State of Tennessee v. Manoochehre Lee Dadfar
The Defendant, Manoochehre Lee Dadfar, appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for his convictions for initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine and possession with the intent to sell a controlled substance and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Kelly Smith v. Grady Perry, Warden
Richard Kelly Smith, Petitioner, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“the Petition”), claiming that he is “being illegally restrained of his liberty by an illegal, void, and/or expired criminal conviction/sentence.” The habeas corpus court found that his sentence had not expired and that the Petition “demonstrate[d] no right to relief” and summarily dismissed the Petition. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jared Effler Et Al. v. Purdue Pharma L.P. Et Al.
This appeal concerns the interpretation of the Drug Dealer Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-38-101, -116 (“DDLA”). A number of Tennessee district attorneys (“the District Attorney Plaintiffs”), as well as two minor children through their guardian ad litem (“Plaintiffs,” all together), sued certain drug manufacturers (“Manufacturer Defendants”) and others in the Circuit Court for Campbell County (“the Trial Court”) alleging the diversion of opioids.1 Manufacturer Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The Trial Court, in granting the motion to dismiss, held that the DDLA does not apply to manufacturers who lawfully produce drugs and that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that their complaint contained allegations sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. Manufacturer Defendants contend that the DDLA applies to “street dealers,” not regulated entities such as themselves. In addition, Manufacturer Defendants argue that the District Attorney Plaintiffs lack standing. We hold, first, that the DDLA allows district attorneys to pursue DDLA claims on behalf of the political subdivisions within their respective judicial districts. Thus, the District Attorney Plaintiffs have standing. We hold further that, taking as true Plaintiffs’ detailed allegations that Manufacturer Defendants knowingly participated in the diversion of opioids, Plaintiffs have stated claims upon which relief can be granted. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for this case to proceed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Lynn Mathews v. Douglas Clay Mathews
This is a post-divorce case involving a husband’s petition to terminate his alimony obligation. Husband argued that the wife cohabited with a paramour, which, pursuant to the parties’ MDA, terminated his alimony obligation. The trial court, however, found that wife and her paramour did not cohabit with one another and denied husband’s petition. Additionally, the trial court denied wife’s request for attorney’s fees, finding that her increased income, combined with the alimony she was receiving from husband, allowed her to afford to pay her attorney’s fees at trial. Wife and Husband raise separate issues on appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Bigelow v. John Schumacher
This is a parentage action in which the putative father challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-201, et seq. After the trial court accepted jurisdiction and appointed a special master, the putative father filed a notice of appeal. Because the trial court has not entered a final judgment that resolves all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Arnold Ray Parker v. William H. Clayton
In this suit for conversion, a truck owner alleges that his friend converted his truck for the friend’s own use and the friend asserts that the owner gave him the truck as a gift. The trial court found the owner was more credible and concluded the friend was liable for conversion. The court awarded the owner damages, including lost earnings to compensate him for the time he was unable to earn a living by driving his truck. The friend appealed, claiming the court erred by awarding the owner more than the dollar amount set forth in the complaint. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in most respects, but we modify the damages award to conform to the requested amount. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Makoyous Houston
The Appellant, Makoyous Houston, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, contending that the proof adduced at the hearing was insufficient to support the revocation and that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Rachel Beth Haynes v. Allan Vincent Daugherty - Concurring in part and dissenting in part
When Allan Daugherty fell behind in paying child support for his three children, the State of Tennessee, acting on behalf of the children’s mother, filed a petition for civil contempt. Mr. Daugherty and the State agreed on the amount of the child support arrearage, $10,288.57, and Mr. Daugherty further agreed that an automatic attachment could issue for his arrest if he failed to pay child support for a thirty-day period. The circuit court confirmed an agreed order reflecting both of these agreements. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Helena Moore
The Appellant, Helena Moore, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her community corrections sentence and order to serve her original two-year sentence in confinement, contending that she should have been returned to community corrections. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Rachel Beth Haynes v. Allan Vincent Daugherty
The issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court erred in requiring a cash-only appearance bond. Father, who had an arrearage judgment for failing to pay child support, was arrested and incarcerated pursuant to an order of attachment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(2). The trial court set an appearance bond, without an evidentiary hearing, at the full amount of the alleged arrearage, $13,413.45, and restricted the bond to cash. The order also directed that, upon payment of the cash bond, the funds were to be forwarded immediately to the State Disbursement Unit and applied to Father’s arrears. In subsequent hearings, the trial court denied Father the right to post a secured bond, and this Tenn. R. App. P. 10 Extraordinary Appeal followed. First, we hold that the trial court violated Father’s constitutional rights under Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution and under the equal protection guarantees of both the Tennessee and United States Constitutions by imposing a cash-only appearance bond. Second, we hold that the trial court violated Father’s due process rights under both the state and federal constitutions by imposing a $13,413.45 cash-only bond as a means to collect a civil debt and ordering that the bond be immediately applied in satisfaction of the alleged debt, without an evidentiary hearing. Finally, we hold that the trial court misconstrued the applicable statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(2), as allowing it to use the appearance bond solely as a means to collect the alleged arrears, rather than as a means to ensure Father’s appearance for legal proceedings. Therefore, because the trial court failed to identify and apply the appropriate legal principles, both statutory and constitutional, and its decision was not supported by an evidentiary foundation, the decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Because the trial court erred in requiring a cash-only appearance bond, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, the amount of bond shall be $1,000, which Father may post with sufficient sureties, and the case is remanded for further proceedings as may be necessary. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon A. Loving v. Jonathan E. Loving
Husband appeals from a divorce judgment and the entry of a permanent parenting plan, arguing that the trial court erred in not allowing him to put on any proof at the trial of this matter. For the reasons stated herein, and because we conclude that Husband should have been able to put on proof concerning the child’s best interests, we vacate the permanent parenting plan and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia A. Graham v. Garrett Weaver Et Al.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her premises liability action for failure to show that Defendant was the owner of the premises or built the deck on which Plaintiff fell. Plaintiff has failed to file a trial transcript or statement of the evidence; consequently, we accord the trial court’s judgment a presumption that the evidence supports the holding and affirm the judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of John E. Mayfield
The owner of a storage facility agreed to sell the facility and died shortly after signing the purchase and sale agreement. The buyer filed a claim with the estate, seeking specific performance of the agreement. The estate’s administrator excepted to the claim, arguing that the agreement was unenforceable and that the decedent lacked the mental capacity to understand his actions when he signed the agreement. The trial court concluded that the agreement was not enforceable because there was no mutuality of assent to its terms and dismissed the buyer’s claim. The buyer appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand it for further proceedings. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of John E. Mayfield - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the Trial Court’s order dismissing Mr. Saltsman’s claim. I instead would affirm the dismissal because Mr. Mayfield informed Mr. Saltsman before Mr. Saltsman ever even saw it that the Commercial Purchase and Sale Agreement (“the Purported Instrument”) was invalid and, as the majority states, “had to be rewritten . . .”, and Mr. Saltsman acknowledged and agreed to that. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
William Zukowski v. Shawn Phillips, Warden
William Zukowski, Petitioner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pronounce judgment and sentence for his five convictions of rape of a child because (1) his consecutive sentences violated double jeopardy, (2) the indictment was deficient because the charges were multiplicitous, and (3) the trial court’s failure to require an election violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. The habeas corpus court found that Petitioner’s claims were not cognizable habeas corpus claims and summarily dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeremy Ash v. Jaclyn Ash
This appeal arises from a post-divorce dispute over child custody wherein the father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan. Following a hearing in October 2017, the Trial Court found that a material change in circumstance existed and implemented a temporary parenting plan, determining that plan to be in the child’s best interest. Thereafter in April 2018, the Trial Court converted that temporary parenting plan into a permanent parenting plan upon its determination that the temporary plan appeared to be working satisfactorily. Mother appeals to this Court. Because the Trial Court did not conduct a best interest analysis or make the required statutory finding of best interest, we vacate the April 2018 judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings as necessary. We affirm the Trial Court in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alan Cartee v. Dale Morris, Et Al.
The plaintiff filed a premises liability action against a premises owner alleging that the premises owner was liable for injuries the plaintiff sustained after falling down a staircase located on the premises owner’s property. The trial court denied the premises owner’s motion for summary judgment but granted permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of an essential element of his claim, we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Department of Health Et Al. v. Norma J. Sparks
The Department of Health reprimanded and issued civil penalties against a physician assistant for prescribing controlled substances under the supervision of a physician who lacked DEA registration, failing to register with the Controlled Substances Monitoring Database (“CSMD”), and failing to check the database prior to prescribing controlled substances. On a petition for review, the chancery court reversed the Department’s decision. We conclude that the Department’s interpretation of the Physician Assistants Act is contrary to law and improperly places the duty on the physician assistant to determine whether a supervising physician is in compliance with an unwritten requirement that the physician be registered with the DEA to be able to supervise a physician assistant who prescribes controlled substances. Furthermore, the record does not contain substantial and material evidence that the Department provided the physician assistant with the statutorily-required notice that either registration with the CSMD or checking with the CSMD was required. We affirm the decision of the chancery court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Zachary Ronald Wright v. Angelene Hope Wright
After father engaged in abusive conduct, mother petitioned for an order of protection. The trial court granted an ex parte order precluding father from contacting mother and their two minor children and set a hearing. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that the minor children were domestic abuse and sexual assault victims; it extended the order of protection for one year. The court permitted father supervised visitation with his biological daughter once every other week, and awarded mother child support. The court deviated from the amount of support required by the child support guidelines, and instead awarded mother $200 per week. The court did not state the amount of support that would have been ordered under the guidelines nor a justification for the variance. Father appeals. We affirm the extension of the order of protection for one year. We vacate the portion of the trial court’s order requiring father to pay excess child support, and remand to the trial court with instructions to make the requisite findings, pursuant to applicable law, and consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Doe v. Austin Davis
The plaintiff, who is now an adult, filed this action against Austin Davis seeking compensatory and punitive damages for intentional invasion of privacy and defamation. The plaintiff also sought to enjoin Mr. Davis from further intrusion into her private life by posting to social media statements regarding her childhood sexual molestation as well as the private details of her life and childhood. After two years of Mr. Davis’s refusal to submit to any discovery on any subject and refusal to obey an order compelling discovery, the parties appeared before a special master for a case management conference. During this meeting, Mr. Davis unequivocally informed the Special Master that he had no intention of providing responses to any of the plaintiff’s discovery. Two weeks later, Mr. Davis responded to the plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel discovery by reiterating his refusal to provide responses, stating: “[T]he Defendant does not wish to provide any Discovery information to anyone voluntarily or involuntarily involved in the [sexual abuse] cover up.” Mr. Davis reaffirmed this declaration in open court during the hearing on the renewed motion for sanctions. Following the hearing, the trial court granted the motion for sanctions and awarded the plaintiff a default judgment on all issues concerning liability. After a trial on the issue of damages, the jury returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff $300,000 in compensatory damages and $1,800,000 in punitive damages. The trial court adopted both awards in its final judgment, and this appeal followed. The brief filed by Mr. Davis in this appeal is profoundly deficient and fails to comply with Rule 27(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Specifically, his Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are littered with a series of nonsensical, illogical statements unrelated to the merits of this appeal. Moreover, the Argument section of his brief fails to set forth any contentions with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefore, including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record as required by Rule 27(a)(7)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In fact, the entire Argument, which is less than one page, merely contains a restatement of the issues and the statement that Mr. Davis relies on this “court’s ability to exercise ‘sua sponte’ authority in the best interest of justice, and to protect children.” Based on Mr. Davis’s profound failure to comply with Rule 27(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Mr. Davis has waived his right to an appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Doe v. Austin Davis - Dissenting
Upon reading the majority opinion, both what is said and what is left unsaid, one may sum it up as follows: Mr. Davis is at fault, he did not follow the rules, and he is getting what he deserves. Mr. Davis may indeed deserve what the majority is giving him, but not in the way they do it. I respectfully dissent. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Anne Dillon, Et Al. v. Craig Morris, Et Al.
The plaintiffs/appellants filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing one of the plaintiffs’ claims as to all of the defendants and all of the claims as to one of the defendants. The defendants/appellees responded to the notice of appeal by filing a motion to dismiss this appeal as premature and not subject to a final appealable order of the trial court. Because the trial court has not yet resolved all the claims between all the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dianne Hamilton, et al. v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. The plaintiff contends the trial judge should be disqualified because a lawyer with the Lewis Thomason law firm, which represents the defendant in this action, provided a letter of recommendation on behalf of the trial judge in support of the judge’s application for appointment to a vacancy on the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Plaintiff also contends the trial judge should be disqualified because the judge failed to disclose “the extrajudicial relationship.” Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B § 2.01, we find that the lawyer who provided the letter of recommendation has no involvement in this case, and that lawyer merely has a de minimis interest in the outcome of this case because the law firm representing the defendant is one of the larger multi-city firms in this state. Based on these facts and the relevant legal principles, we find no basis to conclude that the trial judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Darion Merriweather v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Darion Merriweather, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Yates v. State of Tennessee
In this procedurally complex and litigious case, the Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, was convicted in three sets of convictions, 1993, 1994, and 2003, of: (1993) especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping, receiving an effective eighteen-year sentence; (1994) five counts of aggravated assault, receiving a ten-year concurrent sentence; and (2003) aggravated robbery, receiving a thirty-year Range II sentence. The Petitioner has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences. In this, his latest challenge, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2003 convictions. He contended that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court had improperly amended his judgment of conviction. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the grounds for relief had clearly been waived because they had not been raised in the Petitioner’s prior petition for post-conviction relief. In the alternative, the trial court stated that, if it considered the petition as a motion to re-open the prior post-conviction proceeding, the Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |