Doug Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Company, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that Alcoa owed a duty to Ms. Satterfield to take reasonable steps to prevent her from suffering harm as a result of the risks created by the operation of Alcoa’s facility. I write separately to express my belief that any discussion of foreseeability in the context of duty encroaches upon the role of the finder of fact. In doing so, I will explain the considerations that I believe are relevant to a duty analysis. This Court has previously stated that the existence of a duty depends upon the presence |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
Doug Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Company, et al.
This appeal involves the efforts of the estate of a twenty-five-year-old woman who contracted mesothelioma to recover damages for her death. While she was alive, the woman filed a negligence action against her father’s employer, alleging that the employer had negligently permitted her father to wear his asbestos-contaminated work clothes home from work, thereby regularly and repeatedly exposing her to asbestos fibers over an extended period of time. After the woman died, the Circuit Court for Blount County permitted her father to be substituted as the personal representative of her estate. The employer moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the narrow ground that it owed no duty to its employee’s daughter. The trial court granted the motion. The deceased woman’s father appealed the dismissal of his daughter’s wrongful death claim. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., No. E2006-00903-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1159416 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2007). We granted the employer’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the deceased woman’s omplaint can withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings. We have determined that it does because, under the facts alleged in the complaint, the employer owed a duty to those who regularly and for extended periods of time came into close contact with the asbestos contaminated work clothes of its employees to prevent them from being exposed to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed; Case Remanded |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
Colonial Pipeline Company v. John G. Morgan et al.
Colonial Pipeline Company filed suit for declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of specified portions of the state tax code and seeking an injunction as to the enforcement of those provisions. The Chancery Court dismissed the action, holding that the company had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. We granted an application for permission to appeal and, after consideration of the issues, hold that (1) a party making a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of a statute need not exhaust its administrative remedies, and that (2) the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for declaratory judgment asking state officers to be enjoined from enforcing such a statute so long as the action does not seek money damages. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Lee Meeks, et al.
This appeal involves the warrantless search of a motel room containing an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory. After the occupants of the room were indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine and for possessing methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, they filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Coffee County seeking to suppress the evidence found in the motel room. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence and vacated the order dismissing the indictment. State v. Meeks, No. M2006-01385- CCA-R3-CO, 2007 WL 1987797 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2007). We granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to address more fully the principles applicable to warrantless searches of actively operating methamphetamine laboratories when the State asserts that the officers were acting to avert a serious and immediate risk of injury to themselves or others. Like the Court of Criminal Appeals, we have determined that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress and by dismissing the indictment. |
Coffee | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs. Marco M. Northern Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur with all portions of the majority opinion except Part III(C), which discusses the defendant’s right against self-incrimination under the Tennessee Constitution. I would decline to address that issue as it is not presented by this case. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs. Marco M. Northern
We granted this appeal to consider whether the courts below correctly held that Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), does not bar the introduction into evidence of the defendant’s Mirandized2 videotaped confession which occurred after the defendant made an incriminating admission during a prior unwarned custodial interrogation. This Court has not previously interpreted and applied Seibert. After carefully considering the plurality opinion, the concurring opinions, and the dissenting opinions in Seibert, we conclude that the courts below correctly held that Seibert does not bar admission of the defendant’s videotaped confession. We further hold that this Court’s decision in State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1992), interpreting the right against self-incrimination provided by article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, does not bar admission of the defendant’s videotaped confession. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder but remanded for resentencing. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ariel Ben Sherman
A Loudon County grand jury indicted the defendant, Ariel Ben Sherman, and co-defendant, Jacqueline Crank, for child neglect. The trial court dismissed the indictment against Sherman. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded. We granted Sherman’s application for permission to appeal to consider the issues presented for review, and hold as follows: (1) When deciding a motion to dismiss an indictment, a trial court may consider undisputed facts that are clearly and unequivocally agreed upon by the parties; (2) a person standing in loco parentis to a child may have a legal duty of care, the breach of which may result in criminal culpability; and (3) the State is not bound at the outset of a trial by the legal theories espoused in its bill of particulars. Because the trial court erroneously dismissed the indictment, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstate the indictment against Sherman, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
Marc Eskin et al. v. Alice B. Bartee, et al.
This appeal involves claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress made by two family members of a child who was seriously injured in an automobile accident. In their complaint filed in the Circuit Court for Shelby County, the injured child’s mother and brother alleged that they had sustained severe emotional injuries after they observed him lying on the pavement in a pool of blood. The injured child’s parents served a copy of the complaint on their automobile insurance company because the driver of the automobile that struck their son lacked adequate insurance. The insurance company moved for a partial summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because neither the injured child’s mother nor his brother had seen or heard the injury-producing accident. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion, and the injured child’s mother and brother appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. We granted the insurance company’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly permitted these negligent infliction of emotional distress claims to proceed. We have determined that persons who observe an injured family member shortly after an injury-producing accident may pursue a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Jeremy Flax, et al. v. Daimler-Chrysler Corporation, et al.
The plaintiffs filed this products liability case against Daimler-Chrysler seeking damages for the wrongful death of their son and for emotional distress suffered by the mother. The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages. We granted review to determine: 1) whether a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought simultaneously with a wrongful death claim is a “stand-alone” claim that requires expert medical or scientific proof of a severe emotional injury; 2) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support an award of punitive damages; 3) whether the punitive damages awarded by the trial court were excessive; and 4) whether the trial court erred by recognizing the plaintiffs’ second failure to warn claim. We hold that the simultaneous filing of a wrongful death suit does not prevent a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim from being a “stand-alone” claim. Therefore, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims brought under these circumstances must be supported by expert medical or scientific proof of a severe emotional injury. In addition, we conclude that the punitive damages awarded by the trial court were adequately supported by the evidence and were not excessive. Finally, we hold that the trial court erred by recognizing the plaintiffs’ second failure to warn claim but conclude that the error did not prejudice the judicial process or more probably than not affect the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the compensatory and punitive damage awards based on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim and reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn the punitive damage award related to the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jeremy Flax, et al. v. Daimler-Chrysler Corporation, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
The heart-wrenching facts of this wrongful death/emotional distress case, which are adequately set forth in the majority opinion, need not be restated here. The tragedy visited upon this family is indeed great. The record, like the trial itself, is lengthy. The trial testimony is extensive and, at times, contradictory. The fact that the members of this Court disagree as to how to resolve some of the difficult legal issues–which are hotly contested–is no surprise. The case is complex on multiple levels and resolving the issues presented while attempting to achieve a just result has proven to be no easy task. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jeremy Flax, et al. v. Daimler-Chrysler Corporation, et al - Dissenting
The Court has decided to uphold a judgment for $18,367,345 in compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the death of an eight-month-old child in a collision between a minivan and a truck. While the parents’ loss of their child is heart-wrenching and tragic, I cannot concur in affirming the awards of either compensatory or punitive damages against the manufacturer of the minivan in which the child was a passenger. The child’s parents are not entitled to $13,367,345 in punitive damages because they have failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the manufacturer acted recklessly in the design, construction, or marketing of the minivan. They are likewise not entitled to recover $5,000,000 in compensatory damages because of the erroneous admission of evidence regarding twenty-five “similar incidents” occurring after the date that the minivan was sold. Accordingly, rather than approving the award of $18,367,345 in compensatory and punitive damages, I would remand the case for a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages only. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jeremy Flax, et al. v. Daimler-Chrysler Corporation, et al. - Concurring
I concur with Justice Holder and Chief Justice Barker as to the propriety of the award of $5 million for the wrongful death of Jeremy Flax, apportioned one-half to the fault of the DaimlerChrysler Corporation [the “Defendant”] and the other one-half to Lewis Stockell. I further concur in their affirmance of the trial court’s reduction of punitive damages against the Defendant regarding the wrongful death action from $65,500,000 to $13,367,345. Finally, I agree that the $2.5 million in compensatory damages awarded Rachel Sparkman for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, one-half of which was adjudged against the Defendant, and the punitive damages of $6,632,655, all of which was assessed against the Defendant, should be set aside. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Dennis J. Hughes v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
Although I concur in much of the majority opinion, I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s expansion of the scope of our standard of review in Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR”) cases. Under its revised standard, the majority fails to give proper deference to the panel’s conclusion that Mr. Hughes clearly and convincingly demonstrated that his reinstatement would not be detrimental to the integrity of the bar, the administration of justice, or the public interest. Because the outcome of this case turns upon the proper application of our standard of review, I will explain my views on that standard in some detail. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Dennis J. Hughes v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
This is a direct appeal from a judgment of the trial court, which set aside a decision by a hearing panel designated by the Board of Professional Responsibility granting a disbarred attorney’s petition for reinstatement of his law license. The issue presented is whether the attorney, who was convicted of bribing a witness and conspiracy to bribe a witness in a criminal trial, has met the criteria for immediate reinstatement to the practice of law. Although the panel properly determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly proved the moral qualifications of the attorney and his knowledge of state law, we hold that the evidence failed to so meet the threshold as to the third requirement–that reinstatement would not be detrimental to the standing of the bar, the administration of justice, and the interest of the public. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Lacay Crew v. First Source Furniture Group D/B/A Anderson Hickey Company
In 2004, the plaintiff, Lacay Crew, filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging injuries to her left and right hands, wrists, and arms, while in the course and scope of her employment. In response, the defendant, First Source Furniture Group, d/b/a Anderson Hickey Company, denied the claim on issues of causation. The trial court found that Crew sustained a compensable, gradual injury to both upper extremities and awarded a permanent partial vocational disability of 25% to each upper extremity equating to a judgment award of $25,479.00. Discretionary costs in the amount of $150.00 were awarded for reimbursement to Crew for a doctor’s completion of a Tennessee Department of Labor Form C-32 on Crew’s behalf. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel found that there was insufficient evidence of causation and dismissed the case. We affirm the decision of the Appeals Panel. |
Lauderdale | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Allen and State of Tennessee v. Eric Lumpkin
We granted permission to appeal in these consolidated cases to determine whether Tennessee’s consecutive sentencing scheme passes constitutional muster under the holdings of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). We also address the “physical facts rule” in Defendant Lumpkin’s case. We hold that the trial courts’ imposition of consecutive sentences in these cases did not violate the Defendants’ federal constitutional rights. We also hold that the physical facts rule does not require the reversal of Defendant Lumpkin’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals in both cases. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Adam Hannah, et al.
We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal in order to construe Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-154(a) (2004), the impeding traffic statute. The trial court held that the driver of a slow-moving vehicle does not impede traffic, unless other traffic is made to come to a stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Upon review, we hold that the trial court based its decision on an erroneous interpretation of the statute. Therefore, we reverse the trial court and remand for a new suppression hearing. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Kathleen R. Caldwell, BPR #9916
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in staying a disciplinary proceeding pending before a hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility. We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to stay the disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse the stay order issued by the trial court, and we dismiss the respondent’s motion for a stay. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Billy Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Division et al.
In this claim for workers’ compensation, the defendant/employer filed a motion seeking permission to have an ex parte interview with the treating physician regarding the medical condition of the plaintiff/employee. The employer also sought an order requiring the employee to submit to an independent medical evaluation. The trial court denied each motion, and we granted the employer’s application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Upon review of the record and consideration of the applicable law, we hold that (1) the employer may not communicate ex parte with the employee’s treating physician without first obtaining a waiver of the implied covenant of confidentiality from the employee; and (2) the employer’s request for the worker to undergo a medical evaluation should be granted unless the trial court determines that the request is unreasonable. |
Smith | Supreme Court | |
Billy Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Division et al. - Concurring
I concur with the Court’s conclusion that, in the context of litigation regarding a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the employer and the employer’s lawyer are not entitled to have ex parte communications with the physician treating the employee. However, I base my conclusion on legal principles that differ from the “contract implied in law” theory relied upon by the Court. |
Smith | Supreme Court | |
Duell Wayne West v. Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc., et al. and Terry Thompson v. Peterbilt Motor Company and/or Paccar Inc.
We granted review of these workers’ compensation cases to decide when a case becomes “pending” for purposes of the prior suit pending doctrine. We conclude that a lawsuit becomes “pending” when the complaint is filed. Although the filing of the complaint initiates the pendency of the case, a subsequent case will be subject to dismissal under the prior suit pending doctrine only if the court in the prior case has acquired personal jurisdiction over the parties. Accordingly, the lawsuit filed by the employer in West v. Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc. was entitled to priority, and the employee’s lawsuit is remanded to the trial court for dismissal. The employee’s lawsuit in Thompson v. Peterbilt Motor Co. has been rendered moot and is dismissed. |
Smith | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Carri Chandler Lane
The defendant pled guilty to two counts of theft in excess of $60,000 after embezzling over $630,000 from her employer. The trial court imposed a sentence requiring a term of confinement and probation. As a condition of her probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to make monthly restitution payments of approximately $1,500 to her former employer upon her release from confinement. After her release, the defendant petitioned the trial court to modify the conditions of her probation by reducing her monthly restitution payments to $500 per month. The trial court denied her motion to modify, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the defendant could not appeal as of right the trial court’s decision to deny her motion to modify under Tennessee’s rules of appellate procedure. Nevertheless, a majority of the intermediate appellate court reviewed the defendant’s challenge as a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and concluded that the trial court’s decision constituted a “plain and palpable abuse of discretion.” The State appealed. Upon review, we hold that the defendant does not have an appeal as of right to challenge the trial court’s denial of her motion to modify. Furthermore, we conclude that the intermediate appellate court erred in granting the defendant a common-law writ of certiorari and in finding that the trial court’s decision was erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand with instructions that the trial court’s order be reinstated. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Amanda Lynn Dewald, et al., v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, et al.
In this medical malpractice appeal, the trial court denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment finding that a factual dispute exists as to whether the hospital may be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of an independent contractor radiologist based on a theory of apparent agency. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment to the hospital on all grounds. We granted permission to appeal and consolidated this case for argument with Boren v. Weeks, No. M2007-00628-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. May 6, 2008). In Boren, in an opinion filed contemporaneously herewith, we adopted the analysis derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 for determining when a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of independent contractor physicians. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings and for reconsideration of the hospital’s motion for summary judgment consistent with the analysis and new standard adopted in Boren. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kacy Dewayne Cannon - Concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority, particularly the excellent analysis pertaining to the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions; however, I would have affirmed that portion of the opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals holding that the article of clothing containing semen identified as that of the defendant was properly admitted as evidence, despite any weakness in the chain of custody. In my view, the majority places an inordinate degree of emphasis on the initial link in the chain and falls short of affording the trial judge adequate deference under our limited scope of review. Because, however, other evidence offered by the State violated constitutional principles, and the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I agree that a new trial is warranted. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kacy Dewayne Cannon
Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction but remanded for re-sentencing. Thereafter, we granted permission to appeal to consider the following issues: 1) whether the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the admission into evidence of pantyhose the victim was allegedly wearing at the time of the rape; 2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; 3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defense motion to suppress the identification of his DNA profile from a DNA database; 4) whether admission of the victim’s statements into evidence through third parties violated Defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation; 5) whether the friendship between the trial court and one of the prosecuting attorneys created a serious appearance of impropriety and biased the trial court against Defendant; and 6) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by remanding this case for re-sentencing. After considering these issues, we conclude that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the admission into evidence of the pantyhose and that the victim’s statements describing the assault to the police officers and her statements to the sexual assault nurse examiner were testimonial and admitted in violation of Defendant’s right of confrontation. We further hold that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress and Defendant’s motion for recusal. Because the error in admitting the pantyhose into evidence was not harmless, however, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for aggravated rape and remand for a new trial. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court |
