Robert Dickerson v. United Medical Transportation, LLC, et al.
After suffering an injury, patient alleged that in-patient facility was negligent in failing to inform medical transportation company of his physical limitations prior to his discharge from the facility. In response to the facility’s summary judgment motion, patient relied on the testimony of an “expert in passenger ground transportation.” The trial court found that issues of fact remained as to patient’s ambulation needs, but granted summary judgment as to standard of care and breach because patient’s expert was not competent to testify under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act, and the common knowledge exception did not apply. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Gersper v. Jonathan Turner
This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-101 to -110, challenging the denial of the petition to dismiss all three claims asserted by the plaintiff. After the defendant filed his TPPA petition, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed two of his three claims, leaving only his claim for malicious prosecution. While the TPPA petitioner sought to adjudicate all three claims under the TPPA, the trial court ruled that the only remaining issue was whether the plaintiff “has properly plead a claim for malicious prosecution and whether this action should be dismissed pursuant to TPPA.” Following a hearing limited to the malicious prosecution claim, the trial court denied the petition to dismiss without setting forth the reasons for its decision. On appeal, the TPPA petitioner contends he was wrongfully deprived of a decision on his petition concerning the two claims the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed. He also contends the trial court erred in denying his TPPA petition to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim. Relying on the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling in Flade v. City of Shelbyville, ––– S.W.3d ––––, No. M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV, 2024 WL 4448736, at *5 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2024), we affirm the trial court’s determination that the TPPA petitioner was not entitled to a decision on the two voluntarily dismissed claims. As for the trial court’s denial of the petition to dismiss the remaining claim, malicious prosecution, we have determined that the TPPA petitioner established that the TPPA applies to the claim presented, which shifted to the plaintiff the burden to establish “a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in the legal action.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-105. We have also determined that the plaintiff failed to establish an essential element of his malicious prosecution claim, that the proceeding brought against him by the defendant “terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” See Mynatt v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, Chapter 39, 669 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2023). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to not adjudicate the first two claims after they were voluntarily dismissed but reverse the trial court’s decision denying the TPPA petition to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim and remand with instructions to dismiss that claim. Further, the TPPA states that, “[i]f the court dismisses a legal action pursuant to a petition filed under this chapter, the court shall award to the petitioning party . . . [c]ourt costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, discretionary costs, and other expenses incurred in filing and prevailing upon the petition.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-107(a), (a)(1). Accordingly, we remand with instructions for the trial court to make the appropriate award as it pertains to the costs and fees incurred in the trial court and on appeal that pertain to the TPPA petitioner’s efforts to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Roxana Bianca Jordan v. Thomas Kerry Jordan
A pro se litigant sought to appeal the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion. She did not follow the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2.03. Therefore, we dismiss the case. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Foothills Land Conservancy v. Creekside Estates Partnership Et Al.
This case involves dueling declaratory judgment actions arising out of a deed of conservation easement dated December 31, 2007, encumbering property located within the Town of Farragut in Knox County. The trial court found in favor of Foothills Land Conservancy and awarded the nonprofit its damages, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. Upon review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mitchell C.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to a minor child based on severe abuse. The trial court also concluded that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron Malone v. State of Tennessee
Aaron Malone, Petitioner, was convicted of first degree felony murder for his role in a murder that took place during an attempted robbery and sentenced to life in prison. State v. Malone, No. W2009-02047-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1005487, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 13, 2011). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. Malone v. State, No. W2016-00666-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 1404374, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2017). Petitioner then filed a “Petition to Reopen for Requesting DNA Post-conviction.” The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, and Petitioner timely appealed, arguing that: (1) the postconviction court erred by failing to address and make findings of fact regarding all four requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-304 in its order denying the petition; (2) the post-conviction court erred in finding the evidence was previously subjected to DNA analysis; (3) the post-conviction court erred in finding there was not a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results were obtained from DNA analysis; (4) the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing; and (5) the post-conviction court erred by failing to appoint new counsel after counsel informed the court he was leaving the jurisdiction. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lorenzo C. White, et al. v. Carolyn Fields Hayes, et al.
This appeal concerns the estate of Dr. Hillery W. Key (“Dr. Key”), who died testate in 1912. These proceedings began in 1998 in the Chancery Court for Tipton County (“the Trial Court”). The parties are descendants of Dr. Key. Odessa Rose and Marilyn Locke (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) advocate a per capita distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. Carolyn Fields Hayes and Frederick Fields (“Hayes Defendants,” collectively) and Larry Murrell, Jr., Joyce A. Carter, Dorethea McIntyre, and Lynnie Higgs (“Murrell Defendants,” collectively) (“Defendants,” all defendants together) assert that this Court, in a 2005 opinion, already decided upon a per stirpes distribution. The parties reached an agreement on the record in open court ostensibly ending this long-running matter, but Plaintiffs have appealed anyway. Defendants filed motions to dismiss. We hold, inter alia, that Plaintiffs are bound by the agreement announced in court whereby the parties waived their right to appeal. We hold further that the law of the case doctrine prevents Plaintiffs from relitigating the distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. We affirm. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied as moot. We find this appeal frivolous, and remand for the Trial Court to award Defendants reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122, to be paid by Plaintiffs rather than from the common fund in this case. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Martin Robbs
The Defendant, Andrew Martin Robbs, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence per |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua James Smith
A Hamblen County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua James Smith, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges his conviction and sentence, but the State argues that this appeal should be dismissed because his notice of appeal was untimely. Upon our review, we agree that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the “interest of justice” does not require us to waive the timely filing requirement. We respectfully dismiss the appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua James Smith
I ultimately concur in the majority’s judgment dismissing this appeal. I write |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher L. Dowlen
The Defendant, Christopher L. Dowlen, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve his original four-year sentence for his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement (1) by finding sufficient evidence that the Defendant possessed a firearm in violation of his probation, and (2) by failing to consider whether full revocation of his sentence would serve the “ends of justice” and “best interest” of the Defendant. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mamadou Dian Diallo v. Aminata Cherif Diallo
This is an appeal of a final divorce decree brought by a husband acting pro se. Because the husband’s brief is deficient, we determine that he has waived consideration of any issues. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Charles C. Rowe
The Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) granted the petition of Janice Peters-Rowe (“Petitioner”) for a conservatorship over her husband, Charles Rowe (“Respondent”). Respondent’s daughter from a previous marriage, Dawn Rowe (“Daughter”), filed an intervening petition. Daughter claimed that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction, arguing that Respondent had lived his entire life in New York until recently and that Respondent had not established residency in Tennessee. The Trial Court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter; that the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent was valid, giving Petitioner priority for appointment as conservator; and that it was in Respondent’s best interest that Petitioner be appointed as his conservator. Daughter appealed. Given that Respondent did not have the mental capacity to change his domicile at the time of his arrival in Tennessee, we conclude that the Trial Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and accordingly vacate the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Marina Kotova v. Thomas Kevin True
This is an appeal from a final order entered on June 6, 2024. According to the appellant, the notice of appeal was mailed to this Court on July 3, 2024, but the notice never arrived at the Appellate Court Clerk’s Office. The appellant provided a tracking number that was allegedly used to mail the notice of appeal, but the tracking information does not demonstrate that the notice was sent via certified mail pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 20 during the thirty-day appeal period. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy D. Woodard Jr.
The Defendant, Billy D. Woodard, Jr., appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve the original five-year sentence for his theft conviction in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement (1) by relying on grounds not included in the probation violation warrant; and (2) by failing to consider any other punishment or alternative to incarceration. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Bank National Association v. Mark A. Searcy
A bank obtained a money judgment in South Carolina in 2010. The judgment debtor moved to North Carolina, and the bank domesticated the South Carolina judgment in North Carolina, a state that treats enrolled judgments as new North Carolina judgments. The judgment debtor moved to Tennessee, and in 2023, the bank filed a petition to enroll the North Carolina judgment in Tennessee. The judgment debtor objected, arguing that the original South Carolina judgment had expired. The bank responded that it was not seeking to enroll the South Carolina judgment, but instead the North Carolina judgment. The trial court enrolled the North Carolina judgment. The judgment debtor appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gene A. Hoskins, Jr.
The Defendant, Gene A. Hoskins, Jr., appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve the original three-year sentence for his aggravated assault conviction in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement (1) by failing to consider the consequence of the revocation as a separate discretionary decision, and (2) by failing to consider the interests of justice. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Jordan L. Et Al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two children. The trial court determined that the mother had abandoned the children by willful failure to make reasonable payments toward the support of the children and ruled that it was in the children’s best interests for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the ground of abandonment by failure to support and that clear and convincing evidence exists to support that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Tony Burrell
Defendant, William Tony Burrell, was indicted for driving under the influence (DUI), possession of a handgun while under the influence, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and violation of the implied consent law. After Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained against him during a traffic stop that led to his arrest was denied by the trial court, Defendant entered into negotiated guilty pleas to one count of DUI and one count of possession of a handgun while under the influence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties reserved a certified question of law for appeal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). After review, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because the certification did not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and we dismiss the appeal. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Williams, IV
The defendant, Cornelius Williams IV, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second-degree murder and convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error in providing the jury with an erroneous instruction; (3) the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to introduce a pro se pleading purportedly filed by the defendant; (4) the defendant is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (5) the defendant’s sentence for convicted felon in possession of a handgun is illegal. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count two indicating the statutorily authorized release eligibility of eighty-five percent on the handgun conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Williams, IV - Concur in Part/Dissent in Part
I fully concur with my respected colleagues reasoning and judgment as it relates to Parts I through IV of the majority opinion. As it relates to Part V, however, I must depart from the majority regarding the remedy for the trial court’s imposition of an illegal sentence. I believe the Defendant has the right to a sentencing hearing upon remand. On this point alone, I dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Rolandus Keel v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, filed a pro se “Motion to Reopen Post Conviction Petition in Conjunction with Writ of Error Coram Nobis” (“the Petition”).1 The trial court found that the Coram Nobis Petition, on its face, failed “to establish that there is newly discovered evidence that would give rise to coram nobis relief” and summarily dismissed the Coram Nobis Petition. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the Coram Nobis Petition. Because Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking appellate review of the denial of the Motion to Re-open, we lack jurisdiction to consider the Motion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(c). |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danielle Wright v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Danielle Wright, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Houston-Polk, III
The Defendant, John Houston-Polk, III, was convicted in a Rutherford County Circuit Court bench trial of simple possession of methamphetamine, a Class A misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail with the first 30 days to be served at 100% and the sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in two general sessions court cases. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his vehicle parked in the driveway of his parents’ home. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jarmie Alonzo Hill
The Defendant, Jarmie Alonzo Hill, whose first trial with a codefendant before a Davidson County Criminal Court jury ended in a mistrial, was convicted in a second Davidson County Criminal Court bench trial of aggravated assault with serious bodily injury. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not sua sponte recusing itself based on a prejudicial finding it made against the Defendant in the codefendant’s unrelated drug case; (2) whether the State committed a Brady violation by not providing the Defendant with the transcript of an unavailable witness’s jury trial testimony until the first day of the retrial; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |