Joe Billy Russell, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Joe Billy Russell, Jr., appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for relief. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that his petition is timely because it falls within one year of certain federal opinions which establish a constitutional right requiring retrospective application. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ladon Antoine Doak
The appellant, Ladon Antoine Doak, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurent sentences of fifteen and eight years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Dewayne Gipson
The defendant, Travis Dewayne Gipson, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas he entered to two counts of the delivery of cocaine. Because the defendant failed to establish a manifest injustice requiring that he be allowed to withdraw his pleas, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lajuan Harbison
The Defendant, Lajuan Harbison, stands convicted by a Knox County jury of four counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which the trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twenty-two years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for a severance; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, including therein a double jeopardy challenge to his employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony convictions, and (3) that consecutive sentencing was improper. Following our review, we first conclude that a severance of defendants should have been granted and that the failure to do so constitutes reversible error. We also conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support one of the Defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because the doctrine of transferred intent is inapplicable to such a conviction, and therefore, the corresponding count of employing a firearm during the commission of said dangerous felony likewise cannot stand. Additionally, multiple convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violate double jeopardy principles because the statute does not authorize separate firearms convictions for each felony committed in a single transaction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jereme Dannuel Little v. State of Tennessee
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Hamilton County Criminal Court granted the Petitioner, Jereme Dannuel Little, post-conviction relief and vacated his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred by concluding that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's (1) failure to seek a severance of two counts of aggravated robbery from the especially aggravated kidnapping charge, either pre-trial or after judgments of acquittal were granted on the aggravated robbery charges; (2) failure to interview witnesses from the store where the victim was allegedly kidnapped; and (3) decision to call a witness to testify without first adequately interviewing that witness. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and reinstate the Petitioner‟s conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James K. Hudgins
The defendant, James K. Hudgins, was convicted of one count of first degree (premeditated) murder. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a phone call from jail; and that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence that the defendant had previously accused someone of molesting his daughter. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sedrick Clayton
The Defendant, Sedrick Clayton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of three counts of first degree murder, attempt to commit first degree murder, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, employing a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2014), 39-13-202(a)(1) (2014), 39-14-106, 39-17-1324(a) (2010) (amended 2012). The jury sentenced the Defendant to death for each first degree premeditated murder conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifteen years for attempted first degree murder, three years for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, six years for employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to the police; (3) double jeopardy principles prohibit his dual convictions for possessing a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony and employing a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony; (4) the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims during the penalty phase; (5) the trial court erred in admitting recordings of two 9-1-1 calls made from the victims' residence around the time of the murders; (6) Lieutenant Goods' testimony during redirect examination was improper in numerous respects; (7) Tennessee's death penalty scheme constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (8) Tennessee's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional in numerous other respects; and (9) the Defendant's sentences of death are disproportionate. Although we affirm the Defendant's convictions and sentences for each first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder, we conclude that the trial court should have merged the convictions for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony with the employing a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Therefore, we remand for the entry of corrected judgments. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerome S. Barrett v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jerome S. Barrett, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, he asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) for failing to call an alibi witness; (2) for failing to call a deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) expert; and (3) for failing to timely request independent DNA testing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael D. Boone v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael D. Boone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug (cocaine), a Class B felony, and possession with intent to sell or deliver between one-half ounce and ten pounds of a Schedule VI substance (marijuana), a Class E felony. He is currently serving an effective twenty-four-year sentence for these convictions. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel “battered [him] with tactics designed to scare or otherwise misinform” the petitioner, which resulted in his acceptance of the plea agreement. Following review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Erin Lea Gentry
Defendant, Erin Lea Gentry, pled guilty to aggravated statutory rape and reserved a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) in which she asked this Court to determine whether the initial search warrant which led to the discovery of evidence supporting the indictment was overly broad; whether the affidavit supported a finding of probable cause to search specific items; and whether the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. After a review, we determine that the motion to suppress was properly denied, and thus we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lance Elliott Falcon
The defendant, Lance Elliott Falcon, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, arguing that the trial court improperly commented on the defendant's credibility in front of the jury, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the sentence is excessive, and that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial entitles him to a new trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lance Elliott Falcon - concurring
I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the judgments of the trial court. I write separately to express my opinion that the question posed by the trial judge was essentially a comment on credibility and violated an unequivocal rule of law. “[J]udges in Tennessee are prohibited by our constitution from commenting upon the credibility of witnesses or upon the evidence in the case.” State v. Suttles, 767 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn. 1989); see also Tenn. Const. Art. VI, § 9. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mohnika M. King
Mohnika M. King (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and one count of forgery. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request that she be placed on judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Beaty
The State appeals from the trial court's dismissal of a three-count indictment based on the trial court's finding that there was an excessive delay in prosecuting the defendant, Charles Beaty. The State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment on finding a violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial and due process. We conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed any offenses which were merely the reindictment of a previously dismissed case. However, the trial court erred in dismissing any new charges, because the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated and the defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the delay as required for due process relief. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Javonte Thomas
The defendant, Javonte Thomas, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tanyawa Sallie
Defendant, Tanyawa Sallie, was indicted for the offense of cutodial interference, but a Lake County Circuit Court jury convicted her of custodial interference with voluntary return of the child, a Class A misdemeanor. She was sentenced by the trial court to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ten days to serve and the remainder of the time on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of her conviction and argues that the trial court erred in sentencing by considering her 2004 felony conviction in an unrelated matter and by imposing an excessive sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lynn Clark
An Obion County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Lynn Clark, of one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication and four counts of vehicular assault with intoxication. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences for an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, claiming: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court invaded the province of the jury by commenting on the evidence in response to a juror question; and (3) his sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ramon Curry
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Ramon Curry, of one count of false imprisonment, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated assault. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of thirty years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) he was entitled to a mistrial because a State's witness assisted the prosecutor by carrying a box of evidence; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering partial consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Lee Sowers
The Defendant, Jeffrey Lee Sowers, pleaded guilty in the Greene County Criminal Court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to official misconduct, a Class E felony, with the length and the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-16-402 (2014). The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eighteen months’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Mark Alan Greene
The defendant, George Mark Alan Greene, pled guilty to one count of incest, a Class C felony, and the trial court denied his application for judicial diversion. On appeal, he contends that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because he is a suitable candidate for judicial diversion. We conclude that although the trial court did not properly consider all of the factors in denying judicial diversion, a de novo review of the record supports the denial of diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tabitha Gentry, aka Abka Re Bay
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Tabitha Gentry, aka Abka Re Bay, of theft of property valued over $250,000 and aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior sentence from another Shelby County conviction. The Defendant appeals contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions, (2) the trial court improperly limited cross-examination of a State witness about adverse possession; (3) the trial court improperly limited the Defendant's closing argument; and (4) consecutive sentencing was inappropriate in this case. After review, we remand the case for resentencing and affirm the trial court's judgments in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lynn Dockery
A Sevier County jury found Defendant, Bobby Lynn Dockery, guilty of forgery. He was sentenced to serve 5 years at 45% as a Range III offender. Defendant alleges on appeal that his conviction for forgery violates the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. Defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Jack Lynch v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, John Jack Lynch, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review, we determine Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wesley Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Wesley Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in numerous respects and that the post-conviction court erred by denying his request for a DNA expert and for DNA testing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wesley Jones v. State of Tennessee-Concurring
I concur with most of the majority opinion, but write separately to express my opinion that Detective Lundy and the unnamed uniformed patrol officer unconstitutionally seized Petitioner by handcuffing him and taking him to the police department and placing a leg shackle restraint on him inside the interview room. Although testimony by law enforcement officers was at best equivocal (and probably better described as “evasive” in a reading of the transcript) about restraints used on Petitioner, two things are clear: the officers dutifully followed police department “policy” and the policy dictated that “witnesses” be transported while handcuffed via marked patrol cars to interviews at the police station. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |
