State of Tennessee v. Malcolm Benson
Following a jury trial on April 23, 2003, the defendant was convicted of one count of sale of a controlled substance more than .5 grams. He was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and fined $3000. He appeals this conviction. The defendant argues two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant’s uncle to testify at trial as to the identity of an individual in the videotape of the drug sale. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronnie Simpson v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Ronnie Simpson, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Simpson pled guilty to especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and received an effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Simpson challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lee
The defendant appeals his conviction for attempted first degree murder. The defendant’s sole issue on appeal is a claim that the jury venire was unconstitutionally empaneled by failing to include adequate representation of African-Americans. The defendant failed to prove a prima facie case, and the conviction is affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John C. Walker, III
The Appellant, John C. Walker, III, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years of incarceration. In this direct appeal, Walker alleges that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action due to destruction of evidence; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser included offenses and by giving other improper jury instructions, such as instructing on “flight,” giving substantive instruction at the beginning of the trial, and providing papers to the jury unseen by counsel; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Walker to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the conviction and resulting sentence. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John C. Walker, III - Concurring/Dissenting
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part I join with the majority in affirming the appellant’s conviction and resulting sentence. I dissent, however, from that portion of the opinion which holds that aggravated assault and assault are not lesser included offenses of first degree (premeditated) murder. In State v. Paul Graham Manning, No. M2002-00547-CCA-R3-CD, 203 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 117, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 14, 2003), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2003), a panel of this Court reasoned that: [f]irst degree premeditated murder is the “premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). An aggravated assault is committed, on the other hand, when the accused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another. See id. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A). Similarly, an assault is committed when one “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” Id. § 39-13-101(a)(1). The mens rea of intentional includes the mens rea of knowing and reckless. See id. § 39-11-301(a)(2). A killing certainly includes serious bodily injury (as well as bodily injury). Thus, all of the statutory elements of these forms of aggravated assault and assault are included within the statutory elements of first degree premeditated murder, and they are therefore lesser included within the statutory elements of first degree premeditated murder, and they are therefore lesser included offenses under Part (a) of the Burns test. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Anthony v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Kenneth Anthony, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Anthony was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Anthony argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stefanie M. Henson
The defendant, Stefanie M. Henson, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to robbery, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received a sentence of four years for the offense, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for an alternative sentence and ordered that she serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that she serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Creason
A jury found the Defendant, Carl Creason, guilty of driving on a revoked driver's license. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the Defendant to six months in the county jail. The Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing him to serve his sentence on probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but remand for entry of a uniform judgment document. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael A. Prechtel
Defendant, Michael A. Prechtel, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. On September 6, 2001, Defendant pled guilty in the Cumberland County General Sessions Court to possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days with all but two days suspended and placed on supervised probation. Following three separate probation revocation proceedings in the general sessions court, defendant's probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve his sentence in the Cumberland County jail. Defendant appealed to the Cumberland County Criminal Court. Following a de novo hearing, the criminal court affirmed the general sessions court's decision to revoke defendant's probation and ordered him to serve 11 months and 29 days in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the Cumberland County Criminal Court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Lowell Bledsoe
The appellant, Phillip Lowell Bledsoe, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Gibson County of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Lynn Vernon, Pro Se v. Jim Dickman, Warden & State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Garry Lynn Vernon, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Don Allen Coleman v. Jack Morgan, Warden
Don Allen Coleman petitioned the Hickman County Circuit Court for habeas corpus relief, contending that the two rape of a child judgments against him impose illegal sentences. We agree that the sentences are illegal and we vacate them, thereby reviving the two indictments and pleas for further proceedings. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leslie E. Raymond
The petitioner, Leslie E. Raymond, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court's action pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The motion is without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric T. Davis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Eric T. Davis, pled guilty to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to six years probation. The petitioner subsequently pled guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years probation, to be served consecutively to his prior sentence. The petitioner's probation was revoked in both cases. He appealed the trial court's order revoking his probationary sentences, and this court affirmed the revocation of his probation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged, among other things, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, holding the petitioner failed to assert a colorable claim for post-conviction relief. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the post-conviction court was correct in summarily dismissing the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Lomax
The defendant, after entry of a plea of guilty, appeals from the imposition of consecutive sentences, the denial of alternative sentencing, and the requiring of restitution to be paid to an entity not named as a victim in the indictment. Upon careful review, we affirm the respective sentences and the denial of alternative sentencing, but reverse the imposition of consecutive sentencing. The cause is remanded for additional hearing for determination of Automotive Financing Corporation’s victim status and if so established, the amount of restitution. We further direct that the recipient of the restitution for sales tax and clerk fees be changed from the State of Tennessee to the individuals named in the indictments who paid the sales tax and clerk fees. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Lomax - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the named victims’ receiving restitution. However, I seriously question whether a person or entity situated as AFC was in this case could be viewed as a “victim” for restitution purposes. The persons buying the vehicles are the named victims–and victims in fact–relative to the theft offenses charged in the indictment. The defendant took their money. AFC, with the titles, could have repossessed the vehicles. However, it voluntarily chose to relinquish the titles to the named victims, thereby essentially removing their loss from their purchases. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harry G. Sturgill
The appellant, Harry G. Sturgill, was convicted by a jury of eight counts of rape of a child and two counts of statutory rape. As a result, he received a twenty-five year sentence for each of his eight child rape convictions and a two-year sentence for each of his statutory rape convictions. Two of the child rape convictions were ordered to be served consecutively. All of the other sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for an effective fifty-year sentence. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in regard to his child rape convictions and the length and consecutive nature of the sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Lee Chilton v. David Mills, Warden
The Defendant appeals from the judgments of the trial court denying him habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petitions, finding that they failed to state cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dewayne Cathey v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dewayne Cathey, petitioned the Hardeman County Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his sentence in his 1993 Shelby County, guilty-pleaded conviction of first degree murder. The lower court summarily dismissed the petition, and on appeal, the petitioner claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing. Upon our review of the record, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s order. Furthermore, we order the lower court to grant habeas corpus relief. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Hackworth v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, William Hackworth, pled guilty to four counts of incest and received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I offender. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, in part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek DNA testing in order to establish the paternity of the child borne of the victim in this case. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and that Petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction DNA analysis. Petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ydale Banks
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ydale Banks, of first-degree felony murder, first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracies to commit both modes of first-degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated assault. The defendant now claims on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his pretrial statement; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; (3) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the convictions for first-degree murder; (4) the trial court erred in admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence in the sentencing phase of trial; (5) the trial court erred in admitting victim-impact evidence during the sentence phase; (6) the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) relative to the use of victim-impact evidence are unconstitutional; (7) the trial court erred in instructing the jury; and (8) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the definition of "knowingly." We reverse the judgment of conviction of conspiracy to commit felony murder but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lee Bellamy
The appellant, David Lee Bellamy, plead guilty to violation of an habitual traffic offender order, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, four counts of reckless endangerment, driving under the influence, driving under the influence, fourth offense, improper passing, and driving left of center, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. Unsatisfied with the denial of alternative sentencing, the appellant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael K. Miller
Aggrieved of the order to serve 90 days of his two-year sexual battery sentence in confinement, the defendant, Michael K. Miller, appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Allen Michaels
Defendant, James Allen Michaels, pled guilty to two counts of robbery, both Class C felonies. Defendant was originally indicted on charges of aggravated robbery. For his convictions, Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years and three years as a Range I standard offender, to be served consecutively. The length of the sentences imposed was agreed upon in the negotiated plea agreement. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of probation. After reviewing the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Scott Akers
The Appellant, David Scott Akers, was indicted for the crimes of robbery and attempted robbery and, following a jury trial, was convicted of theft under $500 and attempted robbery. The trial court consolidated the sentencing hearing for these convictions with Akers’ two pending probation revocation hearings. Following this hearing, Akers received an effective ten-year sentence for his two jury convictions and two one-year sentences from the revocation of his sentences for violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) Act. On appeal, Akers raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting Akers’ three prior MVHO convictions for impeachment purposes; (2) whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and at sentencing; and (3) whether the trial court erred in conducting the revocation hearing without proper notice. Finding no error, the judgments of the Dyer County Circuit Court are affirmed. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals |
