02 motion. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s order setting aside its prior denial of the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion, as well as the order granting the husband the relief requested.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Torrance Randle v. State of Tennessee
M2013-01497-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ellen H. Lyle

Civil Service Employee filed a grievance with the Civil Service Commission complaining he was not given supervisory responsibilities in accordance with the job description that was posted when he accepted the position. The administrative law judge dismissed Employee’s grievance because it was a “non-grievable matter” as that term is defined in the rules promulgated by the Department of Human Resources, leaving the Civil Service Commission without subject matter jurisdiction. Employee petitioned the Chancery Court for judicial review. The Chancery Court affirmed the administrative law judge’s dismissal of Employee’s grievance. Employee appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals, and we affirm the dismissal of Employee’s petition

Davidson Court of Appeals

Kathryne B.F. v. Michael B.
W2013-01757-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen R. Williams

In this post-divorce case, Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of Father/Appellee’s motion for involuntary dismissal of her petition to be named the primary residential parent of the parties’ child. Implicitly finding that there has not been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the last custodial order, the trial court granted Father’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) motion to dismiss Mother’s petition. The trial court also denied Father’s request for attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-103(c). Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Rule 41.02(2) in that it neither finds the facts specially upon which the court based its determination that there has been no material change in circumstances, nor indicates the court’s reason(s) for denial of Father’s request for attorney’s fees, we are unable to conduct a meaningful review. Vacated and remanded.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Kathryne B. F. v. Michael B. - Separate Concurrence
W2013-01757-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen R. Williams

I fully concur in the majority’s decision to remand the case to the trial court for it to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are sufficient to enable this Court to review the matter on appeal. I write separately only to comment on some points that we can glean from the appellate record about the trial court’s reasoning.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Donna Faye Thompson v. Kim Kail
W2013-01049-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. The complaint alleged that the defendant circuit court clerk failed to timely send to the appellate court a case file in a matter other than the case that was on appeal. The defendant court clerk filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; the trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Crockett Court of Appeals

Timothy W. Hudson v. Delilah M. Grunloh
E2013-01434-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor E.G. Moody

This case involves a claim for contractual attorney fees and a counterclaim for legal malpractice. The trial court dismissed the legal malpractice claim at the summary judgment stage, it granted summary judgment on certain aspects of the attorney’s fee claim, and, following a trial, it awarded a judgment in favor of the attorney. We affirm.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

David L. Trantham by Betty J. Ward Hartsell, as his attorney in fact v. Evelyn Nix Lynn
E2011-02611-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frank V. Williams, III

This is a boundary line dispute based upon competing surveys. Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action against Defendant, seeking to have the boundary line declared. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded the property to Plaintiff and assessed damages against Defendant for damage caused to a bridge located on Plaintiff’s property. Defendant appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Loudon Court of Appeals

Mildred Joan Pantik v. Martin Julius Pantik
W2013-01657-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen Williams

This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Shelby County courts over a petition for an order of protection. The petition was originally filed in general sessions court, but it was transferred by consent to circuit court, where another matter was pending between the parties. Thereafter, the circuit court denied a motion to transfer the petition back to general sessions court but sua sponte granted permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 due to a perceived conflict between two statutes addressing the courts’ jurisdiction. We granted the application for an interlocutory appeal and now affirm the decision of the circuit court. This case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Michelle Rye, et al. v. Women's Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC d/b/a Ruch Clinic, et al.
W2013-00804-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gina C. HIggins

This interlocutory appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the Defendant/Appellee medical providers on various issues. The Plaintiff/Appellant couple filed a complaint for damages stemming from the medical providers’ failure to administer a RhoGAM injection during wife’s pregnancy. The couple alleged causes of action for compensatory damages associated with medical malpractice, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and disruption of family planning. The trial court granted summary judgment to the medical providers on the wife’s claim for future medical expenses, husband’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the couple’s claim for disruption of family planning. The trial court declined to grant summary judgment on wife’s physical injury claim, her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, and the claim that wife could present evidence of the disruption of her family planning as evidence in her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on wife’s claim for future medical expenses associated with future pregnancy and husband’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which he may support with evidence concerning the disruption of the couple’s family planning. The trial court’s ruling is affirmed in all other respects. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Clifton A. Lake, et al. v. The Memphis Landsmen, LLC, et al.
W2011-00660-COA-RM-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This appeal is from a jury verdict in a negligence and products liability case. Plaintiff-Husband suffered a traumatic brain injury when he was a passenger on a bus that collided with a concrete truck. Plaintiff-Husband and Plaintiff-Wife filed suit against the bus manufacturer, the bus owner, and the bus owner’s franchisor. The jury found that the Plaintiffs suffered $8,543,630 in damages, but apportioned 100% of the fault for the collision to the owner of the concrete truck, with whom the Plaintiffs reached a settlement prior to trial. Plaintiffs appealed. We find that the jury’s verdict was proper and is supported by material evidence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Colette Suzanne Turman v. Fred Turman
W2013-01938-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ron E. Harmon

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Henry Court of Appeals

Francis L. Johnston, as Trustee of the Mae Charlayne Johnston Revocable Family Trust v. Charles Glen Johnston
E2013-00525-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

This action involves a dispute regarding the validity of an $80,000 check written against the revocable living trust account of the decedent by the defendant, who is the decedent’s nephew. Two days before the decedent’s death, the defendant deposited the check into a personal savings account he held jointly with the decedent. The plaintiff, serving as trustee and as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a complaint seeking recovery of the $80,000. The trial court issued an ex parte restraining order, directing, inter alia, the bank where the joint account was held to transfer $80,000 to the clerk and master for safekeeping in the registry of the court. Following a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the $80,000 check at issue was a forgery and that the defendant did not have permission from the decedent to sign the check. The court directed the $80,000 to be transferred from the clerk and master to the decedent’s estate account and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for damages. The defendant appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Bradley Court of Appeals

Ms. B., Individually and on Behalf of Minor Child, John Doe, "N" v. Boys and Girls Club Of Middle Tennessee, et al.
M2013-00812-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda Jane McClendon

Plaintiff filed an action against Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, in addition to its Tennessee affiliate and others, seeking damages arising from alleged sexual and emotional abuse of a minor child by a Big Brothers Big Sisters of Middle Tennessee volunteer. The trial court determined that the national organization did not owe a duty to the minor child and entered summary judgment in favor of the organization. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Kimberly Meeks v. Bryant Leo Meeks
M2013-01203-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

In this child support case, Father appeals the trial court’s determination that he was voluntarily underemployed. We have reviewed the record and the relevant authorityand find that the trial court did not err in concluding that Father was underemployed for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation. We affirm.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

In Re Karma S.C.
E2013-02198-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Michael W. Moyers

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment for willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. We vacate the decision of the chancery court and we remand for further findings.

Knox Court of Appeals

The SJR Limited Partnership v. Christie's Inc. et al.
W2013-01606-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

In this case, we are asked to determine whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss. The Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-5-319, grants Tennessee appellate courts subject matter jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals only in specifically enumerated circumstances involving arbitration agreements. The statutory exceptions include appeals from orders denying an application to compel arbitration, and appeals from orders granting an application to stay arbitration. Because the order appealed in this case is simply a denial of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss, it does not fall within the statutory exceptions. Accordingly, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Dismissed and remanded.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Daniel Scott Bowman v. Bank of America, s/b/m To Courtrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al.
M2013-00424-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Laurence M. McMillan, Jr.

After foreclosure proceedings were instituted against Plaintiff, Plaintiff asserted numerous claims against Defendants. All claims were dismissed in the trial court. We affirm.

Robertson Court of Appeals

Christopher Wayne McElhiney v. Elizabeth Allison Billips
M2009-02309-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Royce Taylor

This appeal involves a post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. Mother appeals the trial court’s decision modifying the parenting plan to designate Father the primary residential parent of the parties’ children. Finding no error in the court’s ruling, we affirm.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

Dwight O. Satterfield v. Margaret H. Satterfield
E2012-02367-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge William R. Brewer, Jr.

This appeal concerns post-divorce alimony issues. Dwight O. Satterfield (“Mr. Satterfield”) and Margaret H. Satterfield (“Ms. Satterfield”) divorced after 31 years of marriage. Mr. Satterfield some years later filed a motion to terminate alimony in the General Sessions Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Ms. Satterfield had been cohabiting with a man. The Trial Court ruled orally that under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), Ms. Satterfield’s cohabitation did not precipitate termination of alimony. Before an order was entered on his first motion, Mr. Satterfield filed another motion, this time based on the statutory rebuttable presumption that arises if there is cohabitation. The Trial Court held that res judicata resolved the issue and that alimony would not be modified. Mr. Satterfield appeals. We affirm the Trial Court as to its interpretation of the MDA. However, as Mr. Satterfield’s second motion was pending when the first order was entered, the first order was not final and the Trial Court erred in holding in its second order that res judicata resolved the alimony issue. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Blount Court of Appeals

Dwight O. Satterfield v. Margaret H. Satterfield - Concurring
E2012-02367-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge William R. Brewer, Jr.

I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s well-reasoned majority opinion. I write separately to stress the linchpin of the majority’s rationale in rejecting Mr. Satterfield’s first issue.

Blount Court of Appeals

Richard A. Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc. et al.
E2013-01214-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Jeffrey Hollingsworth

The issue on this appeal is the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The trial court, applying the principles promulgated in Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 1996), held that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it requires the plaintiff to submit to arbitration virtually all of his claims, while allowing the defendants access to a judicial forum for some of their potential claims. We agree with the trial court that the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor is controlling and that Taylor mandates a holding that theagreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

In Re T.F.H. et al
E2013-01147-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mindy Norton Seals

A.F.C. (“Father”) appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor children, T.F.H. and P.F.H. (“the Children”). After a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds exist to terminate Father’s parental rights. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Father appeals. He challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but not the best-interest determination. We affirm the judgment in all respects.

Hamblen Court of Appeals

Lataynia Jones v. Sharp Electronics Corporation
W2013-01817-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

Plaintiff filed an action alleging retaliation and interference in violation of the Tennessee Disabilities Act. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant Employer on the basis that the Act does not require employers to make “reasonable accommodations,” as were required by Plaintiff at the time she was discharged. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

In Re: Riannah M.F.
W2013-02057-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles C. McGinley

The trial court found that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate willful abandonment in this action to terminate the parental rights of Mother. We affirm.

Hardin Court of Appeals