SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

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M2000-00372-SC-RL-RL
M2000-00372-SC-RL-RL

Erskine Leroy Johnson vs. State
W1997-00024-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: William H. Williams

The sole issue in this capital post-conviction appeal is whether the State improperly withheld material, exculpatory evidence at the appellee's capital sentencing hearing. The appellee was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death in 1985, and in 1991, he filed a post-conviction petition alleging, among other things, that the State improperly withheld a police report that was discoverable under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The post-conviction court denied relief, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and vacated the capital sentence. Finding that the police report was exculpatory and material, the intermediate court held that a new sentencing hearing was constitutionally required. The State then appealed to this Court. For the reasons given herein, we hold that the State improperly withheld the police report, which was both "evidence favorable to the accused" and material as to the issue of sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals vacating the appellee's sentence, and we remand this case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for a new capital sentencing hearing.

State vs. King
E1998-00283-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer
We granted review to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error by conducting trial proceedings in violation of a common law rule that prohibits judicial functions on Sunday. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendants' convictions for second-degree murder and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court violated a common law rule prohibiting judicial functions on Sunday and that such proceedings were "absolutely void." We conclude that conducting judicial proceedings on Sunday does not violate the Tennessee Constitution or any state statute and that the justifications for the common law rule are no longer sufficiently persuasive to invalidate Sunday proceedings as a matter of law. We further hold that the issue of whether to conduct judicial functions on Sunday rests within the discretion of the trial court. In exercising this discretion, the trial court should be deferential to the preferences of the litigants, witnesses, jurors, and attorneys; must be mindful of the need for every participant in a trial proceeding to be prepared and rested; must respect and accommodate the genuinely-held religious view of any litigant, witness, juror or attorney; and must weigh all of these concerns against whatever pressing need or compelling interest may necessitate a Sunday proceeding. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion under the facts of this case and, therefore, affirm the result reached by the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals on the separate grounds stated herein.

State vs. Fields
E1998-00388-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner
The issue raised on this appeal is whether the defendant's conviction of the Class C felony of facilitation of an illegal drug transaction within 200 yards of a school overcomes the presumption in favor of alternative sentencing so as to justify a sentence of confinement. The trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals found confinement necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. We conclude that the evidence presented is insufficient to overcome the presumption of alternative sentencing. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court to determine an appropriate alternative sentence.

Shelby Abbott, et al. v. Blount County, Tennessee, et al.
E2004-00637-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
This Court granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether summary judgment was appropriately granted by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the plaintiffs were made whole by the amounts paid by Blount County and the tortfeasors. As part of this determination, we find that issues of material fact also exist regarding whether Blount County has a right to reimbursement. Additionally, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Blount County waived its claim to subrogation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that summary judgment was inappropriate and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Michael H. Sneed v. Board of Professional Responsibility
M1999-01588-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor by Interchange Tom E. Gray

This cause is before the Court on the petition for rehearing filed by the respondent, Michael
H. Sneed. The crux of the petition is Sneed’s request for a period of thirty days within which to
“wind down [his] practice and to prepare for the transition of any remaining cases to substitute
counsel.”

Regina L. Cable v. Charles E. Clemmons, Jr.
E1998-00526-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bill Swann

We granted this appeal to determine the following two issues: 1) whether double jeopardy bars multiple convictions for criminal contempt based on violations of an order of protection and 2) whether domestic violence counseling may be imposed as part of the sentence for criminal contempt. After finding the defendant guilty of six counts of criminal contempt, the trial court's sentence consisted of 1) ten days in jail for each act of contempt to be served consecutively and 2) forty-five weeks of domestic violence counseling. A new order of protection was issued. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported only one conviction for criminal contempt and that the trial court lacked the authority to impose counseling as part of a sentence for criminal contempt. After reviewing the record and authority, we hold that double jeopardy does not bar multiple convictions for criminal contempt and that the evidence supports three convictions in this case. We further hold that although the legislature has not specifically authorized domestic violence counseling as a sentence for criminal contempt, the trial court properly imposed the requirement as part of a new order of protection.

Leslie vs. State
M1998-00585-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
We granted review in this post-conviction case to determine whether the trial court erred by allowing the appellant's appointed attorneys to withdraw and refusing to appoint new counsel. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court did not err either by allowing the appointed attorneys to withdraw or by refusing to appoint new counsel because the appellant had abused the post-conviction process. We conclude, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred by allowing counsel to withdraw without a hearing and failing to appoint new counsel. We therefore reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for the appointment of counsel and proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Stewart vs. State
M1998-00304-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
In this case, we determine whether the Tennessee Claims Commission properly asserted jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) and -307(a)(1)(F) for the alleged negligence of a state highway patrol officer in failing to properly control county police authorities at an arrest scene. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction, and the State requested permission to appeal on the issue of whether the Claims Commission properly asserted jurisdiction and whether the plaintiff, who stepped into the road before being hit by the truck, was fifty percent (50%) or more at fault for his accident. We hold that the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction in this case under either section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) or section 9-8-307(a)(1)(F), and because the Claims Commission possessed no jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims, we decline to reach the issue of whether the plaintiff was more than fifty percent (50%) at fault for his accident. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals finding proper jurisdiction is reversed, and the plaintiff's claim against the State is dismissed.

Sneed vs. Bd. of Professional Responsibility
M1999-01588-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This case is before the Court on an appeal of right from the judgment of the Chancery Court of Davidson County suspending Michael H. Sneed, the appellant, from the practice of law for six months together with other sanctions. Sneed contends that the trial court erred in imposing discipline and that the six-month suspension is too harsh a sanction. Because we conclude that the trial court had the authority to impose sanctions and that the sanctions imposed are fair and proportionate in light of the entire record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State vs. Scott
M1997-00088-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
The appellant in this case was arrested and charged with the rape and aggravated sexual battery of a nine-year-old child in Davidson County. Prior to trial, the State conducted various types of DNA analysis on several pieces of evidence, and the appellant, who is indigent, requested state-funded expert assistance in the field of DNA analysis to prepare his defense. The trial court denied the appellant's motion for expert assistance and declined to hold a hearing to establish the reliability of mitochondrial DNA analysis. The trial court also held that the State properly established the chain of custody for certain hairs removed from the victim during her physical examination. The appellant was found guilty by a jury on both charges, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. On appeal to this Court, we address the following issues: (1) whether the appellant was entitled to expert assistance in the field of DNA analysis under State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. 1995) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to hold a pre-trial hearing on the reliability of mitochondrial DNA analysis; and (3) whether the State's failure to establish a chain of custody as to certain hairs retrieved from the victim was error. For the reasons given herein, we hold that although the appellant was not entitled to a pre-trial hearing on the reliability of mitochondrial DNA analysis, he was entitled to receive expert assistance in the field of DNA analysis. We also hold that the State failed to properly establish the chain of custody of the hair samples. We reverse the appellant's convictions and sentences, and we remand this case to the Davidson County Criminal Court for a new trial on both counts of the indictment.

Bryant vs. Genco Stamping & Mfg. Co., Inc.
M1999-01762-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
The sole issue in this case is whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(a) applies to a pre-existing permanent mental disability. The employee suffered a work-related shoulder injury, treatment for which resulted in aggravation of a pre-existing mental disorder. The trial court concluded that the previous mental disability is included within the purview of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(a). The court thereby found both the employer and the Second Injury Fund liable for disability benefits. On appeal, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the trial court's apportionment of liability to the Second Injury Fund, holding that section -208(a) does not contemplate pre-existing mental disorders. We affirm the judgment of the Special Appeals Panel and find the employer liable for the full amount of benefits due the employee.

State vs. Carruthers and Montgomery
W1997-00097-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey

State vs. Carruthers and Montgomery
W1997-00097-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey

Harold W. Ferrell, Sr v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Insurance CO., et al.
M1999-01669-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Clerk and Master Richard McGregor

This workers' compensation case presents two issues for review concerning the merits of the employee's claim for benefits. The first is whether this action is barred by the statute of limitations. The second is whether the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the employee's injury was work-related. The trial court ruled that the statute of limitations had expired, and it also addressed the merits and found that the employee failed to prove that his injury was work-related. We hold that the statute of limitations had not expired, and we further hold that the trial court's dismissal of the employee's claim should be affirmed on the merits because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury was not work-related. In addition to the merits of this suit, we also granted review to determine the legality of the trial court's practice of referring workers' compensation cases to a clerk and master for trial. We hold that the proper procedure for appointing a special/substitute judge was not followed; however, reversal is not required because the Clerk and Master was acting as a de facto judge.

State of Tennessee v. Eddie Arcaro Williams
01S01-9503-CR-00033
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ann Lacy Johns

We granted the State's appeal to consider whether the defendant's federal or state constitutional right of confrontation was violated by the admission into evidence of surveillance photographs taken at the scene of the robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided that the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated and that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, they reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction.

Jack and Nancy Ritter, Thomas H. and Debra Kitts, and Fred A. and Donna J. Sykes v. Custom Chemicides, Inc.
01S01-9408-OT-00092
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harry W. Welford

The Court has accepted for decision two questions of law certified by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 23, Supreme Court Rules, which questions are as follows:

( l ) Whether the tort of negligent misrepresentation applies only to professinals and others who  specialize in providing information as a service; and not to commercial entities or businesses which allegedly supply misleading information for the guidance of others in their business transactions; and

(2) Whether a party alleging negligent misrepresentation, in order to recover 'economic losses," must be in privity of contract with the defendant. The decision of the Court is that liability for the tort of  negligent misrepresentation is not limited to 'professionals'; however, the record in this case does not establish the essentials of that cause of action.

Lenore Berry Ross Storey, Debtor v. Bradford Furniture Company, Inc.
93-08973-KL3-7
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge Keith N. Lundin

QUESTION CERTIFIED Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules,1 we have accepted a question certified to us by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The bankruptcy court has asked: Which of the following is the correct interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E): (1) Once asserted in any judicial proceeding, the exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective with respect to all subsequent executions, seizures or attachments of alimony; or (2) The exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure or attachment of alimony is sought. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the alimony exemption set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure, or attachment of alimony is sought.

Debra Michelle Lambert v. Famous Hospitality, Inc. A/K/A A.S. Hospitality A/K/A M W M Dexter, Inc. and American Motorist Insurance Company
02S01-9511-CV-00112
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wyeth Chandler

In this workers’ compensation action, the employer, Famous Hospitality, Inc., defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Shelby County finding that the employee, Debra Lambert, plaintiff-appellee, sustained a 60 percent permanent impairment to the whole body due to a workrelated shoulder injury. The trial court also directed the employer to pay various medical and litigation related expenses incurred by the employee, but did not require the employer to pay for future medical treatment by doctors that had been selected by the employee and who had treated her before trial. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5), affirmed the trial court. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-225(e)(5)(B). We granted the motion to determine whether the employee should have been authorized to seek future medical treatment, at the employer’s expense, from doctors selected by her who had treated her injuries. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment except to the extent that the judgment does not authorize future medical treatment by the employee’s treating physicians at the employer’s expense.

State vs. Coley
M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.

White vs. Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc.
E1999-02023-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address whether a private employer may be held liable for the negligent actions of an off-duty police officer who was hired by the employer for private security purposes. In the circuit court, the defendant employer moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' wrongful death action for failure to state a claim, and the motion was granted by the trial judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the actions of the off-duty officer were taken in furtherance of his official duties as a peace officer, and therefore, the defendant employer could not be held liable for the officer's negligent actions. After reviewing the complaint in this case, along with the applicable legal authority, we hold that the complaint does state a claim against the defendant employer for the negligence of the off-duty officer. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Knox County Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State vs. Garrison
E1997-00045-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
The defendant, John C. Garrison, was convicted by a jury of solicitation to commit first degree murder. In this appeal, he raises two issues: (1) whether trial counsel's failure to communicate a plea bargain offer from the State is per se prejudicial to the extent necessary to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); and (2) whether the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury that the "request," as used in the statutory definition of the offense of solicitation, must be intentional. After a thorough consideration of the record and a full review of the authorities, we conclude that trial counsel's failure to communicate a plea bargain offer does not demonstrate, alone, prejudice sufficient to satisfy the second prong of Strickland. We conclude also that the trial court's omission of certain required language from the jury instruction constitutes harmless error. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, reversed and the case is dismissed.

Edgar Doyle, et al vs. Charles Frost, M.D., et al
W1998-00391-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
In this appeal, the plaintiffs contest the trial court's overruling of a motion to amend their complaint to add the Jackson-Madison General Hospital District, a governmental entity, as a party defendant. At issue is the scope of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03, which allows the filing date of certain amendments to a pleading to "relate back" to the date of the filing of the original pleading. We are asked to determine whether Rule 15.03 applies to governmental entities. We conclude that it does and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

State vs. Maurice Shaw
W1998-00503-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
We granted this appeal to decide two issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice and to support the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver and (2) whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice and to support the defendant's conviction and that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals upon the separate grounds stated herein.