State of Tennessee v. Ronald Turner
Defendant, Ronald Turner, appeals his convictions stemming from various drug and firearm offenses. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the criminal gang enhancement of some of his offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121(b) was unconstitutional in light of State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016). Upon review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. However, because Defendant is entitled to retroactive application of the holding in Bonds, we vacate the sentences of the underlying convictions to which the enhancement was applied and remand those convictions for resentencing. Additionally, we conclude that the trial court committed plain error by improperly applying the Drug-Free School Zone Act and remand for resentencing on this basis. We also remand for correction of clerical errors. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennis M. Dykes v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Dennis M. Dykes, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. After a review, we determine Petitioner waived his issues by failing to present them on direct appeal. As a result, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alexander Johnson and Michael F. Williams
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendants, Alexander Johnson and Michael F. Williams, challenge the ruling of the Knox County Criminal Court granting the State’s motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum issued to four State’s witnesses. The State challenges that portion of the court’s ruling denying its motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum issued to various electronic communications service providers. Because the State lacks standing to challenge any of the subpoenas issued in this case, we reverse that portion of the court’s ruling granting the State’s motion to quash the subpoenas issued to the witnesses. We affirm that portion of the trial court’s ruling that the State lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas issued to the service providers. In the interest of judicial economy and to facilitate further appellate review, we have examined the preempted issues related to the subpoenas duces tecum issued in this case and have concluded that: (1) although nothing prevents the defendants in this case, generally, from obtaining the type of electronic communications at issue via a subpoena issued under the terms of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 to the witnesses themselves, the defendants have failed to establish entitlement to all of the requested communications as discussed more fully below; and (2) under the terms of the Stored Communications Act, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 - 2703, the defendants cannot obtain the contents of the electronic communications from any of the service providers via a Rule 17 subpoena duces tecum. Accordingly, the trial court’s November 3, 2015 order relative to the subpoenas duces tecum issued in this case is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Kirkpatrick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Kirkpatrick, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged the petitioner’s Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Durward Watson, II
The Defendant, Joseph Durward Watson II, was charged with possession with the intent to sell more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-417 (2014). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the search of the home in which the marijuana was found. The trial court granted the motion, determining that the police exceeded the scope of a levy issued for the collection of unpaid court costs and fines. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because the Defendant disclaimed any expectation of privacy in the home, depriving him of standing to challenge the search. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Durward Watson, II - Dissenting Opinion
Only a person who has a legitimate expectation of privacy in an invaded place has standing to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment and may seek to have illegally obtained evidence excluded. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 720 (Tenn. 2016); State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 520-21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). Because of his conduct, Defendant is not such a person. I believe that Defendant’s actions in this case fall squarely within the rule established by our supreme court in State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833 (Tenn. 2001). Defendant disclaimed and abandoned whatever interest he may have had in the property, thus losing a subjective expectation of privacy. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darrell Jennings v. Michael Parris, Warden
The Petitioner, Darrell Jennings, filed a petition in the Lake County Circuit Court seeking habeas corpus relief from his first degree felony and second degree murder convictions and resulting life sentence, alleging that he is entitled to relief because he was convicted of an offense that was not alleged in the indictment and because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Warren Hildred v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Warren Hildred, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Enrique Leon v. Mike Parris, Warden
The petitioner, David Enrique Leon, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 2009 Dickson County Circuit Court jury conviction of first degree felony murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alexander Haydel v. State of Tennessee
Alexander Haydel (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and received two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief; the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that lead trial counsel’s performance was deficient because “he misled the [Petitioner] in the events leading up to the [Petitioner’s] entering a guilty plea.” The Petitioner asserts that he was prejudiced by lead trial counsel’s deficient performance because absent that advice he would have proceeded to trial. Additionally, the Petitioner argues that his guilty pleas were entered unknowingly and involuntarily due to lead trial counsel’s deficient performance. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cameron M. Cook v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Cameron Cook, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received a sentence of 30 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddy Lee Penley
The defendant, Freddy Lee Penley, appeals his Greene County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of filing a false report and leaving the scene of an accident, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his entire three-year sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Chris Luthi
A Coffee County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Michael Chris Luthi, for DUI, third offense, DUI per se, and violation of the seat belt statute. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of a search of his vehicle, contending that the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to support the stop. The trial court denied the motion. A Coffee County jury convicted the Defendant of DUI, third offense and of violating the seat belt statute. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trooper could not have seen that the Defendant was not wearing his seat belt and, thus, lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Talley
Defendant, John Talley, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct an illegal sentence. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that relief was not available because his illegal sentence had expired. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cordell L. Butler v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cordell L. Butler, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of conspiracy to sell over fifty grams of hydromorphone and possession of over fifty grams of hydromorphone. The Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Murphy v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Murphy, appeals the Lewis County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and two counts of incest and resulting effective sentence of forty-eight years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations because due process required that the statute of limitations be tolled. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tory Hardison
The Appellant, Tory Hardison, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, the possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the possession of alprazolam with the intent to sell. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Appellant received a total effective sentence of twenty years, which was suspended to community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s community corrections sentences for failure to comply with the terms of release and ordered the Appellant to serve his original sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his judgments of conviction are illegal and cannot be revoked. In the alternative, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentences and ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Upon review, we conclude that the case must be remanded to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wendall Curtis Doree
The Appellant, Wendall Curtis Doree, was convicted by a Perry County Circuit Court Jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous offense, theft over $1,000, and facilitation of vandalism over $1,000. The trial court merged the theft conviction with the aggravated robbery conviction and imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-two years. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, contending that in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), the State failed to adduce sufficient proof that the confinement of the victim was not incidental to the aggravated robbery and was sufficient, standing alone, to sustain his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demond Hughes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Demond Hughes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated rape and his effective twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Sample
The defendant, Edward Sample, was convicted of the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and evading arrest. He was sentenced, respectively, to eleven months and twenty-nine days, twelve years, six years, six years, two years, and eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court found him to be a dangerous offender and ordered that all sentences be served consecutively, resulting in a total effective sentence of twentyseven years, eleven months and twenty-eight days. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a recording of his jailhouse phone call, by charging the jury regarding his admission against interest, and by enhancing his sentences and ordering that they be served consecutively. Additionally, he argues that double jeopardy results from his convictions for attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during its commission and that the State’s closing argument was improper. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demetrius Armstrong v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Demetrius Armstrong, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief by the Gibson County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
L. B. Rittenberry, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, L.B. Rittenberry, Jr., was convicted of second degree murder despite his claim of self-defense. He appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by finding that he was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate the victim’s prior history of violence. We affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Kizer v. State of Tennessee
In 2009, the Petitioner, Robert Kizer, pleaded guilty to sale of cocaine and was sentenced to twelve years of incarceration, with all but ninety days to be served on Community Corrections. In 2010, a Community Corrections violation warrant was issued, prompting the Petitioner to file a motion for post-conviction relief alleging that his sentence was incorrect and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2012, a second violation warrant was issued, and, in 2013, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s Community Corrections sentence and dismissed his post-conviction petition. Later in 2013, the Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held a hearing in 2015 following which it denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea hearing because his attorney lacked “legal authority” to represent him and because his attorney had a conflict of interest. After review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Helkie Nathan Carter
Helkie Nathan Carter (“the Defendant”) was indicted for the following counts: (1) driving under the influence (“DUI”)—third offense; (2) driving with a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of .08 or more (“DUI per se”)—third offense; (3) violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender statute; and (4) driving on a revoked license. The Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a mandatory blood draw was granted by the trial court. The State sought and was granted permission to appeal, arguing that the Defendant gave both actual and implied consent to the blood draw and that, if the good-faith exception is adopted in Tennessee, it should apply to this case. Upon review, we concluded that the Defendant’s actual consent was not freely and voluntarily given; that Tennessee’s implied consent law did not, by itself, operate as an exception to the warrant requirement; and that the Tennessee Supreme Court had yet to recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and it was not the role of this court to do so. State v. Helkie Nathan Carter, No. M2015-00280-CCA-R9-CD, 2016 WL 3044216, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 20, 2016). Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court’s granting of the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. On March 8, 2017, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s recent opinion in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016). Upon reconsideration in light of Reynolds, we conclude that the good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applies in this case and that suppression of evidence derived from the testing of the Defendant’s blood was not required. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court suppressing the results of the warrantless blood draw is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George P. Watkins, III
The Defendant-Appellant, George P. Watkins, III, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell (Count 1), one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver (Count 2), one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 3), and two counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 4 and 5). See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), -425, -1324(a). The trial court, after merging Count 2 with Count 1 and Count 5 with Count 4, sentenced Watkins to two years at thirty percent for the possession of marijuana with intent to sell conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, and three years at one hundred percent for the firearm conviction. The court then ordered the sentences for the marijuana and drug paraphernalia convictions served concurrently and ordered the sentence for the firearm conviction served consecutively to the other sentences in accordance with Code section 39-17-1324(e), for an effective sentence of five years. On appeal, Watkins argues that (1) the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the mental states of “knowingly” and “recklessly” for the offenses of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his firearm convictions. Because the erroneous jury instruction for the firearm offenses constitutes plain error, we reverse and vacate the judgments in Counts 4 and 5 and remand the case for a new trial on these counts. We also remand the case for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 1 and 2. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |
