State of Tennessee v. Tyrail Jermaine Cooke
Aggrieved of his convictions of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse, the defendant, Tyrail Jermaine Cooke, appeals. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the entirety of his pretrial statement to the police; that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the video recording of his pretrial statement; that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence photographs, testimony, and other evidence relating to bruising in the victim’s genital area and a hole in the wall in the closet of the defendant’s residence; that the trial court erred by refusing to grant the defendant’s request for a special jury instruction regarding the right of parents to use corporal punishment to discipline their children; that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based upon the prosecutor’s improper comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent during his closing argument; that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the 29-year effective sentence is excessive; and that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of the constitutional right to a fair trial. Because we discern no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bashan Murchison v. State of Tennessee
A Sullivan County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bashan Murchison, of nine counts of felony drug offenses. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments and sentence. See State v. Bashan Murchison, No. E2014-01250-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 659844 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 12, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Lee Hogan
A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Lee Hogan, of two counts of the sale of cocaine, one count of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and one count of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Career Offender to an effective sentence of forty-five years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of casual exchange; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John R. Jackson v. State of Tennessee
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, John R. Jackson, of two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of facilitation of theft of property valued over $500, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments and sentence. See State v. John R. Jackson, No. M2013-00696-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2039761 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 16, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, his convictions are based on illegal evidence presented at trial, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during opening and closing statements. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tre Desean Bell
The Defendant-Appellant, Tre Desean Bell, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of voluntary manslaughter, see T.C.A. § 39-13-211, for which he received a sentence of six years in continuous confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying his request for judicial diversion; (2) imposing the maximum sentence permissible; and (3) imposing a sentence of continuous confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Cosby, AKA Patrick A. Britton, AKA Patrick T. Britton
Defendant, Patrick Cosby, plead guilty to attempted aggravated robbery with an agreed sentence of six years with the trial court to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve his six-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Daniel Morton
The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Daniel Morton, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder, for which he received a life sentence. See T.C.A. § 39-13- 202. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his (1) petition for writ of error coram nobis and (2) request for a jury charge of voluntary intoxication. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Samantha Gadzo
The Defendant, Samantha Gadzo, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, driving under the influence per se, reckless driving, violation of the Due Care law, and failure to maintain her lane of travel. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401,-401(a)(2),-205; 55-8-136, -123. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop, arguing that it was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, which is the subject of this State appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Lashun Wren
Defendant, Curtis Lashun Wren, appeals from the denial of relief from his “Ex Parte Injunction and/or Show Cause Order,” which the trial court treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the pleading, even if treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, does not meet the procedural requirements set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-21-105, -106, and/or -107, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, albeit for different reasons. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ziberia Marico Carero, Alias
The Defendant, Ziberia Marico Carero, Alias, was indicted for possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, and a criminal gang offense enhancement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121. A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted him of simple possession, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the conviction for simple possession into the conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. After a bifurcated hearing, the Defendant’s conviction offense was enhanced to a Class A felony pursuant to the criminal gang offense enhancement statute. The trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years as a Range I offender with 30% release eligibility for the Class A felony conviction, to be served consecutively to a twenty-three-year sentence the Defendant was already serving. The Defendant was later granted a new sentencing hearing when the criminal gang offense enhancement statute was deemed unconstitutional. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of a fifteen year sentence as a Range II offender with 35% release eligibility for his now Class B felony conviction, as well as the court’s order that it be served consecutively to the twenty-three-year sentence he was already serving. After review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gavino Torres, Jr.
The Defendant, Gavino Torres, Jr., pled guilty to attempted possession of a Schedule I drug with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; possession of a Schedule II drug with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; and two counts of possession of a Schedule IV drug with intent to sell or deliver, Class D felonies, in exchange for an effective sentence of ten years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of confinement, which the Defendant now challenges. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Tyler Harris
The Defendant, Patrick Tyler Harris, pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) per se. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401(2). Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging whether there existed sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Juan A. Hill v. Randy Lee, Warden
In 1997, the Petitioner was convicted of rape of a child and was sentenced to thirty-five years to be served consecutively to his sentence for a prior conviction. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Juan Alfonso Hill, No. 03C01-9710-CR-00441, 1999 WL 222370, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 1999), perm app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 20, 1999). The Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. This court affirmed the denial of relief on appeal. See Juan Alfonzo Hill v. State, No. E2004-02915-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 2276422, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2005). |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Michael Anthony Skettini
The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Anthony Skettini, appeals from the revocation of supervised probation by the Blount County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ian Kolb
The Defendant-Appellant, Ian Kolb, appeals from the revocation of his supervised probation sentence by the Sevier County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Lamont Booker
Antonio Lamont Booker, Defendant, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to alter or amend the judgment revoking his probation and placing his sentence into effect. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kerry V. Covington v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kerry V. Covington, appeals from the Cheatham County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his nolo contendere pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel due to trial counsel’s having a conflict of interest. However, the Petitioner failed to timely file his notice of appeal. Because we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of this requirement, we dismiss the appeal. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy P. Guilfoy v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy P. Guilfoy, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred in denying his petition because he presented newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit from the jury foreperson stating that the jury viewed videotaped forensic interviews of the victims during its deliberations. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Morris Rucker v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Defendant, Morris Rucker, appeals the trial court’s denial of his Tenn. Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60.02 motion to set aside his judgments and/or for injunctive relief, arguing that the judgments are invalid because they do not bear the required file-date stamps. Following our review, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew Tyrone Sisson
The Defendant, Matthew Tyrone Sisson, entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years and eight years for the two convictions and ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay during the hearing, giving too much weight to enhancement factors, failing to apply additional mitigating factors, and running the sentences consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Lynden Myrick
The Defendant, Jeremy Lynden Myrick, appeals his jury convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of five and one-half years’ imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges the following errors: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement because the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his voluntary manslaughter conviction, challenging the evidence establishing cause of death; (3) that admission of a photograph of the victim’s injuries was more prejudicial than probative; and (4) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by referring to the amended death certificate which was testimonial in nature. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Skinner v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Steven Skinner, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis without a hearing on his “newly discovered” evidence. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lee Freels, Jr.
A Sevier County jury convicted Ronald Lee Freels, Jr., Defendant, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty-five years as a persistent offender with 100% service. On appeal, Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence was excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Allen Gooch, Jr.
A Sumner County jury convicted James Allen Gooch, Jr., Defendant, of sale of 0.5 ounces or more of marijuana within one thousand feet of a Drug-Free Zone and the attempt to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced Defendant, as a Range III persistent offender, to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. After Defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion, the trial court determined that Defendant’s sentence was void and ordered a new sentencing hearing. The trial court then sentenced Defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to a total effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the State waived the ability to seek a Range II sentence when it filed a notice of intent to seek a Range III sentence. He further argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict or sentence him because the State did not have an arrest warrant charging him with the present offenses. Lastly, he asserts in his reply brief that the State “committed a fraud upon the court” because his resentencing was based upon a presentence report that was erroneously admitted without personal knowledge. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Lorenzo Wade
The Defendant, Johnny Lorenzo Wade, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder; two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-102, -13-202, -13-403. The trial court merged one of the first degree felony murder convictions into the first degree premeditated murder conviction and the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted first degree murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus forty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1)that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion alleging that the seizure of his cell phone was illegal; (3) that the trial court erred by admitting a video taken from his cell phone because it was not relevant and its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting the statement of a co-defendant under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; (5) that the trial court erred by allowing a witness to identify an item of evidence without personal knowledge of the item; (6) that the trial court erred in allowing an employee of the Defendant’s cell phone provider to testify as an expert witness on the operation of the provider’s cellular network; (7) that the trial court erred in allowing a police investigator to testify as a lay witness about “the plotting and pinging of the Defendant’s cellular telephone records”; and (8) that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentences because such sentences “were excessive.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |
