Tim Burrus v. Jimmy Wiseman
This is a lawsuit filed by eight county officials to resolve a budget dispute. The officials filed an application in Chancery Court seeking judicial authorization to hire additional staff and to increase the salaries and benefits paid to a separate group of county employees. One day after the petition was filed, the officials, along with the defendant County Mayor, entered a consent order approving each petitioner’s requests. One month later, the County Commission attempted to intervene and have the order set aside. The trial court denied the County Commission’s motions, and the County Commission appeals. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to intervene. However, several procedural and substantive defects require this Court to vacate the Consent Order and remand |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul L. McMillin vs. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in 2005 and another action, similar in nature, against the same defendant in 2006. The actions were assigned to two separate Judges and the 2005 action was first dismissed by one Judge and subsequently the 2006 action was dismissed by the other Circuit Judge. The plaintiff has appealed the 2006 action. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Amodeo, D.C., et alL. v. Conservcare, LLC., et al.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees as to Appellants’ claims of civil conspiracy; violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(8), (27); violation of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1986, Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-32-229(a); and common law claims of outrageous conduct and tortious interference with another’s business. We are also asked to determine whether the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants’ Tennessee Trade Practices Act claims. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Edwin O. Martin, et al v. Carl Nash, et al
Members of family in whose name a cemetery was established brought suit against owners of property surrounding the cemetery seeking removal of a cloud upon their title to the cemetery, injunctive relief and damages. The trial court declared the boundaries of the original cemetery and limited those entitled to be buried therein to the family members; allowed that members of the general public were permitted to be buried in land added to the original cemetery tract; and appointed trustees to manage the cemetery as established under both conveyances. Family members appeal, contending that trial court erred in setting the cemetery boundary; in disregarding proof of cost of repairing fence which had been removed by one defendant; and in refusing to hear testimony as to the trust fund established for the maintenance of the cemetery. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Winston E. Wolfe, Trustee of the Winston E. Wolfe Revocable Living Trust Dated December 5, 1997 v. O. Michael Jaeger, et ux.
This appeal arises from a private condemnation action commenced by Plaintiff pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 54-14-101, et. seq. After the jury of view filed its report, but before the report was acted upon by the trial court, Plaintiff moved for a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. The trial court granted the nonsuit, and Defendants filed a Rule 60.02 motion for relief from the judgment granting the nonsuit. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Friendship Home Health Agency, LLC
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a continuance based on Appellee’s failure to provide certain documents until the day before trial and the absence of a witness for Appellant. We are also asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that no accord and satisfaction was made when Appellee cashed a check from Appellant for a lesser amount than was owed to Appellee for increased insurance premiums. Finally, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the statute of frauds was not violated although no writing was made when Appellant’s insurance policy was re-instated. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a continuance, and affirm the trial court’s ruling that no accord and satisfaction was made. Because a statute of frauds defense was not properly raised in the trial court, we deem the issue waived. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne B. Gillard v. James A. Taylor, et al.
Police officer who was injured while driving his patrol car brought this action against his automobile insurer to recover uninsured motorist benefits under his personal policy. The trial court denied insurers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the regular use exception found in the policy was ambiguous. The insurance company appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda Reust Williams v. Eric Butze
This case began as a petition for dependency and neglect, which petition was dismissed by consent of the parties. The juvenile court then proceeded to determine custody pursuant to its authority granted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f). When custody was placed with Father/Appellee, Mother/Appellant appealed to the Circuit Court of Shelby County. The Circuit Court determined that the Tennessee Court of Appeals was the proper appellate court and entered an order transferring the appeal to us. Mother appeals that transfer. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa S. Biancheri, Trustee of the Mercer Family Trust v. Charles M. Johnson, Jr., et al. AND Charles M. Johnson, Jr. v. Ida Louise Cromwell, et al.
The matters at issue arise from a contract for the sale of a residence and the buyers’ refusal to close on the purchase of the residence. The seller, the trustee of a family trust, and the buyers entered into a contract for sale of a residence. Prior to closing, the buyers discovered that elaborate audio-visual equipment, that was material to them, had been removed by the husband of the Trustee. The buyers considered this a material breach and refused to close; as a result, the seller filed suit against the buyers for breach of contract. The buyers counter-claimed alleging the seller breached the contract first and that the seller, through its real estate agent, had made fraudulent misrepresentations to induce the buyers to sign the contract, specifically that the audio-visual equipment was part of the sale and that the previous resident, who died inside the home after being shot by his wife in the bedroom closet, had not died in the home. The buyers also filed a separate action against the seller’s real estate agent alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, promissory fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The buyers’ claims against the seller were summarily dismissed upon findings by the trial court that the contract was valid and that the buyers breached the contract by failing to close. The real estate agent was summarily dismissed upon a finding that the buyers could not establish actionable misrepresentations. The buyers then filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages for breach of contract, contending the contract afforded the seller the option of electing liquidated damages, in lieu of compensatory damages, in the amount of the earnest money and that the seller had made that election by retaining the earnest money. The trial court summarily ruled that the seller had elected to receive liquidated damages as its exclusive remedy. The buyers appeal the summary dismissal of their claims against the seller and the seller’s real estate agent. The seller appeals the summary ruling that it elected to recover liquidated damages in lieu of compensatory damages. We have determined the real estate agent was not entitled to summary judgment as material facts are in dispute concerning whether the agent made material misrepresentations to induce the buyers to enter into the contract. We have determined the seller was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability for the buyers’ alleged breach of the contract because material facts are in dispute concerning whether the buyers are entitled to rescission of the contract based on the agent’s alleged misrepresentations and whether the seller breached the contract prior to the buyers’ alleged breach by removing components from the integrated television system, which the buyers contend was a material part of the contract. Due to our ruling that the seller was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability, the seller is not entitled to damages for breach of contract, and it is premature to determine which party may be entitled to damages and in what amount. Accordingly, the award of liquidated damages in favor of the seller is reversed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Renee Adams v. Jeffery Farrell Adams
This appeal involves a father’s petition to modify a parenting plan due to an alleged material change in circumstances. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred, and that it was in the children’s best interest for the father to be named primary residential parent. The trial court awarded the father his attorney’s fees. Mother appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
William L. Odom, Jr., et ux. v. Harold Oliver, et al.
Purchasers brought this action against sellers, realtor, and realty company of home that they purchased, alleging fraudulent concealment, and violation of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act. We affirm summary judgment for realtor and realty company, but we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to sellers. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Joann Abshure, et al. v. Jeremiah Upshaw, M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice action filed against individual Defendants/Physicians and Defendant Hospital. Following Plaintiffs’ second Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01 voluntary dismissal of individual Defendants, Defendant Hospital moved for summary judgment. The trial court awarded Hospital summary judgment upon concluding that the evidence demonstrated negligence on part of one Defendant/Physician only, and Plaintiffs had failed to assert a claim of vicarious liability against Hospital for the alleged negligence of its agent, Defendant/Physician prior to twice dismissing Physician. The trial court determined Plaintiffs’ cause of action had been extinguished where the statute of repose applicable to claim against Physician had expired, and that Plaintiffs had conferred on Physician an affirmative right not to be sued again. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and affirm the award of summary judgment to Defendant Hospital. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Beverly Waller v. Brenda Evans
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the decedent, Floyd Evans, Sr., possessed the requisite mental capacity to execute a power of attorney naming his brother as attorney-in-fact, which was subsequently used to change his life insurance and investment account beneficiary from his daughter to his wife. Additionally, we are asked to determine whether a confidential relationship existed between the decedent and his wife such that his wife exerted undue influence upon him in having his beneficiaries changed just prior to his death. We affirm the trial court, finding that the decedent possessed the requisite mental capacity and that the presumption of undue influence was rebutted through independent advice. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Total Building Maintenance, Inc. v. J & J Contractors/Raines Brothers, a Joint Venture, J & J Contractors, Inc., Raines Brothers, Inc., St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., and Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland
In this action plaintiff sued for money owed under its subcontract with the defendant contractor. The defendants’ contractor denied liability, raised as affirmative defenses, waiver/estoppel, unclean hands and breach of contract, filed a counter-claim alleging that plaintiff failed to complete its work in a timely and proper manner and permitted the roof to be harmed by others during the construction and generally failed to cooperate. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Judge determined that both parties had breached the contract, that plaintiff was guilty of unclean hands, denied both parties any recovery and dismissed the case. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Thompson, Individually, and as Executor of the Estate of Gertrude Thompson, Deceased v. James Haywood Thompson, et al.
This case involves two brothers and their mother’s estate. One brother filed suit against the other, claiming that the defendant brother and his family members wrongfully converted certain assets belonging to his mother and obtained other assets through undue influence. The trial court found no conversion or undue influence. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Nana Landenberger v. Project Return, Inc.
In this action brought under Tennessee’s False Claims Act, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to set aside its offer of judgment and strike the relator’s notice of acceptance. The relator subsequently abandoned the case, and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the results reached by the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Willie German, William W. Lents, Robert Pinner, Darrell Sells, Deana Sells v. John Ford, Kent Ford, Billy Walker, and Dyer Investment Company, LLC.
This appeal involves a contract dispute arising out of the Lennox Lewis/Mike Tyson prize fight in Memphis, Tennessee. The defendant/appellee investment firm agreed to provide financing to guarantee minimum ticket sales for the prize fight. If ticket sales for the fight were below the minimum requirement, the investment firm would pay the difference, but if ticket sales exceeded the minimum, the investment firm would profit. The investment firm solicited the plaintiff/appellant sub-investor and other sub-investors to provide back-up financing, so that the investment firm would not bear the entire risk of loss in the event that minimum ticket sales were not met. The plaintiff sub-investor would also participate in the profits if ticket sales exceeded the minimum. Under the alleged agreement between the investment firm and the sub-investor, the sub-investor was to post a letter of credit in order to obtain his interest in the potential profits and liabilities. As the ticket sales were ongoing, the plaintiff sub-investor arranged for the required letter of credit to be issued, but needed information from the investment firm in order to get it issued. The investment firm did not provide the information to the sub-investor. Meanwhile, the ongoing ticket sales reached (and ultimately exceeded) the minimum requirement. At that point, the investment firm no longer faced a risk of loss and told the plaintiff sub-investor that it no longer needed sub-investors and would not go through with the agreement. The sub-investor never posted a letter of credit and the investment firm did not pay the sub-investor a percentage of the profits. The sub-investor then filed the instant lawsuit against the investment firm, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendant investment firm filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that there was no enforceable contract because the sub-investor never posted the letter of credit, and dismissed the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they were derivative of the breach of contract claim. Accordingly, the trial court granted the investment firm’s motion for summary judgment. The sub-investor now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s holding that there was no enforceable contract between the investment firm and the sub-investor, finding that the investment firm had an implied duty to cooperate in the sub-investor’s performance of its contractual promise. Finding an enforceable contract, we also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Kay (Woods) Shooster v. Raymond (Ray) Gerald Shooster
In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s award to the wife of permanent alimony. In addition, he contends the trial court erred in requiring him to pay the wife’s monthly health insurance premiums and to maintain an existing life insurance policy on his life with the wife designated as the beneficiary. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Gene Anderson, et al. v. Lamb's Auto Service, Inc.
Plaintiffs/Appellees bring this case pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and a negligent bailment theory. They allege that auto service center made poor cosmetic repairs to interior of their car and that exterior of the car was damaged while at the service center. Finding no violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and that Defendant/Appellant failed to overcome presumption of negligent bailment, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Todd D. Dingman, et ux., Sharon Dingman v. Randy Garrison and Donna Garrison
This is a factual dispute about whether defendant signed a lease as a tenant and is liable under the terms of the lease. The Trial Court held defendant liable for damages under the lease. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Beth Ann Mason v. Thaddeaus Scott Mason
Following the entry of a final decree in a divorce action, Husband filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, pursuant to Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., asserting that the parties made a clerical error in the marital dissolution agreement, as a result of which Wife received a higher percentage of marital assets than intended. The trial court denied relief. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re B.D., R.M.T. & V.F.T.
Mother and Father appeal the order of the Juvenile Court for Dickson County, Tennessee terminating their parental rights. Mother’s termination was based on: noncompliance with the permanency plan; failure to visit; failure to establish a suitable home; and the persistence of conditions that prevent return of the children; and the children’s best interests. Father’s termination was based on noncompliance with the permanency plan and the children’s best interests. Finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the children’s best interests, as modified, the judgment is affirmed. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Benjamin F. Darnell, Sr., et al vs. Charles Fenn, et al
Charles Fenn and Dott Fenn owned property in Sevier County. In August 1996, they entered into a contract to sell the property to Benjamin F. Darnell, Sr. The Fenns agreed to finance the sale over a ten-year period. According to the contract, Mr. Darnell was to make monthly payments of $999.11 for ten years, with one final balloon payment of $113,058.43. Mr. Darnell died in February 2004 and his wife, Mary Darnell, continued making the monthly payments. Unbeknownst to Ms. Darnell, on October 14, 2005, the Fenns sold the property to Teddy Jones. Four days later, Ms. Fenn, through her attorney, sent Ms. Darnell a letter terminating the contract based on various alleged breaches. Ms. Darnell filed suit seeking specific performance of the contract. Following a bench trial, the court found that the contract was enforceable; it ordered specific performance. The trial court rejected the claim of the defendant Teddy Jones that he was a bona fide purchaser without knowledge. The Fenns and Mr. Jones appeal. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Scott Sutton, et al. v. Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group, LTD., et al.
In 2004, Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Defendants had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy in the State of Tennessee. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss citing two defenses: lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion for failure to state a claim but explicitly declined to rule on the jurisdictional question. Defendants have not |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Lou Eella Sherill, et al. v. Bob T. Souder, M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee doctor finding that, based upon the discovery rule, the one year statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim had expired prior to the filing of the Appellants’ complaint. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |
