Robin Lee Stanfill, et al. v. John T. Mountain, et al.
This appeal arises out of a real estate transaction in Maury County, Tennessee, wherein the Plaintiffs/Appellants purchased property from Defendants/Appellees John T. Mountain and Melody Mountain. Defendant/Appellee Carl Brooks served as an independent real estate agent for the transaction. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Defendants alleging fraud, misrepresentation and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. Both Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. By Order dated April 19, 2006, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. Subsequently, the trial court awarded discretionary costs against the Plaintiffs. For the following reasons we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Freeman, et al. v. Lewisburg Housing Authority
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant public housing authority, dismissing claims by its former employees for retaliatory discharge in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act and for constructive discharge based on a racially hostile work environment in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Because we find that the employees failed (1) to establish an essential element of a claim for retaliatory discharge or (2) to show that the hostile work environment was racially discriminatory, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Alena Wharton v. Robert Wharton
This interlocutory appeal arises from a petition for contempt to enforce a child support order. Although it is undisputed that neither the parents nor the child who is the subject of the support order in this case resided in Crockett County for at least six months prior to the filing of the current petition, the trial court denied Mother’s request under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-3003 to transfer the matter to Dyer County, where the child resides with Father. We reverse, remand, and order the matter transferred. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Farrell Nesbitt v. Paula Nesbitt
This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Paula Nesbitt. The trial court granted the parties’ divorce, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129, and ultimately awarded the divorce to the wife because the husband appeared to be at greater fault on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. Farrell Nesbitt challenges the trial court’s alimony in futuro award, arguing rehabilitative alimony was the proper award. We affirm the trial court’s ruling. Costs of this appeal shall be assessed to the appellant, Ferrell Nesbitt. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Mae (Edwards) Maloy v. Paul David Maloy
This is a divorce case. The husband is a musician and songwriter; the wife is a medical assistant. During the marriage, the husband became physically incapacitated, and the wife quit her job and took care of him. The parties’ living expenses and costs associated with the husband’s medical care were funded through monies that the wife inherited as well as credit cards. This resulted in significant credit card debt. The husband eventually recovered, but was deemed completely disabled and received social security disability payments during the marriage. The wife then had a health crisis. During the wife’s health crisis, the husband took over the parties’ finances, and both parties signed a document outlining division of the parties’ property in the event of divorce. Over a year later, the wife filed for divorce, based in part on the husband’s failure to care for her during her health crisis. The husband counterclaimed for divorce. After declaring the parties divorced, the trial court held a trial on the issue of property division. After one day of testimony, the husband filed a motion seeking to enforce the document signed by the parties purporting to divide their property in the event of divorce. After the hearing, the trial court refused to enforce the alleged agreement. It divided the marital property, including in the marital estate the social security disability payments that had been received by the husband. The trial court refused, however, to divide the parties’ marital debt. The husband appeals the trial court’s refusal to enforce the alleged agreement and the inclusion of his social security disability benefits in the marital estate. Both parties appeal the trial court’s failure to divide the marital debt. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that (1) the social security disability payments were properly included in the marital estate, (2) the document is neither an MDA nor an enforceable postnuptial agreement, and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to divide the parties’ marital debt. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, v. Daryl K. Stark
The Trial Court granted defendant permission to attend traffic school in lieu of a fine. On appeal, we reverse because State and federal law does not permit diversion for a commercially licensed operator. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Charles R. Ray, Tony V. Carruthers, v. Sandra B. Ray
Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against defendant’s Estate. The Trial Court held the claim against the Decedent’s Estate was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Martha Smith, et al. v. Greg Brooks, et al.
In 2005, Martha Smith and her husband, Brian D. Smith, filed suit (“the First Lawsuit”) in the trial court against four individuals and the Polk County Board of Education (“PCBE”). Each of the four counts in the complaint includes an allegation that defendants Greg Brooks, Tracy McAbee, and Grady Samples “were acting in their official capacity while engaging in their illegal and tortious activity and . . . these defendants . . . are duly elected members of PCBE.” An order of voluntary nonsuit without prejudice was entered in the First Lawsuit as to PCBE and all of the individual defendants except a non-board member, Shane Wooten. In 2006, the plaintiffs again filed suit (“the Second Lawsuit”). The “illegal and tortious activity” alleged in the Second Lawsuit is identical to that alleged in the First Lawsuit. The Second Lawsuit names Brooks, McAbee, and Samples (“the defendants”) as the sole defendants. They are sued as individuals and not as members of PCBE. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss – citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) – asserting that the Second Lawsuit had been filed outside the period of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and dismissed the Second Lawsuit. The plaintiffs appeal, relying upon Tenn. Code Ann. §28-1-105(a) (2000), a part of the so-called Tennessee saving statute. We hold that, under the facts of this case, the saving statute is not available to the plaintiffs to preserve their causes of action against the defendants in their individual capacities. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Foster Business Park, LLC v. J & B Investments, LLC, et al.
The plaintiff, a debtor under a promissory note, brought this action against two defendants, the bank that issued a promissory note to the plaintiff and the holder of the note for charging and attempting to collect a rate of interest the plaintiff contends was usurious. In the Complaint, the plaintiff contends that two defendants engaged in unconscionable conduct under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-117(c) and unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The bank’s conduct at issue pertains to its issuance of a promissory note to Foster that contained a default rate of interest of 24%, which the plaintiff contends is usurious. The conduct of the other defendant, the holder of the note, pertains to its attempts to collect the default rate of interest. The Chancellor dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint upon the defendants’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motions to dismiss, concluding that the interest was not usurious, and therefore, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lillie Walker vs. Collegetown Mobile Estates, Inc.
Plaintiff who fell in a mobile home sued the lessor owner for damages for injuries. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendant. On appeal, we vacate the summary judgment and remand. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of D.R.T., d/o/b 12/25/93 Kevin Dean Turnage v. Misty Renee Mitchell Carr
This is a case involving the chancery court’s decision not to terminate a mother’s parental rights. The father and his wife petitioned the court to terminate the mother’s rights and allow the wife to adopt the minor child. The court held a termination hearing to determine if the other’s rights should be terminated. In the order dismissing the petition for termination and adoption, the court found that the mother had not abandoned the child by failure to visit because her attempts to maintain contact and visit the child were thwarted by the father and his wife. As to the father and wife’s contention that the mother abandoned the child by her failure to pay child support, the court found that the mother had no reason why she did not pay child support, but then found that her failure to pay did not constitute abandonment. On this appeal, we do not have a transcript of the trial proceedings. The father filed a statement of the evidence, and the mother filed an objection to the father’s proposed statement of the evidence. In the mother’s filed objection, she stated that the parties stipulated at trial that her failure to pay child support “was not sufficient in itself to terminate [her] parental rights.” The chancery court certified its own statement of evidence, concurring with the mother’s filed objection and stating that the mother’s failure to pay child support was not willful |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Darryl J. Roberts vs. The Baylor School
Plaintiff sued recipient of an inter vivos gift to recover the gift on the grounds defendant violated a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff, and the failure of defendant to comply with conditions of the gift. The Trial Court ruled in favor of defendant. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Magness et al. v. Terrell W. Couser et al.
This case involves a property dispute between neighbors. Property owner and her son who resides on her property brought an action to quiet title and for ejectment against a neighboring property owner. The trial court imposed sanctions against the defendant under Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to comply with its order compelling discovery responses. The court subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and, after a hearing on damages, issued a permanent injunction against the defendant and her son and a judgment for damages and costs against the defendants. The defendants have appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, reverse in part and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Verdis Chambers v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, et al.
An inmate appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-807(b) for failure to make partial payment of the filing fee and argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to specify the amount of the partial payment due. The trial court gave the inmate an opportunity to make the filing fee payment prior to dismissal and was not required to specify the amount due since the statute provided the formula to determine the amount of the partial payment due. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Financial Leasing, Inc. v. Mountain Rentals of Gatlinburg, Inc.
Wells Fargo Financial Leasing, Inc., brought this action against Mountain Rentals of Gatlinburg, Inc., to collect rent under an equipment lease. The trial court granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo, and Mountain Rentals appealed. After careful review, we hold that the rental agreement is an enforceable finance lease and that Mountain Rentals’s obligation to pay rent was irrevocable and independent. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County, Tennesse v. Printer's Alley Theater, LLC d/b/a Brass Stables and Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County v. C&A Entertainment, Inc. d/b/a/ Club Platinum
These consolidated appeals involve punishment for criminal contempt. The two defendants are businesses that were providing sexually oriented entertainment, as defined by the Nashville Metropolitan Code of Laws, without licenses. The businesses continued to provide sexually oriented entertainment in violation of injunctions forbidding such activity and later injunctions ordering the businesses to be closed. The businesses were held in contempt of court, and an individual who was a corporate officer or part owner of each business was sentenced to five days in jail in each case, to be served concurrently. The individual appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he should be punished for contempt. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Paige Townson Lyles v. Joshua Paul Lyles
The Trial Judge awarded primary residential custody of the parties’ child, d.o.b. 2/14/05, to the father. The mother appealed the award of custody. We affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Jan Marie Vaughn v. William Daniel Vaughn
In this divorce case filed by the Appellee/Mother, she was granted a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court divided the marital property and ordered the Appellant/Father to pay alimony in futuro and child support for the parties’ two minor children, the oldest of whom is severely disabled. The trial court ordered the Father to acquire the equipment necessary to take care of the child while visiting in his home and to begin intensive training in the use of equipment. Both parties were to maintain term life insurance in the face amount of $250,000. Additionally, the trial court awarded Mother attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,000.00 and ordered Father to pay child support arrearages in the amount of $4,756.00. Father appeals the decision of the trial court regarding the award of alimony, the upward deviation of child support, the award of attorneys’ fees, and the award of support arrearages. We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. John W. Carney, Jr. v. Danny J. Crosby
The plaintiff appeals the decision of the trial court to not issue a writ of ouster against the mayor of Coopertown. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mayor knowingly or willfully committed misconduct that would constitute grounds for removal from office under the ouster statute. The mayor also raises the issue on appeal of whether the trial court erred in denying the mayor’s request for attorney fees. We affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Katherine Deloriese Olinger, et al. v. University Medical Center, et al.
This medical malpractice action was filed by Katherine Deloriese Olinger and Perry Michael Hale (“Plaintiffs”) after their son was born with brachial plexus palsy. Plaintiffs claim the injury occurred because the defendants failed to take the proper medical steps to resolve a delivery complication known as shoulder dystocia. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of all of the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal claiming the Trial Court erred when it gave a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine, and further erred by refusing to permit cross-examination of a witness by the use of medical literature which Plaintiffs maintain had been established as a reliable authority pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 618. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Alan P. Woodruff vs. Fort Sanders Sevier Medical Center
Plaintiff's Declaratory Judgment asks the Court to declare the contract he signed with defendant void because it was not sufficiently definite to be enforced, and it was a contract of adhesion. The Trial Court held that the contract was enforceable and not a contract of adhesion. On appeal, we hold the contract was enforceable, but whether the contract was one of adhesion is not appropriate for declaratory judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
David Richard Huddleston v. Patricia Waggoner Huddleston
The plaintiff loaned the defendant $50,000 which was to be repaid in 15 monthly installments of $800 each with a final balloon payment of $46,600. The parties agreed that the total amount to be repaid was $58,600, but did not specify an interest rate or make any provision for interest on the balance in the event the balloon payment was not timely made. The defendant paid the initial 15 monthly installments, but failed to pay the balloon payment, and instead continued to make monthly payments for approximately 44 more months paying a total of $59,416. The issue presented is what amount of interest, if any, is owed on the balloon payment that the defendant failed to timely pay when the contract failed to make a provision for interest in the event of default. The trial court held that the parties had agreed that the defendant would pay interest at the rate of 14.1 percent per annum, based upon the $8,600 he agreed to pay in excess of principal, and that the plaintiff was entitled to have the balance of the loan outstanding at the time of default paid at such rate. Upon review, we conclude that the parties failed to agree on an interest rate to be paid in the event of default of the balloon payment, and accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated to the extent that it awards the plaintiff interest at the rate of 14.1 percent, and the case is remanded with instructions that the trial court grant the plaintiff an award of prejudgment interest in accord with Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-102. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Henry Atlas Qualls Amos E. Qualls v. H. J. Q. Klutts, Executrix
This is the second appeal by the appellant who again has asked this court to review the Probate Court of Perry County’s denial of his petition. In that petition, the appellant contested the manner in which the Executrix of his late father’s estate administered the estate. We have determined the issue is res judicata and thereby affirm the trial court. We have also determined the appeal is devoid of merit and, therefore, the Executrix is entitled to recover her reasonable expenses incurred on appeal. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
Bridgestone/Firstone, Inc. v. William J. Orr
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment dismissing Appellant’s counterclaim for statutory retaliatory discharge against his employer, the Appellee herein. Finding that the material facts of this case are undisputed and that Appellant failed to show that he refused to participate in or to remain silent about any alleged illegal activity, and/or to prove an exclusive causal link between his alleged refusal to participate in or to remain silent about alleged illegal activities and his termination, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Hall, et al. v. Thomas Howell Fowler, et al.
In this action to quiet title in ancestral land held as a tenancy in common, the plaintiff co-tenants challenged two deeds conveying a portion of the land to a grantee outside the family. The defendant grantee procured two deeds to an undivided fractional interest in this property for the sum of $3,500. The first deed was executed by some of the heirs of a record co-tenant, and the second deed originated from two sons of a record co-tenant’s non-marital child. At that time, both the co-tenant of record and his non-marital child were deceased. Five days later, the grantee conveyed his interest in the subject property to a subsequent grantee for $21,000. The trial court set aside all deeds to the grantee, in part, on the ground of fraudulent procurement. It also set aside the deed to the subsequent grantee because the grantee had no title to convey. The court quieted title to the subject property in the plaintiff family members according to a series of quit claim deeds they had executed and recorded so as to partition the property among themselves. Further, the trial court ordered, sua sponte, the grantee to return the purchase price of the subject property, plus pre-judgment interest, to the subsequent grantee. Finding support in the record for setting aside the conveyances from only two of the original six grantors, we affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for a calculation of the respective interests in the property and for a determination regarding the subsequent grantee’s counterclaim for a partition in kind. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals |
