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| Nancy Elizabeth Taylor v. Mt. Juliet Health Care
M1999-00045-SC-WCM-CV
This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann._ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference;
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
|
Wilson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/05/00 | |
| Miley R. Strong v. Royal Insurance Co.
M1999-00411-WC-R3-CV
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference.
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
|
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/05/00 | |
| Rachel Jeanette Mccormick v. Yasuda Fire & Marine
M1998-00162-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with the Tenn. Code Ann. Section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appellant, Calsonic Yorozu Corporation (hereinafter "CYC") raises seven issues arguing that the trial court erred by (1) failing to find Plaintiff's claim was barred by Plaintiff's voluntary intoxication and willful disregard of safety procedures, (2) holding that part of Plaintiff's disability was due to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, (3) not applying the "concurrent injury rule", (4) holding Plaintiff gave adequate notice of her bilateral carpal syndrome to Defendants, (5) awarding compensation for unauthorized medical treatment, (6) improperly ordering a lump sum award, and (7) entering its judgment contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court Affirmed GAYDEN, J., in which BIRCH, J., and WEATHERFORD, SP. J., joined. Bruce Timothy Pirtle, McMinnville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company and Calsonic Aeries Corporation, Inc. Frank D. Farrar and William J. Butler, Lafayette, Tennessee, for the appellee, Rachel Jeanette McCormick. MEMORANDUM OPINION On August 19, 1996, Plaintiff filed a complaint for workers' compensation. In the complaint -2-
Authoring Judge: Gayden, J.
|
Warren County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/02/00 | |
| Rebecca Day v. Travelers Insurance Company
03501-9808-CH-00096
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated _50-6-225 (e) (3) (1998 Supp.) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Trial Court, after considering all of the evidence, found the worker to lack credibility, and determined that she was not entitled to recover under the workers' compensation law, and after consideration of the entire record, we affirm the Trial Court's decision.
Authoring Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frank V. Williams |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/02/00 | |
| Thomas Gregory v. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins.
M1999-00403-SC-WCM-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 5- 6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Plaintiff/Appellee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Sumner County for workers' -2-
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
|
Sumner County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/29/00 | |
| Kirby Dies v. Perma Pipe, Inc.
M1998-00610-WC-R3-CV
This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann._ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference;
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
|
Wilson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/29/00 | |
| Brenda K. Bascko v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and A.J. Metler Hauling & Rigging Company, Inc.
03S01-9907-CV-00083
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellants, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and A. J. Metler Hauling & Rigging Company, Inc., contend that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that there was a causal connection between the fatal heart attack suffered by Richard I. Bascko and his driving a tractor-trailer rig. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). This case was tried upon stipulations and depositions of medical doctors. As relevant to this decision, the stipulations are as follows: 1. Richard I. Bascko died on October 15, 1993 while driving a tractor-trailer rig for A.J. Metler. The truck was found at 2:48 a.m. on October 15 and Mr. Bascko was unresponsive over the driver's wheel. 2
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben W. Hooper |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/25/00 | |
| James E. Fleenor v. Grand Piano and Furniture Company
03S01-9905-CV-00061
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Grand Piano and Furniture Company (hereafter "Grand Piano") has appealed an award to James E. Fleenor of 8 per cent disability to the body as a whole. The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Fleenor sustained a compensable injury. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). James E. Fleenor, age 47, has a 5th grade education. His tested I.Q. is 49 and he reads at a 2nd grade level and can do arithmetic at the 1st grade level. He began work at Grand Piano in 1995. He had worked as a furniture mover for most of his life. He drove a truck for Grand Piano and loaded and delivered furniture. He had hurt his back approximately 15 years before when a co-worker dropped the end of a couch; and while he had pain in his back for many years, he testified that the pain at Grand Piano became worse than the pain he had working for previous employers. He told his supervisor at Grand Piano that the work was "getting to me." He never had any specific incident at Grand Piano that caused sudden pain. He testified, "the more I worked, the more I picked up, the worser it got. And I just, I just had to give it up." 2
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. G. Richard Johnson |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/25/00 | |
| Linda Liles v. The Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance
M1999-00016-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225 (e)(3)(1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo with a presumption that the trail court's findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6- 225(e)(2)(1999); Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W. 2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses and issues of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, considerable deference is afforded the trial court's findings of fact. See Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W. 2d 315, 315-16 (Tenn.1987). Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed SAMUEL L. LEWIS, SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J., and TOM E. GRAY, SP. J., joined. A. Gregory Ramos, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, The Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company of America, Inc. Christina Henley Duncan, Manchester, Tennessee, for the appellee, Linda Liles. OPINION This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225 (e)(3)(1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo with a presumption that the trail court's findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6- -2-
Authoring Judge: Samuel L. Lewis, Sp. J.
|
Franklin County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/24/00 | |
| Landstar Poole, Inc. v. George Hugh Rhoades, Jr.
M1999-00040-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225 (e)(3) (1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo with a presumption that the trial court's findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(2) (1999); Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W. 2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses and issues of credibility and weight of testimonyare involved, considerable deference is afforded the trial court's findings of fact. See Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W. 2d 315, 315-16 (Tenn. 1987). Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed SAMUEL L. LEWIS, SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J., and TOM E. GRAY, SP. J., joined. Kent. E. Krause, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Landstar Poole, Inc. Alan Wise, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, George Hugh Rhoades, Jr. OPINION This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225 (e)(3) (1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo with a presumption that the trial court's findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(2) (1999); Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W. 2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). When a trial court has -2-
Authoring Judge: Samuel L. Lewis, Sp. J.
|
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/24/00 | |
| Lumbermen's Mutual Underwriting Alliance v. Ramon
M1999-00453-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employer contends (1) the trial court erred in awarding, as medical benefits, the fees of an unapproved chiropractor and (2) the award of temporary total disability benefits is excessive. The employee insists the trial court erred in denying him any permanent partial disability benefits. As discussed herein, the panel has concluded the award should be modified by disallowing the unapproved medical benefits, by reducing the award of temporary total disability benefits from fifty-four weeks to two weeks and by awarding permanent partial disability benefits based on fifteen percent to the body as a whole. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Modified LOSER, SP. J., in which DROWOTA, J., and CANTRELL, SP.J. joined. Richard C. Mangelsdorf, Jr., Leitner, Williams, Dooley & Napolitan, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lumbermen's Mutual Underwriting Alliance, Appellant Martin S. Sir, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Ramon Sanchez MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Sanchez, is forty-five years old and has a seventh or eighth grade education. He moved to the United States from Puerto Rico in 1969. He has experience in construction labor. He began working for the employer, Concrete Form Erectors, in March of 1995. On April 23, 1996, while working for the employer, the claimant and another worker, Robert Garst, were constructing forms for a wall when it began to sway because of high winds. As the wall was -2-
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
|
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/15/00 | |
| Globe Business Furniture, Inc. v. Edeltraub Ingrid Morris
M1999-00393-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Globe, initiated this action for a declaration of the extent of its liability, if any, to the employee, Morris, for an injury to her finger. The employee, Morris, filed a counterclaim seeking medical and disability benefits. After a trial on the merits, the trial judge found (1) that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment and (2) the claimant was not permanently disabled to any extent. The counterclaim was dismissed at the cost of Ms. Morris. By this appeal, the employee insists the trial judge erred in finding that the claimant's injury did not occur while she was performing a "special errand" for the employer and in refusing to award any disability benefits. As discussed herein, the panel finds that the injury is compensable and remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court reversed in part; and Remanded Loser, Sp. J., delivered the opinion of the panel, in which Drowota, J. and Gayden, Sp. J. joined. D. Stuart Caulkins, Stillman, Karr & Wise, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Edeltraub Ingrid Morris. Arthur E. McClellan, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Globe Business Furniture of Tennessee, Inc. MEMORANDUM OPINION The facts are not disputed. The claimant came to the United States in 1988 from her home country of Germany. She graduated from high school in Germany and had three years of training in a hotel -2-
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
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Sumner County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/15/00 | |
| Judy F. Barnett v. Nn Ball & Roller, Inc. and Wasau Insurance Companies
03S01-9811-CH-00133
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has been perfected by the employee, Judy F. Barnett, from the action of the trial court in awarding her 65% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal the employee insists the award of disability is not sufficient and that her disability should be fixed at 1%. Mrs. Barnett was 43 years of age and is a high school graduate. She had taken a drafting course but never used it. She said she had also taken a basic computer concepts course and a typing course. Her prior work experience was in a sewing factory and a grocery store. She began work for defendant, NN Ball & Roller, Inc., in 1984 and at the time in question, she was employed as an inspector of steel bearings. In 199-91 she testified she had an allergy reaction after being out in the sun (not work- related) for some period of time and it had been diagnosed as photodermatitis. The inspector position required her to examine steel bearings on an assembly line passing in front of her. She said that prior to this inspection, the production process involved cleaning the bearings with kerosene in order to cut off grease and that after a ball wash, the bearings were dipped in pack oil. She said that as the process operated there was a strong odor which settled in her hair and clothing. She testified she began having problems in 1993 and that it continued throughout her employment. Her problems were shortness of breath, swollen eyes, sores in her nose, ears peeling, earaches, upset stomach and headaches. She worked until June 2, 1997 and stopped working on her doctor's advise. During the course of her employment, the employer attempted to accommodate her medical problems by improving the ventilation, changing her job and other efforts which did not greatly improve her condition and she was eventually terminated on January 8, 1998 because the company could not comply with her medical restrictions. Causation of injury is not an issue. Material Safety Data Sheets were introduced into evidence. The manufacturer of the pack oil warned it could cause 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Thomas J. Seeley, Jr., |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/10/00 | |
| Komatsu America Hamilton County International Company and Travelers Property Casualty v. Mark A. Cash
03S01-9905-CV-00051
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant employee, Mark A. Cash, appeals the judgment of the trial court and asserts as error the following: (1) the failure to award any permanent disability, (2) the assessment of court costs against the defendant, (3) the failure to award the defendant his costs to prosecute the action, (4) the granting of the motion in limine, (5) the failure to give the defendant the presumption of T.C.A. _ 5-6-116 and (6) the plaintiff's defense should be disallowed because of the provision of T.C.A. _ 5-6-25(d)(1). We conclude that all of the foregoing are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The defendant was born March 26, 1964. He graduated from high school and completed a welding class. His work history consists of working for the Marion County Sheriff's Department; Tennol, a gasohol plant; Concrete Emporium; Chattanooga Corporation; and the plaintiff employer, Komatsu America International Company where he went to work on a regular, rather than a temporary, basis in November 1989. His work over the years has been primarily as a welder. The defendant began to have problems with his left shoulder area in 1992 or 1993. Prior to March 15, 1998, the date of the incident at work, the defendant had been examined and treated for his left shoulder problems by several doctors. On August 18, 1997, he had left shoulder surgery, consisting of an anterior inferior acromioplasty, which was a decompression of the AC joint resection and an inspection of his rotator cuff. His post operative diagnosis was stage II impingement, AC joint arthrosis. He continued to have left shoulder area problem and underwent another surgical procedure on December 1, 1997, which released his levator scapula and curetted the medial border of the scapula. His postoperative diagnosis was chronic levator scapulae syndrome. None of the defendant's shoulder problems at this point were work related. 2
Authoring Judge: H. David Cate, Special Judg
Originating Judge:Hon. L. Marie Williams, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/09/00 | |
| Richard W. Beckwith-Adams v. State of Tennessee
M1999-00041-WC-R3-CV
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference. Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the Panel should be accepted and approved; and It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court. Costs will be paid by appellant, for which execution may issue if necessary.
