State of Tennessee v. Billy L. Couch, M.D. A/K/A Dr. B. L. Couch, et al.
Defendant doctor appeals an award of summary judgment to the State in this action brought pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) in connection with the sale and administration of flu vaccine. The trial court found the defendant doctor guilty of two hundred seventy (270) violations of the TCPA for vaccinating fifty-four (54) patients with serum manufactured for the previous flu season while representing it would protect them in the upcoming flu season; awarded restitution to the patients, imposed a civil penalty of $50 per violation, and awarded $10,500 in attorney’s fees and costs for investigation; and issued permanent injunction prohibiting doctor from selling or administering a flu vaccine manufactured for a previous flu season. On appeal, defendant doctor contends he established that two material facts were in dispute. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky Holloway et al. v. Cyril Evers, et al.
A contractor who was a partner in a subdivision development venture sold his interest to the other partners for $175,000. He subsequently filed a complaint against them alleging that they had deliberately taken advantage of his weak financial and physical condition to force him out the partnership. His complaint included claims for violation of fiduciary duty, duress and fraud. The trial court dismissed the contractor’s claim on summary judgment. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Raines, as Administrator of the Estate of Zelma Raines, deceased, v. National Health Corporation
This case was filed as a nursing home neglect case. The issue before the Court relates to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement signed during the nursing home admissions process by the holder of a durable power of attorney. The trial court denied the appellants’ motion to compel arbitration. It held that the arbitration agreement was beyond the authority of the attorney-in-fact, and, therefore, it did not reach questions related to the capacity of the decedent to execute the durable power of attorney; nor did it address the unconscionability of the agreement. We reverse the trial court as to its ruling on the authority of the attorney-in-fact and remand for a hearing and decision on the other issues not previously reached below. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Ross Products Division Abbott Laboratories, v. State of Tennessee
A manufacturer of infant formula entered into a contract with the State of Tennessee to furnish large quantities of its products to retailers for the federally-funded WIC program. The contract included a cash rebate which the manufacturer agreed to pay the State for each can furnished, to offset the cost of administering the program. After operating under the contract for four years, the manufacturer unilaterally decided to reduce the size of the cans it was providing, and it asked the state to reduce the rebate proportionally. The State refused, citing a provision in the contract that precluded rebate reductions. The manufacturer then filed an administrative claim, asking for a $1.2 million refund of its alleged overpayment of rebates. The Claims Commissioner granted Summary Judgment to the State. We affirm the Commissioner’s judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Tennessee Claims Commission Affirmed |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia “Kay” Provonsha, v. Students Taking a Right Stand, Inc. (STARS)
The gravamen of this action is an alleged retaliatory discharge. Plaintiff charged defendant with a common law violation, as well as a violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act. Defendant moved for summary judgment which the Trial Court granted. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Heather Hill, et al. v. Andrea Giddens, M.D., et al.
Patient filed a complaint against Doctors, OB/GYN Group, and Hospital (together “Defendants”) alleging medical malpractice for failing to obtain informed consent and failing to properly care for Patient during and after her hospitalization. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that Patient failed to provide a competent medical expert as required by T.C.A. § 29-25-115 (Supp. 2006). Patient appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Dennis Hardaway & Sonya Hardaway v. Hamilton County, Tennessee Board of Education, et al
In this action for damages allegedly due to water runoff from construction for a new school, the Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we conclude there are disputed issues of material fact, and remand and vacate the summary judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. C.W. and J.C.W., In the Matter ofL C.W.(DOB 04/21/99) and J.W. (DOB 02/22/02)
The Trial Court terminated the parental rights of the parents of the two minor children. On appeal, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of M.P.J., DOB 1/29/02
This is a case involving the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Department of Children’s Services instituted a dependent and neglect proceeding and the court granted a protective order removing the minor child from the mother’s home. At the time, the father’s whereabouts were unknown. The child, almost seven months old, was placed in the temporary custody of her greataunt. The father subsequently began serving a 56 month sentence in federal prison. When the child was almost five years old, the great-aunt petitioned the court for the termination of both the mother and the father’s parental rights and for the adoption of the child. The mother joined in the petition. After a termination hearing, the court announced that the father had abandoned the child, that his rights were terminated, and granted the great-aunt’s petition for adoption. The court first entered an order of adoption, but had yet to enter the order terminating the father’s parental rights. The court then issued an order of termination, but failed to include any findings of fact. Next, the court issued an amended order of termination with specific findings of fact, nunc pro tunc to the termination hearing date. Father appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court failed to make findings of fact; (2) that there is not clear and convincing proof of abandonment; (3) that the Department of Children’s Services did not afford him a reasonable opportunity to reunite with the child; and (4) that substantial harm to the child must be proven before a court may constitutionally terminate a parent’s rights. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Moore Family Properties, LLC, et al. v. Pull-A-Part of Tennessee, LLC, et al.
This appeal involves a review of actions taken at a meeting of the Memphis City Council. When the council members voted on a resolution, for unknown reasons, the electronic voting machine did not record an entry for one of the council members. This resulted in six votes being cast in favor of the measure and six votes against it. The omitted council member orally expressed his intention to vote in favor of the resolution before the Chairman announced the result of the vote. The Chairman then called for the electronic voting machine to be cleared so that all members could re-enter their votes. After the second vote, the Chairman declared that the resolution passed by a vote of seven to six. The appellants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the chancery court, alleging that the first vote was final and that the City Council acted illegally by taking a second vote. Upon review of the record of the proceedings, the trial court granted summary judgment to the City of Memphis and the Memphis City Council. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Edward Hargrove v. Merriellen Hargrove A/K/A Merriellen Warstler
This is a post-divorce case involving disputes over obligations in the Marital Dissolution Agreement and modification of the visitation schedule contained in the permanent parenting plan. Husband filed for divorce from Wife, and on August 25, 1998, the chancery court entered a final decree of divorce that incorporated the Marital Dissolution Agreement. The permanent parenting plan was filed on February 12, 2004. Concerning Husband and Wife’s minor son, born January 7, 1990, the residential schedule in the permanent parenting plan provided that Husband would be the primary residential parent and Wife would be responsible for the child every other weekend and during certain holidays. As to property division, the Marital Dissolution Agreement required Husband to transfer one-half of his pension plan to Wife. Concerning the marital home, Wife agreed to execute a quitclaim deed to Husband conveying her interest to Husband simultaneously with Husband paying her $15,000. After a contempt hearing, the court modified the parenting schedule; found that Wife was entitled to one-half of Husband’s pension, but not one-half of Husband’s annuity; and found that Husband had satisfied the $15,000 obligation. Wife appeals pro se, arguing that the modification of the residential schedule found in the parenting plan is void because the court did not follow Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-405(a). Wife also argues that the parties’ intent was that she was to receive half the annuity along with half the pension. Finally, Wife contends that Husband did not meet his burden of proof to establish the defense of accord and satisfaction. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Bessie L. White, et al. v. Premier Medical Group, et al.
In this medical malpractice action against a treating physician, his medical group, and several hospital entities, the plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by including in the jury instructions the defense of superseding cause requested by the treating physician and his medical group. The plaintiffs argue the evidence was insufficient to justify the instruction. It is proper to charge the law upon an issue of fact within the scope of the pleadings upon which there is material evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict. The record contains material evidence regarding each of the essentialelements of the defense of superseding cause sufficient to sustain a verdict of superseding cause; therefore, an instruction as to superseding cause was appropriate. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Wood, et al. v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Health, et al.
This is an appeal challenging the issuance of several permits to North American Galvanizing Company by the Air Pollution Division of the Metropolitan Department of Health. Appellants base their challenge on the failure of the Department to consider the location of the company as well as noise and exhaust fumes arising from truck traffic traveling through a residential neighborhood to and from the company. They also challenge the representation of both the Department and the Boardof Health by Metropolitan Department of Law attorneys. The Chancellor ruled against the appellants. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda L. Weber, v. Donald D. Weber, Jr.
In this dispute over child support owing by the father, the Trial Court ordered child support ended on the grounds the child turned 18 and his high school class had graduated, but ordered payments of back child support arrearage. On appeal, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Harry McLemore, Jr. v. Charles Traughber, Tennessee Boards of Probation and Paroles
An inmate filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari, alleging that the Board of Paroles acted arbitrarily and illegally in denying parole. The chancery court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The inmate appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy L. Aldridge v. Pam Aldridge, et al. In Re: Conservatorship of Bill M. Aldridge
This is a case involving a petition for appointment of conservator and a request for attorney’s fees by the non-petitioning spouse of the ward. The husband and wife were married, but lived apart. The husband lived with his daughter from a previous marriage. Unknown by the husband’s children, he continued to see and financially support his estranged wife. The husband suffered from bipolar disorder requiring several hospitalizations. The husband, during a manic period, emptied his 401K account and purchased several vehicles and properties. The husband’s daughter petitioned the court for appointment of a conservatorship for her father. The court found that the husband was disabled, and appointed the daughter as the conservator over his person and a third-party attorney as the conservator over his finances. The wife was represented by counsel during the proceedings. The court ordered the conservator to pay the wife spousal support in the amount of $2,000 a month out of the husband’s $150,000 estate. The wife then petitioned the court for an award of her attorney’s fees, which the probate court denied. Wife appeals, arguing that the lower court has the statutory authority pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-109 to include in the award of financial support her attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Highwoods Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis
This appeal involves the second case filed by the appellants to challenge an annexation ordinance. Previously, the appellants filed a quo warranto action seeking to have the annexation ordinance declared null and void on various grounds. Other landowners had previously filed quo warranto actions that were consolidated and still pending, and the appellants sought to consolidate their action with the others. The trial court held that the appellants’ quo warranto action was not timely filed, and accordingly dismissed it. On appeal, this Court affirmed. The consolidated quo warranto proceedings concluded with a consent order approving the reasonableness of the annexation ordinance, but providing that the annexation would take place in two phases. The appellants then filed the present action seeking a declaration that the annexation accomplished through the consent order was procedurally invalid and unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the appellants’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence Levine et al. v. Ron Marsh et. al.
This appeal involves a dispute over the personal property of a wife who was murdered by her husband. Following their appointment as conservators of her property, the wife’s parents filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against their son-in-law and certain members of his family seeking to recover their daughter’s personal property. Following a three-day trial, the jury returned a $222,449.10 verdict for the parents against the husband’s brother, sister, and brother-in-law. On this appeal, the husband’s family members take issue with the denial of their motion for directed verdict based on the statute of limitations, the failure to join the original conservator as a necessary party, the admissibility of certain evidence, and the jury instructions. We have determined that the trial court did not commit error during the trial and, therefore, affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Heatherly Awad v. Selma Curtis
This is a breach of contract case. The parties executed a contract for the sale of a beauty salon whereby, according to one of the provisions, Seller agreed to work for Buyer for a specific amount of time. Seller quit before the specified period expired. Both parties sued for breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages to Buyer in the amount of $18,000.00. Seller appeals, asserting that the provision at issue was too indefinite to be enforceable and challenging the damages awarded Buyer. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry D. Carmack et al. v. Louis W. Oliver, III
Landowners who hired an attorney to defend their property rights brought suit for legal malpractice |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Serena Rucker v. St. Thomas Hospital
This is a common-law retaliatory discharge case. Plaintiff/Appellant alleged that she was wrongfully discharged from her employment with Defendant/Appellee. Defendant/Appellee moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff/Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Trent Watrous, Individually, and as the surviving spouse and next of kin of Valerie Watrous v. Jack L. Johnson, et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim of negligent entrustment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Crawford, Sr. et al. v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc.et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
The defendants’ filings in this case clearly establish that Teri Crawford does not have a cause of action for intentional interference with the dead body of her brother, Robert H. Crawford. That cause of action belonged to Mr. Crawford’s widow, to the exclusion of all others. Furthermore, in my opinion, the record before us negates Ms. Crawford’s alleged causes of action against all defendants except those asserted against the individuals and entities directly associated with the operation of the Tri-State Crematory (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “the Tri-State Defendants”). As to these latter individuals and entities, I believe the defendants’ filings fail to negate Ms. Crawford’s three causes of action for (1) intentional, (2) reckless, and (3) negligent infliction of mental distress. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court was correct in dismissing Ms. Crawford’s complaint with respect to these “infliction of mental distress” theories. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Crawford, Sr. , et al. v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves one of numerous civil lawsuits filed against T. Ray Brent Marsh and his former business, Tri-State Crematory, Inc., and others. The plaintiffs in this case are the parents and siblings of Robert H. Crawford, Jr., whose body was sent to the Tri-State Crematory for cremation. The body, however, was not cremated and to this day the plaintiffs do not know what happened to their loved ones’ body. The Trial Court dismissed the lawsuit after finding that the decedent’s surviving spouse was the only person with standing to bring the various tort claims asserted by the plaintiffs. The decedent’s sister, Teri Crawford, appeals that determination. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Rondal Akers, et al. v. Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc., et al.
This is an appeal from three consolidated lawsuits filed against T. Ray Brent Marsh, Marsh’s former business, Tri-State Crematory, and Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc. The plaintiffs are relatives and a girlfriend of three deceased individuals whose bodies were sent by Buckner-Rush Funeral Home to Tri-State Crematory for cremation. The bodies were not cremated and either were dumped or buried by Marsh on the Tri-State premises. The Trial Court dismissed all three lawsuits after holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring any of the tort, contract, or statutory claims at issue. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |
