State of Tennessee v. Robert Lee Pattee
The defendant, Robert Lee Pattee, appeals as of right following his conviction by a jury in the Sumner County Criminal Court for first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. Defendant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter; (2) whether the trial court erred when it determined Defendant’s suicide note was inadmissible at trial; and (3) whether the evidence of premeditation was sufficient to convict him of first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Lee Pattee - Concurring
I concur in the result reached and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. However, I believe that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury being instructed regarding voluntary manslaughter. I agree, though, that the failure to instruct the jury was harmless. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Linda Gail Philpot
Linda Gail Philpot entered “best interest” pleas to forty-one counts of forgery. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, Philpot received an effective sentence of fourteen years. The manner of service, including entitlement to probation, was submitted to the trial court. The trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing based upon its finding of lack of remorse and poor prospects for rehabilitation. On appeal, Philpot argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. After review, we conclude that a sentence of split confinement will best serve the interests of the public and the Appellant. The judgment, accordingly, is reversed and remanded for entry of a sentence of split confinement reflecting a period of thirty-five days confinement in the local jail or workhouse with the remainder of the effective fourteen-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Linda Gail Philpot - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur that a sentencing alternative of split confinement should be utilized in the present case; however, I respectfully disagree that confinement for 35 days is appropriate. A consecutive sentence of 20 days confinement for each count would be more in line with the sentence approved by this court in the remarkably similar case of State v. Cynthia D. Stacey, No. 03C01-9803-CC-00091 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, May 24, 1999) (approving 180 days of confinement followed by two years of community corrections, for defendant who, as a home health care worker, stole money from an elderly couple in her care). The cases are very similar, and in light of Cynthia D. Stacey, the present case, on its own facts, suggests a more punitive, deterrent sentence than 35 days in confinement. Thus, I would extend the confinement portion of the sentence to an aggregate of 140 days. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Ronald Jordan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William Ronald Jordan, was convicted by a jury in the Giles County Circuit Court of driving under the influence of an intoxicant ("DUI") and attempted robbery. The trial court sentenced Petitioner as a multiple Range II offender to six years for the attempted robbery conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. This court affirmed Petitioner's convictions on direct appeal, and Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition, with two amendments, for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied Petitioner relief. In this appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on the following grounds: (1) counsel failed to submit adequate evidence at the hearing on his motion to dismiss based upon denial of his right to a speedy trial; (2) counsel's advice to Petitioner not to testify at trial deprived him of a jury instruction on renunciation as a defense; and (3) counsel failed to object when the State filed an untimely motion for enhanced punishment under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.3. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Stillwell
The defendant appeals the trial court's six-year sentence of total confinement and denial of any form of an alternative sentence. After review, we reverse the trial court's order of total confinement and denial of any form of an alternative sentence. We remand the case to the trial court to order the defendant to serve a sentence of split confinement with one (1) year of incarceration and the remaining five (5) years on supervised probation with restitution as a condition of probation. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clarence Davis
The Defendant, Clarence Davis, was convicted by a jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court reduced the Defendant's conviction to second degree murder and remanded the case for re-sentencing. State v. Clarence Davis, No. 01C01-9811-CR-00451, 1999 WL 737873, at *1, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, September 22, 1999). After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced to the maximum term of twenty-five years. The trial court further ordered the Defendant to serve this sentence consecutively to a previously imposed sentence in a case wherein Defendant's sentence to community corrections had been revoked. The Defendant now appeals contending: 1) the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence for second degree murder and 2) the trial court erred in ordering his sentence to run consecutively to a previously imposed sentence in an unrelated case. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the length of the sentence and the order of consecutive sentencing, but remand for a determination of the amount of pretrial jail credit to which the Defendant is entitled. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Shawn Shoffner
Michael Shawn Shofner appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his "Motion to Void Judgment," in which he seeks relief under Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 from an order declaring that he is an habitual motor vehicle offender. He claims on appeal that the habitual motor vehicle offender order is void because (1) no summons was attached to the show cause order served upon him to notify him of the habitual motor vehicle offender proceedings, and (2) the state failed to obtain an alias summons after process was not returned within thirty days of entry of the show cause order. We hold that Shofner's motion for relief under Rule 60.02 is untimely. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Riley Roper
The defendant appeals from his conviction for driving under the influence, third offense, contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Colvin - Dissenting
I am unable to join with my colleagues in holding that a trial judge may not modify a misdemeanant’s “program eligibility” percentage following revocation of the misdemeanant’s suspended sentence. Our sentencing laws provide that “in imposing a misdemeanor sentence, the court shall fix a specific number of months, days or hours and the defendant shall be responsible for the entire sentence . . .,” subject to various authorized sentencing credits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(b). The program eligibility percentage, as provided by subsection 302(d), has no bearing upon the misdemeanant’s length of sentence or when the sentence expires; rather, as noted above, every non-suspended misdemeanor sentence is served at one hundred percent. Moreover, as observed by the majority, program eligibility percentage is distinguished from probation, which is authorized in subsection 302(e). Program eligibility, which is viewed under our sentencing law as a rehabilitative measure, relates only to placement in “rehabilitative programs” for service of the sentence as |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Lynn Anderson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner originally pled guilty to felony reckless endangerment, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and two counts of theft over $1,000. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lillie Fran Ferguson
The Defendant, Lillie Fran Ferguson, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance and to failure to obey a stop sign. As part of her plea agreement, she expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal certain certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) relating to the frisk of her person and the subsequent seizure of contraband. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained against her as the result of an unlawful frisk. She claims that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that she was armed and dangerous, thereby warranting a Terry pat-down, and that the incriminating nature of the crack pipe felt by the officer during the pat-down was not immediately apparent within the meaning of the "plain feel" doctrine. However, because the Defendant failed to properly certify her issues for review, we are unable to reach the merits of her case. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Lamont Anthony
The Defendant, Kenneth Anthony, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree pre-meditated murder and attempted second degree murder. For these offenses, the Defendant received a sentence of imprisonment for life and a concurrent sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, respectively. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the first degree premeditated murder conviction. Finding sufficient evidence in the record to support the Defendant's convictions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Ray Swan
The defendant, Michael Ray Swan, was convicted for simple assault, driving on a revoked, suspended, or cancelled license, and violating the implied consent law. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 months, 29 days for the assault; ordered a term of six months on the revoked license conviction; and revoked the defendant's license for one year for violating the implied consent law. In this appeal of right, the defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court properly charged the jury; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the state to submit a statement of evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to stay the suspension of his license; and (5) whether the trial court erred by revoking the defendant's license. After a review of the record, we reverse and dismiss the conviction for driving on a revoked, suspended, or cancelled license; the judgment for the implied consent violation is modified to a one-year suspension rather than revocation. The conviction for simple assault is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Ray Taylor
Alvin Ray Taylor was convicted by a jury of driving on a revoked license, second offense. The jury fixed his fine at $27,500. Taylor argues on appeal that the fine provisions of TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-504(a)(2) permit the imposition of a fine with no maximum limit violating the Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines. After review, we find the penalty provisions of the statute, as it relates to the amount of fine which may be fixed, unconstitutional and the fine imposed in this case excessive. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment imposing a fine of $27,500 is vacated. The Appellant’s fine is modified to reflect a fine of $2,500 pursuant to TENN.CODE ANN. § 40-35-111 (e)(1) ( maximum authorized fine for class A misdemeanor). |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Ray Taylor - Dissenting
I find that I must respectfully depart from Judge Hayes’s opinion. I concur in the reversal of the fine of $27,500, but I disagree that the fine provision of Code section 55-50–504(a) should be declared unconstitutional and that we should impose a fine pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-111(e)(1). I have concluded that we should hold that the particular fine in this case is excessive via our sentencing law but that we may, and should, stop short of declaring the statutory provision unconstitutional. On de novo review, we should impose a fine of $3,000, as is authorized by Code section 55-50-504(a). |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus W. Keener
The defendant was indicted for first degree murder and convicted by a Lawrence County jury of second degree murder. In this appeal as of right, the defendant presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of criminally negligent homicide and reckless homicide. The trial court charged the jury as to first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. The defendant received a sentence of twenty years to be served at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on two additional lesser-included offenses. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus W. Keener - Concurring
While I concur in the result, I write separately because I believe that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of criminally negligent homicide and reckless homicide. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danyelle Dewain Parker
The defendant was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of eighteen years. In this appeal as of right, he raises the following issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the victim's son to testify about the defendant's prior assault on the victim; 2) whether the convictions for aggravated assault and kidnapping should have been merged; and 3) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darryl J. Ross v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant was convicted in two jury trials of six counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. He received an effective sentence of sixty years for these crimes. The Defendant subsequently pled guilty to three additional counts of aggravated robbery, one additional count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of theft. After an unsuccessful appeal of his second trial, the Defendant filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing the post-conviction court denied relief, which ruling the Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doug Myers
Doug Myers was convicted by a Warren County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Myers, as a Range I standard offender, to six years incarceration in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Myers raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his aggravated assault conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony concerning Myers' subsequent criminal conduct; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing Myers to six years incarceration. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Glenn Wiley
William Glenn Wiley was convicted by a Davidson County jury of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. Wiley was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and sentenced to twenty-five years for the robbery conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, Wiley raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction for felony murder; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated robbery; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's reliance on two aggravating factors when imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; and (4) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the theory of self-defense. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey E. Copeland
The defendant appeals from his conviction for vehicular homicide, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his motion to suppress the result of his blood alcohol test. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clement Dale Potter
In this Rule 9 interlocutory appeal, the defendant, an incumbent district attorney general, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss a presentment returned against him by the grand jury. He asserts that the General Assembly, in Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-6-112, vested the sole or exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute an incumbent district attorney general in the Attorney General and Reporter's office. After review, we disagree with the defendant and affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Dwayne Tucker
The defendant was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant now contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough examination of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals |
