State of Tennessee v. H. R Hester

This appeal involves a defendant who bound up two victims, doused them with kerosene, and then set them on fire because one of the victims had refused to loan him ten dollars to buy beer. One of the victims lost his life in the ensuing fire. A McMinn County grand jury indicted the defendant for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated arson. A jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury, finding the existence of the aggravating circumstances in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-204(i)(5) and (14) (Supp. 1999), sentenced the defendant to death for the murder of the victim who died in the fire. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for attempted first degree murder and twenty years for aggravated arson. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions but reduced his twenty-five year sentence for attempted first degree murder to twenty years because the trial court had considered improper enhancing factors. The Court of Criminal Appeals also determined that the trial court had erred by excluding mitigating evidence offered by the defendant during the sentencing phase of the trial but that this error was harmless. After conducting its own comparative proportionality review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the defendant's sentence of death was proportionate to punishments imposed in similar cases. State v. Hester, No. E2006-01904-CCA-R3-DD, 2009 WL 275760 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009). We hold as follows: (1) the manner in which the district attorney general gave notice of the State's intention to pursue the death penalty was not improper; (2) the defendant was not denied his right of self-representation; (3) the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's request for a continuance filed eight days before the trial; (4) the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case that the process used to select the jury venire deprived him of his right to select a jury from a fair cross-section of the community; (5) the defendant failed to make the necessary pretrial objections to raise an argument that the jury selection procedures violated Tenn. Code Ann. _ 22-2-304(e) (1994) and has failed to demonstrate any prejudice that he suffered from any violations thereof; (6) the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's request to retain an expert statistician; (7) even assuming two of McMinn County's jury commissioners were not statutorily qualified for their positions, Mr. Hester suffered no resulting prejudice; (8) the trial court did not commit reversible error with regard to its decisions relating to the admission or exclusion of evidence; (9) the trial court did not improperly comment on the evidence; (10) the trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt was not erroneous; (11) the trial court did not err when it replaced a juror during the sentencing phase of the trial; (12) the record contains sufficient evidence of premeditation; (13) the defendant's due process rights were not infringed by the denial of compulsory process, the trial judge's failure to recuse himself sua sponte, or the manner in which the trial court considered his motion for new trial; (14) the defendant is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction and sentence because of the cumulative effect of errors during the entire proceeding; and (15) the defendant's multiple challenges to Tennessee's death penalty statutes and the procedures and the protocol for carrying out the death penalty are without merit. Finally, in accordance with our obligation under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-206 (2006), we have thoroughly reviewed the record and have determined: (1) that the defendant's sentence of death was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion; (2) that the evidence fully supports the jury's finding of the existence of the aggravating circumstances in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13- 204(i)(5) and (14); (3) that the evidence supports the jury's finding that these aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances presented by the defendant; and (4) that the defendant's death sentence, taking into consideration the nature of the offense and the defendant himself, is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. We have also independently determined that the defendant should receive two twentyyear sentences for his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated arson and that these sentences should be served consecutively with each other and with the defendant's death sentence. In all other respects, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, as modified by this opinion, is affirmed.