Frederick L. Moore v. State of Tennessee
Frederick L. Moore (“the Petitioner”) filed his second petition for writ of error coram nobis, presenting “newly discovered evidence” in the form of expert testimony regarding cell phone towers accessed by the Petitioner's cell phone at the time of the offense. The coram nobis court denied relief without a hearing, finding that the Petitioner's claim was time-barred, that the evidence was not newly discovered, and that it was not the type of evidence which might have produced a different result at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott L. Bishop
The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Scott L. Bishop (“the Defendant”) with four counts of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court ordered concurrent sentences for an effective sentence of eleven years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the trial court failed to act as a thirteenth juror; (3) the trial court should have granted the Defendant a new trial based on newly discovered alibi and impeachment evidence; (4) the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to ask leading questions during the direct examination of the nine-year-old victim; (6) a juror's sleeping during the jury instructions requires a new trial; (7) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive; and (8) cumulative error necessitates granting a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Brown
The defendant, Carl Brown, sought relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to vacate and correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence, the judgments in question not stating whether they were to be served concurrently or consecutively. The trial court concluded the motion was without merit, and, following our review, we affirm the court’s order denying the motion for relief, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adrianne Kiser v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Adrianne Kiser, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, he asserts that: (1) the post-conviction court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating trial counsel's performance and the resulting prejudice, and (2) if the post-conviction court applied the correct standard, then the court's interpretation of that standard renders Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106(e) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13 section 5(a)(2) unconstitutional as applied to him. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Seddrick Curry
The defendant, Seddrick Curry, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony; and one count of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to serve an effective sentence of thirty years at 60%. Subsequently, he filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty, which was denied following a hearing. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the pleas. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jordan Thomas Peters
Defendant, Jordan Thomas Peters, was convicted of one count of delivery of psilocin, a Schedule I controlled substance, and one count of delivery of psilocin within 1000 feet of a school. Defendant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years to serve at 100%. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether a retrial for delivery of a controlled substance violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy after Defendant was originally acquitted of sale of a controlled substance; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery of the case names and files of other cases in which the confidential informant had been involved; (3) whether the trial court erred by giving acquittal-first jury instructions, precluding the jury from considering the inference of casual exchange; (4) whether the trial court erred in not giving a specific instruction with regard to the defense of entrapment by luring into a school zone; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (6) whether his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime committed and therefore unconstitutional. Upon our thorough review of the arguments, record, and authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jordan Thomas Peters - concurring
Given the clear and apparently controlling case law concerning convictions enhanced pursuant to the Drug Free School Zone Act (the Act), I must reluctantly concur. However, I write separately to set forth my ever increasing concern regarding enhancement of convictions under the Act. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy D. Seagraves
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Roy Seagraves, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant. He properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The question of law is dispositive of the case. Having reviewed the record in this case, we hold that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charges with prejudice. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shelby Lesean Harris
The Defendant, Shelby Lesean Harris, was indicted for one count of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403. The trial court merged the Defendant’s conviction for facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine into his conviction for facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court then sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years and six months. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the in-court identification of the Defendant by two confidential informants; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ray Neil Thompson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ray Neil Thompson, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County. He was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery and later entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. For these offenses, he received an effective sentence of fifty years at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shasta Jackson
Defendant, Shasta Jackson, appeals after being convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court's refusal to allow an expert witness testify about eyewitness identification; (3) introduction of evidence relating to Defendant's membership in the “Westside 111 Neighborhood Crips”; (4) introduction of pictures from Defendant's Facebook page; (5) the decision by the trial court to strike the testimony of a defense witness after he refused to answer a question on cross-examination; and (6) the length of her sentence. After a review of the record, we determine that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Thomas Kendrick III v. State of Tennessee
This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Petitioner, Edward Thomas Kendrick III,1 was convicted by a jury of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, raising, inter alia, numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. On appeal, a panel of this court granted the Petitioner post-conviction relief, concluding that he had established that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial due to (1) trial counsel‘s failure to offer expert proof about the trigger mechanism in the rifle, which was known to cause accidental shootings; and (2) trial counsel‘s failure to seek to admit, as excited utterances, out-of-court statements by a crime-scene investigator made to his fellow officers after he shot himself in the foot with the Petitioner‘s rifle. Our supreme court disagreed, reversing our conclusion that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel with regard to these two issues. The case has now been remanded to us for consideration of the issues that were pretermitted by this court after finding the two issues to be meritorious. Those pretermitted issues are as follows: (1) whether trial counsel erred by waiving the Petitioner‘s attorney-client privilege with his divorce attorney and, in so doing, allowed the State to insinuate adultery as a motive for the shooting; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the Petitioner‘s cousin, Randall Leftwich, to testify about the Petitioner‘s activities on the day of the shooting and about his discovery of cabbage simmering on the Petitioner‘s stove immediately following the shooting; (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective when he ―opened the door‖ on direct examination of the Petitioner for the State to inquire about additional misdemeanor convictions on cross-examination that had not been previously admissible; (4) whether trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately challenge Lennell Shepheard‘s testimony that the Petitioner stood over the victim‘s body and said "I told you so" six times; (5) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Officer William Lapoint to testify about the Petitioner‘s "very distraught" demeanor at the airport just after the shooting; (6) whether trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective when they did not object or raise on appeal the issue of Detective Mark Rawlston‘s volunteered testimony that the Petitioner never told him that the gun accidentally discharged when interviewed in the back of a patrol car at the airport; (7) whether trial counsel‘s failure to seek curative measures for a security officer‘s, Ms. Martha Maston, surprise testimony about the Petitioner‘s daughter‘s statement at the airport was ineffective; and (8) whether the cumulative impact of counsels‘ errors entitle him to relief. After consideration of these remaining issues, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v.Curtis Scott Harper
A Knox County jury found Curtis Scott Harper (“the Defendant”) guilty of three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, three counts of vehicular homicide by creating a substantial risk of death and serious bodily injury, one count of reckless endangerment, one count of tampering with evidence, one count of leaving the scene of an accident, one count of driving under the influence, and, in a subsequent deliberation, one count of driving under the influence (second offense). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective thirty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the introduction of fifty crime scene and autopsy photographs, many of which were gruesome, graphic, or horrifying, deprived the Defendant of a fair trial by inflaming the passions of the jury; (2) the State presented false expert testimony concerning the speed of the Defendant's vehicle, thereby depriving the Defendant of due process; (3) the State violated Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide to the Defendant a copy of the article the forensic pathologist relied upon during his testimony; (4) the prosecutor engaged in improper argument, including personal attacks on defense counsel, that violated the Defendant's right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences; and (6) the cumulative effect of the error requires a new trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting numerous graphic and gruesome crime scene and autopsy photographs, the prejudicial effect of which far outweighed their probative value, and such error was not harmless. We, therefore, reverse the judgments of the criminal court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Scott Harper - concurring
I believe that the majority opinion provided an excellent discussion of the photographs and subsequent legal analysis of their admissibility; I write separately only to amplify the gruesome and appalling nature of the photographs. “Surely, there is a line between admitting a photograph which is of some help to the jury in solving the facts of the case and one which is of no value other than to inflame the minds of the jurors. That line was crossed in this case.” People v. Burns, 241 P.2d 308, 319 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). The photographs in this case were, without a doubt, the most grotesque, horrifying, and unnecessary photographs that I have viewed in 17 years on this court. These photographs served no purpose other than “to arouse passion and shock at the sight of a gory event.” Clark v. Com., 833 S.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Ky. 1991). As the majority opinion correctly concludes, the State was more than able to present a compelling case for conviction without the addition of the grisly autopsy and crime scene photographs. The photographs were overwhelmingly prejudicial to the defendant, and the gruesome nature and sheer volume of the photographs comes close to indicating a lack of respect for the victims themselves. A combination of overzealous prosecuting and weak gatekeeping by the trial court can result in an unfair trial for a defendant. That is precisely what happened in this case. The trial court repeatedly expressed apprehension about the admission of the photographs. The trial court should have stood firm in its concerns and warnings and prevented the prosecutor’s overzealous prosecution of the defendant. The failure to do so requires a remand and a new trial in this case. I am authorized by Judge Norma McGee Ogle to say she also joins in this concurring opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Anthony v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Richard Anthony, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his 1990 convictions for aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and resulting concurrent sentences of twelve years and six years, respectively. As we understand, the petitioner claims that, although he has had no contact with trial counsel in the last twenty-five years, he was unaware that counsel was not pursuing a second-tier appeal of the convictions. As relief, he asks that his convictions be vacated or, in the alternative, that he have counsel appointed to pursue a second-tier direct appeal of his convictions. The post-conviction court determined both that his petition was untimely and without merit, even if considered as a motion to reopen a similar 1997 petition. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Smith v. Doug Cook, Warden
The petitioner, James Smith, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2000 conviction of first degree murder, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the indictment was void. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of summary dismissal. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Ray Graves, Jr.
In 2013, the Defendant pleaded guilty in case number F-13761 to two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000, one count of theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000, and one count of simple possession of a controlled substance. The Defendant also pleaded guilty in case number F-14140 to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. For these convictions, the trial court imposed a six-year sentence in case number F-13761 and a two-year consecutive sentence in case number F-14140, for a total effective sentence of eight years, to be served on supervised probation. In 2014, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brent Hicks
In February 2013, the Williamson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Brent Hicks, for theft of merchandise over $1,000, a Class D felony. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Martindill
Defendant, Jason Martindill, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ray Rowland
Ray Rowland (“the Defendant”) filed a Motion for Return of Property pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case and dismissed the Defendant’s motion. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court does have jurisdiction. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Yuell Frank Reeves
Yuell Frank Reeves (“the Defendant”) appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. In September 1990, the Defendant was sentenced to four years for burglary, an offense which the Defendant committed in May 1990 (“the May offense”). In November 1990, the Defendant pleaded guilty to two additional burglaries committed in June and July 1990 (“the June/July offenses”) and received an effective four-year sentence which was ordered to run concurrently with the four-year sentence for the May offense. Approximately twenty-four years later, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion seeking to set aside his plea alleging he was released on bail for the May offense when he committed the June/July offenses. The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion, and the State concedes that the case should be remanded for a hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the Rule 36.1 motion as to the May offense and reverse the judgment summarily dismissing the motion as to the June/July offenses and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Yuell Frank Reeves - concurring
I agree with the majority that the summary dismissal in case number 183558 (May 1990 offense) should be affirmed. Viewing appellant’s motion in the light most favorable to him, I also agree with the majority that appellant has presented a colorable Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 claim with respect to case numbers 183785 and 183905 (the June/July 1990 offenses) due to the trial court’s concurrent, rather than statutorily-mandated consecutive, sentence alignment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-111(b) (mandating consecutive sentence alignment when a defendant commits a felony while the defendant is released on bail and the defendant is convicted of both offenses). |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rocky Joe Houston v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Rocky Joe Houston, appeals as of right from the Roane County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing as untimely his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion to affirm the post-conviction court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert L. Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Robert L. Mitchell, of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of assault. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-seven years of incarceration. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Robert L. Mitchell, No. M2005-01652-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1506519, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 1, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2006). After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction and habeas corpus relief, the Petitioner filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief that is the subject of this appeal. He challenged his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, alleging first that the allegation of “force, threat, or fraud” in the indictment for especially aggravated kidnapping did not support his conviction and, second, the indictment failed to charge aggravating factors that he asserts were required to support his conviction based upon the fact that he was the parent of the victim. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s petition, and he now appeals. On appeal, we conclude that the habeas corpus court did not err, and we therefore affirm its judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Monoleto D. Green v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Monoleto D. Green, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
