State of Tennessee v. Billy Ray Moats
The Defendant, Billy Ray Moats, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court convictions for two counts each of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient relative to the value of the stolen property in support of his theft convictions; in addition, he raises for the first time on appeal a challenge to the version of the theft grading statute applied during sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that although the evidence regarding the property’s value was sufficient, the trial court should have applied the amended theft grading statute that went into effect on January 1, 2017, and that plain error relief is warranted. We remand for the entry of corrected judgments in Counts 3 and 4 reflecting Class A misdemeanor convictions and a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to serve. The trial court’s merger of the convictions and its determination regarding consecutive sentencing will remain the same. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leslie Burnett Montgomery v. Gary Alan Montgomery
This divorce action concerns the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate, among other issues concerning the trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Judith Michele Dial v. James Klemis, M.D., et al.
This is a health care liability case. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint due to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), arguing that the plaintiff had not provided them HIPAA compliant medical authorizations allowing them to receive medical records from the other providers being sent statutorily-required pre-suit notice. The trial court agreed with the defendants’ argument and, upon observing that the plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the 120-day extension of the statutory limitation period pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c), held that the complaint was time-barred and should be dismissed with prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Revada Wright
The Defendant, Revada Wright, was convicted by a Bradley County Criminal Court jury of speeding, a Class C misdemeanor, and possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 gram of cocaine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (Supp. 2012) (subsequently amended) (possession of cocaine); 55-8-152 (2017) (speeding). He received a sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because there is insufficient evidence to support his drug conviction. We reverse the judgment for possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 gram of cocaine, vacate the Defendant’s conviction, and dismiss the charge. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeff Druek v. Hydrogen Engine Center, Inc., Et Al.
This action involves the plaintiff’s attempted levy of execution on improved real property in Greeneville, Tennessee, owned by an intervening corporation, HEC-TINA, Inc. (“HECTINA”), and subject to a lease by another corporation, Plastic Innovation, Inc. (collectively, “Intervenors”), to satisfy a judgment against the original defendant/debtor corporation, Hydrogen Engine Center, Inc., of Iowa. The plaintiff alleged that Hydrogen Engine Center, Inc., was the parent corporation of HEC-TINA. Following a hearing and upon Intervenors’ pleadings, the Greene County Circuit Court (“trial court”) entered two orders, one granting Intervenors’ petition to intervene and one granting Intervenors’ motion to quash any levy of execution on assets owned by HEC-TINA. The plaintiff has appealed the latter order. Having determined that the order granting the motion to quash was entered based upon the consent and agreement of both the plaintiff and Intervenors, we affirm. We deny Intervenors’ motions to consider post-judgment facts and Intervenors’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Alexis S.
This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of termination petitions upon remand. We reverse the dismissal of the petition as applied to the father but affirm the dismissal of the petition as applied to the mother. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Richens
The Defendant, Jonathan Richens, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revocation of probation for his effective six-year sentence for resisting arrest and aggravated assault. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Scott Whitson, Jr.
Defendant, David Scott Whitson, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his Community Corrections sentence in May 2019. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it required Defendant to serve his sentence. After conducting a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Heun Kim, et al. v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the court for a second time. Plaintiffs filed a negligence suit in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee after their six-year-old son fell from the fifth-floor balcony of the state-owned and -operated Paris Landing State Park Inn. Plaintiffs alleged that the State was negligent in two respects: 1) in allowing their son to gain access to an unoccupied guest room and the attached balcony, and 2) in maintaining balcony railings that were shorter in height than was required by applicable building codes. Following a bench trial, the Tennessee Claims Commissioner concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to establish that the State’s negligence was the proximate cause of their son’s injuries. Plaintiffs appealed to this Court, and we held that the Commissioner’s conclusions of law were deficient and vacated and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the Commissioner entered a supplemental order that included additional conclusions of law as to both claims for negligence, and, again, determined that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that the Inn’s acts were the proximate cause of their son’s fall and dismissed the claim in its entirety. Plaintiffs again appeal. We affirm the Commissioner’s holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish that the negligence of the Inn was the proximate cause of their son’s injuries. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Dane Lee Duckett
The Appellant, Dane Lee Duckett, appeals the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to three counts of possession of one-half gram or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, which resulted in an effective ten-year sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Brian W. Et Al.
A mother and father appeal the juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights based on six statutory grounds. They also challenge the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Loans Yes v. Kroger Limited Partnership I Et Al.
A commercial tenant stopped paying rent on leased space six months before the end of its five-year term. The landlord was unsuccessful in its attempts to find a replacement tenant and sued the tenant for breach of contract. The trial court found in favor of the landlord and awarded it damages, including unpaid rent, late fees, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. The tenant appealed. Other than a change in the amount of late fees awarded and instructions regarding recalculating the prejudgment interest, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Rommie H.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. The trial court concluded that the paternal grandparents had proven three statutory grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights: abandonment by failure to visit; abandonment by failure to support; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of her child. The court also concluded that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, the mother argues that the grandparents’ petition did not sufficiently plead the statutory grounds for termination. And even if sufficiently pled, the mother argues that the evidence of the grounds and the child’s best interest was less than clear and convincing. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Wallace v. City of Lewisburg, Tennessee
Former city employee brought suit for age discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Based upon its determination that the city fired the employee because a majority of the city council members disapproved of his job performance and that the employee failed to prove that age was a determining factor in his termination, the trial court dismissed the employee’s complaint. We affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Mindy Donovan v. Joshua R. Hastings
The trial court dismissed a contractor’s amended countercomplaint against a homeowner for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court then awarded the homeowner her attorney fees in the amount of $3,600 pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119(c). The homeowner appealed arguing that, in limiting her recovery to $3,600, the trial court interpreted the statute too narrowly. Because the trial court properly interpreted the statute, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mindy Donovan v. Joshua R. Hastings - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that some of the issues raised by the defendant/appellee, Joshua R. Hastings, are untimely. Mr. Hastings was required to raise issues related to the voluntary dismissal of claims and his motions to compel within thirty days of the final judgment. See TENN. R. APP. P. 4(a). After ruling on those issues, the trial court deemed the May 24, 2019 order to be a final judgment. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 58. But Mr. Hastings did not seek an appeal within thirty days of that order. So appellate review is limited to what took place after the time for appeal of the May 24, 2019 order ran, the award of attorney’s fees to plaintiff/appellant Mindy Donovan. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Decosio Jacques Clark
The defendant in this case is a co-defendant below with the defendants in the matter, State v. Griffin, __ S.W.3d __, __, No. E2020-00327-SC-T10B-CO (Tenn. 2020). This Court issued a separate opinion today in Griffin which is controlling to the outcome of this case. See id. Specifically, we held in Griffin that the trial judge properly denied recusal, even though he served as a Deputy District Attorney General in Knox County at the time the defendants were indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury. Id. For the reasons provided in Griffin, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case and reinstate the trial court’s denial of recusal. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Raffell Griffin, Et Al.
The trial judge in this matter served as a deputy district attorney general in Knox County at the time the defendants were indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury. After a subsequent appointment to serve as a trial judge in Knox County Criminal Court, the trial judge was assigned to the defendants’ cases. The defendants moved for recusal, arguing that the trial judge had supervisory authority over their cases as Deputy District Attorney General. The trial judge denied the motions for recusal, and the defendants filed an appeal in the Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial judge’s decision, holding that recusal of the trial judge was necessary. We then granted the State’s accelerated application for permission to appeal to this Court. Having thoroughly reviewed the filings of the parties and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial judge’s denial of the motion to recuse was appropriate in this case. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Isaiah Styles
This case is one of three cases decided today by this Court involving a trial judge who previously served as a deputy district attorney general in Knox County at the time the defendants in each case were indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury. After a subsequent appointment to serve as a trial judge in Knox County Criminal Court, the trial judge was assigned to the defendants’ cases. The defendant in this case moved for recusal, arguing that the trial judge previously had supervisory authority over his case as Deputy District Attorney General. The trial judge denied the motion for recusal, and the defendant filed an appeal in the Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial judge’s decision, holding that recusal of the trial judge was necessary. We then granted the State’s accelerated application for permission to appeal to this Court. This Court issued a separate opinion today in State v. Griffin, __ S.W.3d __, __, No. E2020-00327-SC-T10B-CO (Tenn. 2020), which is controlling to the outcome of this case. Specifically, we held in Griffin that the defendant failed to establish that the trial judge’s supervisory responsibilities in his role as a deputy district attorney general were personal or substantial in that case. Id. We hold that the same is true for this case. Therefore, for the reasons provided in Griffin, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s denial of recusal in this case. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Moriarco Lee v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Moriarco Lee, was found guilty by a jury of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault, and he received a twenty-two-year sentence in confinement. The Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to this court. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending, among other claims not raised on appeal, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to subpoena alibi witnesses to testify at trial, failed to present video evidence at trial, and failed to challenge a biased juror. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bryan Austin Demeza v. State of Tennessee
A Tipton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bryan Austin Demeza, of one count of aggravated child neglect, three counts of aggravated child abuse, and one count of felony murder. On direct appeal, this court reduced one of the Petitioner’s convictions from aggravated child neglect to child neglect. State v. Bryan Austin Demeza, W2016-02086-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1040145, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 7, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 8, 2018). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brian Lee Higdon v. Aehui Nmi Higdon
This appeal arises from a divorce. Brian Lee Higdon (“Husband”) filed for divorce from Aehui Higdon (“Wife”) in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”). The parties executed a marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”). The Trial Court approved the MDA and entered a Final Decree of Divorce. Wife later filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 seeking to have the MDA and Final Decree of Divorce set aside on grounds of mistake of fact, fraud, and fundamental unfairness. After a hearing at which both Husband and Wife testified, the Trial Court denied Wife’s motion. Wife appeals, arguing among other things that she was coerced into signing the MDA. Deferring to the Trial Court’s implicit credibility determinations, we do not find that Wife was coerced into signing the MDA. Wife failed to meet her burden of clear and convincing evidence that there was mistake of fact, fraud, or fundamental unfairness in the execution of the MDA. In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s decision to deny Wife’s Rule 60.02 motion. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trevor Rochel Cullom, Alias
Defendant, Trevor Rochel Cullom, Alias, appeals from the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation. After a review of the record, we determine that Defendant was denied due process during his revocation hearing. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new hearing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Toomes
The Defendant, Antonio Toomes, appeals his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in ordering him to proceed pro se at trial on the day before trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement; and (3) the prosecutors made improper comments during voir dire and closing arguments. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the Defendant implicitly waived or forfeited his right to counsel and in requiring the Defendant to proceed pro se at trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Moran
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Joseph Moran, of two counts of sexual battery and one count of domestic assault by provocative contact. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of two years, suspended to supervised probation after serving sixty days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we agree the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, but given the otherwise overwhelming evidence presented at trial, this error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |