Highwoods Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis
The Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking to set aside a consent judgment entered in a lawsuit between property owners in an area of a proposed annexation and the City of Memphis. The earlier lawsuit, which the Plaintiffs failed to timely join, was a quo warranto challenge to an ordinance purporting to annex certain territory contiguous to the boundaries of the City. The consent judgment provided for the annexation of the territory described within the ordinance in two stages, with a portion of the area having an effective annexation date in 2006 and the remainder having an effective date in 2013. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted permission to appeal in order to determine the propriety of the challenge to the consent decree approving of the two-step annexation. We hold that (1) the Plaintiffs are not authorized to file a declaratory judgment action challenging the consent judgment as violative of the terms of the annexation ordinance; and (2) the consent judgment did not create an unconstitutional taxing structure. The judgment of dismissal is, therefore, affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Steven Waters, et al. v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
Effective January 1, 2005, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a tax on the possession of unauthorized substances for the purpose of generating revenues to assist state and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat drug crimes. Subsequently, Steven Waters was assessed with taxes, penalty, and interest in the total amount of $55,316.84 by the Tennessee Department of Revenue after purchasing nearly a kilogram of cocaine from a confidential informant. In a declaratory judgment suit in the Chancery Court of Loudon County, Waters challenged the constitutionality of the statute on grounds of self-incrimination, double jeopardy and due process. The chancellor declared the statute unconstitutional and set aside the assessment. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the enactment exceeded the General Assembly’s taxing power under article II, section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Initially, we hold that the statute imposing the tax on unauthorized substances does not violate the constitutional protections against self-incrimination and double jeopardy or abridge the guarantee of procedural due process. Because, however, the tax cannot be classified as either a tax on merchants, a tax on peddlers or a tax on privileges, as authorized by our state constitution, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
Steven Waters, et al v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
The Court today invalidates the Unauthorized Substances Tax on the ground that it exceeds the General Assembly’s taxing power under Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Court reaches this conclusion despite the precedents requiring us to interpret statutes in a manner that sustains, rather than defeats, their constitutionality. Even though I concur with the Court’s conclusions that the Unauthorized Substances Tax does not run afoul of the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and self-incrimination and that it is consistent with the requirements of due process, I cannot concur with its decision that this tax cannot be imposed in a constitutional manner on persons who possess significant quantities of illegal drugs for the purpose of resale. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Richards - Dissenting
The pivotal question in this case is straightforward. Did the law enforcement officers who came upon Marcus Richards and his three associates sitting at a picnic table on which residue of powder cocaine was in plain view have probable cause to search Mr. Richards incident to arresting him for the simple possession of the cocaine on the table? The Court has concluded that they did not. I respectfully disagree. Based on the essentially undisputed facts, I would affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the warrantless search incident to Mr. Richards’s arrest was valid. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Richards
The issue presented in this case is whether evidence seized from the Defendant’s person following a warrantless search should have been suppressed or, conversely, whether the search was justified as a search incident to lawful arrest. After receiving a tip from a citizen informant that three individuals were involved in drug activity around a picnic table in the back yard of a house, police officers were dispatched to the scene and found the three identified persons plus a fourth person – the Defendant – seated around the picnic table. As the officers approached, they observed one participant sweep the table with his arm and drop a corner baggie to the ground, and they subsequently discovered that this person held a rolled dollar bill containing a white powdery residue. The officers also saw a white powdery residue on the surface of the table that field-tested positive for cocaine. Although the Defendant was seated at the picnic table where the police officers observed evidence of cocaine use, they did not see the Defendant engaged in any illegal or suspicious activity. An initial “pat down” search of the Defendant revealed no drugs or weapons. After a consensual search of one of the participants at the table revealed white powder on the seat of his wheelchair, the officers searched the Defendant a second time and found a bag of marijuana and a bag of cocaine in his pocket. The Defendant was indicted for misdemeanor possession of marijuana and cocaine. The trial court found that the search was proper due to exigent circumstances supported by probable cause, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding that the circumstances did not support the existence of probable cause. After review, we conclude that the search of the Defendant cannot be justified as a search incident to an arrest because, at the time of the search, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the Defendant. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Milburn Hogue and Melanie Hogue
