Timmy Sykes et al. v. Chattanooga Housing Authority et al.
This opinion replaces one filed on March 31, 2009, which opinion was withdrawn by us “and held for naught” by order of April 21, 2009. The joint complaint filed by the plaintiffs, Timmy Sykes and Curtis Greene, who are African-Americans, actually involves the independent claims of the two plaintiffs against their former employer, the Chattanooga Housing Authority (“the CHA” or “CHA”), and the plaintiffs’ supervisor in that employment, Jeff Hazelwood, Chief of the CHA’s Public Safety Department, for wrongful termination of their employment and other claims. Sykes, who was a CHA criminal investigator, was terminated by the CHA on September 30, 2004, and Greene, also a criminal investigator, was terminated on January 19, 2005. They each seek damages for wrongful termination, asserting two theories of recovery. Sykes also seeks damages from Chief Hazelwood for alleged defamatory statements made by him and both plaintiffs sue Hazelwood for interfering with their CHA employment. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted as to all claims. The plaintiffs appeal. They raise three issues in common and Sykes complains of the trial court’s judgment with respect to his defamation claim. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Maggie Barron, et al. v. Emerson Russell Maintenance Company d/b/a ERMC II, L.P., et al.
After being abducted from a mall parking lot, the plaintiff filed suit against the security company that provided security services to the mall. The trial court granted summary judgment to the security company, concluding that only the premises owner, i.e., the mall, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea S. Martin v. Patricia L. Williams, et al.
The central issue in this case is which of two insurance companies is required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the Plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the company through which Plaintiff had automobile insurance, finding that the company insuring the automobile in which Plaintiff was a passenger held the primary policy. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Ramey, Former Perry County Sheriff v. Perry County, Tennessee
The sheriff of Perry County sued the county mayor under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 seeking additional employees, equipment, and vehicles to properly perform his duties. The trial court ordered the county to provide the sheriff’s office with funding for two additional deputies as well as gasoline, equipment, and uniforms. We have concluded that the trial court erred in ordering the county to fund two new road deputies and in authorizing expenditures to support road deputies. The evidence supports the need for one new detention officer and a part-time detention officer. We remand for a hearing on the reasonableness of the attorney fee award. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel Samelba P. Lewis (Robinson) v. T.J. Robinson, III
In this post-divorce proceeding, the father claims that his child support obligation should have been reduced due to his health and financial circumstances. The chancellor confirmed the child support referee’s recommendation to deny the father’s petition, finding that the father failed to file a timely request for a hearing before the chancellor following the hearing before the referee. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Baptist Memorial Hospital and Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation v. Argo Construction Corporation, Hanson Pipe & Products South, Inc., and ETI Corporation and ARGO Construction Corporation v. Hanson Pipe & Products South, Inc.
This appeal involves a cross-claim for indemnity. The cross-plaintiff construction company served as the general contractor on a drainage improvement project for a hospital. The cross-defendant subcontractor manufactured and provided concrete pipe for the project, which was installed by the general contractor. After completion of the project, a sinkhole developed in the hospital’s parking lot. An investigation revealed that the internal steel reinforcement for the concrete pipe was improperly positioned. The hospital sued, among others, the general contractor and the pipe subcontractor. The general contractor then filed a cross-claim against the pipe subcontractor for indemnity in the event the hospital received a judgment against the general contractor. The subcontractor filed a motion for summary judgment as to the general contractor’s indemnity claim, arguing that the claim was barred by (1) the one-year limitations period contained in the parties’ contract, as permitted under Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-2-725, and (2) the exclusive remedy provision in the parties’ contract, which provided that the only remedies available to the general contractor were repair, replacement, or refund of the purchase price of the pipe. The general contractor argued that the one-year contractual limitations period was not applicable to its indemnity claim, and that the exclusive remedy provision did not preclude its indemnity claim. In the alternative, the general contractor argued that, because the defect in the pipe was latent and not discoverable upon reasonable inspection, the exclusive remedy in the contract failed of its essential purpose and the general contractor was not bound by it. The trial court granted the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the indemnity claim was barred by the one-year contractual limitations period and the exclusive remedy provision, and also that the latency of the alleged defect in the pipe did not cause the exclusive remedy to fail of its essential purpose. The |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donnie Vaught, et al. v. Alan Jakes, Sr. and Wife Deborah Jakes, et al. - Order
In response to an opinion by this Court, filed on May 26, 2009, Alan Jakes Sr. and the other defendants in this case have filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 Petition to Rehear. In our opinion, we reversed the Chancery Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ trespass claim and granted the plaintiffs judgment on that claim. The defendants note that the opinion erroneously stated that the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint at the conclusion of all the proof. In fact, the defendants raised an oral motion for involuntary dismissal of the complaint at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ proof, and the trial court granted their motion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Donnie Vaught, et al. v. Alan Jakes, Sr. and wife Deborah Jakes, et al.
A group of Rutherford County landowners whose property abutted one side of a private road which they maintained at their own expense filed a suit for trespass against a neighbor and developer who used the same road for access to houses he was building on the other side. Their suit also included a due process claim against the County for erroneously granting building permits for those houses. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ proof, the trial court announced that it agreed that the building permits were granted in error, but it ruled that the county’s action was an innocent error rather than a due process violation. The trial court also granted the developer’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against him, holding that he was entitled to use the road because of a permanent easement he had acquired from his predecessors-in-interest. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the due process claim. However, we vacate its dismissal of the trespass claim because the plaintiff was able to present evidence that the individual who sold the property to the defendant had abandoned the easement and, thus, that the defendant had no right to use the road. We remand this case for further proceedings to give the defendant the opportunity to present evidence. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
East Ridge Dental Center, Inc., and Drew Shabo, DDS., vs. Joseph D. Prince, DDS.
Plaintiffs sued the defendant, alleging breach by defendant of the contract with defendant to purchase his dental practice. Included in the agreement was a restrictive covenant not to compete. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial Court held that the $75,000.00 that was paid for the restrictive covenant should be returned to the plaintiffs under the theory of unjust enrichment, because the covenant was not enforceable. On appeal, we hold that defendant abided by the terms of the restrictive covenant for five of the seven years that the covenant covered and, as a matter of equity, the Judgment of the trial court should be reduced proportionately. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
T.O.T.S., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corporation
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its complaint for failure to state a claim. We dismiss the appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Marlow Williams, et al. - Dissenting
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Marlow Williams, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue in this case. Finding that the grounds of abandonment, unwillingness to assume custody, and failure to establish paternity are not established by clear and convincing evidence in the record, we reverse in part, affirm in part and dismiss. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Edwards, et al. v. City of Memphis
The Charter of the City of Memphis provided for automatic promotion of police officers to the rank of captain after thirty years of service. In 2005, the rank of thirty-year captain was abolished, except for pension purposes. Plaintiffs, police officers with the City of Memphis, filed suit stating that they had been denied promotions to which they were entitled under the Charter, and asking the court to require that such promotions be given. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim, finding that the suit was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lena Jaden v. Vanderbilt University
A graduate student at Vanderbilt sued after the university terminated her graduate studies. She claimed that Vanderbilt breached its contract with her. The trial court granted summary judgment to Vanderbilt. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Lynn Averitt, Sr. v. Lynn Binkley Averitt
In this divorce dispute, Wife argues that the trial court erred in not awarding her the divorce, by characterizing her condominium as marital property, and in the division of marital assets, including funds that the court found Husband had dissipated from the marital estate. Finding that the Husband did not dissipate marital funds, we reverse. On all other issues, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Megan Griswold v. Josh Williams, et al
Sellers of truck appeal award of damages and attorneys fees awarded to purchaser based on finding that sellers violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Janice L. Bane v. William E. Jarvis
Father appeals order finding him in contempt of court and sentencing him to a total of 180 days incarceration. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Samantha Nabors v. William M. Adams, M.D., et al.
This appeal involves a medical malpractice action. In a motion for summary judgment, defendant physician asserted that plaintiff’s expert witness failed to satisfy the requirements of the locality rule. The trial court granted the motion finding that plaintiff’s expert failed to demonstrate a familiarity with the standard of care in defendant’s community or a similar community. In a motion to alter or amend the judgment, plaintiff attached a supplemental affidavit of the same expert in order to cure the deficiency. The trial court considered the expert’s supplemental affidavit and denied the motion because the new affidavit still failed to satisfy the locality rule. Plaintiff appeals. Reviewing the record, we find that the expert’s supplemental affidavit cured the initial deficiency by relating facts which showed the similarity of the two communities. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Silvino Gonzales, Invidually and as Next Friend of Rubcel Gonzales, a Minor v. Judith Long
This appeal arises out of a minor automobile accident. The plaintiff filed suit individually and on behalf of his son, claiming that his son suffered whiplash in the accident. The defendant admitted fault for the accident but denied that she caused any damages to the plaintiff. The plaintiff presented testimony from a physician who opined that the son was injured in the car accident. Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Advertising Company (formerly Outdoor Communications, Inc.) v. By-Pass Partners
This is a dispute over lease agreements. The plaintiff outdoor advertising company leased two parcels of property from the defendant real estate development company for the purpose of erecting billboard signs. The defendant then cancelled the leases. The defendant had contracted to sell the property to another outdoor advertising company, and cancelled the leases with the plaintiff in reliance on a lease provision allowing cancellation in the event that the plaintiff’s signs interfered with the defendant’s sale or development of the property. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant’s cancellation was ineffective because this was not the type of interference that was contemplated in the agreement. The defendant counterclaimed, seeking damages allegedly suffered as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to remove its billboards. Meanwhile, the third-party outdoor advertising company that was supposed to purchase the property filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging that the plaintiff was interfering with its contractual relations with the defendant real estate development company. A trial was held, and no proof of damages was submitted. The defendant real estate development company and the third-party advertising company that sought to intervene asked for a hearing on damages in their post-trial brief. The trial court issued a letter ruling finding that the defendant’s termination of the leases was effective. Years later, an order was entered reiterating the finding that the defendant effectively terminated the leases; the order set the matter for a special hearing on damages owed to the defendant real estate development company and the third-party advertising company. The third-party’s motion to intervene was never explicitly granted. Shortly thereafter, the trial judge assigned to the case died. A substitute judge was assigned to hear the remainder of the case. In response to a series of motions, the trial court determined that the trial was properly bifurcated, that the third-party advertising company did not transfer its right to damages in a sale of its assets, and that its motion to intervene was never granted by the previous trial judge, and it therefore could not recover damages. The thirdparty advertising company now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decision that the motion to intervene was never granted, finding that the motion to intervene was implicitly granted in the order following the trial. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the bifurcation was proper, that the defendant real estate development company effectively terminated the leases, and that the third-party advertising company that sought to purchase the property retained the right to damages after the sale of its assets. The case is remanded for a hearing on the damages owed to the third-party advertising company, if any. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Knox County, Tennessee, on the relationship of Environmental Termite & Pest Control, Inc., qui tam
Plaintiff filed this action as a “qui tam claim” pursuant to the Tennessee False Claims Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-101 et seq. The Trial Court awarded plaintiff proceeds from the settlement under the Act and both parties have appealed. On appeal we hold that plaintiff did qualify under the statute as an original source, and the Trial Court had jurisdiction to award a recovery. However, we hold there is not sufficient evidence to affirm the award. We vacate the award and remand pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-3-128. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Spears and Dana Spears v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
Owners of an insured vehicle that was damaged by fire filed suit against their insurance company for breach of contract, failure to pay insurance claim in good faith, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Insurer filed a counter-complaint alleging that one of the insureds had no right of recovery under the policy because she had no insurable interest in the vehicle and that the other insured was barred from seeking recovery under the policy because the insured failed to answer questions under oath when asked by the insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: S.E.J. Donald Jordan v. Donald Roberson
This case involves competing adoption petitions filed by a child’s maternal and paternal grandparents after the child’s father was sentenced to death for killing the child’s mother. The trial court simply compared the relative fitness of the two sets of grandparents and granted the adoption petition of the paternal grandparents. We conclude that the trial court erred in giving equal weight to both petitions because the paternal grandparents did not meet the requirements set forth in Tennessee’s adoption statutes. We also conclude that the maternal grandparents were fit persons to have the care and custody of the child, that they are financially able to provide for the child, and that adoption is in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand for entry of an order granting the adoption petition filed by the maternal grandparents. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Thuy-T-Lam d/b/a Nail Paradise v. Tuan Ngoc Buile a/k/a David Le
The appellant-defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment and the modification and enforcement of his non-competition agreement with appellee-plaintiff. We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant-defendant’s motion for summary judgment; we affirm the trial court’s ruling modifying the territorial restrictions in the non-compete agreement; we further modify the terms of the non-competition agreement in order to be consistent with Tennessee’s public policy; and we reverse the trial court’s institution of a permanent injunction against the appellantdefendant. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Georgia O'Keeffe Foundation (Museum) v. Fisk University
At issue in this appeal are the respective rights of three parties concerning charitable gifts of 101 pieces of art given, subject to conditions, to Fisk University in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The collection has an estimated present value in excess of $60 million. Four of the pieces, including the painting Radiator Building - Night, New York, were the property of Georgia O’Keeffe and given to the University by Ms. O’Keeffe. The other ninety-seven pieces were part of a much larger collection formerly owned by Alfred Stieglitz, Georgia O’Keeffe’s late husband. The ninety-seven pieces were gifted to the University by Ms. O’Keeffe as executrix of the estate and/or as the owner of a life estate in the ninety-seven pieces. All 101 pieces were charitable, conditional gifts that were subject to several restrictions, two of which are at issue here; the pieces could not be sold and the various pieces of art were to be displayed at Fisk University as one collection. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
