In Re Ashanti P. Et Al.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing only that the court abused its discretion in denying her motion to continue the trial. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the juvenile court’s denial of the motion to continue. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds on which the mother’s rights were terminated and to support a conclusion that termination was in the children’s best interest; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court terminating the mother’s parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
First Community Mortgage, Inc. v. Appraisal Services Group, Inc., et al.
A mortgage company appeals the dismissal of its lawsuit against an appraisal company and its employee as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The appraisal company and its employee urge this Court to affirm the dismissal of the lawsuit and to award them attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c). We affirm the dismissal of the mortgage company’s action against the appraisal company and its employee. We conclude, however, that section 20-12-119(c) does not authorize the award of attorney’s fees incurred for appellate work. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon
The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Gevedon, pleaded guilty to two counts of driving under the influence and to one count each of leaving the scene of an accident, violation of the financial responsibility law, and simple possession of marijuana. He agreed to serve an effective sentence of three consecutive terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ninety-six hours in confinement and the remainder on probation. He also agreed to a special condition that a restitution hearing would be held at a later time. A violation of probation warrant was issued before the restitution hearing was held, and following a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement and to pay $30,490.76 as restitution. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s order requiring him to serve his sentence in confinement and its restitution order. After review, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon (Dissent)
John Everett Williams, P.J., dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal because no final judgment has been entered. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) provides that a criminal defendant has “a right to appeal when the trial court has entered a final judgment of conviction.” State v. Comer, 278 S.W.3d 758, 760-61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). However, “‘Rule 3 appeals … may be taken only from final judgments.’” State v. William Chandler Daniels, No. E2009-02172-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5343776, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2010) (quoting State v. Maddox, 603 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)). A judgment is considered final “‘when it decides and disposes of the whole merits of the case leaving nothing for the further judgment of the court.’” State v. David Allan Bohanon, No. M2012-02366-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 5777254, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2013) (quoting Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 460 (Tenn. 1995)). |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Miracle Tenney Ex Rel. Desirae B. v. Daniel Paul Bullington
The father of a fourteen-year-old daughter appeals the propriety of two separate orders of protection issued upon the mother’s petition for the protection of their daughter. Because both orders of protection have expired, we dismiss the father’s challenges to the propriety of the orders of protection on the basis of mootness and decline the father’s claim to recover his attorney’s fees. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the father’s issues, the mother seeks to recover the attorney’s fees and costs she incurred in defending the father’s appeal. The Tennessee Supreme Court’s recent decision inNew v. Dumitrache, 604 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2020), makes it clear that the legislative mandate in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-617(a)(1) extends to the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal by victims of domestic abuse, even if the respondent’s challenge to the order of protection is no longer justiciable. Accordingly, we hold that the mother is entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs she incurred in defending this appeal and remand this case for the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah P. Linn v. Mark A. Linn
At issue in this appeal is the trial court’s characterization of the alimony obligation in the parties’ divorce decree. The trial court determined that the alimony is part alimony in solido and part alimony in futuro. Based in part on this conclusion, the court denied Husband’s petition to modify his alimony obligation. The trial court also entered judgment against Husband for alimony arrearages, life insurance premiums, and Wife’s discretionary costs and attorney’s fees. Additionally, the court found Husband in contempt for failing to pay alimony and life insurance premiums. Because we conclude the trial court mischaracterized the alimony at issue, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part its judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Park Place Boat Dock Association, Inc. Et Al. v. Gary Phillips Construction, LLC Et AL.
This appeal concerns easement rights. The Park Place Community Association, Inc. (“the PPCA”) and the Park Place Boat Dock Association, Inc. (“the PPBDA”) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) filed suit in the Chancery Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”) against Gary Phillips Construction, LLC and Gary Phillips (“Phillips”). Plaintiffs sought access to a certain boat dock and sun deck on Boone Lake over a strip of land previously owned by the community’s developer that Phillips bought at a bankruptcy auction. After a trial, the Trial Court found Plaintiffs had proven the elements of an easement by implication and an easement by necessity over the property at issue. Phillips appeals raising a number of issues, including whether Plaintiffs have standing. We find, inter alia, that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action. We further find that lake access has been, and is, essential for Plaintiffs’ use and beneficial enjoyment of Park Place, in some instances representing the exclusive reason why people bought their homes in the community. Plaintiffs have proven the elements of an easement by implication and an easement by necessity. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Reynolds
Jeremy Reynolds was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder at the conclusion of a jury trial in which the State was permitted to introduce evidence related to gang membership. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence of premeditation was legally insufficient and reversed the conviction. The intermediate appellate court noted that the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, but it nevertheless remanded for a new trial based on its determination that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting certain pieces of evidence related to gang membership. We accepted the State’s appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. We further conclude that there was no reversible error on the part of the trial court in admitting evidence related to gang membership. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate Reynolds’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Stefani Franklin v. Jimmy Franklin
In this post-divorce case, Father appeals the trial court’s order allowing Mother to relocate with the parties’ son from the Memphis area to Houston, Texas. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark DeLong Et Al. v. Brian Paul General Partner, LLC
Appellant debtor appeals the judgment of the trial court on the sole basis that the choice of law provision in the parties’ contract means that another state is the exclusive forum for this action. We affirm the decision of the trial court and award Appellee creditors damages for responding to a frivolous appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Perry Singo v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Perry Singo, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Hickman County, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John William Owens v. Meredith Elizabeth Owens
This is an appeal of rulings by the trial court in a contentious divorce action. Following a bench trial, the trial court valued the parties’ marital assets and divided the marital estate equally. The court awarded the husband the marital home upon his payment to the wife of one-half the combined equity, equal parenting time, and designation as the primary residential parent. The court found that the wife was not entitled to alimony. The wife, inter alia, challenges the trial court’s division and valuation of the marital estate, in declining to award her attorney’s fees, in awarding the parties equal parenting time, and the designation of the husband as primary residential parent. Having carefully reviewed the voluminous record, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Kizer v. State of Tennessee
For offenses occurring in 2010, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Kizer, of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of forty-five years of incarceration. This court affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. Michael Kizer, No. W2013-02559-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 5512863, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 3, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2015). In 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. In it, he contended that there was newly discovered evidence about his mental capacity that was not considered by mental health professionals at the time of their evaluation. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the one-year statute of limitations had run and that the Petitioner had failed to establish that he was entitled to a hearing. The Petitioner filed this appeal. After review, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bernard Woodard
A jury convicted the Defendant, Bernard Woodard, of burglary of a building other than a habitation, theft of property valued $2,500 or more, and Class E felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and he received an effective sentence of eighteen years in prison as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that his right to an impartial jury was violated by the racial composition of the jury venire, that the State did not establish the value of the stolen property, that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument, and that the trial court erred in imposing partially consecutive sentences. After a thorough review, we discern no error and affirm the judgments. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
G.T. Issa Construction, LLC v. Bonnie Blalock
This is a controversy between a homebuyer, the plaintiff, and a residential developer/contractor concerning the construction and sale of a newly constructed custombuilt home and lot within a subdivision with restrictive covenants. The parties executed a fill-in-the-blank “Purchase and Sale Agreement” (“the Agreement”) pursuant to which the defendant agreed to construct a custom home and sell the home and lot to the plaintiff. The principal matter in dispute is whether the defendant was contractually obligated to provide a brick veneer on the retaining wall installed by the defendant. The Agreement did not expressly include the construction of a retaining wall; however, the parties agree that a retaining wall was to be constructed and included in the sale. Although the brick veneer had not been installed and the hotly disputed issue remained unresolved, the sale closed. Shortly thereafter, the buyer commenced this action in which she asserted, inter alia, claims for breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to finish the retaining wall with brick veneer as required by the subdivision’s restrictive covenants and implicitly required by the Agreement. In its answer, the defendant denied liability and asserted that it had no obligation to provide a veneer finish on the retaining wall. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Buttercup Ridge Farms, LLC, Et Al. v. McFall Sod & Seeding, LLC, Et Al.
This is an action to quiet title to a strip of land used as an ingress/egress for property perpendicular to the land at issue. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Levie Roberts v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Levie Roberts, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not notice before trial that the State’s “key” witness gave inconsistent statements to the police and because trial counsel failed to recall the witness to the stand in order to question her about the inconsistencies. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stacy Renee Lofton v. James Warren Lofton
This is a divorce case. On appeal, the husband raises issues about the trial court’s property division and spousal support award. We generally affirm the trial court’s judgment. For the reasons discussed herein, however, we vacate the trial court’s partition of Husband’s railroad retirement pension benefits, not because of any error with the intended disposition, but for the entry of an order that is fully compliant with 20 C.F.R. § 295.3. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Lawrence Street
The defendant, Joseph Lawrence Street, appeals the denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 motion to reduce the sentence imposed for his 2018 convictions of automobile burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Ima D. Et Al.
In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the Hickman County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Terrell Biggs, Jr. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
The plaintiff challenges the order of the Sullivan County Circuit Court (“trial court”) granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Liberty Insurance Corporation1 (“Liberty”), and dismissing his complaint on the merits with prejudice. The trial court granted summary judgment to Liberty based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and its conclusion that the plaintiff would be unable to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a motion for directed verdict. Because the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Liberty, albeit for a different reason than that found by the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Johah Paul Anders v. Mayla C. Anders
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court granted the parties a divorce instead of the annulment Husband requested, among other findings. Husband now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Laseena Tirree White
The Appellant, Laseena Tirree White, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction, suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that there was insufficient proof of her identity as the perpetrator and of the value of the stolen items. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Charles Edward Walker
A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that an attorney should be suspended from the practice of law for three years for violating multiple provisions of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. The trial court affirmed, finding that the hearing panel’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion.Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jorge I. Calzada, M.D. v. State Volunteer Mutual Insurance Company
A doctor’s professional liability insurer refused to insure him against claims brought against him by his former partners and investigations of him being conducted by state and federal agencies. The trial court found that the insurer was not required to provide coverage for the doctor against the claims or the investigations. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |