Harold Oliver, et al. v. Todd Pulse, et al.
This appeal requires us to determine the scope of a real estate licensee’s duty under the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § § 66-5-201 et seq. to advise their client to disclose conditions of improved real property. We hold that a licensee’s duty under the Act encompasses a duty to advise his or her client/seller to disclose known material defects. We affirm denial of Plaintiff/Sellers’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of breach of statutory and contractual duties. In light of the undisputed facts of this case, we find Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the question of breach and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this Opinion. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Provectus Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Peter R. Culpepper
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an amended pleading that seeks to vacate an arbitration award that was delivered to the parties more than 90 days earlier relates back to the date of the original pleading pursuant to Rule 15.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure when the original pleading only sought to modify the arbitration award. A dispute arose when an employer terminated the employment contract of its chief financial officer. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“the Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-301 to -320. After the arbitrator issued a monetary award in favor of the corporation, the employer filed a petition to confirm the award in chancery court. Within 90 days of the delivery of a copy of the award to the employee, which is the limitation period set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-314(a) of the Act, the employee timely filed an answer to the petition in which he sought modification of the award with respect to prejudgment interest only. Otherwise, the employee admitted all material allegations in the petition. Significantly, the employee did not seek to vacate the award. After waiving any claim to prejudgment interest, the employer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to confirm the arbitration award in all other respects. Before the hearing on the motion, but more than 90 days after a copy of the award was delivered to the employee, the employee filed a Rule 15 motion to amend his answer to assert a counterclaim to vacate the award on grounds not previously raised. The trial court denied the employee’s Rule 15 motion to amend the answer as futile on the ground that it was not a timely application to vacate the final award and awarded the employer judgment on the pleadings. The employee appeals, contending the court erred because an amended pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading pursuant to Rule 15.03. We have determined that strict adherence to the 90-day limitation furthers the primary objectives of the Act, which is to bring the arbitration process to a speedy and final resolution. Furthermore, the limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-5-312 and -313(b) are more specific than the general relation-back provision of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to amend the answer as futile on the ground that the employee did not file a timely application to vacate the final award, and we affirm the entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the employer. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Samantha Beau Ballard v. Casey John Ballard
A father filed a petition to modify a parenting plan in which he sought to change the primary residential parent or modify the residential schedule. The trial court denied his petition, and he appealed. We hold that the father failed to establish a material change of circumstances to justify any change to the parties’ parenting plan and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Zaylee W.
A father appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to support, (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child. He further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights but vacate the court’s judgment regarding two of the grounds for termination. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Steven J. Strange Et Al. v. Hank E. Roberts, Et Al.
The owners of the dominant estate sued the owners of the servient estate of an easement to Tanner’s Bar, a piece of land near a river. The trial court ruled that the easement was an easement appurtenant for ingress and egress only and did not entitle the dominant estate owners to engage in recreational activities at Tanner’s Bar. The trial court further ruled that a member of the dominant estate family had to accompany all invitees to the easement. Having concluded that the intent of the easement was for the dominant estate owners to have the right to enjoy the river at Tanner’s Bar, we reverse the decision of the trial court prohibiting recreational use. We have further determined that the trial court erred in requiring that a dominant estate family member be present with invitees. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Collins et al. v. John D. Carter et al.
Four family members sued their former employer and eight individual defendants after their employment was terminated amid allegations of malfeasance. The complaint alleged nine causes of action. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the former employer and six of the eight individual defendants on summary judgment. The plaintiffs and the remaining two defendants then became embroiled in an extended discovery battle. The battle ended with the trial court dismissing the remaining claims with prejudice based on the plaintiffs’ failure to cooperate in discovery. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the contract claims because the contract at issue was not ultra vires. Because we reverse that portion of the trial court’s decision, we also reverse the award of attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-113(a). We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ELI S.
In this termination of parental rights case, both parents appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights to their son upon numerous statutory grounds and upon its finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Upon our review, we conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s determinations with respect to certain grounds though not others and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse portions of the court’s order finding that certain grounds for termination were established, affirm the remainder of the grounds and the best interest determination, and affirm the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Latoya Ledford, ex rel. Nayeli Roriguez v. State of Tennessee
This appeal is from the Claims Commission’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 9-8-402, 29-26-121, and 29-26- 122. We must affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Caydan T.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, which the trial court granted on the grounds of persistent conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that the termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Estate of Jesse L. McCants, Sr.
This is the second appeal arising from probate proceedings involving the estate of Jesse McCants, Sr. The first appeal concerned the accuracy of the personal representative’s final accounting. The trial court determined that some expenses identified by the personal representative should not be allowed. This Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded “for the entry of a modified order consistent with this Opinion and for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with our direction herein.” The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly followed our instructions on remand. We conclude that the trial court did so; therefore, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Huddleston Heaton Jr. Et Al. v. Catherine L. Mathes Et Al.
The plaintiffs filed a health care liability action against a pharmacy and other medical defendants, claiming, inter alia, that the defendants failed to provide proper patient counseling and failed to warn of the risks associated with a prescription drug. The pharmacy defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the gravamen of the complaint against them was a products liability action rather than a health care liability action. The defendants further asserted that the “seller shield” defense found within the Tennessee Products Liability Act provided them with immunity from liability. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that the complaint stated a health care liability action rather than a products liability action. The trial court subsequently granted the defendants’ motion for permission to seek interlocutory appeal regarding whether the seller shield defense contained within the Tennessee Products Liability Act could be asserted when the plaintiffs’ claim is made pursuant to the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. Following our thorough consideration of the issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, determining that the seller shield defense found in the Tennessee Products Liability Act is inapplicable to claims made under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
ORNL Federal Credit Union Et Al. v. Estate of Helen D. Turley Et Al.
This appeal concerns a lawsuit between brothers over funds belonging to their late mother, Helen D. Turley (“Decedent”). Tim Turley, executor of Decedent’s estate (“the Estate”), deposited $138,605.14 from a Y-12 Federal Credit Union (“Y-12 FCU”) account owned by Decedent into an estate account at ORNL Federal Credit Union (“ORNL FCU”). An issue arose because William Dean Turley was named sole payableon- death beneficiary on the Y-12 FCU account, and he asserted the funds were his. ORNL FCU filed a complaint for interpleader in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) to determine the funds’ owner. In a cross-claim, Tim Turley and the Estate alleged that William Dean Turley exercised undue influence over Decedent and that Decedent was incompetent when she named William Dean Turley as the payable-on-death beneficiary on the account. William Dean Turley filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Estate and Tim Turley appeal. We hold that William Dean Turley successfully demonstrated that the evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish undue influence, fraud, or lack of mental competency, and there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment, however, to the extent it awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to William Dean Turley, as these fees and expenses were awarded in contravention of the American Rule. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Alys Harris Lipscomb
In this appeal of a probate matter, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion occurred as a result of transactions conducted by Appellant as attorney-in-fact of Decedent. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in ruling that a bank account where both Appellant and Decedent signed a signature card was an individual account instead of a joint account with rights of survivorship. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Glenn Mitchell v. Carol Ann Thomas Mitchell
This is the second appeal in this post-divorce action involving the interpretation of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement and allegations of contempt for failure to comply with the same. We remanded the case to the trial court for submission of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The husband appeals the trial court’s opinion on remand. We affirm the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Gale Gates v. Scott Gates
In this divorce action, the issue is whether the trial court correctly credited the number of parenting days awarded to each parent for purposes of calculating child support under the terms of the permanent parenting plan (PPP). Scott Gates (father) argues on appeal that the trial court miscalculated his residential time by undercounting the number of days awarded him in the PPP. We hold that there are irreconcilable inconsistencies in the PPP that require us to vacate the trial court’s order and remand for clarification of the actual number of days awarded and recalculation of child support. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Lunsford v. K-VA-T Food Stores, Inc.
This appeal involves a slip and fall premises liability case filed by an invitee against a business proprietor. The trial court granted summary judgment to the business proprietor because invitee’s evidence did not show that the condition in the business proprietor’s store was inherently dangerous and because the court found the condition to be open and obvious. For the following reasons, we agree with the trial court that the condition at issue was not inherently dangerous and summary judgement should be granted for Defendant. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B. Et Al.
This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights to his three children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination were proven and that termination is in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rickey Thompson v. State of Tennessee, Department of Correction
This appeal concerns the court’s summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s age discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims against the State of Tennessee, Department of Correction. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Reginald D. Hughes v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, ET AL.
A state inmate filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of the prison disciplinary board’s decision to deny parole. The board filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the board’s motion to dismiss because the petition was not filed within the sixty-day period prescribed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 (2017). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Lee Algee v. David Anthony Craig as personal representative of the Estate of Nancy P. Craig
This personal injury action concerns an automobile accident. The defendant died shortly after the accident. The estate was opened, administered, and closed before the plaintiff filed suit against the former personal representative within the applicable statute of limitations. The personal representative moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff moved to enlarge the time for filing service of process based upon a claim of excusable neglect. The trial court dismissed the action as untimely. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Kira Mendiola Leonard v. Craig Michael Leonard
This case involves the classification and division of marital property between ex-military spouses. In dividing the marital property, the trial court failed to address the factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121 or make necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law as is required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s decision and remand with instructions to properly address the required statutory factors. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Sue Noland v. Matthew Cook, Administrator Ad Litem of Estate of Ronnie Sue Lowe
This is an appeal from a personal injury case where the trial court entered a directed verdict on liability and where the jury returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff $0 in damages. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for additur. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in not giving the jury an instruction that she was entitled to damages for medical evaluation and diagnostic expenses following her motor vehicle accident and that there is no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict because the unrefuted expert testimony indicated she had suffered an injury and had incurred medical evaluation and diagnostic expenses following the accident. Finding no error by the trial court or with the jury’s verdict, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Louise Ann Mawn v. Gregg Thomas Tarquinio
During the pendency of a divorce, Husband was convicted of six counts of criminal contempt for violating the statutory injunction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-106(d). On appeal, Husband contends that the trial court erred in finding that he willfully violated the statute. Because we are unable to determine if the trial court applied an impermissible conclusive presumption to find that Husband was aware of his obligations under the statutory injunction, we vacate and remand to the trial court for reconsideration. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jill St. John Parker v. Virgil Duane Parker
This is an appeal from a trial court’s order holding an ex-husband in civil contempt on twelve counts and ordering him to pay $240,507.70 in attorney fees and accounting fees incurred by the ex-wife in this case and a related bankruptcy proceeding. The exhusband appeals. We affirm the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Benanti v. Jamie Satterfield Et Al.
This is a defamation case. Michael Benanti (plaintiff) was convicted of committing multiple felonies, including: armed bank extortion, kidnapping, and carjacking. He is serving four consecutive life sentences at a federal prison in California. Shortly after his incarceration, plaintiff filed a complaint against Jamie Satterfield, the Knoxville News Sentinel, and USA Today (defendants), seeking $3,000,000 in damages. Plaintiff alleged that defendants defamed him by falsely reporting that the FBI suspected plaintiff of committing additional crimes, including murder. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
