Alexis Luttrell Tutor v. Joseph Keith Tutor
In this post-divorce dispute, Appellant Mother and Appellee Father filed cross-petitions seeking modification of the permanent parenting plan for their minor child. Father sought a change in primary residential parent, and Mother sought modification of the parenting schedule and decision-making authority. On its finding that the parties stipulated to a material change in circumstance, the trial court granted Father’s petition and denied Mother’s petition. Because the trial court failed to delineate between the burden of proof for modification of custody and the burden of proof for modification of parenting schedule, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), (C), we vacate the trial court’s order and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Carlie Z. Et Al.
The is an appeal from an order terminating a father’s parental rights. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Heather R. Wilder v. Joseph C. Wilder
This appeal involves questions of post-divorce child support. In the trial court proceedings, both parties prayed for a modification of support. Additionally, mother pursued an extension of support post-majority for two of her children. While the trial court dealt with the question of post-majority support, it did not address the parties’ requests for modification of the ordinary support owed, father for a decrease, or mother for an increase. Although the trial court addressed post-majority support issues, its order was incomplete even as to those matters, as a specific amount of support was never set. It follows that there is not a final judgment in this case, and we must therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Belinda Bentley Wright v. John Andrew Wright
This is a divorce case. Appellant Husband appeals the trial court’s: (1) classification of certain property; (2) imputation of income for purposes of child support; (3) denial of the parties’ proposed parenting plan; and (4) award of rehabilitative, transitional, and alimony in solido to Appellee Wife. We conclude that the trial court erred in: (1) the classification of certain marital property; (2) the amount of income imputed to the parties’; (3) denying the parties’ proposed parenting plan absent sufficient findings; (4) its award of rehabilitative alimony; and (5) in the amount of transitional alimony awarded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Burns v. State Farm Fire And Casualty Company
This appeal concerns a plaintiff’s effort to amend a civil warrant. Brandon Burns (“Burns”) had homeowners insurance through State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“SFFCC”). When SFFCC did not repair the progressing damage to his home caused by a sinkhole, Burns sued “State Farm Insurance” in the Knox County General Sessions Court (“the General Sessions Court”). It was the wrong entity. Nevertheless, Burns obtained a $25,000 default judgment against it. SFFCC, a non-party, somehow and for some reason filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Circuit Court”). In the Circuit Court, Burns filed a motion to amend. SFFCC filed a motion to dismiss, which the Circuit Court granted as to SFFCC but not as to State Farm Insurance. SFFCC then dismissed its appeal, content to let the General Sessions Court judgment stand against State Farm Insurance. Some months later, Burns made an oral motion to amend in the General Sessions Court, which was granted. The parties agreed to remove the case back to the Circuit Court, which granted summary judgment to SFFCC. Burns appeals. We hold that the General Sessions Court lacked jurisdiction to grant Burns’ motion to amend or otherwise modify its judgment because its judgment became final months before Burns’ motion was noticed for hearing in the General Sessions Court. We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh v. Waleed Fawzi Abed
This is the second appeal of a parenting plan. In the first appeal, Father successfully challenged the adoption of a plan that allocated him only 80 days parenting time; the case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to increase Father’s parenting time. Following a hearing, the trial court adopted Father’s proposed parenting plan which granted the parties equal parenting time, and in so doing, addressed other matters. Mother appeals. We affirm the award of equal parenting time and the adjustment to child support and income tax deductions that necessarily followed; we modify the plan to include certain provisions that were in the previous parenting plan. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Hembree (Schumacher) Deluca v. Kerry James Schumacher
A husband and wife executed a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) providing that the husband would pay the wife alimony in futuro even if she remarried. Following the wife’s remarriage, the husband sought to have his alimony obligation terminated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(3), which provides that an alimony in futuro award “shall terminate automatically and unconditionally upon the death or remarriage of the recipient.” The trial court terminated the husband’s alimony obligation, and the wife appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment because the parties voluntarily agreed to terms outside of the statute, and their contract is enforceable as written. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Great American Insurance Company v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC
This appeal arises out of a negligence lawsuit. TLD Logistics Services, Inc. (“TLD”), an interstate common carrier, sued Pilot Travel Centers, LLC (“Pilot”) in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). TLD was a customer of Comdata Network, Inc. (“Comdata”), and Pilot was a Comdata vendor. Upon request from TLD, Comdata issued codes for the creation of Comcheks, negotiable draft instruments TLD used to pay workers. Pilot would print and deliver the Comcheks. TLD alleged that Pilot breached its duty of care by failing to ascertain whether Comchek payees were legitimate, thus causing TLD monetary loss when a rogue TLD employee fraudulently caused numerous Comcheks to be issued that were negotiated by Pilot. Pilot filed a motion for summary judgment. Pilot argued in its motion that TLD should have kept better internal safeguards to prevent what happened with its employee, and that TLD was 50% or more at fault in this matter. The Trial Court granted Pilot’s motion for summary judgment. Great American Insurance Company (“Great American”), subrogee of TLD and substituted as plaintiff mid-proceedings below, appeals to this Court. We hold that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether TLD was 50% or more at fault. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Ray, et al. v. Anthony Willougby
A pro se defendant appeals a judgment entered against him on a promissory note. Because the defendant failed to file a transcript or statement of evidence, we presume that the trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence. In light of that presumption, we affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Trina Petty as Administrator of the Estate of Ida Mae Ewing v. Robert Burns, MD, PC d/b/a Robert Burns, MD
This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment because, inter alia, Appellant failed to provide Appellee with the proper pre-suit notice under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Janet Lynnette McCormick v. Donny Joe McCormick
Wife appeals the trial court’s judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in treating an obligation contained in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement as an alimony obligation rather than a division of marital debt that was extinguished upon the foreclosure of the subject property. In the alternative, Wife contends that the trial court erred in not further reducing or eliminating her alimony obligation. We conclude that Wife waived her arguments concerning the proper classification of this obligation as a marital debt by not raising this argument in the trial court. As to the trial court’s decision regarding modification of Wife’s alimony, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand for an order fully compliant with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark T. Cross v. River Sound Homeowners Association, Incorporated
This is an appeal from an order of partial summary judgment. Although the trial court attempted to certify its order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we hold that such certification was improvident. There being no final judgment before us, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Neveah M.
Foster parents brought a petition to terminate the parental rights of a biological mother on three grounds, and the trial court granted the petition on all three grounds. Because the foster parents failed to prove any of the grounds by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristin Edge Hunt-Carden v. Jason Vincent Carden
This appeal involves a marriage of short duration. Following a bench trial, the court granted the wife a divorce and classified and divided the parties’ marital estate. The husband takes issue with the trial court’s classification and division of the marital property, as well as the award of alimony to the wife. The wife seeks attorney fees and costs. We affirm in part as modified and reverse in part. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Trinity P.
This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory ground of abandonment for failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume responsibility of the child. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Joe V. Williams v. Dennis Epperson Et Al.
This case involves an appeal to the Bradley County Chancery Court (“trial court”) of an administrative decision by the Building Board of Adjustment and Appeals for the City of Cleveland (“the Board”) to uphold the City of Cleveland’s chief building official’s decision to condemn and order the demolition of a commercial building. Upon a notice of condemnation issued by the chief building official based on the allegedly dilapidated and unsafe condition of the building, the building’s owner appealed to the Board. Following a hearing, the Board upheld the condemnation and demolition order. The owner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court, requesting, inter alia, that the demolition order be vacated. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the Board’s decision had been supported by substantial and material evidence and accordingly upheld the Board’s affirmance of the condemnation and demolition order. The owner filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the trial court denied. The owner timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jadarian C. Et AL.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willingness and ability to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children. Mother appeals both the grounds for termination and that termination was in her children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kyland F.
The parents of a severely abused child appeal the termination of their parental rights. When the child was less than five months old, his primary care physician became alarmed upon discovering that his head circumference had grown at an abnormal rate. Upon being admitted to the hospital for tests, the medical staff noted retinal hemorrhaging and the presence of blood in his cerebrospinal fluid, both of which indicated inflicted trauma. A pediatrician with a subspecialty in child abuse examined xrays that revealed healing fractures in the anterior lateral aspect of multiple ribs, which also indicated child abuse. When investigators from the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) interviewed the parents, the father admitted to observing the mother hitting the child in the head and covering his face with a blanket to muffle his cries. The mother told investigators she squeezed and shook the child, but it was the father who struck the child in the head. DCS placed the child in foster care, and both parents were charged with aggravated child abuse. While the parents remained incarcerated, DCS filed a petition to terminate their parental rights on two grounds, severe child abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(27) and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Following a trial, the court found that both grounds had been proven and that termination of the parents’ rights was in the child’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that DCS proved the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; however, we affirm the trial court in all other respects. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Mpoyi v. Richard T. Mpoyi
Ex-Husband appeals from a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”), which was entered several years after the final decree of divorce. Ex-Husband complains that the QDRO grants his ex-wife benefits that she was not entitled to under the final decree of divorce. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Michelle Henry v. Richard H. Henry
In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s award of 60 percent of the marital assets to Wife, the holding that he had gifted his mother’s ring to Wife, and the award of transitional alimony and alimony in futuro to Wife. Upon our review, we affirm the award of alimony and the holding that Husband gifted the ring to Wife, and hold that the issue of the division of the marital estate is waived. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Brianna Danielle King v. Aaron Jefferson Daily
The mother has filed a notice of appeal from an order granting the father’s motion to continue the trial. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Khaled Eleiwa, et al. v. Suzanne Abutaa f/k/a Izdihar Jabr
Petitioners appeal the dismissal of a petition for civil and criminal contempt related to alleged violations of a permanent injunction against the Respondent. In response, the Respondent appeals the dismissal of two protective orders she concurrently sought against the Petitioners. As the trial court’s order failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for review, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand the matter for further consideration. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Gibbs v. Capital Resorts Group, LLC, Et Al.
This appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss and to compel mediation and arbitration. The Trial Court determined that the plaintiff had properly challenged the mandatory arbitration provisions of the contract, including the delegation clause, on the basis of fraudulent inducement of the contract including the delegation clause. The Trial Court, therefore, denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and to compel mediation and arbitration. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Sidney W. White, et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Appellants were injured in a car accident and, with the permission of their insurance company, Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), settled with the at-fault driver for his policy limits under his coverage with United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”). To fully recover for their injuries, Appellants notified State Farm of their willingness to settle or submit their underinsured motorist (“UIM”) claim to binding arbitration. After evaluating Appellants’ claim, State Farm informed Appellants that it would not offer a settlement for the UIM claim because it believed they had been fully compensated by the payment from USAA. Appellants, in response, demanded that State Farm elect to either participate in binding arbitration or decline arbitration and preserve its subrogation rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206 (“the Statute”). Believing that its obligation under the Statute was never triggered, State Farm refused to make an election. Appellants filed an action for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to declare that State Farm failed to comply with the Statute. On competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted State Farm’s motion and denied Appellants’ motion. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron Patrick Taylor v. Joseph Winston Harsh
Plaintiff filed claims of slander, defamation, and interference with prospective economic advantage against defendant deputy sheriff in his individual capacity. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that he was entitled to immunity. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s claims on the basis of immunity. Because we cannot discern whether the trial court relied on the proper law in its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s judgment. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals |