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
|
Workers Compensation Panel | 05/08/00 | ||
| Anita Chapman v. E-Z Serve Petroleum Marketing
M1999-00441-WC-R3-CV
Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr., Special Judge
Authoring Judge: Honorable Clara Byrd, Judge
Originating Judge:Wilson |
Wilson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/08/00 | |
| Daughters of Charity, d/b/a Saint Thomas Hospital v. Brenda Boyd
M1999-00443-WC-R3-CV
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker's Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _50-6-225(e) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Saint Thomas Hospital, insists (1) that trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the employee's mental injury claim, (2) the trial judge erred by awarding permanent partial disability benefits to employee based on a 55% vocational disability to the body as a whole, (3) the trial judge erred in awarding discretionary costs to the employee and failing to award discretionary costs to the employer, and (4) the trial court erred in awarding employee medical expenses related to her treatment by medical providers not authorized by the employer.
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:HONORABLE CAROL SOLOMAN |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/08/00 | |
| Rebecca J. Amell, By Next of Kin Marvin H. Amell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
03S01-9905-CV-00056
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (hereafter "Liberty Mutual") appeals an award of workers' compensation death benefits to the surviving spouse of an employee killed in the course and scope of her employment. The trial court, acting on a motion for summary judgment, made an award of $77,196 to be paid at the rate of $144.75 per week to the surviving spouse, who was the only dependent of the employee. Liberty Mutual contends that the maximum award to the surviving spouse with no other dependents is limited to $57,9 (4 weeks x $144.75). We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Appeal from a summary judgment order in a workers' compensation case is not controlled by the standard of review provided by T.C.A. _ 5-6-225, but by Rule 56, T.R.C.P. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S..W.2d 523 (Tenn.1991). Where, as in this case, the facts are not in dispute, "the question on appeal is one of law, and our scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying" the trial court's conclusions. Union Carbide Corp. v Huddleston, 854 S.W. 2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993); Smith v. Norris, 218 Tenn. 329, 43 S.W.2d 37 (1966). On March 27, 1998, Rebecca J. Amell sustained fatal injuries in the course and scope of her employment with Arrow Factory Store in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee. She was survived by Marvin H. Amell, her spouse. Her average weekly wage was $289.49 generating a workers' compensation rate of $192.99. The maximum weekly benefit on March 27, 1998, as defined by T.C.A. _ 5-6-12(7)(a), was $492. Liberty Mutual asserts that T.C.A. _ 5-6-21(e)(1) limits the benefits payable to a surviving spouse with no dependent child to one-half of the employee's average weekly wage for 4 weeks. It cites Spencer v. Towson Moving & Storage, Inc., 922 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1996) as limiting the benefits to 4 weeks, and Schultz v. Majik Market, a Div. of 2
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Rex Henry Ogle |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/03/00 | |
| Rebecca J. Amell, By Next of Kin Marvin H. Amell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
03S01-9905-CV-00056
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (hereafter "Liberty Mutual") appeals an award of workers' compensation death benefits to the surviving spouse of an employee killed in the course and scope of her employment. The trial court, acting on a motion for summary judgment, made an award of $77,196 to be paid at the rate of $144.75 per week to the surviving spouse, who was the only dependent of the employee. Liberty Mutual contends that the maximum award to the surviving spouse with no other dependents is limited to $57,9 (4 weeks x $144.75). We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Appeal from a summary judgment order in a workers' compensation case is not controlled by the standard of review provided by T.C.A. _ 5-6-225, but by Rule 56, T.R.C.P. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S..W.2d 523 (Tenn.1991). Where, as in this case, the facts are not in dispute, "the question on appeal is one of law, and our scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying" the trial court's conclusions. Union Carbide Corp. v Huddleston, 854 S.W. 2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993); Smith v. Norris, 218 Tenn. 329, 43 S.W.2d 37 (1966). On March 27, 1998, Rebecca J. Amell sustained fatal injuries in the course and scope of her employment with Arrow Factory Store in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee. She was survived by Marvin H. Amell, her spouse. Her average weekly wage was $289.49 generating a workers' compensation rate of $192.99. The maximum weekly benefit on March 27, 1998, as defined by T.C.A. _ 5-6-12(7)(a), was $492. Liberty Mutual asserts that T.C.A. _ 5-6-21(e)(1) limits the benefits payable to a surviving spouse with no dependent child to one-half of the employee's average weekly wage for 4 weeks. It cites Spencer v. Towson Moving & Storage, Inc., 922 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1996) as limiting the benefits to 4 weeks, and Schultz v. Majik Market, a Div. of 2
Authoring Judge: Peoples, H.N., Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Hon. Rex Henry Ogle |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/03/00 | |
| William Allen Jones v. Travelers Casualty& Surety
E1999-01548-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant-employee appealed the trial court's ruling that his injury was of a temporary nature and that appellee was only liable for medical expenses to the date of the trial. Appellant argues the only expert medical evidence established his injury was of a permanent nature. Judgment of the trial court is reversed to fix permanent disability at 2% to the body as a whole and case is remanded to enforce other alternative findings.
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/27/00 | |
| Charles Thurman v. Maytag Cooking Products, Inc.
03S01-9902-CV-00023
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988).
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
|
McMinn County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/27/00 | |
| Hilda Light v. Frontier Health, Inc., d/b/a Woodridge
E1999-00256-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, Frontier Health, Inc., d/b/a Woodbridge Mental Health Hospital (hereafter "Frontier"), appeals an award to Hilda Light of sixty percent disability to the body as a whole. The issue is whether the trial court erred in basing an award to the body on an impairment rating for an upper extremity. We modify the award to thirty-six percent to the body as a whole.
Authoring Judge: Peoples, H.N., Sp. J.
Originating Judge:G. Richard Johnson, Chancellor |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/26/00 | |
| Darryl Davis v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corporation and
M1999-00008-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) (1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo with a presumption that the trial court's findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(2) (1999); Hill vs. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W. 2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses and issues of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, considerable deference is afforded the trial court's findings of fact. See Humphrey vs. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W. 2d 315, 315-16 (Tenn. 1987).
Authoring Judge: Samuel L. Lewis, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Carol L. Mccoy, Chancellor |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/19/00 | |
| Michael Grandberry v. Illinois Tool Works,
M1998-00528-SC-WCM-CV
This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann._ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference;
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
|
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/12/00 | |
| Scotty Bailes Builder v. Allen H. Davis
03S01-9904-CH-00046
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(1) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue before us is whether the Plaintiff, Scotty Bailes doing business as Scotty Bailes Builder, and Defendant, Allen Davis, agreed for Mr. Davis to have workers' compensation coverage during the roofing job in question. We think they did not and thus affirm. In November 1996, Mr. Davis, a subcontractor, heard that Mr. Bailes, a general contractor, needed a roofer. After meeting with Mr. Bailes, Mr. Davis prepared a proposal, and the parties met on November 13, 1996, although what occurred at this meeting is disputed by the parties. Mr. Davis contends that he, along with two other men, met with Mr. Bailes, but Mr. Davis asserts that he was never asked to sign a form indicating that he did not desire workers' compensation coverage until after his injury. However, Mr. Bailes argues that Mr. Davis, a subcontractor, met with him and his assistant, and Mr. Davis verbally declined workers' compensation coverage for himself, although Mr. Bailes explained that he was required to obtain workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Davis's employees. Mr. Bailes insists that he repeatedly attempted to obtain from Mr. Davis the proper paperwork
Authoring Judge: Houston M. Goddard, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Telford E. Forgety, Jr. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/11/00 |