Stan Ley M Oo Re v. Pay Less Ca Shway S, In C., E

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals the trial court dismissal of his claims by granting summary judgment in favor of employer, holding the action was barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse and remand. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Reversed and Remanded. JOE H. WALKER III , SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J, and JOE C. LOSER, SP. J. joined. Steve Taylor, Memphis, TN, for the Appellant, Stanley Moore. Lori D. Parrish, Memphis, TN, for the Appellees, Payless Cashways, Inc., et al. MEMORANDUM OPINION Stanley Moore worked for Payless Cashways. During the course of his employment, on June 23, 1999, lumber accidentally fell on Mr. Moore. He was transported to the emergency room and treated by Dr. Bobo. He was paid temporary total benefits until released to return to work in September, 1999. He was followed by Dr. Bobo and Dr. Chen for reflex sympathetic dystrophy until released February 1, 2. The last payment for medical treatment was made March 29, 2, for treatment received February 1, 2. Dr. Bobo was of the opinion that he had no permanent partial impairment. Mr. Moore had obtained counsel at some point, who notified Mr. Moore in April 2, that medical records indicated Mr. Moore had no permanent partial impairment, and the attorney was closing his file, that Mr. Moore could consult with another attorney. Mr. Moore continued to have problems with his left upper and lower extremities. He obtained new counsel and a complaint was filed April 3, 21. Dr. Rizk evaluated the claimant and opined by letter dated June 11, 21, that Mr. Moore has reflex sympathetic dystrophy which Dr. Rizk considers to be a permanent condition, and caused by his work-related accident. Summary judgment was granted for the employer on the ground that the suit is barred by the statute of limitations found at T.C.A. _ 5-6-23, and 224. I. Rule 56.4 provides that summary judgment is appropriate where: (1) there is no genuine issue with regard to the material facts relevant to the claim or defense contained in the motion, and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. See Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). "Courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must also draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor." Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 89. "Courts should grant a summary judgment only when both the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the facts permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion." Id. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment by order entered July 3, 21, stating: "It is the opinion of this Court that Defendants' Motion is not well- founded and should be and is hereby denied." Defendants filed for permission to appeal or for reconsideration. On March 5, 22, the trial court entered an order granting relief from the prior order, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing the complaint. The trial court made no findings of fact, thus the appeal comes with no presumption of correctness. The panel finds that summary judgment was not appropriate in this case. II. A complaint for workers' compensation benefits must be filed within one year after the accident resulting in injury, T.C.A. _ 5-6-23; or within one year after the occurrence of injury, T.C.A. _ 5-6-224. It is well-settled that "the running of the statute of limitations is suspended until by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that an injury compensable under the workmen's compensation laws has been sustained." Livingston v. Shelby Williams Indus., Inc., 811 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1991). It is the date on which the disability manifests itself to a person of reasonable diligence, not the date of the accident which triggers the running of the statute of limitations. Jones v. Home Indem. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tenn. 1984). Ordinarily, the limitation period should not begin to run until a physician presents claimant with a diagnosis of his condition. Poore v. Magnavox Co., 666 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1984).