State of Tennessee v. Shaun David Pierce
The Defendant, Shaun David Pierce, pled guilty to four counts of burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony, two counts of theft over one-thousand dollars, a Class D felony, two counts of theft over five-hundred dollars, a Class E felony, four counts of theft under five-hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor, and two counts of vandalism under five-hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. The Defendant received an effective sentence of sixteen years. The sole issue in this direct appeal is whether the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to serve his sentence in the community corrections program. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Clark
A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Terry Clark, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant ("DUI") and assault. The Defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support her assault conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that sufficient evidence exists and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deji A. Ogundiya
After a mistrial in August of 2001, the Defendant, Deji Ogundiya, was retried and convicted by a jury of three counts of sexual battery. In this appeal, the Defendant raises several issues, including whether the trial court erred by failing to charge misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of sexual battery. The State concedes that the trial court so erred. We agree that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense. Therefore, the Defendant's convictions are reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronnie M. Cauthern v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ronnie M. Cauthern, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1988, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of two counts of felony murder and sentenced to death. He was also convicted of the related crimes of first degree burglary and aggravated rape. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court, but his death sentences were reversed and remanded for a new sentencing trial. Upon retrial before a jury in 1995, the petitioner received the death penalty for the murder of one victim and a sentence of life imprisonment for the second victim's murder. Those sentences were appealed and affirmed, following which the petitioner instituted a collateral proceeding seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions and sentences. Lengthy hearings were conducted on the petitioner's claims, the majority of which involved allegations that counsel representing him in his 1988 and 1995 trials rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the petitioner contends (1) that trial counsel's services were deficient and prejudicial; (2) that the state suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process rights; (3) that the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona require that his death sentence be set aside; (4) that he was entitled to but was not notified of his right to seek German consular assistance pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (5) that the lower court erroneously concluded that some of his claims had been waived or previously determined; (6) that Tennessee's system of capital punishment is unconstitutional; and (7) that erroneous jury instructions impaired his right to a fair trial. After an extensive review of the record and consideration of applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald F. Long v.Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
The State appeals the trial court's grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the court acted without jurisdiction because the petitioner's sentence has not expired. Because the record reveals a parole violation warrant was issued and the petitioner declared delinquent before the expiration of his six-year sentence, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darryl D. Jackson v. State of Tennessee
On November 2, 2001, the Davidson County Grand Jury returned a three count indictment against the Petitioner, Darryl D. Jackson. He was charged with possession of a schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a schedule II controlled substance, and driving on a suspended license. On January 22, 2002, he pled guilty to possession of a schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver. The other two charges were dismissed. The appellant received a two year and one month sentence and was given a recommendation for the Department of Correction's Boot Camp program. On October 4. 2002, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and an amended petition on November 14, 2002. A hearing was held on February 18, 2003 and on March 3, 2003, the trial court entered an order denying the petitioner's request for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and was not the result of trial counsel's ineffective assistance. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. Londono
The Appellants, Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. Londono, were convicted by a Davidson County jury of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, facilitation of first degree felony murder, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and facilitation of aggravated robbery. Gomez and Londono were ordered to serve forty-nine years in the Department of Correction as Range I standard offenders. On appeal, Gomez presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in not suppressing the photographic line-up and subsequent in-court identification and (2) whether it was error to permit testimony concerning $19,600 found in Gomez's apartment. Londono argues that: (1) the trial court erred by admitting the statements of Co-defendant Bryant Guartos; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the statements of the victim as either an excited utterance or a dying declaration; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts. Both Gomez and Londono argue that the length of their respective sentences was excessive and that consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles William Young v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Charles William Young, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Young is currently incarcerated as a result of a jury conviction for aggravated assault. On appeal, Young presents two issues for our review: (1) whether he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and (2) whether the court erred in refusing to appoint "advisory counsel" at the post-conviction hearing. After review of the issues, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcie A. Murray v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief from her convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The petitioner has failed to show prejudice from any alleged ineffective assistance, and the issue concerning Leonard Rowe's testimony has been previously determined and is not cognizable for relief on post-conviction. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Allen Cutshaw v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Allen Dale Cutshaw, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition presents no cognizable ground for coram nobis relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Greg Smith
The defendant, Greg Smith, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to increase the number of pretrial jail credits applied to his sentence. Because the defendant has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b), the appeal is dismissed. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Greg Smith - Concurring
I agree with the result reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. However, I question the conclusion that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain a request to grant earned pretrial jail credits. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Veasley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony Veasley, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a Range II multiple offender to nineteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Louise Dawson Marlow
The defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to reckless homicide and agreed to a sentence of seven years as a Range II, multiple offender. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined following a sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve one year in the county jail followed by six years in community corrections. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in requiring any confinement in this case. We conclude that the defendant is not eligible for community corrections and remand for re-sentencing. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrew Moore v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Andrew Eakin Moore, entered an open plea of guilty to three counts of attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of resisting arrest. As a result of the guilty pleas, the petitioner received an effective sentence of ten years on all six counts, but the petitioner was ordered to serve 365 days in jail and then be placed on community corrections for the balance of the sentence. Following his release from the jail sentence, the petitioner violated his community corrections sentence and was ordered to serve the balance of the sentence. In this post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner attacks his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph M. Stone v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. We also conclude that the petitioner's guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Based on the foregoing conclusions and the record as a whole, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Dykas v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner contends on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the trial of his case. In making his claim, the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance in three areas: (1) failure of counsel to effectively conduct voir dire, (2) inadequate preparation for and examination of witness Riggan, and (3) failure to prepare the petitioner to testify. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Jefferson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner was indicted on charges of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. He pled guilty to a reduced charge of second degree murder, and the other charge was dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, he received a sentence of forty years, to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We also conclude that the petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Dison v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Dison, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted for rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years confinement. This Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. James Dison, No. 03-C01-9602-CC-00051, 1997 WL 36844, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, January 31, 1997), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. 1997). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was appointed counsel and subsequently filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Len Profitt, Alias
The defendant was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, simple possession, and driving on a suspended license. The defendant contends on appeal that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and aggravated assault, (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of inactive marijuana metabolites found in the defendant's blood after the accident, (3) the trial court erred in allowing evidence concerning extrapolation of the defendant's blood alcohol concentration back to the time of the accident, (4) the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant to plead guilty to driving on a suspended license, (5) the trial court erred in allowing evidence concerning extradition and instructing the jury on flight, and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joe R. Osborne
The appellant, Joe Robert Osborne, was convicted by a jury of one count of Driving Under the Influence (DUI). As a result, he was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, with probation after service of 48 hours in jail, revocation of his driver's license for one year, mandatory attendance at Alcohol Safety School and assessed a $350 fine. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the "missing witness" inference. Because we conclude there was no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Blair
A Humphreys County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Bobby Blair, of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a continuance when the state announced a few days before trial that it was going to call an expert witness to testify; (3) the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress and exclude evidence because the defense was not able to examine and test the equipment and chemicals found at the crime scene; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the state's expert to testify that the defendant was not manufacturing methamphetamine for personal use; (5) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine; and (6) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on "immediate precursor." We conclude that no error occurred, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Christopher Abrams
The petitioner appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his appeal and petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that he was entitled to a criminal court review of the general sessions court's ruling on his motion to suppress evidence. Because we conclude we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Chitwood
The defendant, James Chitwood, pled guilty in the Clay County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and agreed to a five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his entire sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that he should have received an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Clay | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Joseph Brown, appeals pro se the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for facilitation of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He argues that the trial court’s failure to advise him of his constitutional right against self-incrimination voids his guilty pleas and that the court’s failure to provide him with a transcript of the post-conviction hearing violated his constitutional rights. Additionally, he argues that the record does not reflect that counsel who represented him at the post-conviction hearing was relieved from continuing to represent him on appeal, and that he is entitled to counsel in his appeal to this court. We agree that the petitioner is entitled to be represented by counsel in the first tier appeal of the denial of his post-conviction petition and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal and remand to the post-conviction court with instructions to reenter its findings of fact and conclusions of law, with the petitioner’s time for appeal to start at the date of reentry, and the petitioner to be represented by counsel on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |
