Kimberly Powell v. Community Health Systems, Inc. et al.
This appeal involves the evidentiary privilege in the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)]. A former hospital employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County against the hospital and an orthopaedic surgeon on the hospital’s medical staff. During discovery, the former employee sought to depose the hospital’s infection control director regarding the details of an investigation into postoperative nosocomial infections and her knowledge of whether the defendant surgeon had tested positive for infectious diseases. The hospital moved for a protective order on the ground that the requested information was privileged under Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219(e). The trial court declined to issue a protective order after determining that the information sought by the former employee was not privileged because it had been created in the regular course of the hospital’s business and because the infection control director was the “original source” of the information. After granting the hospital an interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. E2008-00535-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 17850 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2009). We granted the |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Kimberly Powell v. Community Health Systems, Inc. et al. - Concurring
I concur in the judgment and in the reasoning of all but Sections III and IV.B of the majority’s opinion. In Section III, the majority holds that “the first step” in addressing whether to apply the peer review privilege set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 63-6-219(e) “is to determine whether the subject matter of the underlying proceeding is within the subject matter covered by the statute.” In Section IV.B, the majority relies on the rationale developed in Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2010), observing “that the privilege in [section] 63-6-219(e) applies only to peer review proceedings regarding a physician’s professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine.” The majority determines “that some, but not all, of the functions of the Quality Review Committee [at Cleveland Community Hospital] were peer review proceedings involving the professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine of the physicians on the hospital’s medical staff.” |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Kimberly Powell v. Community Health Systems, Inc. et al.
This appeal involves the evidentiary privilege in the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)]. A former hospital employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County against the hospital and an orthopaedic surgeon on the hospital's medical staff. During discovery, the former employee sought to depose the hospital's infection control director regarding the details of an investigation into post-operative nosocomial infections and her knowledge of whether the defendant surgeon had tested positive for infectious diseases. The hospital moved for a protective order on the ground that the requested information was privileged under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-219(e). The trial court declined to issue a protective order after determining that the information sought by the former employee was not privileged because it had been created in the regular course of the hospital's business and because the infection control director was the "original source" of the information. After granting the hospital an interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No.E2008-00535-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 17850 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2009). We granted the hospital's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that records received or made in the ordinary course of a hospital's business apart from the operation of a peer review committee are not protected by the peer review privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-219. We have also determined that documents prepared by or at the request of a peer review committee exercising its peer review function and documents prepared by third parties as part of the work of a peer review committee performing its peer review function are privileged. Finally, we have determined that the hospital did not waive its right to invoke the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-219(e) with regard to the work performed by its infection control director in the context of a peer review proceeding. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher et al. - Dissenting
While the majority’s narrow interpretation of the statutory peer review privilege has appeal, I cannot reconcile its result with the basic principles of statutory construction. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher et al.
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Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher et al. - Dissenting
While the majority’s narrow interpretation of the statutory peer review privilege has appeal, I cannot reconcile its result with the basic principles of statutory construction. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher et al.
This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Sidney J.
We granted appeal to determine whether a trial court may grant an intervening adoption petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-116(f)(1) when the intervening petitioners did not have physical custody or the right to receive physical custody of the child sought to be adopted at the time they filed their petition. The maternal grandparents petitioned to adopt the child, who was in their physical custody, and the paternal grandparents filed an intervening adoption petition. After engaging in a comparative fitness analysis, the trial court granted the paternal grandparents' petition. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in considering the paternal grandparents' petition because they did not meet the physical custody requirement in section 36-1-116(f)(1) and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting the maternal grandparents' petition. We hold that section 36-1-116(f)(1) includes an exception to the physical custody requirement when the petitioners have filed an intervening adoption petition and the child sought to be adopted is in the physical custody of the original petitioners. We also hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the paternal grandparents were fit, that they were financially capable of providing for the child, and that the child's best interests would be served by granting their petition. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
As the majority opinion observes, the Court of Criminal Appeals has twice held that petitioner Davis’s sentences were illegal. After our intermediate appellate court’s first opinion in this case, Davis v. State, No. M2007-01729-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 1958174, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2008), we granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn. 2008). Upon reconsideration, the Court of Criminal Appeals again remanded to the trial court for the entry of habeas corpus relief. Davis v. State, No. M2009- 00011-CCA-RM-HC, 2009 WL 961777, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 8, 2009). Upon application by the State, we granted permission to appeal. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I write separately to state my position in this case. I concur with the views of my colleagues as expressed in the majority and concurring opinions that the defendant is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. My decision in this case would have been different had the trial court imposed this sentence on the defendant after a trial. However, because this was a voluntary guilty plea agreement, and not a sentence imposed by the trial court following a trial, the defendant waived any habeas corpus relief he may have been entitled to receive because the sentence he bargained for was within the statutory minimum and statutory maximum for the offense. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to address the legality of a pleabargained sentence requiring the defendant, being sentenced for two cocaine offenses committed in a school zone, to serve twenty-two years of a Range I sentence at “100%.” The defendant alleges that his sentence is illegal because it makes no provision for the possibility of early release on parole. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. We hold that the defendant’s sentence is not illegal, and he is therefore not entitled to habeas corpus relief. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Hatcher
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Hatcher
We granted permission to appeal in this case in order to consider whether Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 permits a defendant to amend his motion for new trial after the hearing on the initial motion has been conducted and an order denying the motion has been entered. In this case, newly-appointed defense counsel filed several pleadings seeking to add grounds in support of a new trial after the hearing on the original motion for new trial had been held and an order denying a new trial had been entered. The trial court considered the new grounds and subsequently entered a second order denying a new trial. The defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals refused to consider any issues raised after the trial court denied the original motion for new trial. As to the issues that were raised in that motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the defendant is not entitled to relief. We have concluded that trial courts should not permit the defense to amend its motion for new trial after the new trial hearing has been held and an order denying a new trial has been entered. Further, we have reviewed an issue the defendant properly preserved and have reviewed for plain error the issues the defendant failed to preserve but argues to this Court. We hold that the defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Franklin
We granted this appeal to determine whether the admission into evidence of an automobile license tag number observed and written down by a bystander near the crime scene who did not appear at trial violated the defendant’s right to confrontation under the federal and state constitutions. A few seconds after being robbed at her place of employment, the victim ran out of the business, told a bystander that she had been robbed, and asked the bystander to observe the tag number of the vehicle operated by the man who had just left the business. The bystander did so and then came inside the store to write the number down for the victim. The victim added other descriptive information about the robber to the same piece of paper and then turned it over to the police. The tag number was traced to a vehicle owned by the defendant, whom a jury ultimately convicted of one count of robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the written tag number was “testimonial hearsay” within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), and concluding that the statement’s admission was plain error. Based on our objective review of the circumstances surrounding the statement, we conclude that the written tag number was “nontestimonial hearsay” that did not implicate the defendant’s right of confrontation and was admissible as an excited utterance. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate defendant’s conviction. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re Estate of Mary Reeves Davis
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Samuel D. Leggett, et al. v. Duke Energy Corporation, et al.
The plaintiffs, commercial and residential consumers of natural gas, purchased natural gas from utilities, which had acquired the product wholesale from the defendants. In this class action antitrust suit, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in various anticompetitive practices, including making false statements about natural gas transactions and engaging in “wash trades” and “churning.” After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the claims were barred by both field pre-emption and the filed rate doctrine, the chancellor dismissed the claims. The plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claims were not subject to dismissal. Because the Natural Gas Act and subsequent federal legislation pre-empt state actions in this particular field of regulation, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and all claims are dismissed. |
Fayette | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Swift
We granted appeal in this case to clarify whether the location of the use of violence or fear is relevant in distinguishing theft from robbery. We hold that the temporal proximity between the taking of property and the use of violence or fear is the sole relevant factor. Applying this analysis to the facts of this case, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The evidence, however, supports a conviction for the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. We therefore vacate the defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery, modify the conviction to aggravated assault, and remand this case to the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas L. Turner, II
During the course of an investigation for a robbery and homicide, officers provided Miranda warnings to the defendant, who sought clarification regarding his right to the presence of counsel. Ultimately, the defendant executed a waiver and made a statement to police. Indicted later for first degree murder and other offenses, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his entire statement, arguing that the investigating officers had failed to honor an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. The trial court granted the motion, the State received permission to take an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. We accepted the application for review to determine whether the defendant was equivocal in his request for counsel and, if so, whether the police properly limited further questions to the clarification of his right to counsel until the right was either clearly invoked or waived. Because the defendant did not clearly assert his right and the police officers limited the scope of their questions until the defendant chose to execute the waiver of rights form, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Home Builders Association of Middle Tennessee, et al. v. Williamson County, et al. - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority’s sound conclusion that Williamson County was required to collect the new development tax at the time of the application for the building permit, I disagree with the ruling that ultimate tax liability must be based on the projected – rather than the actual – square footage of construction. I would, therefore, hold that when the developer has paid a sum based on projected square footage and later built a larger structure than initially anticipated, the County would be entitled to recover the deficiency in payment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-6-108(6) (2005), 9-3-202 (1999). |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Home Builders Association of Middle Tennessee, et al. v. Williamson County, et al.
This appeal involves a question of law concerning the interpretation of the Williamson County Adequate Facilities Tax Act, which imposes a privilege tax based upon the gross square footage of new construction in Williamson County. In 2005, the County notified certain builders of new residential construction that a review for the period from January 1, 1998, through December 31, 2003, indicated that the builders owed an additional amount of privilege tax because the actual square footage of the completed construction was greater than the projected square footage at the time the privilege tax was paid. The builders objected to payment of the additional privilege tax and filed an action for declaratory judgment, contending that the County’s belated collection attempts were in derogation of the Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We accepted this case for review to determine whether, after the privilege tax is paid based upon the projected square footage of new development before construction, the County is authorized to collect an additional privilege tax after construction based upon the actual completed square footage. We hold that after the County collects the privilege tax |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
In Re Angela E. et al.
We granted this appeal to resolve a conflict within our Court of Appeals regarding the required contents of a trial court’s written order following a proceeding to terminate parental rights where the parent losing the rights does not oppose the termination. In this case, the trial court’s written order omitted findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the grounds for termination. After rejecting the father’s contention that his rights were surrendered rather than terminated, the Court of Appeals held that the findings and conclusions required by statute were unnecessary because the father had consented to the petition to terminate. We agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights. Nonetheless, we hold that the trial court’s written order of termination must contain the findings and conclusions set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-1-113(c) and (k), even where the parent consents to the termination of parental rights. Because the trial court’s order does not comport with the statute, we must reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for a new hearing |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Brown
The defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse and felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The defendant appealed the felony murder conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction. We granted permission to appeal and address the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder, which include second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to these lesser-included offenses, and accordingly, we reverse the felony murder conviction and remand the case for a new trial on the felony murder count. |
Supreme Court | ||
Michael Sneed v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this direct appeal of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding involving eight separate complaints, we must determine whether the trial court correctly affirmed the hearing panel’s finding that attorney Michael Sneed violated numerous ethical rules and should be disbarred from the practice of law. Sneed contends that his disciplinary proceedings were procedurally unlawful because the hearing panel did not (1) conduct a prehearing conference as required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 13.6, (2) authorize the filing of two supplemental petitions for discipline, or (3) allow him to call as witnesses disciplinary counsel or the Board of Professional Responsibility’s executive secretary. He also asserts that the evidence does not support the hearing panel’s findings of professional misconduct and that he was denied a meaningful review in the trial court because the trial court failed to properly schedule and review his appeal from the hearing panel. Finally, Sneed challenges the finding of the hearing panel and the trial court that he should be disbarred from the practice of law. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court disbarring Mr. Sneed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Alisia Arias v. Duro Standard Products Company, et al.
The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits, contending that she had developed occupational asthma as a result of exposure to dust in the workplace. The employee offered into evidence the written report of a physician who performed an independent medical evaluation of the employee at the request of the employee’s attorney. The employer objected to the introduction of the report, contending that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235 is the exclusive method of introducing medical proof in workers’ compensation cases and that this statute permits the employer to depose the expert whose report is offered into evidence. Overruling the objection, the trial court admitted the report into evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(6) and awarded workers’ compensation benefits to the employee based on the physician’s report. The employer appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the evaluating physician’s report into evidence and that the remaining admissible evidence is insufficient to establish either causation or permanency. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court awarding workers’ compensation benefits is vacated, and the complaint is dismissed. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
Andrew Carter v. Quality Outdoor Products, Inc., et al.
The employee filed suit seeking workers’ compensation benefits and provided notice to the employer of his intent to rely at trial on a physician’s report generated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235. The employer objected to the introduction of the medical report and notified the employee of its intent to depose the physician pursuant to the same section. The employer moved to exclude the medical report when it was unable to depose the physician. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to exclude the physician’s report but granted the employer permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We hold that the physician’s unavailability to provide the deposition requested by the employer pursuant to section 50-6-235 renders the physician’s written report inadmissible. We further hold that the physician’s report is not admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804 as an exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Supreme Court |
