State of Tennessee v. Edward Jerome Harbison
The Defendant, Edward Jerome Harbison, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his “Motion for Second Chance,” which the trial court considered as a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alfred R. Mason
Alfred R. Mason, Defendant, pled guilty to various drug offenses and received a sentence to be served on community corrections. After a violation warrant was filed and Defendant admitted to the violation, the trial court revoked community corrections and ordered Defendant to serve his sentence. Defendant appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) ordering Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence instead of resentencing him and (2) failing to award Defendant credit for time served on community corrections. After our review, we affirm the revocation of Defendant’s community corrections sentence and remand to the trial court. On remand, the trial court should enter amended judgment forms to reflect credit for time successfully served on community corrections prior to the issuance of revocation warrants. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew B. Foley v. State of Tennessee
This is the third occasion Petitioner, Matthew B. Foley, appeals from a denial of his petition for post-conviction relief raising the same primary lament – he does not belong on the Tennessee Sexual Offender Registry. He is seeking relief from his 2002 guilty-pleaded conviction for facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, an offense which, at the time of his plea agreement, was not listed as an offense requiring sexual offender registration. Petitioner, who was a sixteen year-old minor at the time of his guilty plea, continues to allege that the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief should be tolled on due process grounds and that the State breached a material element of his plea agreement by requiring him to register as a sex offender. The post-conviction court summarily denied relief based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. In the first appeal, this Court concluded that the statute of limitations should be tolled based on due process grounds, and we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Matthew B. Foley v. State, No. M2015-00311-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 245857, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2016), no perm. app. filed (“Foley I”). On remand, the post-conviction court held a hearing and found the statute of limitations should not be tolled. In the second appeal, this Court found that the statute of limitations issue had been conclusively decided in Foley I and remanded the case to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits. Matthew B. Foley v. State, No. M2016-02456-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 5054571, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017) no perm. app. filed (“Foley II”). On remand for the second time, the post-conviction court denied the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to diligently pursue his rights and, therefore, that the statute of limitations should not be tolled. The post-conviction court also found that Petitioner failed to show the State violated a material element of his plea agreement and failed to show the State violated his due process rights. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, grant post-conviction relief and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew B. Foley v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur fully with the majority opinion. Although I realize that the issue in this appeal concerns the denial of post-conviction relief, I write separately to express my opinion that, in light of the numerous amendments to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004 (the TSORA) and specifically the numerous amendments to the residential and work restrictions in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211, it is an appropriate time for the supreme court to revisit its holding in Ward “that the registration requirements imposed [by the TSORA] are nonpunitive and that they are therefore a collateral consequence of a guilty plea[.]” Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 469 (Tenn. 2010). As the Ward court stated, “Obviously, nothing in this opinion precludes the possibility that an amendment to the registration act imposing further restrictions may be subject to review on the grounds that the additional requirements render the effect of the act punitive.” Id. at 472. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tamir Clark v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Tamir Clark, appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of his motion to withdraw his 2012 guilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the motion. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Ray Ward
A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Randall Ray Ward, of two counts of promoting prostitution and one count of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He also argues the trial court erred in failing to merge the convictions regarding S.C. and in failing to give the jury an instruction on accomplice testimony. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for merger of Counts three and four. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholaus Jones
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant of possession of heroin with intent to sell, a Class B felony; possession of heroin with intent to deliver, a Class B felony; two counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, Class D felonies; and two counts of simple possession of Alprazolam, Class A misdemeanors. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the possession of heroin convictions, merged the possession of a firearm convictions, and merged the simple possession convictions and sentenced the Appellant to an effective sentence of nineteen years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to show that the Appellant actually or constructively possessed the drugs or gun. Accordingly, the Appellant’s convictions are reversed, and the charges against him are dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Sherrill
The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the Defendant’s, Brian Sherrill, motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of his vehicle. The Defendant argued that the arresting officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that his truck’s brake light was malfunctioning. The State replied that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant for either the brake light offense or an alleged seatbelt violation. The trial court addressed the brake light offense and concluded that the “totality of the circumstances” did not support the stop. After the trial court granted the Defendant’s suppression motion and dismissed the indictment, the State appealed. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court erred by not considering the State’s alternative theory attempting to establish that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of a seatbelt violation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew Whitehair v. State of Tennessee
Matthew Whitehair, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of simple assault, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery, five counts of attempted incest, one count of incest, one count of statutory rape by an authority figure, and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. Petitioner was found not guilty of two counts of incest and two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Matthew Whitehair, No. M2014-00883-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 880021, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged various instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, among other things. After a lengthy, multi-day hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief. After our review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to relief. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Pamela Kidd Hafer
In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the ruling of the trial court suppressing the results of toxicology testing conducted on the blood sample that the defendant, Pamela Kidd Hafer, provided to the police. The State asserts that the trial court erred because the defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless drawing of her blood. In the alternative, the State contends that the trial court should have concluded that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement obviated the need to suppress the challenged evidence. Because the evidence establishes that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant twice voluntarily consented to the drawing of her blood, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we have concluded that the defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw and because the good faith issue was not fully litigated below, we do not consider the State’s claim that the evidence was admissible via the good faith exception. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cortney R. Logan v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Cortney R. Logan, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the flight or escape from the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Petitioner received consecutive sentences of 25 years and 6 years for a total effective sentence of 31 years. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Juan Vargas v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted Petitioner, Juan Vargas, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a pro se Post-Conviction Petition, and after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct require a new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Wharton
The petitioner, Ronnie Wharton, appeals the Sumner County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he has deemed an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Taylor
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Ronald Taylor, of first-degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed the statutorily required life imprisonment sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the: (1) denial of his motion to suppress; (2) sufficiency of the evidence; (3) omission of a jury instruction; and (4) admission of an officer’s testimony regarding a video prior to admission of the video into evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Taylor - Concurring
I respectfully concur in results with Judge Wedemeyer’s majority opinion. I am unable to join with that portion of the opinion addressing Defendant’s Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) “unlawful detention” issue. I agree the issue is waived as a result of the failure of Defendant’s trial counsel to raise a pre-trial Gerstein challenge to suppress evidence obtained after his warrantless arrest. The State on appeal asserts the issue is waived. If this court concludes in this particular case that the issue is waived, we should stop our analysis there. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Travis Maples v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Charles Travis Maples, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2013 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of three counts of the sale of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. In this appeal, the petitioner claims, as he did below, that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Burrows v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, David Burrows, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to discover his intelligence quotient (“IQ”) of 76 and in failing to seek a mental evaluation. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamarius Gant v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jamarius Gant, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ed Loyde v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ed Loyde, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective sentence of thirty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Arnold Demoss
The Appellant, James Arnold Demoss, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in confinement for aggravated burglary and to a concurrent sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harley Crosland
The State appealed the trial court’s application of the Criminal Savings Statute to the Defendant’s conviction for “Theft over $500,” arguing that the court improperly imposed a misdemeanor sentence for the Defendant’s guilty plea to Class E felony theft and that the amendments to the theft grading statute changed the elements of the offense, rather than the punishment for the offense. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (generic theft statute), 39-14-105 (2014) (amended 2017) (theft grading statute). Upon review, a majority of this court dismissed the appeal after concluding that the State had no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 or Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-402. State v. Harley Crosland, No. M2017-01232-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3092903 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2018), perm. app. granted and case remanded, No. M2017-01232-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2019) (order). On December 5, 2019, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Menke, No. M2017-00597-SC-R11-CD, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2019 WL 6336427 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2019). Harley Crosland, No. M2017-01232-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2019) (order). Upon further review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Defendant’s theft conviction, we reverse the portion of the judgment stating that this theft conviction is a Class E felony, and we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form reflecting that the Defendant’s amended offense and conviction offense are theft of property valued at $1,000 or less and that this theft conviction constitutes a Class A misdemeanor. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nikki Bodie Pate
The Defendant, Nikki Bodie Pate, pleaded guilty to two counts of custodial interference. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and placed the Defendant on probation for eighteen months. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Edward Bostic, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Edward Bostic, Jr., appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and denial of related motions. On appeal, he asserts that the Tennessee Department of Correction refuses to comply with an order by the trial court awarding him jail credit and that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for the trial court to resolve. He also asserts for the first time on appeal that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective because she failed to assist him in his fight for jail credit. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Wade Wilson
Daniel Wade Wilson, Petitioner, challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he sought to correct what he alleged was an illegal sentence for felony murder. Petitioner argues that the conviction violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy and that the trial court failed to follow the mandate of this Court after retrial. After a review of the record and the issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Dowlen v. State Of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony Dowlen, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the petition stated a colorable claim for relief and the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without the appointment of counsel. Following our review, we find the trial court erred in dismissing the petition as it stated a colorable claim thus warranting the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the order of summary dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to the |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |
