State of Tennessee, Ex Rel., Margaret V. Hickman v. Ronald L. Dodd
This is a Title IV-D child support case. Appellee father executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and a consent paternity order. After discovering that he was not the child’s biological father, Appellee sought relief from both his retroactive and future child support obligations. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion on the ground that he was not the biological father. The State of Tennessee seeks review of the trial court’s decision. We conclude that the trial court did not have authority to forgive Appellee’s child support arrears. Moreover, Appellee has neither alleged sufficiently specific facts to challenge the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity as required under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 24-7-113, nor has he satisfied the necessary requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P.60.02 to gain relief from either the consent paternity order, or the order on child support entered in the chancery court. We reverse and remand. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Lovie Mitchell, as Executive of the Estate of Mack Mitchell, Deceased v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc, et al.
This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement between a nursing home and one of its patients. Although the trial court found that the patient’s spouse had authority to sign the agreement under the terms of a power of attorney, the court concluded that the spouse did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the patient’s right to a jury trial. Therefore, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. After reviewing the entire record, we find that thefacts do not support the trial court’s conclusion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald E. Crook v. Landon Despeaux
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in a personal injury case. The plaintiff, a diabetic, consumed a substantial amount of alcohol and then proceeded to drive south towards an intersection. At about the same time, the defendant was traveling east toward the same intersection. The plaintiff’s vehicle skidded, hit the curb, and then collided with a telephone pole. After the onecar accident, the plaintiff followed the defendant and his family to a nearby parking lot and accused the defendant of running the stop sign at the intersection and causing the plaintiff’s accident. After that, the police arrived and gave the plaintiff a breathalyzer test, which he failed. The plaintiff was later convicted of reckless driving and driving under the influence of an intoxicant in connection with the accident. At his criminal trial, the plaintiff admitted drinking alcohol and that his tires were in poor condition. The plaintiff nevertheless filed a negligence claim against the defendant. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that, based on the plaintiff diabetic’s intoxication and faulty tires, he was, as a matter of law, at least fifty percent at fault for his own injuries. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Manufacturers Acceptance Corporation v. U.S. Bank National Association
In this declaratory judgment action, the Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the issue of priority of liens on real property. On the Petition to Set Up a Lost Instrument, the Trial Court following an evidentiary hearing, held that defendant was entitled to set up the lost instrument by a copy of its original. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court’s decision in establishing the lost instrument, but vacate the summary judgment on the issue of the priority of liens and remand for trial on that issue. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Oakwell Farms Limited Partnership et al. v. Metropolitan Board of Fire & Building Code Appeals et al.
An apartment complex owner filed a petition for writ of certiorari to challenge a decision of the Metro Board of Fire and Building Code Appeals denying the owner’s appeal of the fire marshal’s citation of the apartment complex for failure to install pull station alarms in certain areas. We agree with the chancellor’s conclusion that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction, did not act illegally or arbitrarily, and based its decision upon material evidence. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Angie L. Gleaves v. Gary W. Gleaves
In this divorce action, Wife contends that the trial court erred in ordering the marital home sold; finding Husband’s down payment on the marital home to be separate property; failing to award her alimony; and failing to award her counsel fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Venita Decosta Gilliam v. Rollie Gilliam, Jr.
When the trial court entered its divorce decree, husband, who was in prison in another state, was representing himself. Husband asserts that the trial court erred because it lacked personal jurisdiction over him and lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. We have concluded that husband waived the personal jurisdiction issue. However, because the trial court failed to rule on husband’s pending motions before adjudicating the divorce, we vacate and remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Anderson Properties v. International Knife & Saw, Inc. and Simonds International Corporation
This is an appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of defendant-lessee on an action to collect back rent and other expenses pursuant to a long-term commercial lease agreement with plaintiff-landlord. Lessee filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy prior to the filing of the instant action. We have concluded that the commercial lease upon which landlord relies was deemed rejected by operation of law in the bankruptcy proceedings and that landlord is therefore barred from recovering the damages it seeks. Judgment of the chancery court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
High Country Adventures, Inc. vs. Polk County
The issues in this case are whether operators of whitewater rafting ventures responsible for collecting a county privilege tax imposed upon consumers participating in commercial rafting ventures in Polk County have standing to challenge the tax and if so, whether the tax is invalid because it is preempted by federal law. Upon careful review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the operators have standing to contest the legality of the privilege tax and that the tax is preempted by federal law and is, therefore, invalid. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Watson v. Roberto Garza, et al.
This appeal involves a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. The summons issued for service on the defendant-appellee was served by the deputy sheriff on a co-defendant. The trial court granted the defendant-appellee’s motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Pedro and Griselda Valadez, Individuals and as parents and next Friends of Fatima Valadez, a Minor v. Newstart, Llc,
In this appeal we are asked to reverse the trial court’s grants of summary judgment to Appellees and adopt a loss of chance theory of recovery, thus allowing Appellants to recover for Appellees’ alleged failure to timely notify them that their unborn child was afflicted with spina bifida such that they could participate in a clinical trial. Because our supreme court has expressly stated that Tennessee does not recognize a cause of action for loss of chance, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Muhammad Ziyad v. Estate of William B. Tanner, Sr.
This appeal involves a claim against a decedent’s estate for one million dollars. The probate court denied the claim on various grounds, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Trail v. State of Tennessee, Department of Commerce and Insurance (Insurance Division)
The Commissioner revoked appellant’s license to sell insurance and fined her $7,000.00. Appellant petitioned for review by the Trial Court, who affirmed the determination made by the Commissioner. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Stricklan and husband, Reed Stricklan, v. Johnny C. Patterson
In this action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident, the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs. Defendant has appealed and on appeal raises the issues of whether there was sufficient and competent proof to support plaintiff’s claim for medical expenses; whether the Court erred in allowing plaintiff's treating physician to offer an opinion on permanent impairment, and he questioned whether the jury verdict was contrary to the "weight of evidence". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
James D. Young, Administrator, Estate of Alva L. Young, v. Jere R. Young
In this Estate, the Executor sued a legatee for a debt owing the Deceased. The parties settled that action by an Order stating that the indebtedness owed to the Decedent by the legatee at the time of death would be treated as an advancement to the legatee in the distribution of the Estate. In the final accounting by the Special Master, the Master found that the legatee defendant owed the Estate $45,942.64. This finding was concurred in by the Trial Court and, on appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Ross v. Tennessee Department of Correction
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred in finding that the West Tennessee State Penitentiary Disciplinary Board acted within its jurisdiction and did not act illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently and substantially complied with its policies and procedures in dismissing Appellant’s claims that: (1) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(E)(4)(a) by failing to dismiss one of the charges against Appellant; (2) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy 502.01(VI)(E)(3)(c)(6) and (VI)(E)(3)(d)(1)-(4) by failing to call Officer Hankins; (3) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy 502.01(VI)(E)(3)(e) by failing to independently assess and verify the reliability of the confidential informant; (4) the Board deviated from TDOC policy 502.01(VI)(E)(3)(i)(1) by finding Appellant guilty of possession of a controlled substance without any evidence; and (5) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy (VI)(E)(3)(k)(5) by failing to provide detailed reasons for its decisions and failing to summarize the evidence which led to the Board finding Appellant guilty. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Goodman, et al. v. Kathy Jones Kelly
Travis and Stephanie Goodman (“Buyers”) filed a lawsuit for monetary damages or rescission of a residential deed due to defects in a septic system. Buyers sued under the theories of breach of contract, misrepresentation, fraud and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Buyers argue that they did not plead a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-208 (2004) of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act; however, the trial court treated the case as one under the Act. The jury returned a verdict for Seller. Reviewing the record de novo, we hold that the theories of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation were pleaded and supported by the proof. These causes of action should have been charged to the jury. We also hold that the parties litigated the issue of intentional misrepresentation and that the trial court charged the jury on this issue. In addition we hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict for Seller under theories of intentional or willful misrepresentation of the condition of the subject property under the statute or common law. Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part and remand with instructions. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel D. Leggett, et al. v. Duke Energy Corporation, et al.
Plaintiffs sued natural gas companies under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §47-25-101, et seq., alleging that the natural gas companies conspired unlawfully to increase the wholesale price of natural gas. The trial court granted the natural gas companies’ motion to dismiss on the basis of federal preemption. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Crespo, et al. v. Carol McCullough, et al.
Karen Crespo and Freddie Crespo filed this medical malpractice action in August 2007, alleging negligence preceding the birth of their daughter, Laura Crespo, in December 2001. The defendants – OB/GYN physician Carol McCullough, OB/GYN nurse Jerilyn H. Boles, Tennessee Women’s Care, P.C., and Women’s Health Alliance, P.C. – moved for dismissal, claiming the suit is barred by this state’s three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice claims, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a) (2000), as interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005). The plaintiffs allege that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to their case. The State of Tennessee intervened to defend the statute’s constitutionality. The trial court dismissed the case, but stated in its order that “Plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments are important [and] worthy of review” and “would be best addressed by the appellate courts.” The plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Calaway’s interpretation of § 29-26-116(a) – extending the statute of repose to minors – effectively overturned a body of law that the plaintiffs had reasonably relied upon, and that the sudden reversal of those precedents, without any opportunity for the plaintiffs to pursue their vested claims, worked a violation of these plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Crespo, et al. v. Carol McCullough, et al. - Dissenting
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of A.E., E.E., and E.E.
This case involves a parental termination proceeding where Father originally consented to termination of his parental rights, but now appeals on the ground that his surrender was procedurally deficient and made under duress. Father also alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to grant him leave to conduct discovery on opposing counsel and when the trial court failed to recuse itself. On appeal we find no error; the trial court properly granted Mother’s petition to terminate parental rights, Father failed to present any proof that he was under duress when he consented to the motion to terminate or that he was entitled to depose opposing counsel, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for recusal. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Walls dba B.S. Walls Construction v. Jeffrey S. Conner, et al.
This litigation arises out of the renovation of and addition to a 100-year old house. While suit was pending, the plaintiff, Billy S. Walls dba B.S. Walls Construction (“Contractor”) failed to respond to interrogatories with respect to requested information regarding experts. He likewise did not respond to a motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and an order of the court compelling responses. As a consequence of Contractor’s inaction, the trial court refused to allow his two expert witnesses to testify. At trial, Contractor objected to the testimony of an expert tendered by the defendants, Jeffrey S. Conner and Tresia Conner (“Homeowners”). The trial court overruled the objection. Contractor argues in this court that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow his experts to testify and when it held that Homeowners’ expert was qualified to testify. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. V.N., et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights of V.N. (“Mother”), T.W., and any unknown father to the minor child K.B.N. (“the Child”). T.W. signed a Waiver of Interest and Notice waiving any rights he may have to the Child. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence of grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Child under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3), and that it was in the best interest of the Child for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to this Court. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: D. F., S. F., T. F., L. F., A. F., A. F, D. F., K. F., Children Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age
This is a termination of parental rights case. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her eight children based on persistence of conditions and upon finding that she is incompetent to adequately provide for their care and supervision. Father’s parental rights were terminated based on persistence of conditions. Both Mother and Father appeal. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Teresa Garrison v. Larry L. Scobey
This is a child support case. The trial court determined Respondent Father had the ability to earn minimum wage and entered a temporary order of support ordering him to pay child support based upon a minimum wage income. Father filed a motion to set aside the order and failed to pay the ordered support. The State, acting ex rel. Mother, filed a petition for contempt, a petition for retroactive child support, and a petition to set permanent child support. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Father’s motion to set aside the temporary support order, affirmed the finding that Father was capable of earning minimum wage, and held Father in criminal contempt. The trial court also ordered Father to pay retroactive child support. The trial court stayed its order sentencing Father to jail for criminal contempt pending appeal to this Court. Father appeals the order finding him in contempt, the denial of his motion to set aside the temporary order of support, and the order of retroactive child support. We reverse the order on contempt and dismiss the remainder of Father’s appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals |
