State of Tennessee v. Amail John Land
The defendant, Amail John Land, appeals his Dekalb County Criminal Court jury convictions of burglary, theft of property valued at less than $500, and vandalism of property valued at less than $500. He challenges the admission of his pretrial statement to the police, the admission of testimony concerning the contents of a video recording that had been destroyed prior to trial, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Lynn Kelley
Defendant, Gregory Lynn Kelley, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for one count of sale of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of facilitation of the sale of methamphetamine over 0.5 grams, a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender to serve eight years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Defendant’s request to serve his sentence on probation. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Haiser Et Al. v. Michael McClung Et Al.
This case involves two consolidated actions brought by opposing boards of directors of a residential development community club, with each board claiming legitimacy. The plaintiffs to the original action were owners of real property in the development who held a special meeting in September 2011 in order to elect a new board of directors for the community club. The previous board of directors and defendants to the original action contested the validity of the election, claiming that none of the counted votes were cast by members in good standing. The defendants subsequently met in November 2011 and again in March 2012 to ratify their positions on the community club board of directors. In December 2011, the “new” board of directors, purportedly elected in September 2011, filed a declaratory judgment action against the original board of directors in the Cumberland County Chancery Court, requesting that the court declare which board of directors was legally in control. The complaint also requested that the court declare whether the purported developer properly possessed developer’s rights and that the court award damages to the new board for breach of fiduciary duties by the original board. In April 2012, the original board filed a separate declaratory judgment action against the new board in the Cumberland County Chancery Court, making similar allegations and requesting a declaratory judgment, an injunction preventing the new board from acting on behalf of the community club, and damages for conversion. The trial court consolidated the two actions in July 2012 and conducted a bench trial on the matter over the course of seven non-consecutive days in 2015 and 2016. At the conclusion of trial, the court determined that the new board was prevented from challenging the developer’s status due to a statute of limitations. The trial court further determined that neither board was legitimately in control and appointed a special master to conduct an accounting of dues and a supervised election. The trial court also directed each side to pay its own attorney’s fees, ordering the boards to repay to the community club any funds used to pay attorney’s fees. The original board was re-elected during the supervised election, and the special master determined that both sides had paid attorney’s fees from their respective annual assessments collected. The trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ objections to 08/29/2018 2 the special master’s report before adopting the master’s findings in total. The trial court thereby affirmed the original directors as current directors; ordered those directors to repay $54,157.41 to the community club funds; and ordered the plaintiffs to repay $143,513.55 to the community club funds. The plaintiffs have appealed. Determining that the trial court improperly relied upon a statute of limitations that is inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ action, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We further reverse the trial court’s alternative rulings for lack of evidentiary basis. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Rufus S. Johnson, III v. Elaina Irene Johnson
In this divorce case, the trial court denied wife’s request for a continuance of the trial and then, during the trial, excluded an exhibit proffered by wife. Wife contends that the trial court erred in both respects. Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either decision, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Vallaree Goodwin v. Kebede G. Hanebis
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict. The case arises from a motor vehicle accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee, and the trial court entered a final judgment for $68,995.02. Because the trial court erred in excluding relevant medical records, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new jury trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Paul Little v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant-Appellant, John Paul Little, was convicted by a Roane County jury of four counts of rape of a child, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522, for which he received a sentence of 120 years in confinement. The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Stephen Francis v. Janet Kimberley Hughes Et Al.
The trial court determined that the defendant, Janet Kimberly Hughes, breached her fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, Johnny Stephen Francis, by utilizing a power of attorney to withdraw funds from Mr. Francis’s bank account for Ms. Hughes’s sole benefit. The trial court ordered Ms. Hughes to repay those funds. Ms. Hughes timely appealed. Because Ms. Hughes has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Joseph v. William Edge SalonSpa, LLC
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on April 24, 2018. Because the appellant did not file either her motion to alter or amend or her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Charles T.
This appeal arises from the juvenile court’s ruling terminating the father’s parental rights to his son on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, failure to support, and wanton disregard; substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume responsibility. The court further determined that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Alexis C.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Bethany C. (“Mother”), to her minor child, Alexis C. (“the Child”), who was two years of age at the time of trial. The Child was born in 2014 to Mother and Jeremy C. (“Father”). In August 2015, the Maury County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she remained at the time of trial. The trial court subsequently entered an order on October 12, 2015, wherein the trial court found that the Child was dependent and neglected due to Mother’s and Father’s incarceration. On August 23, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, (3) the conditions leading to removal still persisted and other conditions persisted that would in all probability cause the Child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, and (4) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of and financial responsibility for the Child. The court further found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Patterson, Individually And As Surviving Spouse Of David Charles Patterson, Deceased v. STHS Heart, LLC
Appellant sought disqualification of the trial judge pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. The trial judge denied the motion to recuse. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corey Forest
The Defendant-Appellant, Corey Forest, entered a guilty plea to possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance and to unlawful possession of a firearm and attempted to reserve two certified questions pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 37(b)(2) regarding whether the stop of his vehicle was lawful. After this court dismissed the appeal because the certified questions were not properly reserved, Forest filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and obtained an agreed order stating that defense counsel had provided ineffective assistance in drafting the certified questions. The trial court then vacated Forest’s judgments of conviction and allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea. Thereafter, Forest and the State agreed to re-enter the original plea agreement. Following a new plea submission hearing, the trial court accepted Forest’s guilty plea to the same offenses and entered new judgments of conviction, with Forest reserving two new certified questions of law regarding the stop of his vehicle. Because the parties and the trial court did not follow the post-conviction procedures and law before the new certified questions were reserved and because Forest cannot establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors based on this record, we dismiss Forest’s appeal, vacate the agreed order granting post-conviction relief, as well as the subsequent plea agreement and guilty plea, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corey Forest - Concurring
I concur with the majority opinion in this case. I write separately to expand upon what I feel is the inappropriate procedure employed during this post-conviction proceeding. I am unaware of any authority that allows a trial counsel to allege ineffective assistance of counsel against himself or herself. Trial counsel in this case had a clear conflict of interest. See Frazier v. State, 303 S.W.3d 674, 682-83 (Tenn. 2010) (noting that an attorney in a post-conviction proceeding who had represented the petitioner on direct appeal had a clear conflict of interest); see also Velarde v. United States, 972 F.2d 826, 827 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]rial counsel … can hardly be expected to challenge … his own ineffectiveness.”) (quoting United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 418 (7th Cir. 1991)). Attorneys are obligated to avoid ethical violations in their practice of law. Frazier, 303 S.W.3d at 683. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julia Browning v. Mark D. Browning
A creditor obtained a default judgment in general sessions court and the debtor appealed the judgment to circuit court. The debtor was not in the courtroom when the case was called in circuit court, and the court awarded the creditor a default judgment. The debtor appeals the circuit court’s judgment, and we affirm based on the language of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-5-106 and -107. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Noe v. Solid Waste Board Of Hamblen County/Morristown
The petitioner in this Tennessee Public Records Act proceeding requested hard copies and electronic copies of records relating to a landfill maintained by the Solid Waste Board of Hamblen County/Morristown and an upcoming meeting of the Board. The trial court held a hearing as required by the TPRA, after which it dismissed the petition, holding that, under the facts presented, the petitioner was given access to the records in compliance with the TPRA. Upon our review, we conclude that, while some of the records sought were not available at the time of petitioner’s request, some records were available and were not produced for petitioner’s review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in part and affirm in part; we remand the case for further proceedings. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Hampton Crane Service, Inc. v. Burns Phillips, Commissioner Of Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development, Et Al.
Employer appeals from the agency’s decision to award unemployment benefits to an employee. Because the record contains substantial and material evidence to support the agency’s decision, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Spencer T. Gibson
Defendant, Spencer T. Gibson, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to the offense of robbery and received a sentence of eight years on supervised probation. We note that Defendant agreed to be sentenced outside of the statutory range in exchange for the reduced charge. On February 9, 2016, a probation violation warrant was issued. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked probation and ordered Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence by incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his eight-year sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Talley
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Talley, of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued under $500. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-four years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the trial court erred when it applied certain enhancement factors at sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Talley - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to again say that the term “prosecutorial misconduct” should not be used to describe errors by counsel for the State in making arguments to the jury. Instead, I believe it should be referred to as “improper prosecutorial argument” for non-constitutional errors. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory Woods v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gregory Woods, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging that he was not competent to enter a guilty plea, that he was improperly sentenced as a Range II offender, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years as a Range II offender.1 Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mack Transou
Defendant, Mack Transou, appeals the dismissal of his “Motion for Correction of Clerical Oversight Pursuant to Rule 36” of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which Defendant alleged his March 1999 judgment of conviction for driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender contained a clerical error because it failed to properly list his pretrial jail credits. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Anthony Rodgers
The Defendant, Michael Anthony Rodgers, was convicted by a Madison County Criminal Court jury of possession of heroin with the intent to deliver, a Class B felony; possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, a Class C felony; and simple possession of methamphetamine and heroin, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range IV, persistent offender to an effective term of twenty-two years at 45% in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in a federal case. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his felony drug convictions, arguing that there was insufficient proof from which the jury could infer that he possessed the drugs with the intent to deliver. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rudolph Miller Brooks, Jr.
The Appellant, Rudolph Miller Brooks, Jr., appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. The Appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kristie M. Smith v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kristie M. Smith, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Crystal Herpst v. Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. Et Al.
This case involves a second healthcare liability action brought by Crystal Herpst on behalf of the estate of her deceased father, James Ingram. The defendants are Dr. LeAnthony A. Hardy – Mr. Ingram’s treating physician – as well as Parkridge Medical Center, Inc., Chattanooga Diagnostic Associates, LLC, and Columbia Medical Group- Parkridge, Inc. (the Parkridge defendants). The trial court determined that plaintiff could not avail herself of Tennessee’s saving statute because her first complaint was not filed prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The court therefore dismissed plaintiff’s second complaint as untimely filed. She appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |