Franklin Hartsell v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., et al.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, age 54, suffered a job-related myocardial infarction on March 1, 1994. A coronary arteriogram revealed an 8% blockage of his left anterior descending artery which was alleviated by an angioplasty procedure which reduced the blockage to less than 15%. Conservative treatment followed, and he was released to return to full employment on January 1, 1994. From that day forward, the plaintiff has worked steadily and without incident. In July 1991, the plaintiff was hospitalized with chest pains. A cardiac catheterization was performed, which revealed a serious lesion in his left circumflex coronary artery at the left ventricular ridge, with another lesion in his left anterior descending coronary artery. After the 1994 infarction, the lesion in the left anterior artery was substantially worsened. The employer insists that the award is excessive because it was improperly onerated with liability for impairment resulting from pre-existing coronary artery disease. Liability for benefits resulting from impairment as a consequence of the myocardial infarction is conceded. The dispositive issue at trial was the extent of the plaintiff's partial permanent disability. The Chancellor found that the plaintiff had a 5% permanent partial disability and awarded benef its accordingly. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the trial court's judgment is correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The treating physician, Dr. K.P. Channabasappa, testified that the plaintiff's impairment was 29%, which may be extrapolated to Category II of the AMA Guidelines. He stated in a pre-deposition letter that "it is 29%" and on direct examination testified that the impairment was 29%. There was no countervailing testimony offered. 2