Gloria B. Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons
We granted review in this case to determine whether a landowner can bring a nuisance action against an adjoining landowner when tree branches and roots from the adjoining landowner's property encroach upon and damage the neighboring landowner's property. The plaintiff asserts that encroaching branches and roots from the defendant's trees constitute a nuisance for which she is entitled to seek damages. The defendant responds that the plaintiff's sole remedy is self-help and, therefore, the plaintiff may not recover for any harm caused by the defendant's trees. The trial court and Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, and held that an adjoining landowner's only remedy is self-help and that a nuisance action cannot be brought to recover for harm caused by encroaching tree branches and roots. We have determined that self-help is not the sole remedy of an adjoining landowner and that a nuisance action may be brought when tree branches and roots from the adjacent property encroach upon and damage the neighboring landowner's property. Although encroaching trees and plants are not nuisances merely because they cast shade, drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or just because they encroach upon adjoining property either above or below the ground, they may be regarded as a nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual harm to adjoining property. If so, the owner of the tree or plant may be held responsible for harm caused by it and may also be required to cut back the encroaching branches or roots, assuming the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance. We do not, however, alter existing Tennessee law that the adjoining landowner may, at his own expense, cut away the encroaching vegetation to the property line whether or not the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance or is otherwise causing harm or potential harm to the adjoining property. We further find that the record in this case is sufficient to establish liability for nuisance. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's dismissal of the case is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of damages and other appropriate relief. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
John T. King v. Anne B. Pope
Davidson County -In this case, we must decide whether a pay telephone sale-leaseback program marketed and sold by the plaintiff constitutes an investment contract, and thus a security under the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980. In finding that the program was a security, the trial court applied the definition of "investment contract" adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1996). Under this test, an investment contract exists where (1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d at 11 (quoting State v. Hawaii Market, 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971)). The Court of Appeals rejected the Brewer test and instead adopted the federal test for determining whether a particular transaction is an investment contract. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Applying this test, the Court of Appeals held that the pay telephone sale-leaseback program at issue in this case is not a security. After careful consideration, we agree with the trial court's finding that the appropriate test for determining the presence of an investment contract is set forth in Brewer. Applying this test, we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff's payphone sale-leaseback program is an investment contract and that the plaintiff was thus marketing and selling unregistered securities in violation of Tennessee law. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Susan Godfrey v. Jesus Ruiz
This case arises out of an action by the plaintiffs to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The plaintiffs claim their injuries were caused by the negligent operation of a van owned by the defendants and driven by a cousin of one of the defendants. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants offered affidavits and deposition testimony stating that the driver was operating the van without their permission and that the driver was not their employee. Despite the prima facie evidence of an owner-driver agency relationship created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a) (1998), the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. We hold that an owner's offer of testimony negating the issue of agency, standing alone, cannot overcome the prima facie evidence created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid
In this capital case, the defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery for killing two Captain D’s employees and robbing one of the employees. As to each conviction of first degree murder, the jury found in the sentencing hearing that the State had proven three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt – (1) that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), and (7) (1997). Finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death on each murder conviction. The trial court subsequently imposed a twenty-five-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the two death sentences. On direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant mounted numerous challenges to both his convictions and sentences. After fully considering the defendant’s claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the case was docketed in this Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997). After carefully and fully reviewing the record and the relevant authority, the defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the conviction of the defendant. With regard to the imposition of the death sentences in this case, however, I cannot agree. My concerns, as expressed below, pertain to my continued dismay with the comparative proportionality review protocol imposed by the majority. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
John Houghton v. Aramark Educational Resources
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, we accepted certification of a question of law from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee concerning regulations issued by the Tennessee Department of Human Services. The certified question from the district court asks us to determine whether the rationale of statutorily imposed vicarious liability under Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799 (Tenn. 2000), applies to rules governing licensing and operation of day care centers in Tennessee. For the reasons given herein, we answer that our holding in Gleaves is distinguishable from the present case, and the Tennessee regulations governing day care centers do not, absent fault on the part of the licensee, provide for vicarious liability for the injurious acts of an employee occurring outside the scope of employment. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Keith Goodman
The threshold issue presented in this appeal is whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the defendant’s motion to dismiss was not capable of pretrial determination under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) because it requires a determination of the general issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. In our view, the defendant’s motion presents a legal question – the proper interpretation of a statute – and does not require a determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Having decided the threshold issue, we also are of the opinion |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Takeita M. Locke
The defendant, Takeita M. Locke, was tried and convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in the death of Chuck Newman. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed both convictions. We granted this appeal to determine if the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses of felony murder, namely: second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. Additionally, with respect to her conviction for especially aggravated robbery, the defendant maintains that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (especially aggravated robbery), aggravated robbery, and robbery. After examining the facts and the law relevant to these issues, we hold that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide was reversible error. We also hold that the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and robbery was erroneous, but such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Takeita M. Locke
The defendant, Takeita M. Locke, was tried and convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in the death of Chuck Newman. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed both convictions. We granted this appeal to determine if the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses of felony murder, namely: second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. Additionally, with respect to her conviction for especially aggravated robbery, the defendant maintains that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (especially aggravated robbery), aggravated robbery, and robbery. After examining the facts and the law relevant to these issues, we hold that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide was reversible error. We also hold that the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and robbery was erroneous, but such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Ronald Lebron Akins, Sr.
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court accepted certification of the following questions from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern Division: (1) Whether the following acknowledgment on a deed of trust is valid under Tennessee law: State of Tennessee County of Bradley
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Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Linnell Richmond
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Linnell Richmond, was found guilty by a Knox County jury of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years for his convictions, to be served consecutively to a federal sentence arising out of the same criminal episode. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court upon finding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on: (1) the "natural and probable consequence rule" in relation to the charges of attempted first degree murder; and (2) robbery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. The State appealed to this Court, and we granted the application. We hold that: (1) it was harmless error by the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule in relation to the charge of attempted first degree murder; and (2) it was likewise harmless error by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury regarding robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the defendant's convictions are reinstated. This case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Linnell Richmond
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Linnell Richmond, was found guilty by a Knox County jury of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years for his convictions, to be served consecutively to a federal sentence arising out of the same criminal episode. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court upon finding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on: (1) the "natural and probable consequence rule" in relation to the charges of attempted first degree murder; and (2) robbery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. The State appealed to this Court, and we granted the application. We hold that: (1) it was harmless error by the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule in relation to the charge of attempted first degree murder; and (2) it was likewise harmless error by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury regarding robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the defendant's convictions are reinstated. This case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Hubert Patty v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This is a direct appeal in a Board of Professional Responsibility case. A hearing committee found that the petitioner violated four disciplinary rules arising out of client representation, imposed a one-year suspension from the practice of law, and ordered the petitioner to complete courses in ethics and civil procedure at an accredited law school before applying for reinstatement. The chancery court upheld the hearing committee's findings and conclusions with respect to the violations, but reduced the suspension to 60 days and vacated the requirement for law school education. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the chancery court properly affirmed the hearing committee's findings with regard to the petitioner's violations of the disciplinary rules, but we modify the length of the suspension to four months and the condition for reinstatement by requiring the petitioner to complete six hours of continuing legal education in ethics and twelve hours of continuing legal education in courses related to civil trial practice or civil litigation, in addition to the three hours of ethics and twelve hours of general credit required annually of attorneys in this State. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed as modified. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
State v. Christopher Flake
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Supreme Court | ||
Jackie Martin v. Lear Corporation
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Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Pero's Steak House v. Elizabeth Lee & 1st American Bank & 1st Tennessee Bank
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
Larry Seal v. Charles Blalock & Sons
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Hancock | Supreme Court | |
Harold Wayne Nichols v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Harold Wayne Nichols, filed post-conviction petitions seeking relief from his conviction for felony murder, his sentence of death, and his numerous convictions for aggravated rape, first degree burglary, and larceny upon the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as other legal grounds. After conducting several evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied relief as to the felony murder conviction and sentence of death, but granted partial relief by ordering new sentencing hearings as to the remaining convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court erred by allowing the petitioner to assert his right against self-incrimination during the post-conviction proceedings, yet upheld the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude: (1) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel based on the failure to investigate and challenge his confessions as false; (2) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel based on the failure to challenge the legality of his arrest; (3) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to present additional mitigating evidence; (4) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to object to misconduct by the prosecution; (5) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to request mitigating instructions; (6) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to raise issues regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment; (7) that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial based on the failure to object to the discovery of notes prepared by a defense psychologist on self-incrimination grounds; (8) that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in refusing to remand the case for additional DNA testing; (9) that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by addressing the issue of whether the petitioner had a right against self-incrimination in this post-conviction proceeding but the error had no effect on the outcome; and (10) that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and cumulative -2- error did not require the reversal of the petitioner’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Harold Wayne Nichols v. State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the conclusion of the majority that Nichols's convictions should be affirmed. To the extent, however, that the petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel may be interpreted to include the failure to object to the method of proportionality review, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in a long line of dissents beginning with State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 923-25 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting), and elaborated upon in State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 793-800 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). Those dissents suggest, essentially, that the comparative proportionality review protocol currently embraced by the majority is inadequate to shield defendants from the arbitrary and disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c) (1997). Accordingly, while I concur in the affirmance of Nichols's convictions, I cannot, for the reasons above stated, concur in the imposition of the death penalty in this case. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State v. Richard Hale Austin
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State v. Richard Hale Austin
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Memphis Publishing Company, et al, v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., et al. and John Morgan v. Cherokee Children & Family Svcs., Inc.
These two cases, consolidated for consideration, present two issues of enormous significance. First, we must decide whether a non-profit corporation that provides privatized services to a governmental entity is subject to the public access requirements of the Tennessee Public Records Act. The second issue concerns the authority of the state, acting through the Comptroller of the Treasury, to require said corporation to submit to a state audit. In Memphis Publishing Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., Memphis Publishing Company and others seek access to records belonging to Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., a non-profit corporation which contracted with the Tennessee Department of Human Services to help administer a state-subsidized day care program. In seeking access to the records, the plaintiffs rely on both the Tennessee Public Records Act and provisions in the contracts between the corporation and the state. In Morgan v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., the Comptroller of the Treasury, John Morgan, seeks to require the same corporation to submit to a state audit. As authority for the audit, Morgan relies upon the contracts at issue in Memphis Publishing Co. and upon 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts. 960 (now codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-4-116 (Supp. 2001)), which authorizes the Comptroller to audit the records of entities which derive fifty percent or more of their gross revenue from state or local government. The trial -2- courts in the two cases found that Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. was not a governmental agency, but that all records in its possession were state property pursuant to the contracts between it and the state. Additionally, the trial court in Morgan found that an audit was authorized by 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts 960. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that (1) the contractual provisions at issue did not render the records public; (2) Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. was not a governmental agency subject to the Public Records Act; and (3) retroactive application of 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts 960 in Morgan would be unconstitutional. We granted permission to appeal. Because we have determined, for the reasons outlined below, that Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. operates as the “functional equivalent” of a governmental (state) agency, we hold that all of its records are subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act and therefore |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Linda S. Reece v. Findlay Industries, Inc. and Harold Edward Tigue, Jr. v.Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Company, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine the propriety of the trial judge’s actions in the adjudication of these workers’ compensation cases. We hold that the trial judge failed to perform all the duties of the judge’s office prescribed by law in these consolidated cases by improperly delegating his authority to the clerk and master to adjudicate the cases. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the cases are remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Trial Court Reversed; |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
State v. Christopher Flake
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State v. Christopher Flake
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Shelby | Supreme Court |
