Murfreesboro Medical Clinic, P.A. v. David Udom - Concurring and Dissenting
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Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Murfreesboro Medical Clinic, P.A. v. David Udom
The issue presented in this case is whether a covenant not to compete is enforceable between a physician and his former employer, a private medical clinic. The trial court concluded that the noncompete agreement was enforceable and enjoined the physician from establishing a medical practice at a location within the restricted area. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the non-compete agreement was enforceable, but reversed the grant of the temporary injunction and remanded the case to the trial court for further determinations with respect to the agreement’s “buyout” provision. After a thorough review of the issues presented, including considerations of public policy, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment. We hold that except for those specifically prescribed by statute, physicians’ covenants not to compete are unenforceable and void. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
City of Knoxville v. Entertainment Resources, LLC. - Concurring
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
City of Knoxville v. Entertainment Resources, LLC.
We granted this appeal to determine the constitutionality of a Knoxville city ordinance regulating the location of adult businesses. The chancery court upheld the ordinance and enjoined operation of the defendant’s video store after finding that it fit the definition of an adult bookstore and was located within 1,000 feet of prohibited areas and therefore was operating in violation of the ordinance. The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the ordinance’s definition of adult bookstores is unconstitutionally vague. Because we have also determined that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals but on the separate grounds set forth herein. We remand to the trial court for an assessment of the amount of damages incurred by the defendant as a result of the chancery court’s injunction. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
James L. Milligan, Jr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility
Pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility ("the Board") appeals from an order of the Chancery Court for Knox County imposing the sanction of public censure upon James L. Milligan, Jr., Esq. ("Milligan"). The Board contends that the Chancery Court erred in concluding that: (1) Milligan did not misappropriate funds; (2) Milligan's use of a client's funds for personal purposes was not a serious violation; and (3) public censure is the appropriate sanction. Because we conclude that Milligan did misappropriate funds and did otherwise conduct himself in a manner inconsistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, as will be hereinafter detailed, we have determined that suspension for a period of two years is appropriate. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Rickey Hogan v. David G. Mills, Warden, et al
We granted this appeal to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available when: (1) the trial court imposed concurrent sentences for two offenses committed by the petitioner while on parole; and (2) the trial court failed to order these new sentences to be served consecutively to the remaining sentence for the paroled offense. We conclude that the sentences are not illegal under either claim and that the petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. |
Lauderdale | Supreme Court | |
Beverly Miller, et al. v. United Automax
This case arises out of the sale of a used car which Plaintiffs, the buyers of the car, maintain was damaged prior to sale despite Defendant’s denial of damage. A jury found for Plaintiffs, the buyers, on their claims for both common law intentional misrepresentation and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-101 et seq. (1995). Plaintiffs elected to receive the punitive damages awarded by the jury under the common law claim in lieu of treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. When Plaintiffs then requested attorney’s fees under the Act, the trial court held that they could not receive both punitive damages and attorney’s fees. The trial court also held that the election of remedies made by Plaintiffs had become final before the entry of judgment and before Plaintiffs were informed of the amount they might have received in attorney’s fees under the Act and that Plaintiffs could not amend their election of remedies. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court. We reverse, holding that Plaintiffs can receive both punitive damages under the common law misrepresentation claim and attorney’s fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We remand to the trial court for award of appropriate attorney’s fees and costs. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Robert D. Walsh v. State of Tennessee
This case comes before us on appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner sought relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, raising several claims including that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial because of an improper communication by a court officer to the jury during deliberations. During the hearing on the post-conviction petition, the court heard testimony from a juror regarding the content of the communication and also the subjective effect of the officer’s statement upon the juror. At the close of the hearing, the trial court found that the improper communication had not influenced the verdict and therefore denied the petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. In this Court, the petitioner challenges admission of the juror’s testimony relating to the effect of the court officer’s statement on the juror. After thorough consideration, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals. We hold that Tennessee Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits introduction of juror testimony concerning the effect on the juror of an improper communication by a court officer during jury deliberations. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Crowe
The defendant, Anthony Crowe, entered a plea of nolo contendere to facilitation of first degree murder and received an eighteen-year sentence. After imposition of the sentence, but before the judgment became final, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea alleging that the plea was not supported by a factual basis and that the plea had not been voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw. Although we conclude that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) does not mandate that a plea of nolo contendere be supported by a factual basis, we also conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw because the defendant established that his plea had not been voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. Thus, permitting withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct manifest injustice. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, grant the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, vacate the conviction of facilitation of first degree murder, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
McNairy | Supreme Court | |
Lillian Griffis, et al. v. Davidson County Metropolitan Government d/b/a Davidson County Board of Education
In 1908, a fee simple determinable estate in real property was conveyed to the Davidson County Board of Education and its successors ("Metro"). The deed required the property to be used "for school purposes" and to be "devoted exclusively to the cause of education." The deed further provided that the property would revert to the grantors or their heirs should the property be "abandoned" for these purposes. In July 2000, the defendant Metro ceased using the property for classroom instruction and administration but continued to maintain the property, to use it to store surplus food service equipment, and to hold it in reserve for possible use in the indefinite future. In April 2001, heirs of the grantors brought suit against Metro, claiming that the property had been abandoned for school purposes, thereby triggering reversion to them. Concluding that there had been no abandonment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Metro. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the limitations "for school purposes" and the "cause of education" are satisfied solely by classroom instruction. The Court of Appeals thus not only held that Metro had abandoned the property for these limitations, but also granted summary judgment in favor of the nonmovants, the heirs of the grantors. We vacate the Court of Appeals' holding that "school purposes" and the "cause of education" require classroom instruction alone. We hold that these limitations permit any use that directly benefits and enhances the process of learning and instruction or that directly advances the objective of instructing, training, and rearing. Further, we hold that in a fee simple determinable where the term "abandon" is not otherwise defined, the common law definition of abandonment applies; a complainant therefore must show both intent to abandon for the stated limitations and some external act or omission by which the intent to abandon is effectuated. Whether abandonment has occurred is predominantly a factual determination based upon all the relevant circumstances. In the proceedings below, the parties lacked the benefit of our holding today concerning the legal standard for abandonment; consequently, the factual record relevant to this standard has not been sufficiently developed. We thus vacate both the Court of Appeals' grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We remand this case to the trial court to allow the parties the opportunity to litigate the case in accord with the legal standard adopted herein. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Gary L. West, et al. v. East Tennessee Pioneer Oil Co.
We granted review in this case to determine whether convenience store employees owe a duty of reasonable care to persons on the roadways when the employees sell gasoline to an obviously intoxicated driver and/or assist the driver in pumping the gasoline into his vehicle. We answer in the affirmative. The plaintiffs in this case were injured when their vehicle was struck by another vehicle driven by an intoxicated driver. The intoxicated driver had purchased gasoline at the defendant convenience store shortly before the accident. The plaintiffs filed suit alleging the defendant was liable for their injuries based on theories of negligence, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment in furnishing the driver with gasoline. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the negligence per se and negligent entrustment claims, but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the negligence claim. The intermediate court held that the defendant's employees were under a duty to act with due care when undertaking the affirmative acts of selling the gasoline to the visibly intoxicated driver and then helping the driver pump the gasoline into his vehicle. After a careful review of the record and relevant authority, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley Davis IN RE: Ray Driver d/b/a Driver Bail Bonds
We granted the applications of the State and Ray Driver d/b/a Driver Bail Bonds pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 in order to determine whether the imposition of sentence upon Stanley Ray Davis, the defendant, effectively terminated Driver's obligations under an appearance bond, and whether Driver is liable for the payment of the fine and costs assessed against the defendant. Although the issue was contested in the Court of Criminal Appeals, in its brief and oral argument to this Court, the State concedes that Driver's obligation to secure the defendant's appearance terminated upon imposition of sentence upon him and entry of judgment. We hold that Driver's obligation terminated upon Davis' sentencing and reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the Criminal Court for Campbell County for further orders in aid of this opinion. |
Campbell | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. - Concurring and Dissenting
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Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid, Jr.
The defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. In imposing a death sentence for each count of first degree murder, the jury found three aggravating circumstances, i.e., that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that they involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, and that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6) (2003). In addition, the jury found that the evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentences. After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying numerous issues for oral argument. We now hold as follows: 1) the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial; 2) the trial court did not err in excluding evidence during the competency hearing; 3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hold a new competency hearing on the basis that a court-appointed expert was biased; 4) the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions; 5) the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the aggravating circumstances were not stated in the indictment; 6) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to amend the indictment; 7) the trial court did not commit reversible error in limiting extrinsic evidence of inconsistent statements; 8) the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; 9) the death sentences were not arbitrary or disproportionate as imposed in this case; 10) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances; 11)the capital sentencing statutes are not unconstitutional on the basis that they allow evidence to be admitted in violation of due process and confrontation under the United States Constitution; 12) the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the victims at the crime scene during sentencing; 13) the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to charge the jury on the “catch-all” statutory provision as to mitigating circumstances; and 14) the trial court did not err in denying a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during sentencing. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Overnite Transportation Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, et al. - Order
We granted this appeal to determine 1) whether a trial court's order declining to hold an alleged contemnor in civil contempt may be appealed; 2) whether compensatory damages for civil contempt are available pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-105 (1980 & 2000) from a contemnor who commits an act forbidden by a trial court's order; and, if so, 3) whether those damages may be recovered if the violation is not ongoing at the time of the hearing. We answer these questions in the affirmative. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez & Jonathan S. Londono - Order
Petitions for rehearing have been filed by Edwin Gomez, Jonathan Londono, the Attorney General and Reporter1, and amicus curiae, Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. The petitioners primarily argue that the majority opinion rests upon a misunderstanding and misapplication of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and United States v. Booker, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). The arguments advanced in the petitions to rehear were considered and rejected by a majority of this Court in its original opinion. We remain convinced that Blakely must be read in light of Booker. To do otherwise would not serve to “preserve Sixth Amendment substance.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752. In Booker, Justice Stevens explained: If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range. Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues presented by these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the [Sentencing Reform Act] the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges; it is that circumstance that makes the Court’s answer to the second question presented possible. For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant. Id. at 750 (citations omitted). The Court harmonized the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with the Sixth Amendment byapplying in Booker a remedywhich created a discretionarysentencing scheme. Id. at 764. We are not persuaded that the differences between the Reform Act and the post-Booker Federal Sentencing Guidelines are constitutionally significant. If the Sixth Amendment countenances a sentencing scheme that permits judges to find factsrelevant to sentencing and affords judges discretion to select a sentence anywhere within a statutory range, even in the absence of enhancing facts, we are unable to conclude that the Sixth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme in which a state legislature limits judicial discretion by designating the presumptive sentence that must be imposed when a judge finds no enhancement or mitigating factors. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Gatha Blankenship v. American Ordinance Systems, LLS, d/b/a Milan Army Ammunition Plant
The employee in this workers’ compensation case injured her back while taking an upper body strength test on the employer’s premises. The employee, who was laid off at the time of the injury, voluntarily took the strength test as part of the application process for new jobs being created in the employer’s factory. The trial court found that the employee’s injury was not compensable because it did not arise out of her employment. The employee’s appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel hearing oral argument. The dispositive question before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury did not arise out of her employment. After carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury did not arise out of her employment. We also conclude that the employee’s injury did not occur in the course of her employment. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Carroll | Supreme Court | |
Christa Gail Pike v. State of Tennessee
This appeal presents two determinative issues: (1) whether post-conviction review of a death sentence should be mandatory and should proceed over the objection of a competent death-sentenced inmate; and if not, (2) whether, and under what circumstances, a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke her waiver of post-conviction review. We conclude that post-conviction review is not mandatory and may be waived by a competent death-sentenced inmate. We also conclude that a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke a waiver of post-conviction review so long as the revocation occurs within thirty days of the trial court's order permitting the inmate to waive post-conviction review. Our holding is limited to death-sentenced inmates who seek to revoke an initial waiver of post-conviction relief. Our holding does not apply to death-sentenced inmates who attempt to manipulate and to delay the judicial process by repeatedly seeking to waive and thereafter to reinstate post-conviction review. Applying this rule, we conclude that Christa Gail Pike may revoke her waiver and reinstate her post-conviction petition. Pike filed a motion seeking to revoke her waiver on the twenty-ninth day after the trial court filed its order permitting her to waive post-conviction review. Pike had not previously waived post-conviction review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the petition for post-conviction relief and to schedule an evidentiary hearing. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Ray Thacker - Concurring and Dissenting
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Dyer | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Ray Thacker
A jury convicted the defendant, Steven Ray Thacker, of first degree murder. Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant; and (2) the murder was knowingly committed by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing, a first degree murder, rape, robbery, burglary, theft or kidnapping. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6), (7)(1997). The jury also found that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the jury imposed a sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both the conviction and sentence. Upon automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206 (2003) this Court entered an order specifying five issues for oral argument,1 including (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of Dr. Keith Caruso, a forensic psychiatrist, at the sentencing hearing; (3) whether the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct on the defendant’s “history of abuse and neglect” as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance; (4) whether the State improperly relied upon aggravating circumstance (i)(6) to support the death penalty; and (5) whether the death sentence is comparatively proportionate and valid under the mandatory review provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)-(D) (2003). After a careful review of the record and relevant legal authority, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Dyer | Supreme Court | |
Connie Frances Fritts v. Safety National Casualty Corporation
The employee in this workers' compensation case suffered a spontaneous and large right-lung pneumothorax while at work. The pneumothorax required two corrective surgeries and resulted in treatment with narcotics for chronic pain. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the injury sustained was an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. We further hold that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the employee was totally and permanently disabled. We affirm the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez & Jonathan S. Londono - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez & Jonathan S. Londono
We granted this appeal to determine whether the defendants are entitled to relief on their claim that admission of testimony about a co-defendant’s oral statement violated their Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and whether the defendants’ sentences were imposed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. We conclude that admission of testimony about a co-defendant’s oral statement violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the defendants had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant. See Crawford v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). Nevertheless, we conclude that Gomez is not entitled to relief on this claim because he has failed to preserve it for review and has failed to establish the prerequisites for obtaining relief via plain error review. Although Londono preserved the issue for plenary appellate review, we conclude that he is not entitled to relief because the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we conclude that the defendants’ sentences were not imposed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. See United States v. Booker, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Thus, the defendants are not entitled to relief on this claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jennifer L. Biscan, et al. v. Franklin H. Brown, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether an adult who hosts a party for minors and knows in advance that alcohol will be consumed has or may voluntarily assume a duty of care towards the minor guests. We hold that the defendant adult host had such a duty of care even though he did not furnish any alcohol. We also hold that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence regarding the minor plaintiff’s prior alcohol-related offenses and her prior experience with alcohol and that the trial court did not err in determining that the plaintiff’s sister was not at fault as a matter of law pursuant to Tennessee’s statutory shield for furnishers of alcoholic beverages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in all respects. We affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals on the separate grounds set forth herein. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jennifer L. Biscan, et al. v. Franklin H. Brown, et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court |
