Greta Denise Smith (Austin) v. Ricky Allan Smith
This appeal involves a petition for past due child support. When the parties divorced in 1993, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent of the child, and the father was ordered to pay child support “directly to” the mother. In 1998, the mother remarried. From that point forward, the father made his child support checks payable to the child, not to the mother. Nevertheless, the mother endorsed the checks, deposited them into the same bank account as she had before, and maintained control over the use of the funds. Years later, in 2005, the father filed a petition to modify custody, seeking to be designated as primary residential parent. The mother filed a counterclaim for child support arrearages, claiming that the father had not made proper payments as required under the divorce decree since 1998, and that he should not receive credit for the child support checks that were made payable to the child. After a hearing, the trial court gave the father credit for the child support checks. The trial court reasoned that, although the checks were made payable to the child, the money remained in the mother’s control and she treated it as her own. The mother now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the father should receive credit for the disputed payments under the circumstances presented. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
City of Millersville v. Geary Falk
This appeal involves a dispute between the City of Millersville and a homeowner regarding the enforcement of an ordinance regulating the location of dumpsters on residential property. After the Millersville City Court fined the homeowner fifty dollars for violating the ordinance, the homeowner appealed to the Circuit Court for Sumner County. Following a bench trial, the court found that the homeowner had violated the ordinance and, in addition to fining him fifty dollars, ordered the homeowner to remove the dumpster from his property. The homeowner has appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by ordering the homeowner to remove the dumpster from his property. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha L. Stewart and Timothy G. Stewart v. Ricky E. Cottrell, Kathy D. Cottrell and Heather B. Cottrell
The issue on appeal is whether the general sessions court may back date the dismissal of a civil warrant, the result of which deprives the plaintiff of the benefit of the Savings Statute to commence a new civil action. When it was discovered that the plaintiffs had requested a voluntary dismissal a year and a half earlier but the case had not been dismissed, the general sessions court entered a dismissal and backdated the effective date of the dismissal to the date the voluntary dismissal had been requested. When the plaintiffs perfected an appeal of the dismissal to the circuit court within ten days of the entry of the order of dismissal, the defendants moved to dismiss the case as being barred by the statute of limitations, relying on the nunc pro tunc application of the dismissal. The circuit court dismissed the case as time barred and this appeal followed. We have determined a dismissal of a civil warrant is not effective until an order of dismissal, signed by the judge, is entered by the clerk of the court. The plaintiffs timely appealed the dismissal of their general sessions warrant within ten days of the date of entry of the order by the clerk. Therefore, this action is not time barred. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Milan Box Corporation v. Donna Hardy, et al.
Plaintiff Milan Box filed this lawsuit against former employee Donna Hardy and her husband, Billy Hardy, alleging fraud, embezzlement, conversion, and unjust enrichment. During discovery the Hardys submitted responses to written interrogatories, but subsequently asserted their fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination during deposition and moved the court to stay litigationpending criminal proceedings. The Hardys subsequently withdrew the motion to stay; nevertheless, the trial court denied the motion to stay when the Hardys failed to execute deeds of trust to real property in favor of Milan Box as security. The trial court granted Milan Box’s motion for summary judgment, and the Hardys appeal. We affirm summary judgment against Donna Hardy but modify the award of damages, reverse the award of summary judgment against Mr. Hardy, and remand for further proceedings. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Jean Webb v. David Fred Lane
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment rendered in her favor contending that the award was insufficient to compensate her for her injuries. In the absence of a transcript or sufficient statement of the evidence, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Anna C. Burden v. Harry Donald Burden
In this divorce case, Anna C. Burden (“Wife”) challenges the trial court’s award of joint custody and its adoption of the Permanent Parenting Plan submitted by Harry Donald Burden (“Husband”), which plan provides for equal parenting time with regard to the parties’ child, A.V. (“Child”). Wife contends that she should be the primary residential parent, with Husband having visitation rights. Wife also challenges the court’s division of the marital property and its denial of alimony. We reverse as to custody, affirm as to the division of property, and vacate the judgment as to alimony. This case is remanded for further proceedings on the issue of alimony. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Heather McBride v. Sherry Nebel Webb
In this action, plaintiff obtained a Default Judgment. Defendant moved to set aside the Judgment. The Trial Court refused, and we affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Willie L. Hill v. Margie L. Simpson
In this action for damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the Trial Judge approved a jury verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed on grounds of jury misconduct. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Victoria Bowling
Defendant was cited for criminal contempt by Judge. Another Judge found defendant guilty of contempt. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Dot Vaughn and Janelle Lee, Next of Kin for the deceased Muriel Powers Davis v. John W. Harton Regional Medical Center
Muriel Powers Davis was hospitalized in the John W. Harton Regional Medical Center for pneumonia. During the admission process, it was noted she had recently fallen and had difficulty ambulating without assistance. As a result, fall precautions were implemented. Two days later, during the evening hours, she was discovered lying in the floor. An X-ray revealed a fractured femur. The fracture was surgically repaired, but Ms. Davis died some twenty days after her fall. Her next of kin instituted a medical malpractice action against the hospital alleging that Ms. Davis's fall was the result of negligent care provided by the hospital. The hospital moved for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. After carefully reviewing the record, we are of the opinion that the affidavit filed by the hospital in support of its motion for summary judgment failed to negate the plaintiffs' right of recovery and so we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Jones, et al., v. KITE/CUPP Legends Golf Development Co., et al. - Corrected Opinion
In this case, the plaintiff, Charles Jones, stepped onto a wooden bench while playing a round of golf at Vanderbilt Legends Club of Tennessee (Legends), a golf course owned by the defendant, Kite/Cupp Legends Golf Development Co. (Kite). The bench overturned and Mr. Jones fell sustaining significant injuries. Mr. Jones brought a premises liability suit against the golf course alleging that it was negligent by failing to have secured the bench to the concrete slab on which it was sitting or by failing to have warned players it was not so secured. Kite filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. We find there are genuine issues of material fact, and so we reverse. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Ann White v. Dewey Wayne White
This is an appeal from a judgment that was not final. This Court ordered that a final judgment be entered with a copy filed in the record before us, which the appellant has failed to do. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Irina N. Parris v. Jerral D. Parris
This is a post-divorce case involving several issues stemming from a modification of child support and custody hearing and order resulting from that hearing. The parties were divorced in 2003, and the permanent parenting plan was filed on November 10, 2003. Wife retained custody of the parties’ two minor children. Husband was to pay Wife $1,250 a month child support. In 2005, Husband filed motions to review and revise both the custody and visitation arrangements contained in the permanent parenting plan and his child support obligation. The court treated Husband’s motions as a petition for modification of custody and child support. Husband represented himself pro se on July 17, 2006, at the petition hearing. The court entered an order on August 21, 2006, finding no material change of circumstance and thus, Wife retained custody of the two children. The order also increased Husband’s child support obligation. Finally, the court found Husband in contempt of court and sentenced him to five days in jail with $1,000 bond. Husband appeals, arguing that 1) the court erred in finding no material change of circumstance; 2) the court erred in the findings concerning both Husband and Wife’s income pertaining to the child support; and 3) the court erred in finding Husband in contempt. We affirm. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
John C. Kersey, Sr. v. John Bratcher, et al. - Concurring
I fully concur in Judge Swiney’s Opinion but wish to elaborate on the fact that the Judge had custody of the file that the plaintiff sought and was charged with safekeeping and protection of the file. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John C. Kersey, Sr. v. John Bratcher, Beverly Raechelle Wilson and Michelle Blaylock
John C. Kersey, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) sued John Bratcher, Clerk of the Chancery Court for Rutherford County, Tennessee (“Bratcher”); Beverly Raechelle Wilson, Deputy Clerk of the Chancery Court (“Wilson”); and Michelle Blaylock, Judicial Assistant to Circuit Judge Rogers (“Blaylock”), claiming, in part, that the defendants had violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 regarding records open to public inspection. Blaylock filed a motion for summary judgment, and Bratcher and Wilson filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Blaylock’s motion for summary judgment and Bratcher’s and Wilson’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John C. Kersey, Sr. v. John Bratcher, Beverly Raechelle Wilson and Michelle Blaylock - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this Public Records Act case. I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claim against the Clerk and Master and the deputy clerk and vacate the grant of summary judgment as to the judge’s assistant. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Eldora Burkes, by and through its Administrator, C.T.A., Calvin Burkes v. St. Peter Villa, Inc., d/b/a St. Peter Villa Nursing Home
This appeal involves an award of discretionary costs after a voluntary dismissal. The plaintiff estate filed a lawsuit against the defendant nursing home, alleging abuse and neglect of the plaintiff’s decedent. The defendant nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to exclude the plaintiff’s expert. The motion for summary judgment was denied, but the motion to exclude the plaintiff’s expert was granted. The plaintiff then filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Consequently, the trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. After entry of this order, the defendant nursing home filed a motion for discretionary costs, pursuant to Rule 54.04(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the motion, and entered an order assessing the costs against the plaintiff estate. The plaintiff estate now appeals, arguing that the defendant nursing home was not entitled to an award of discretionary costs because it obtained no relief on the merits of the case and therefore was not a “prevailing party.” We affirm, finding that Rule 54.04(2) expressly authorizes the trial court, in its discretion, to award discretionary costs to a defendant in a lawsuit that is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of William Reynolds, Jr., Deceased
This appeal involves a sale of equipment, made by a decedent to his friend, eleven days before he died. The administrator of the decedent’s estate filed a complaint to set aside the sale alleging fraud, undue influence, and inadequate consideration. Following a bench trial, the trial court set aside the sale and ordered the estate to reimburse the purchase money to the buyers. We reverse. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of William Reynolds, Jr., Deceased - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
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Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Patrick Hayes v. Deborah Ingrid Hayes
The Trial Court denied the husband Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 relief from a default judgment in the divorce case. We grant a new trial as to equitable division of marital property. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
James E. Rasberry v. Orman Campbell, O.D., et al.
Plaintiff brought suit to enforce a contract for the sale of real estate contending that one of the selling heirs was the authorized agent of the remaining heirs to enter into the agreement. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits and the Plaintiff countered with his affidavit. Finding no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court granted the motion and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Clayton Murray, Jr. et al v.Jes Beard, Esquire - Dissenting and Concurring
I concur in the majority’s decision except that I, respectfully, dissent from the majority’s holding “that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the [Plaintiff’s] amended motion and limiting the trial to the issue of damages only.” I believe the Trial Court acted well within its discretion in ordering this sanction. As discussed by the majority, Rule 37.04 clearly is authority for a trial court’s “rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party” because that party failed to serve answers or objections to interrogatories. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(C). That is exactly what the Trial Court did here. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Clayton Murray, Jr. et al v. Jes Beard, Esquire
This is a legal malpractice case. Raymond Clayton Murray, Jr. (“the Client”) sued his former attorney, Jes Beard (“the Attorney”), in connection with the Attorney’s representation of the Client in the latter’s action to modify child support. In the present case, after the Attorney failed to answer interrogatories regarding his experts, the Client filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37 seeking to prevent the Attorney from offering any expert testimony. The court entered an order granting the Client’s motion and barring the Attorney from introducing expert testimony at trial. The Client subsequently filed a second motion for Rule 37 sanctions, this time seeking a default judgment against the Attorney. The motion sought this further sanction as punishment for the Attorney’s alleged failure to cooperate in the discovery process. The court granted this motion and announced its decision in a fax to counsel on the day before trial. An order was never entered memorializing this ruling. The Attorney filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. After a hearing solely on the issue of damages, the trial court entered a judgment against the Attorney for $16,697.38. He appeals. After review, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted a default judgment against the Attorney as a Rule 37 sanction. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial, but solely on the issue of liability. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, v. Unitrac Railroad Materials, Inc.
Plaintiff sought to recover payment of workers compensation benefits via subrogation against the defendant. The Trial Court entered Judgment for defendant. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Davidson County v. Alfred O. Hibler, II
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) brought this action alleging that Alfred O. Hibler, II, had failed to report earned income as required in order to avoid a reduction in the amount of his Metro disability pension, resulting in significant pension overpayments to Mr. Hibler. The income in dispute consisted of distributions of excess earnings of an S corporation owned by Mr. Hibler. The issue is whether this income is properly characterized as “earned income,” defined by the Metro Code as including “wage or salary – not rent, interest, dividends or capital gains.” After a trial, the trial court ruled that the distributions, labeled “draws” by the S corporation, were not earned income required to be reported to Metro for purposes of calculating Mr. Hibler’s disability pension, and dismissed the action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