The certified question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennesse |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Lee Hayes v. Gibson County, Tennessee
The issue presented in this declaratory judgment action brought by Lee Hayes, the Gibson County juvenile court clerk, is whether he should be compensated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-24-102, as amended in 2001, which sets the Gibson County juvenile court clerk’s salary at a minimum of $50,805 per year, or pursuant to a 2000 private act that sets the salary at $32,000 per year. Gibson County argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the private act of 2000 creating the office of Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk and establishing his salary at $32,000 per year, controls. Mr. Hayes argues that the General Assembly’s 2001 amendment to TennesseeCode Annotated section 8-24-102, establishing statewide salaries for county officers, including juvenile court clerks, supersedes the 2000 private act and that his annual salary should be $50,805 in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-24-102, as amended. We hold that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the 2000 private act and the 2001 public act, and that the 2001 public act, a general statutory scheme of statewide application, supersedes and repeals by implication the earlier private act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
Helen M. Borner, et al. v. Danny R. Autrey
This case involves the interpretation and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-5-113(a), which provides a rebuttable presumption that medical bills itemized in and attached to the complaint are necessary and reasonable if the “total amount of such bills” does not exceed $4,000. We hold that a plaintiff may rely on section 24-5-113(a) if the total amount of the medical bills that are itemized and attached does not exceed $4,000, regardless of the total amount of medical expenses that may have been incurred. A plaintiff is not entitled to the presumption, however, if the plaintiff relies on medical bills that have been redacted to reflect a total of $4,000 or less. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
Board of Professional Responsibility v. James T. Allison
This is a direct appeal of a trial court judgment that modified a hearing panel’s order suspending an attorney from the practice of law for sixty days. The trial court did not disagree with the hearing panel’s findings regarding the attorney’s misconduct but determined that the punishment was too harsh and, instead, ordered a public censure. After an independent review of the record, we conclude that the hearing panel’s findings that the attorney commingled his personal funds with client funds, paid personal bills out of his trust account, failed to maintain proper trust account records, and failed to timely respond to Board inquiries were supported by substantial and material evidence and that this conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. These violations, coupled with the aggravating factor that in 1998, the attorney was publicly reprimanded for commingling his personal funds with trust account funds and for paying personal expenses from his trust account, warrant the sanctions imposed by the hearing panel which require that the attorney be suspended from the practice of law for sixty days, that his trust account be monitored for a period of one year following reinstatement of his law license, that he submit trust account bank statements and ledger sheets every thirty days during this one-year period, and that he pay all costs of the proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment to the extent that it modifies the sanctions imposed by the hearing panel. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joey DeWayne Thompson
The defendant was initially charged with premeditated first degree murder and felony murder of one victim (Counts I and II in the indictment) and the attempted first degree murder of a second victim (Count III). He was found guilty of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder on the first count, a mistrial resulted on the second count, and, as to the third count, the jury acquitted the defendant on the primary charge but returned a guilty verdict of attempted second degree murder, a lesser-included offense. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals, because of error in the instructions to the jury, reversed the convictions on Counts I and III and remanded for a new trial. Prior to the second trial, the State voluntarily dismissed Count III, the attempted second degree murder charge, and prosecuted the defendant only on Count I, for second degree murder, and Count II, for felony murder, both of the first victim. After the jury returned verdicts for the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter on Count I and second degree murder on Count II, the trial court imposed sentence and merged the two convictions. The defendant appealed, contending that because the prior jury had in effect returned a verdict of acquittal on the attempted first degree murder of the second victim, and because the alleged attempted first degree murder was the only possible predicate offense to support the felony murder charge in the retrial, the trial court had erred by allowing the |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joey DeWayne Thompson - Concurring
I concur with the Court’s decision to affirm Mr. Thompson’s conviction and sentence for |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Iris Kay Snodgrass v. Robert H. Snodgrass
We granted permission to appeal in this divorce case to address whether a spouse’s 401(k) account is a “retirement or other fringe benefit right[] relating to employment” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) such that any increase in the account’s value that accrues during the marriage is marital property. We hold as follows: (1) the parties’ 401(k) accounts are “retirement or other fringe benefit rights relating to employment”; (2) the entire net amount by which the parties’ 401(k) accounts increased in value during the period of the parties’ marriage is marital property; (3) the premarital balances in the parties’ 401(k) accounts remain their separate property; (4) Husband did not transmute his entire 401(k) account to marital property when he made a single withdrawal for marital purposes; and (5) the trial court correctly divided the parties’ defined benefit pensions by reference to the monthly income each spouse was receiving rather than by reference to the present cash value of each spouse’s pension. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
Frank Barrett d/b/a Barrett Construction Company v. Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
This case presents a constitutional question of first impression: whether monetary penalties assessed by an administrative agency are subject to the fifty-dollar limitation of article VI, section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that article VI, section 14 applies only to the judicial branch of government and therefore is inapplicable to monetary penalties assessed by an administrative agency, which is part of the executive branch. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., et al. v. Richard Epperson, et al.
We accepted Cracker Barrel’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Young
This appeal involves the sentencing of a defendant who shot and seriously wounded a victim during an armed robbery and then two days later led law enforcement authorities on a lengthy and dangerous high-speed chase in an attempt to evade arrest. A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of numerous offenses arising out of these incidents, and the trial court imposed an effective sixteen-year sentence. On the defendant’s first appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the sentences and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing after concluding that the trial court’s sentencing findings were inadequate. On remand, the trial court imposed the same sixteen-year sentence. On the defendant’s second appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals made its own sentencing findings and imposed an effective seventeen-year sentence on the defendant. We granted the defendant’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We now hold that theCourt of Criminal Appeals exceeded its authority under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(c)(2) (2006) by increasing the defendant’s effective sentence from sixteen to seventeen years. We also hold (1) that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require that the facts necessary for the imposition of consecutive sentences be determined by a jury, (2) that the Court of Criminal Appeals made adequate findings with regard to its decision to impose consecutive sentences, and (3) that the record contains sufficient evidence to sustain a decision to impose an effective sixteen-year sentence on the defendant. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Arthur Creech, et al. v. Robert R. Addington, et al.
The eleven Plaintiffs, investors in a real estate development in Tunica, Mississippi, suffered losses when the financing for hotels on the tracts of land they had leased failed to materialize. Five of the Plaintiffs first learned of the investment opportunity in 1993 while attending a presentation by real estate agents Lloyd and Betty Link in Gatlinburg. After suit was filed against several Defendants based upon breach of oral and written contracts, the trial court entered an order of dismissal as to the Links and other of the Defendants and, later, granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of D.C. Parker and Richard Flowers, the owners of the land. When judgments had been entered as to all of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs appealed, but only as to Parker and Flowers. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that whether an agency relationship existed between Parker and Flowers, as principals, and the Links, and whether the Links had been guilty of misrepresentation were disputed questions of fact. Upon remand, a jury found that the Links were the agents of Parker and Flowers, who were vicariously liable for fraudulent misrepresentations made by the Links. Damages were awarded to the Plaintiffs. In a second appeal, this time by Parker and Flowers, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to those five Plaintiffs who had attended the presentation in Gatlinburg, but remanded for a new trial as to those who did not. We granted an application for permission to appeal to consider whether the order of dismissal in favor of the agents precluded any adjudication of vicarious liability as to the principals. |
Sevier | Supreme Court | |
In the Matter of M.L.P.
This appeal involves an action to terminate the father’s parental rights filed jointly by the prospective adoptive parents and the temporary guardians of the child. The Juvenile Court found that the father did not abandon his child because the child’s temporary guardian interfered with the father’s attempts to visit the child. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the father abandoned the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) by willfully failing to visit the child for over four months. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The case is remanded to the juvenile court to determine whether termination of the father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Terrance N. Carter v. Rickey Bell - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. In my view, our legislature has granted trial courts with broad statutory authority to transfer claims filed in the wrong jurisdiction under the remedial provisions found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-116 (Supp. 2008). Moreover, this Court has traditionally encouraged the disposition of colorable claims on the merits rather than on procedural grounds. In consequence, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for a transfer of the claim to the court having jurisdiction under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Terrance N. Carter v. Rickey Bell
This appeal involves the application of the transfer provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116 (Supp. 2008) to habeas corpus petitions challenging a criminal conviction. The petitioner, who was incarcerated in Davidson County, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Criminal Court for Davidson County. The trial court promptly denied the petition on its merits. Rather than filing a petition seeking post-conviction relief, the petitioner appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals. For the first time on appeal, the petitioner, invoking Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116, requested the Court of Criminal Appeals to transfer his habeas corpus petition to Maury County, where he had been convicted, for consideration as a post-conviction petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals declined to transfer the habeas corpus petition to Maury County and affirmed the denial of the petition. Carter v. Bell, No. M2006-01363- CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2744998 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Harold Hanson
The defendant, charged with two counts of aggravated child abuse, was convicted only upon thesecond count. While upholding the propriety of the jury instructions, the Court of Criminal Appealsreversed, ruling that the state had failed to establish that the defendant had knowingly inflicted theinjuries. We granted review in order to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establishthat the defendant acted knowingly and by non-accidental means. Because the trial court providedadequate instructions and because the circumstantial evidence, as accredited by the jury, establishedthe essential elements of the offense, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed andthe conviction and sentence is reinstated. |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
Derek Davis v. Shelby County Sheriff's Department
The issue in this appeal is whether the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board had cause to terminate Derek Davis’ employment for violating the Department’s drug-free workplace program. Upon review, we find that: (1) the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard of review in reviewing the Board’s decision; (2) the positive urine specimen test result was admissible evidence for the Board to consider; and (3) the Board’s decision to terminate Mr. Davis’ employment was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by evidence that is both substantial and material. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Cheryl Brown Giggers, et al., v. Memphis Housing Authority, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that Memphis Housing Authority (“MHA”) owed a duty to its tenants to take reasonable steps to prevent them from suffering harm, and I concur in the reversal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. I write separately to reaffirm my view that “any discussion of foreseeability in the context of duty encroaches upon the role of the finder of fact.” Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 375 (Tenn. 2008) (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting). |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Cheryl Brown Giggers et al., v. Memphis Housing Authority, et al.
The plaintiffs, survivors of a tenant shot and killed by the criminal act of another tenant, filed suit against the defendant housing authority, alleging negligence and breach of contract for failure to provide a safe premises. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the housing authority and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted review to determine whether the housing authority owed a duty of care, an essential component of the claim, under the theory of negligence. Because the potential for violence in the housing project was reasonably foreseeable and the gravity of the harm outweighed the burden on the housing authority to have taken reasonable protective measures, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
James G. Thomas, Jr., Brother and Next of Kin of Karen G. Thomas, Deceased v. Elizabeth Oldfield, M.D.
The plaintiff filed interrogatories and requests for production seeking information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage. When the defendants objected to providing this information, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01. The trial court ruled that the information was subject to discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02 and granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel and the defendants’ request for an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, holding that information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage was not discoverable under Rule 26.02. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
James G. Thomas, Jr., Brother and Next of Kin of Karen G. Thomas, Deceased v. Elizabeth Oldfield, M.D. et al.
The plaintiff filed interrogatories and requests for production seeking information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage. When the defendants objected to providing this information, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01. The trial court ruled that the information was subject to discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02 and granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel and the defendants’ request for an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, holding that information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage was not discoverable under Rule 26.02. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |
