Beverly Angel v. Diane Nixon
The paternal grandmother of a three-year-old child filed a petition seeking visitation pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-306. The grandmother contended that the child's mother prevented the grandmother from seeing the child following the death of the child's father. Grandmother also contended that she had a significant existing relationship with the child and that the loss of this relationship was likely to cause severe emotional harm to the child. The trial court granted the petition and awarded the grandmother three hours of visitation every third Sunday at the grandmother's home. The mother appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in making the award to the grandmother, because the mother did not oppose visitation. Alternatively, she argued that the proof did not support a finding that the grandmother had a significant existing relationship with the child or that the child would be severely emotionally harmed from severance of that relationship. We affirm the trial court's determination that the grandmother is entitled to three hours of visitation every third Sunday. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Foust, Jr. v. Larry E. Metcalf, et al.
Plaintiff filed this action to quiet title to a strip of land along a former railroad line. Defendant, an adjacent landowner, asserts that plaintiff has no interest in the disputed property because the deed that purportedly conveyed the property to plaintiff was champertous and void due to the fact defendant was adversely possessing the property under color of title at the time of the deed. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff, finding that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous or that defendant had acquired title by seven years of adverse possession under color of title for thirty years. We have determined the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard by holding that defendant had to prove seven years of adverse possession to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous. Instead, defendant need only prove that he was in adverse possession at the time of the deed to plaintiff. Defendant established he was in adverse possession under color of title of the disputed property at the time of plaintiff's deed; accordingly, the deed is champertous. Champertous deeds are void; therefore, plaintiff never acquired a legal interest in the disputed property. We reverse the judgment of the trial court quieting title in favor of plaintiff. As for defendant's prayer that he be declared the owner of the disputed property, we have determined that an indispensable party is missing, the grantor of the deed to plaintiff; therefore, we make no ruling concerning defendant's claim that he owns the property by adverse possession of at least seven continuous years under color of title pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-105. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer (Pitts) Bradford vs. David Wilson Pitts
The father was paying child support, became disabled and filed a Petition to suspend child support payments until his disability insurance began paying. By the time of the hearing on his Petition, his disability insurance began paying a monthly amount. The Trial Judge ultimately refused to lower the child support payments, finding that the father established no variance between his income before and after his disability. The father tendered his income tax return for the year when the child support obligation was set, but the Trial Court refused to consider this evidence. On appeal, we vacate and remand. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Quint Bourgeois vs. McCurdy and Candler, LLC, et al
The pertinent order in this case was entered by the trial court on August 25, 2010. Therefore, the thirtieth day from and after the date of entry of the order was Friday, September 24, 2010. The date of September 24, 2010, was not a legal holiday and there is nothing before us to indicate that it was a day when "weather or other conditions have made the office of the court clerk inaccessible." Tenn. R. App. P. 21(a). The appellant's notice of appeal was received and filed by the trial court clerk on Monday, September 27, 2010. As can be seen, the notice was not filed and received by the trial court clerk within 30 days of the date of entry of the order from which the appeal was taken. Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction of this appeal due to the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. Appeal dismissed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Michael C. M., Shania M. J., and Jania M. J.
The trial court terminated Father's parental rights upon a finding of abandonment and upon determining termination was in the best interests of the children. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine M. Love et al vs. Doris Lakins Woods
This case arises from the trial court's denial of Plaintiff/Appellants' motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Appellants, the surviving children of decedent, filed a wrongful death claim against the Appellee herein, the driver of a car involved in the accident that killed decedent. During negotiations, Appellee/Defendant's attorney proposed a settlement in the amount of Appellee's insurance policy limit, which Appellee's attorney misstated to be $100,000, when, in fact, the policy limit was $50,000. The trial court denied Appellants' motion to enforce the $100,000 settlement finding that the settlement was not enforceable, as it failed to contain certain material terms of the agreement. We conclude that the trial court failed to determine whether an agency relationship existed between the Appellee's attorney and the insurance company and also whether the insurance company is required to be a party to this litigation. Vacated and remanded. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Szemborski, et al vs. Roger Sayner
The order from which the appellant Roger Sayner seeks to appeal was entered in the trial court on August 18, 2010. A notice of appeal was filed with and received by the trial court clerk on September 21, 2010. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction of this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs taxed to the appellant. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Eddie Ward vs. Teresa Yokley, et al
In this action to enforce a contract to purchase real estate, the trial court declared the contract enforceable, the seller had breached the contract by refusing to sell to plaintiff, and held that a third party who had a lien against the property tortiously interfered with the sale. The trial judge rescinded the quit claim deed to Tyler Lawson from Yokley and assessed costs and damages. On appeal, we reverse the trial judge and hold the contract became unenforceable because plaintiff did not comply with the conditions set forth in the contract. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Maysoon M.A.A.K., and Falasteen M.A.A.K., Muhammad I.S. and Tessa D. S., v. Sonya G.
Petitioners, custodians of two minor children, filed this action to terminate the mother's parental rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge found there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination, based upon willful failure to support/visit and persistent conditions. The court also found that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination was in the children's best interest. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Freeman, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Freeman, Deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc., a Florida Corporation, et al. - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that Rutherford County was an appropriate venue for this action and, consequently, that the Rutherford County court had subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s statement that “unless the plaintiff and at least one ‘material defendant’ reside in the same county and that county is where the cause of action accrued” the common county rule does not apply. Essentially, the majority holds that the venue statute does not apply, a conclusion that I believe is erroneous. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Freeman, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Freeman, Deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc., a Florida Corporation, et al.
The issues in this case are whether Tennessee's "common county rule" deprived the Rutherford County Circuit Court of subject matter jurisdiction and whether the court erred in assessing discretionary costs. This wrongful death action arises from a fatal vehicular accident in Normandy, Bedford County, Tennessee, in which the decedent's vehicle was stuck by a train owned by CSX Transportation, Inc. The mother of the decedent, in her individual capacity and as the personal representative of the decedent's estate, timely filed this action in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County against CSX and the conductor of the train. Over the next five years the parties conducted extensive discovery. On the first day of trial, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. On the motion of the defendants, the Rutherford County Circuit Court assessed $34,098.27 in discretionary costs against plaintiff. In this appeal, plaintiff contends the Rutherford County Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a consequence of the common county rule, and that it erred in awarding discretionary costs. We have determined that the common county rule does not apply, the Rutherford County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs of $34,098.27 against plaintiff after she voluntarily dismissed this action. Accordingly, we affirm the award of discretionary costs. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Providence Crossings, LLC v. SC Realty Capital, L.P., SC Capital, LLC, and Smith Realty Interests, L.P. - Concurring
I write this concurring opinion because I find it very difficult to believe that the contractual rights at issue were not foreclosed upon and, thus, passed to the bank as a result of the foreclosure, in which event Defendants would be entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as the trial court found. However, as the majority correctly notes, there may be a small crack in the evidentiary chain that pertains to material facts at issue. I am not fully convinced there is a deficiency, but for purposes of summary judgment the court must be convinced that material facts are not in dispute. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Providence Crossings, LLC v. SC Realty Capital, L.P., SC Capital, LLC, and Smith Realty Interests, L.P.
Purchaser of landlocked property brought action against the sellers, seeking to recover damages allegedly caused by the failure of the sellers to complete a road extension or otherwise to insure reasonable access to the property, which had been purchased for development of multi-family rental units. The trial court granted summary judgment to the sellers, finding that the right of the purchaser to proceed with the action was extinguished when the bank that provided financing for the development of the property foreclosed on the loan secured by the property and subsequently sold the property to another entity. The court concluded that the purchaser did not have standing to pursue the claims. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the purchaser's cause of action was included in the assets foreclosed upon, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Christopher M. - Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Ebony M.
Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and mental incompetence. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
SNPCO Inc., d/b/a Salvage Unlimited vs. City of Jefferson City, et al
The question before this Court is whether the grandfather clause of Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208(b)(1) protects the owner of newly annexed city property from the enforcement of a citywide ordinance prohibiting the sale and storage of fireworks. Interpreting section 13-7-208(b)(1) strictly against the landowner, we hold that the grandfather clause does not apply because the ordinance is not a "zoning" restriction or regulation, i.e., the ordinance does not regulate the use of property within distinct districts or zones pursuant to a comprehensive zoning plan. Accepting the facts alleged in the landowner's amended complaint as true, the landowner is not entitled to an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance against its preexisting fireworks business. We accordingly affirm the dismissal of the landowner's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Prestige Land Company vs. Brian Mullins Excavating Contractors, Inc.
Prestige Land Company ("Developer") owned land upon which it intended to build a commercial shopping center. An estimate to complete the project was obtained. Thereafter, the project was opened up for bidding. Brian Mullins Excavating Contractors, Inc. ("Contractor") bid on the project. Although contractor's bid was significantly lower than the next lowest bid, it was only 10% lower than the estimated costs of construction. Contractor was unaware that it had made a unilateral mistake in its bid. Contractor was awarded the project. Eventually, contractor was unable to complete the project because it ran out of money due to its unilateral bidding mistake. Developer sued for breach of contract, and contractor filed a counterclaim for fraud and other claims. The trial court awarded contractor a judgment for $101,357.05. Finding no clear and convincing evidence of fraud by developer, we vacate the judgment for contractor and enter a judgment for developer in the amount of $128,326.56. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Isaiah L. - Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Dianne P.
This is an appeal from a finding of dependency and neglect. An off-duty employee of the petitioner Tennessee Department of Children's Services witnessed the respondent mother hitting the subject child in the parking lot of a retail store. After an investigation, the State filed a petition for dependency and neglect, alleging abuse based on the parking lot incident. The juvenile court determined that the child had been abused and held that the child was dependent and neglected. The mother appealed to the circuit court, which conducted a two day trial de novo. After hearing the evidence, the circuit court below entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child had been abused and declaring the child to be dependent and neglected. The mother now appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., et al vs. Jennifer L. Lund - Concurring
I concur in the decision to vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. I agree that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3) controls the outcome of this appeal. I further agree that the issue in this case is whether Plaintiffs intentionally caused the delay in the prompt service of the summons. I further agree that the record before us shows that Plaintiffs did make at least some attempts to serve Defendant. This being so, I agree that Defendant did not meet her burden of showing that Plaintiffs intentionally delayed service of the summons. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., et al vs. Jennifer L. Lund
Carter County -Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., and Bonnie K. Hakey (collectively "the plaintiffs") filed suit against Jennifer L. Lund ("the defendant") seeking compensation for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a April 22, 2005, multiple-vehicle accident in Carter County. With her answer, the defendant coupled a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 "on the basis of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process." Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with prejudice finding "that the plaintiffs have not provided to the Court any valid reason for the delay in obtaining prompt service of process upon the defendant." Plaintiffs appeal. We (1) vacate the trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and (2) remand for further proceedings. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Arthur A. Winquist, et al vs. James A. Goodwin, et al
This case was precipitated when defendants blocked plaintiffs' use of an existing driveway. Plaintiffs brought this action for a declaratory judgment and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement to use the driveway and that defendants would be required to restore the driveway as well as the excavations damaging plaintiffs' lots. On appeal, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry A. Ridley vs. James G. Neeley, et al
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
84 Lumber Company vs. R. Bryan Smith, et al - Concurring
I agree with so much of the majority opinion as affirms the trial court’s judgment against Allstate Building System, LLC. I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s decision (1) to reverse the judgment in favor of 84 Lumber Company against R. Bryan Smith and (2) to grant summary judgment to Mr. Smith. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
84 Lumber Company vs. R. Bryan Smith, et al
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Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Danny E. Rogers vs. Steven Payne, et al
This appeal involves an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari, which he filed after he was convicted by the prison disciplinary board of participating In security threat group activity. after reviewing the record, the trial court dismissed his petition. We affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
John P. Konvalinka vs Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority
This is the second time this case, filed by John P. Konvalinka ("the Petitioner") to force disclosure of public documents, has been before us. In the trial court's order that generated the first appeal, the court held that the records the petitioner requested from Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority ("the Hospital" or "Erlanger") were exempt from disclosure under state law, and pretermitted the question of whether they were exempt from disclosure under federal law. On appeal, we held that the records were not protected from disclosure by state law and remanded for a determination of whether they were protected from disclosure by federal law. The Hospital attempted on remand to assert additional state law defenses to disclosure. The trial court held that the new state law defenses were outside the scope of the remand. It also held that federal law did not protect the documents at issue from disclosure. Accordingly, it ordered the Hospital to produce the documents. The Hospital appeals challenging both aspects of the trial court's judgment. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
